LINDSAY v. LEWIS et al

Filing 58

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 08/21/2013 as set out herein. RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 40 ) be granted. FURTHER that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend (Docket Entry 36 ) be denied as moot. FURTHER that Plaintiff's Motion in Limine (Docket Entry 39 ) be denied as moot.(Taylor, Abby)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DERRICK JAVON LINDSAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT C. LEWIS, et al.,
Defendants.

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1:11CV67

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The instant matter comes before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge for recommended rulings on Plaintiff’s Motion to
Amend (Docket Entry 36), Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (Docket Entry
39), and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 40).
(See Docket Entry dated May 7, 2013; see also Docket Entry dated
Feb. 15, 2012 (assigning case to undersigned Magistrate Judge).)
For the reasons that follow, the Court should grant Defendants’
instant Motion and should deny Plaintiff’s instant Motions as
moot.1
1

Pursuant to this Court’s Local Rule 56.1, “[a]ll
dispositive motions and supporting briefs must be filed and served
within 30 days following the close of the discovery period.”
M.D.N.C. LR56.1(b). Discovery in the instant case closed on March
15, 2012.
(See Docket Entry 16 at 1.)
Defendants filed the
instant Motion for Summary Judgment on February 15, 2013 (see
Docket Entry 40 at 2), nearly a year after the close of discovery.
“Even when a motion for summary judgment is filed out of time, a
district court may exercise its discretion to entertain the
motion.” Turner v. U.S., 869 F. Supp. 2d 685, 688 n.1 (E.D.N.C.
2012) (citing Lopez v. NTI, LLC, 748 F. Supp. 2d 471, 475-76 (D.
Md. 2010), and Gomez v. Trustees of Harvard Univ., 676 F. Supp. 13,
(continued...)

I.

Background

Plaintiff commenced this case by filing a pro se prisoner form
Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket Entry 2.) The Complaint
alleges

that

Plaintiff,

an

inmate

at

Scotland

Correctional

Institution in Laurinburg, North Carolina, sustained injuries to
his mouth in a fall that occurred when his shackles caught on the
stairs of a prison van as he attempted to exit the vehicle.
id. at 4.)

(See

The Complaint apparently asserts claims under the

Eighth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers
who transported Plaintiff, as well as against various supervisors
and prison officials, concerning Defendants’ alleged deliberate
indifference to the dangers the vehicle steps presented to shackled
inmates and the alleged inadequacy of subsequent medical attention
Plaintiff received.

(See id. at 4-10.)

1

(...continued)
15 (D.D.C. 1987)); see also U.S. v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 110, 116 (4th
Cir. 1991) (“Motions filed out of time are accepted at the
discretion of the trial court . . . .”). In deciding whether to
entertain out-of-time motions, courts consider whether the latefiling party acted in bad faith, whether the lateness of the filing
would prejudice the non-moving party, and whether the court has
insufficient time to consider the motion. See Lopez, 748 F. Supp.
2d at 475.
In the instant case, none of these factors exist.
Furthermore, “[t]he purpose of pre-trial procedure is to serve the
bests interests of justice by eliminating unnecessary proof and
issues and weeding out unsupportable claims.” Gomez, 676 F. Supp.
at 15. As discussed below, the record evidence does not support
the Complaint’s allegations that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights and, therefore, in the interests of justice,
Defendants’ instant Motion should not be denied simply because they
filed out of time.
2

To

support

their

instant

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment,

Defendants filed affidavits from various officials involved in the
incident and related documents (attached as exhibits). (See Docket
Entries 41-1, 41-2, 41-3, 41-4, 41-5, 41-6.)2

