FLEETWOOD TRANSPORTATION CORP. et al v. PACKAGING CORPORATION OF AMERICA
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 12/14/2011. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem Leasing, Inc.'s Motion to Reconsider (Docket Entry 8 ) is DENIED. IT I S FURTHER ORDERED that Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem Leasing, Inc.'s Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal (Docket Entry 11 ) is DENIED and the Clerk is directed to unseal Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem Leasing, Inc.'s Supplementa l Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider (Docket Entry 13 ). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem Leasing, Inc.'s Motion for Stay (Docket Entry 10 ) is GRANTED, and Salem and Plaintiffs have 14 days from the entry of thi s Order to object to United States Magistrate Judge Wallace W. Dixon's Minute Order denying Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem Leasing, Inc.'s Motion to Quash Subpoena (Docket Entry dated June 14, 2011). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Salem Carrier s, Inc. and Salem Leasing, Inc. [sic] Motion for Withdrawal of Appearance of Counsel(Docket Entry 20 ) is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to terminate Gary L. Beaver, Jeffrey M. Reichard, and the law firm of Nexsen Pruet, PLLC as counsel for Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem Leasing, Inc. in this case.(Taylor, Abby)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
FLEETWOOD TRANSPORTATION CORP.
and TRANSPORTATION CONSULTANTS,
INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PACKAGING CORPORATION OF
AMERICA,
Defendant.
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1:10MC58
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The instant case comes before the Court on (1) Salem Carriers,
Inc. and Salem Leasing, Inc.’s Motion to Reconsider (Docket Entry
8); (2) Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem Leasing, Inc.’s Motion for
Stay (Docket Entry 10); (3) Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem Leasing,
Inc.’s Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal (Docket Entry
11); and (4) Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem Leasing, Inc. [sic]
Motion for Withdrawal of Appearance of Counsel (Docket Entry 20)
all filed by non-parties Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem Leasing,
Inc. (collectively “Salem”).
For the reasons that follow, Salem’s motion for leave to file
documents under seal (Docket Entry 11) and Salem’s motion to
reconsider (Docket Entry 8) will both be denied, and Salem’s motion
for stay (Docket Entry 10) and Salem’s motion for withdrawal of
appearance of counsel (Docket Entry 20) will both be granted.
Background
Plaintiff Fleetwood Transportation Corporation (“Fleetwood”)
and Salem are competitors in the trucking business.
2 at 1.)
(Docket Entry
Transportation Consultants, Inc. (“Transportation”) is
the holding company for Fleetwood.
(Id.)
In July 2007, Fleetwood
and Transportation (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a business
interference lawsuit in South Carolina state court against Salem
alleging that Salem developed a plan, along with Plaintiffs’ former
employees, to acquire Plaintiffs’ customer, Packaging Corporation
of America, Inc. (“Packaging Corporation”).
(Id. at 1-2.)
The
action between Plaintiffs and Salem, though “hotly litigated and
involv[ing] extensive discovery,” eventually settled.
The
instant
action
between
Plaintiffs
(Id. at 2.)
and
Packaging
Corporation, which arises from the same factual circumstances as
Plaintiffs’ prior action against Salem, is currently pending in the
United States District Court for South Carolina. (See Docket Entry
6 at 1.)
In connection with that action, Plaintiffs served Salem
with a subpoena for the production of documents pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 45.
contending
(Id.)
that
Salem filed a motion to quash (Docket Entry 1),
this
Court
should
quash
Plaintiffs’
subpoena
because:
(1)
“Salem produced the information requested in the Subpoena
to Plaintiff in [the] prior lawsuit to which Plaintiff
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was the party.
Thus, the document requests will subject
Salem to undue burden and expense, and Plaintiff has
already obtained this information” (id. at 1);
(2)
“Producing the information requested in the Subpoena is
[] unduly burdensome to Salem considering Plaintiff can
obtain the information more easily from a different
party, namely, the defendant” (id.); and
(3)
“The document requests contained in the Subpoena [] seek
information that is of a proprietary and confidential
nature” (id.).
Plaintiffs responded that:
Although Plaintiffs and Salem engaged in discovery during
the course of the prior suit, Salem misconstrues the
extent of that discovery with the requests made by
Plaintiffs in the Subpoena at issue. Plaintiffs
specifically limited its Subpoena to documents not
produced in the prior suit. Additionally, Salem’s
argument that the documents requested in the Subpoena are
confidential and commercial also fails because similar
information was freely produced in the prior suit
without, or subject to, a Protective Order. Lastly, many
of the documents sought by Plaintiffs via the Subpoena
cannot be obtained from [Packaging Corporation].
(Docket Entry 6 at 3.)
Salem declined to file a Reply (see Docket Entries dated Dec.
3, 2010, to present) and this Court, by way of Minute Order of
Magistrate Judge Wallace W. Dixon, denied Salem’s motion to quash.
(See Docket Entry dated June 14, 2011.)
Salem now moves the Court to reconsider Magistrate Judge
Dixon’s earlier Order (see Docket Entry 8) “on the basis of
-3-
additional
information
regarding
the
requested
confidential
business information, the lack of relevance of some of that
information to this lawsuit, and the unfair competitive advantage
that Plaintiff[s] would obtain over Salem if Plaintiff[s] obtained
such information” (Docket Entry 9 at 2).
Salem also moves the
Court to stay the 14-day deadline for “serving and filing written
objections to Magistrate Judge Dixon’s June 14, 2011 minute order
denying Salem’s motion to quash a document subpoena” until the
Court
has
had
an
opportunity
to
rule
on
the
motion
for
reconsideration (Docket Entry 10 at 1) and for the Court to allow
Salem to file under seal the settlement agreement between it and
Plaintiffs, as well as a supplemental affidavit and supplemental
brief discussing that agreement, on which it relies in part in its
motion for reconsideration (Docket Entry 11).
In
addition,
the
Court
will
address
Salem’s
motion
for
withdrawal of appearance of counsel in which Salem “respectfully
moves the Court pursuant to LR 83.1(e) to allow Gary L. Beaver,
Jeffrey M. Reichard, and the law firm of Nexsen Pruet, PLLC to
withdraw their appearance in this case.”
(Docket Entry 20 at 1.)
I. Motion to Seal
Salem “move[s] the Court for [an] Order granting Defendant
leave to file under seal [the] confidential settlement agreement
between Salem and the Plaintiffs . . . and an affidavit and
supplemental
brief
discussing
the
-4-
terms
of
that
agreement.”
(Docket Entry 11 at 1.) Plaintiffs have objected to said motion on
the grounds that, “[d]ue to litigation currently pending in the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina,
Plaintiffs . . . sought and received permission to use documents
related to the prior action [between Plaintiffs and Salem] in South
Carolina State Court.
That permission included the settlement
agreement and documents previously produced under a protective
order.”
(Docket Entry 15 at 1.)
Thus, as Salem gave permission
and the settlement agreement has been publicly docketed in that
action, Plaintiffs contend Salem has waived the confidentiality of
the settlement agreement.
(See id. at 3.)
A. Standard
“The operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of
judges
are
matters
of
utmost
public
concern.”
Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978).
As a
result, “the courts of this country recognize a general right to
inspect and copy . . . judicial records and documents.”
Nixon v.
Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
See also
Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 203
F.3d 291, 303 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Publicity of such records, of
course, is necessary in the long run so that the public can judge
the product of the courts in a given case. It is hardly possible to
come to a reasonable conclusion on that score without knowing the
facts of the case.”); In re Krynicki, 983 F.2d 74, 75 (7th Cir.
-5-
1992) (“Judges deliberate in private but issue public decisions
after public arguments based on public records. The political
branches of government claim legitimacy by election, judges by
reason. Any step that withdraws an element of the judicial process
from public view makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat;
this requires rigorous justification.”).1
“The right of public access to documents or materials filed in
a district court derives from two independent sources: the common
law and the First Amendment.”
Virginia Dep’t of State Police v.
The Washington Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004). The common
law right of access, which attaches to all judicial records and
documents, “‘can be rebutted if countervailing interests heavily
outweigh the public interests in access’ . . . .”
Id. (quoting
Rushford v. The New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th
Cir. 1988)).
has
been
In contrast, the First Amendment guarantee of access
“extended
only
to
particular
judicial
records
and
documents,” Stone v. University of Md. Med. Sys., 855 F.2d 178, 180
(4th Cir. 1988), and, where it applies, “may be denied only on the
basis of a compelling governmental interest, and only if the denial
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest” id.
In light of this legal framework, “[w]hen presented with a
request to seal judicial records or documents, a district court
1
The right of access to court records flows from the right of access to
in-court proceedings; it applies in both civil and criminal cases. See Rushford
v. The New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1988).