2

In connection with

Plaintiff made three filings in opposition to Defendants’
instant Motion. (See Docket Entries 44, 45, 48.) To the first,
Plaintiff attached a document titled “SWORN AFFIDAVIT” which states
that “[t]his sworn affidavit by Plaintiff is in support of
Plaintiffs [sic] statement [in response], stateing [sic] that it is
a true and accurate statement and all that lies within that
statement is true and accurate.” (Docket Entry 44-1 at 1.) The
“Statement of Claim” portion of Plaintiff’s Complaint follows the
title page of the “affidavit.” (See id. at 2-8.) To the second
Response, Plaintiff attached a second “SWORN AFFIDAVIT” which
recounts the factual allegations set forth in the Complaint. (See
Docket Entry 45-1 at 2-6.)
These filings do not constitute
affidavits. “[A]n affidavit, by definition, is a statement reduced
to writing and the truth of which is sworn to before someone who is
authorized to administer an oath.” Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d
979, 984 (8th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The documents Plaintiff submitted lack any
indication that he swore to their truth before anyone authorized to
administer an oath.
(See Docket Entries 44-1, 45-1.)
Nor did
Plaintiff sign the documents under penalty of perjury pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1746. (See id.) Indeed, Plaintiff failed to sign his
Responses to Defendants’ instant Motion at all. (Compare Docket
Entries 44, 45, 48, with Docket Entry 2.) Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11(a) states that all documents before the court “must be
signed by at least one attorney of record . . . - or by a party
personally if the party is unrepresented” (emphasis added).
“Although the Rules of Civil Procedure apply equally to pro se
litigants, courts have held that ‘a pleading filed inadvertently
without any signature may be viewed as a technical defect and not
a substantial violation of Rule 11.’” Harris v. SunTrust Mortg.,
Inc., No. 12-cv-378, 2013 WL 1120846, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 18,
2013) (Schroeder, J.) (unpublished) (quoting Hadlock v. Baechler,
136 F.R.D. 157, 159 (W.D. Ark. 1991)). Under these circumstances,
the discussion which follows will take into account the arguments
presented by Plaintiff in opposition to summary judgment, but will
not treat his statements within his responsive filings as evidence.
See generally United States v. White, 366 F.3d 291, 300 (4th Cir.
2004) (“[U]nsworn argument does not constitute evidence . . . .”).
3

his Responses, Plaintiff provided a number of exhibits which either
duplicate Defendants’ exhibits (compare Docket Entry 44 at 21, with
Docket Entry 41-1 at 8; compare Docket Entry 45 at 10-12, with
Docket Entry 41-1 at 8-9) or which otherwise fail to contradict the
evidence submitted by Defendants in any material way (see Docket
Entry 44 at 7-20, 22-23).

This latter category includes: (1) two

grievance reports that discuss the incident in question in a manner
materially consistent with the facts presented in the affidavits
provided by Defendants (Docket Entry 44 at 7, 22); (2) an apparent
copy of the North Carolina Department of Correction’s Standard
Operating Procedures, Chapter 4: Custody and Security (id. at 815); (3) an unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of
Appeals apparently hand-copied from “Google Scholar” (id. at 1619); and (4) a hand-copied version of an alleged letter Plaintiff
received from “North Carolina Prisone [sic] Legal Services, Inc.,”
informing him that it would not represent him in the instant matter
(id. at 20).
The uncontested record evidence indicates that Defendants
Patterson

and

Correctional

Martin

Institution

transported
to

Central

Plaintiff

from

Prison

June

on

(Docket Entry 41-1 at 1; Docket Entry 41-2 at 1.)

Scotland
3,

2010.

Defendant

Patterson “opened the inmate passenger door [of the van] . . . .
[Plaintiff] was standing up when [Defendant Patterson] opened the
door. [Defendant Patterson] leaned down to let the transport van’s

4

step down, but before [she] could, [Plaintiff] took his foot and
pushed the step forward.”

(Docket Entry 41-1 at 1-2.)

Plaintiff

stepped forward and, before Defendant Patterson could move to
assist him, he “lost his balance and fell forward. . . . [He] fell
with his feet still on the step and his two hands flat on the curb
above his chest.”

(Id. at 2.)

Upon inquiry from Defendant

Patterson, Plaintiff indicated that “he had broken his tooth” but
that he had not hit his head.