-6-
must comply with certain substantive and procedural requirements.
As to the substance, the district court first must determine the
source of the right of access with respect to each document,
because only then can it accurately weigh the competing interests
at stake.”
Virginia Dep’t of State Police, 386 F.3d at 576
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
See also United
States v. Moussaoui, 65 Fed. Appx. 881, 889 (4th Cir. 2003) (“We
therefore must examine [materials submitted under seal] document by
document to determine, for each document, the source of the right
of access (if any such right exists).
As to those documents
subject to a right of access, we must then conduct the appropriate
balancing to determine whether the remainder of the document should
remain sealed, in whole or in part.
The burden of establishing
that a particular document should be sealed rests on the party
promoting the denial of access.” (internal citation omitted)).
Procedurally:
[The district court] must give the public notice of the
request to seal and a reasonable opportunity to challenge
the request; it must consider less drastic alternatives
to sealing; and if it decides to seal it must state the
reasons (and specific supporting findings) for its
decision and the reasons for rejecting alternatives to
sealing. Adherence to this procedure serves to ensure
that the decision to seal materials will not be made
lightly and that it will be subject to meaningful
appellate review.
Virginia Dep’t of State Police, 386 F.3d at 576 (internal citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
-7-
As to the level of substantive protection due to the documents
at issue in this case, the Court notes that significant authority
indicates that “material filed with discovery motions is not
subject to the common-law right of access.” Chicago Tribune Co. v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001).
Accord Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1986)
(“Although we agree that the public has a right of access to some
parts of the judicial process, we conclude that this right does not
extend to documents submitted to a court in connection with
discovery proceedings.”).
Other courts have gone further and
declined to apply common-law right of access and/or First Amendment
analysis to discovery material attached to any “nondispositive
motion” (and instead required only a showing sufficient to trigger
protection under Rule 26(c)).
See, e.g., Pintos v. Pacific
Creditors Ass’n, 565 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009) (“‘[G]ood
cause’ is also the proper standard when a party seeks access to
previously sealed discovery attached to a nondispositive motion.”).
Still other courts have drawn the line of demarcation as to the
common law right of access between discovery motions and other
nondispositive, pretrial motions.
See, e.g., Leucadia, Inc. v.
Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 1993)
(“[W]e hold there is a presumptive right to public access to all
material
filed
in
connection
with
nondiscovery
pretrial
motions . . ., but no such right as to discovery motions and their
-8-
supporting documents.”).
It does not appear that the Fourth
Circuit has made clear its position on this subject, but it has
stated “that a document becomes a judicial document when a court
uses it in determining litigants’ substantive rights.”
In re
Policy Mgt. Sys. Corp., Nos. 94-2254, 94-2341, 1995 WL 541623, at
*4 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1995) (unpublished) (emphasis added).
B. Discussion
Salem’s brief indicates that it seeks to file three documents
under seal: (1) the settlement agreement entered into between
Plaintiffs and Salem as a result of the prior lawsuit; (2) a
supplemental affidavit identifying the settlement agreement; and
(3) a supplemental brief discussing the settlement agreement. (See
Docket Entry 12 at 1.)
The Court notes initially that it appears
that only the brief discussing the settlement agreement has been
provided to the Court.
present.)
(See Docket Entries dated Nov. 3, 2010, to
Given the Court’s interest in examining each document
offered for filing under seal to determine whether a less stringent
alternative to sealing a document in its entirety will suffice, the
Court
is
hesitant
to
opportunity to inspect.
to
seal
applies
to
seal
items
which
it
has
not
had
the
Accordingly, to the extent Salem’s motion
the
settlement
agreement
itself
and
the
affidavit identifying the settlement agreement, the Court will deny
Salem’s motion.
-9-
With
respect
to
Salem’s
brief
discussing
the
settlement
agreement (Docket Entry 13), the Court must determine what, if any,
public access right attaches to the brief covered by the instant
sealing request.
576.2
See Virginia Dep’t of State Police, 386 F.3d at
In this case, Salem filed
the
documents
at
issue
in
connection with a non-dispositive, pretrial motion adjudicating a
discovery dispute.
(See Docket Entry 8.)
Accordingly, based on
significant authority, see discussion supra pp. 8-9, the Court
deems that neither the common law nor First Amendment right of
access applies, and the document in question may be sealed for good
cause, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
In that regard, Salem contends that good cause exists because
the brief in question discusses the confidential terms of the
settlement agreement.