(Id.)

Defendants Patterson and

Martin took Plaintiff to the Central Prison emergency room.
Docket Entry 41-2 at 2.)

(Id.;

The emergency room staff referred him to

the prison’s dental clinic.

(Docket Entry 41-5 at 1.)

At the

dental clinic, Plaintiff received treatment for several broken or
cracked teeth, one tooth was removed, and a small “wound was closed
in the usual manner with sutures.”

(Id. at 2.)

Plaintiff visited the dental clinic at Scotland Correctional
Institution for follow-up three times over the next several days.
(Id.) Plaintiff complained of some pain and that “spicules of bone
were coming out of the extraction site.”

(Id.)

However, the

dentist indicated that “this was not unusual following this type of
injury” and determined that the injuries were healing.

(Id.)

In

October of 2010, Plaintiff returned to the dental clinic, again
complaining of pain, and the clinic referred him to the dental
clinic at Central Prison for a root canal.

(Id.)

Plaintiff

received the root canal “as a result of trauma that occurred in

5

June [2010].”

(Id. at 3.)

In April of 2012, Plaintiff received a

second root canal on another tooth that had been damaged during the
June 2010 fall.

(Id.)

The Complaint requests compensatory damages in the amount of
$2,125,000 and punitive damages in the same amount.
2 at 11.)

(Docket Entry

It also seeks an injunction requiring that Defendants

“replace [the] steps with a safer method of exiting the van.”
(Id.) Finally, the Complaint requests that Defendants pay the cost
of repairing the dental damage from the incident, as determined and
performed by a dentist of Plaintiff’s choosing.

(Id.)

Plaintiff’s instant Motion to Amend (Docket Entry 36) seeks
leave to amend Plaintiff’s prior “Memorandum to Introduce Exhibits
to be Used at Trial” (Docket Entry 35).
1.)

(See Docket Entry 36 at

Plaintiff’s instant Motion in Limine (Docket Entry 39) “seeks

to prevent [] [D]efendants or their attorney or any other party
associated

with

[this

case]

from

discussing

[]

[P]laintiff’s

criminal record, prison disoplinary [sic] record and any other
matter which is not relevant to this case or which will influence
the jury or judge appointed to this case unfairly” (id. at 1).
II.

Summary Judgment Standard

“The [C]ourt shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
P. 56(a).

Fed. R. Civ.

Such a genuine dispute exists if the evidence presented

6

could lead a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in favor of
the non-moving party.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 255 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must view
the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party.

Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment may discharge its burden
by identifying an absence of evidence to support the non-moving
party’s case.
(1986).

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325

The non-moving party then must “set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus.,

475

original).

U.S.

at

586-87

(citation

omitted)

(emphasis

in

In this regard, the non-moving party must convince the

Court that evidence exists upon which a finder of fact could
properly return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (citation omitted); see also Francis v.
Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 308 (4th Cir. 2006)
(“Mere unsupported speculation is not sufficient to defeat a
summary judgment motion if the undisputed evidence indicates that
the other party should win as a matter of law.”).
III.

Discussion

The Complaint alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment rights by exposing him to a condition Defendants
knew to be unsafe (i.e., the van stairs) and failing to take steps

7

to protect Plaintiff from said condition.
6-11.)

(See Docket Entry 2 at

Liberally construed, the Complaint also alleges that

Plaintiff suffered from inadequate dental treatment.
5-6, 11.)

(See id. at

In these regards, “when the State takes a person into

its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution
imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility
for his safety and general well-being.”

DeShaney v. Winnebago

Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). In other
words, “when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so
restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to
care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his
basic human needs — e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
and reasonable safety — it transgresses the substantive limits on
state action set by . . . the Due Process Clause.”