(See Docket Entry 12 at 3.)
Salem also
contends that the interest of the efficient administration of the
courts, including the encouragement of parties to settle disputes,
is served by maintaining those terms as confidential.
(See id.)
However, Salem concedes that the settlement agreement, which
provides the basis for sealing the brief, has been publicly
docketed in Plaintiffs’ action against Packaging Corporation in the
United States District Court for South Carolina. (Docket Entry 19
2
The Court observes that the instant motion to seal has been publicly
docketed since June 28, 2011 (Docket Entry 11). Any interested party therefore
has had sufficient time to seek intervention to contest any sealing order, and
Plaintiffs have done so (see Docket Entry 15). Accordingly, the Court concludes
that, as to the motion at issue, the “public notice” prerequisite to entry of a
sealing order has been satisfied. See Stone, 855 F.2d at 181 (discussing use of
docketing to comply with procedural requirements for sealing).
-10-
at 5.)
Although Salem argues that it never intended to allow
Plaintiffs to use the agreement in a non-confidential manner (see
id.
at
1-2),
and
has
provided
a
letter
which
was
sent
to
Plaintiffs’ counsel in which Salem notes its efforts to have the
settlement agreement re-filed under seal (see Docket Entry 19-2 at
3), as of Salem’s last filing on the issue, the document remained
publicly available (see Docket Entry 19 at 5).
Salem has made no
additional filings with this Court indicating that its efforts to
have the document re-filed under seal have been successful, or that
the status of the settlement agreement has otherwise changed in any
respect.
On
(See Docket Entries dated Aug. 5, 2011, to present.)
these
facts,
given
the
public
availability
of
the
settlement agreement which provides the underlying basis for filing
Salem’s brief under seal, the Court finds that Salem has failed to
show good cause for the Court to file under seal Salem Carriers,
Inc. and Salem Leasing, Inc.’s Supplemental Brief in Support of
Motion to Reconsider (Docket Entry 13).
II. Motion for Reconsideration
Salem asks the Court to reconsider the Minute Order denying
Salem’s motion to quash (Docket Entry dated June 14, 2011).
Docket Entry 8 at 1.)
(See
Citing Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204
F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000), which held that “a motion for
reconsideration is appropriate where the court misapprehended the
facts, a party’s position, or the controlling law,” Salem contends
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that its motion for reconsideration is proper “based on several
factual
bases
that
may
(Docket Entry 18 at 3).
(1)
“That
Salem
have
been
previously
misapprehended”
The “factual bases” Salem lists are:
and
Plaintiffs
are
direct competitors
(Salem’s Opening Br. at 9)” (id.);
(2)
“That the information requested in the Subpoena would
competitively
disadvantage
Salem
if
produced
to
Plaintiffs ([Salem’s Opening Br.] at 6-7)” (id.);
(3)
“That the information requested has no bearing on the
South
Carolina
action,
in
which
Plaintiffs
request
fundamentally different relief than was pursued [sic] the
[p]rior [l]itigation to which Salem was a party ([Salem’s
Opening Br.] at 7-9)” (id.);
(4)
“That the Subpoena impose [sic] an undue burden on Salem
in that it would require Salem to produce literally
thousands of documents to Plaintiffs ([Salem’s Opening
Br.] at 10-11)” (id.); and
(5)
“That these considerations are further heightened by the
fact
that
Salem
previously
settled
the
[p]rior
[l]itigation with the intent to buy its peace from
Plaintiffs ([Salem’s Opening Br.] at 11-12; Salem’s Supp.
Br. [Dkt. No. 13] (submitted for filing under seal))”
(id.).
-12-
In sum, Salem contends that “the Court may have misunderstood
the underlying facts, and the potential consequences to Salem that
will result from its original ruling.” (Id. at 4.) Salem’s motion
relies in part on the sealed brief, which discusses the settlement
agreement previously entered into between Salem and Plaintiffs.3
A. Standard
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “any order or
other decision . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of
a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights
and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). No clear standard exists
for analysis of a motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b)
other
than
that
discretion of the court.”
its
resolution
is
“committed
to
the
American Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms,
Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 515 (4th Cir. 2003).
In contrast, a motion to
alter or amend a final judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) may be
granted “(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling
law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3)
to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”
Pacific Ins. Co. v. American Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403
(4th Cir. 1998).
3
The Court notes again that in addition to the brief, Salem indicates that
it sought to file the settlement agreement itself as well as an affidavit
identifying the settlement agreement under seal with the Court. (See Docket
Entry 11.)
However, the settlement agreement, as well as the referenced
affidavit discussing said agreement, do not appear on the Court’s CM/ECF system.
(See Docket Entries dated Nov. 3, 2010, to present.) Accordingly, the Court is
able to consider Salem’s brief and quoted information in said brief from the
settlement agreement and the relevant affidavit, but the Court is unable to
analyze the actual contents of the settlement agreement or the affidavit.
-13-
Although the Fourth Circuit has made it clear that the
standards governing reconsideration of final judgments under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 59(e) are not determinative of the reconsideration of an
interlocutory decision, see Saint Annes Dev. Co., Inc. v. Trabich,
No. 10-2078, 2011 WL 3608454, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2011)
(unpublished) (“The power to reconsider or modify interlocutory
rulings ‘is committed to the discretion of the district court,’ and
that discretion is not cabined by the ‘heightened standards for
reconsideration’ governing final orders.” (quoting American Canoe,
326 F.3d at 514-15)), courts have routinely looked to those factors
as a starting point in guiding their discretion under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 54(b).
See, e.g., Mesmer v. Rezza, No. DKC 10-1053, 2011 WL
55448990, at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 14, 2011) (unpublished) (“While the
standards articulated in Rules 59(e) and 60(b) are not binding in
an analysis of Rule 54(b) motions, . . . courts frequently look to
these standards for guidance in considering such motions . . . .”
(internal citations omitted)); Phillip v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 5:09CT-3115-FL, 2011 WL 4946769, at *4-5 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 18, 2011)
(unpublished) (same).
Courts have also held, as Salem suggests,
that “[a] motion to reconsider is appropriate when the court has
obviously
misapprehended
a
party’s
position
or
the
facts
or
applicable law, or when the party produces new evidence that could
not have been obtained through the exercise of due diligence.”
-14-
Madison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp., 402 F. Supp.
2d 617, 619 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (citation omitted) (Osteen, J.).
However, the Court also recognizes that “[p]ublic policy
favors an end to litigation and recognizes that efficient operation
requires the avoidance of re-arguing the questions that have
already been decided.”
Akeva L.L.C. v. Adidas America, Inc., 385
F. Supp. 2d 559, 565 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (Osteen, J.).
To this end, “a
motion to reconsider is not proper where it only asks the Court to
rethink its prior decision, or presents a better or more compelling
argument that the party could have presented in the original briefs
on the matter.”
Hinton v. Henderson, No. 3:10cv505, 2011 WL
2142799, at *1 (W.D.N.C. May 31, 2011) (unpublished) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Coryn Group II,
LLC v. O.C. Seacrets, Inc., No. WDQ-08-2764, 2011 WL 4701749, at *2
(D.
Md.
Sept.
30,
2011)
(unpublished)
(“When
a
request
for
reconsideration merely asks the court to ‘change its mind,’ relief
is not authorized.”); DirecTV, Inc. v. Hart, 366 F. Supp. 2d 315,
317 (E.D.N.C. 2004) (ruling that a motion to reconsider is not
proper to “merely ask[] the court ‘to rethink what the Court had
already thought through - rightly or wrongly’” (quoting Harsco
Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985))).
B. Discussion
Salem’s motion to reconsider attempts to “present[] a better
or more compelling argument that [Salem] could have presented in
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the original briefs on the matter.” Hinton, 2011 WL 2142799, at *1
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
As Salem’s own
citations indicate, the arguments currently presented to the Court
were raised by Salem in its original Salem Carriers Inc. and Salem
Leasing, Inc.’s Motion to Quash (Docket Entry 1).
With respect to
consideration of the settlement agreement, the record lacks any
indication that said agreement, and the arguments based on said
agreement, could not have been presented as part of Salem’s
original briefing.
(See Docket Entry 9; Docket Entry 18.)
In
fact, Salem indicates the settlement agreement was entered into in
August 2009 (see Docket Entry 9, ¶ 3), months before the instant
dispute arose.
Furthermore, looking to the factors typically applied to
motions for reconsideration of final judgments under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(e) as guidance, the Court is not convinced that Magistrate
Judge Dixon’s previous Order was based on “clear error” or that
reconsideration is necessary “to prevent manifest injustice.”
Pacific Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403.
Nor does Salem argue that
reconsideration is necessary “to accommodate an intervening change
in controlling law” id., or “to account for new evidence not
available at trial,” id.
(See Docket Entry 9; Docket Entry 18.)
Finally, upon examining whether “the court has obviously
misapprehended a party’s position or the facts,” Madison River, 402
F. Supp. 2d at 619, the Court is not convinced that any facts of
-16-
the
case
were
misapprehended
by
Magistrate
Judge
Dixon
when
deciding the previous Order.
The Court also notes that Salem had
the
expound
opportunity
to
further
on
its
arguments
before
Magistrate Judge Dixon by way of filing a Reply, which it declined
to do.
Under these circumstances, the Court will deny Salem
Carriers, Inc. and Salem Leasing, Inc.’s Motion to Reconsider
(Docket Entry 8).
III. Motion for Stay
Salem “move[s] this Court pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 6, 7, and 72 and Local Rule 7.3(j) for an Order staying
the 14-day deadline in [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 72 for
serving and filing written objections to Magistrate Judge Dixon’s
June 14, 2011 minute order denying Salem’s motion to quash a
document subpoena . . . .”
(Docket Entry 10 at 1.)
Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the
Court, for good cause, to extend the time within which a party must
or may perform a certain act.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1).
Salem
contends that “it does not appear to be appropriate for Salem to
submit written objections to the district judge as doing so for
consideration
on
a
parallel
track
with
the
Motion
To
[sic]
Reconsider would be inefficient and a waste of the Court’s assets.”
(Id. at 1.)
The Court agrees, and, for good cause shown, will
grant Salem’s motion for stay.
Salem suggests that “[t]he stay
should be open ended to allow the parties to submit written
-17-
objections, if they deem it necessary, after the Court decides the
pending Motion to Reconsider” (id. at 2), and the Court will grant
the parties 14 days from the entry of this Order to file objections
to Magistrate Judge Dixon’s Minute Order denying Salem’s motion to
quash (Docket Entry dated June 14, 2011).
IV. Motion to Withdraw
Salem requests the Court “to allow Gary L. Beaver, Jeffrey M.
Reichard, and the law firm of Nexsen Pruet, PLLC to withdraw their
appearance in this case” (Docket Entry 20 at 1).
Salem notes that
“Danielle Williams, Dustin Greene, and the law firm of Kilpatrick
Townsend & Stockton LLP, have already made their appearances as
substitute counsel for Salem.”
(Id.)
Considering the filings of
the parties and all records before the Court, the Court will grant
Salem’s motion.
Conclusion
Salem has not persuaded the Court to exercise its discretion
to reconsider the previous order denying Salem’s motion to quash
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
seal
(Docket
Entry
11),
With respect to Salem’s motion to
Salem
has
not
given
the
Court
an
opportunity to inspect the settlement agreement and the affidavit
identifying said agreement.
Furthermore, as the record indicates
that the settlement agreement providing the basis for Salem’s
motion to seal has been publicly docketed in the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina, Salem has failed
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to show good cause for this Court to seal the documents at issue.
Finally, the Court finds Salem’s motion to stay and motion for
withdrawal of appearance of counsel appropriate.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem
Leasing, Inc.’s Motion to Reconsider (Docket Entry 8) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem
Leasing, Inc.’s Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal
(Docket Entry 11) is DENIED and the Clerk is directed to unseal
Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem Leasing, Inc.’s Supplemental Brief
in Support of Motion to Reconsider (Docket Entry 13).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem
Leasing, Inc.’s Motion for Stay (Docket Entry 10) is GRANTED, and
Salem and Plaintiffs have 14 days from the entry of this Order to
object to United States Magistrate Judge Wallace W. Dixon’s Minute
Order denying Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem Leasing, Inc.’s Motion
to Quash Subpoena (Docket Entry dated June 14, 2011).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem
Leasing, Inc. [sic] Motion for Withdrawal of Appearance of Counsel
(Docket Entry 20) is GRANTED.
The Clerk is directed to terminate
Gary L. Beaver, Jeffrey M. Reichard, and the law firm of Nexsen
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Pruet, PLLC as counsel for Salem Carriers, Inc. and Salem Leasing,
Inc. in this case.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
December 14, 2011
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