Id. at 200

(emphasis added).
However, not every injury suffered by a prisoner “translates
into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for
the victim’s safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
Plaintiff thus cannot maintain a constitutional claim against
Defendants merely based on allegations that they negligently failed
to

protect

him

from

an

unsafe

condition

because

“deliberate

indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than
negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
Instead, this standard applies:

8

First, a constitutional violation occurs only where the
deprivation alleged is “objectively, sufficiently
serious.”
For a claim based on a failure to prevent
harm, a [plaintiff] must show that he [was] detained or
incarcerated “under conditions posing a substantial risk
of serious harm.” . . . Second, an official must have
“a
sufficiently
culpable
state
of
mind.”
In
prison[/jail]-conditions cases, the requisite state of
mind is “deliberate indifference.”
Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388-89 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (internal citations
and secondary internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
Similarly, as to claims based on denial of medical care, Plaintiff
“must demonstrate that the [officials] acted with ‘deliberate
indifference’ (subjective) to the inmate’s ‘serious medical needs’
(objective).”

Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008).

“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard - a showing
of mere negligence will not meet it.”
692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999).

Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d

Instead, the “deliberate indifference”

prong requires Plaintiff to make “two showings”:
First, the evidence must show that the official in
question subjectively recognized a substantial risk of
harm. It is not enough that the [official] should have
recognized it; [he] actually must have perceived the
risk. Second, the evidence must show that the official
in question subjectively recognized that his actions were
inappropriate in light of that risk.
As with the
subjective awareness element, it is not enough that the
official should have recognized that his actions were
inappropriate; the official actually must have recognized
that his actions were insufficient.
Parish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in

9

original). “The subjective component therefore sets a particularly
high bar to recovery.”
A.

Iko, 535 F.3d at 241.

Defendants Patterson and Martin

The Complaint alleges that Defendants Patterson and Martin
“had prior knowledge” that the van steps were unsafe, yet they
“still agreed to transport” Plaintiff in the vehicle, intentionally
placing him in danger.

(Docket Entry 2 at 6-8.)

It further

alleges that both Defendants had access to his shackle connector,
which they could have used to hold the shackles above the steps,
thus preventing his fall, yet neither took this action. (Id.) The
record, however, does not support the Complaint’s allegations.

It

contains no evidence that Defendants Patterson and Martin knew of
any risk the van stairs posed to Plaintiff, much less that they
disregarded said risk.

(See, e.g., Docket Entry 41-6 at 2 (“There

were no reported problems with the van’s steps when [Plaintiff] was
injured.”).)
Furthermore, Defendant Patterson averred that Plaintiff pushed
the stairs out of the van before she could unfold them and that
Plaintiff started down the stairs on his own before she could move
forward to assist him.
4-6.)

(Docket Entry 41-1 at 1-2; see also id. at

Thus, Defendant Patterson’s alleged failure to assist

Plaintiff

apparently

resulted

from

Plaintiff’s

own

actions.

Moreover, Defendant Martin “was moving the medical jackets from the
front of the van” at the time Plaintiff fell.

10

(Docket Entry 41-1

at 1.)

He therefore did not have immediate access to Plaintiff’s

shackles or the connector chain.

Based on the record evidence, a

reasonable factfinder could not conclude that Defendants Patterson
and

Martin

acted

with

deliberate

indifference

to

Plaintiff’s

safety.3
B.
The

Complaint

Defendants Harron and Jones
alleges

that

Defendants

Joel

Harron,

Superintendent of Scotland Correctional Institution (Docket Entry
2 at 2), and Eric Jones, Sergeant of Transportation at Scotland
Correctional Institution (id. at 3), knew of the dangers associated
with the van in question, yet allowed its use anyway.
8-9.)

(See id. at

Further, the Complaint alleges that both Defendants Harron

and Jones knew that a transporting officer could use the connector
chain on Plaintiff’s shackles to hold the shackles off the stairs,
but did not instruct Defendants Patterson or Martin to so use it.

3

Because Plaintiff has failed to show a violation of a
constitutionally protected right, Defendants Patterson and Martin
are also entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity from
§ 1983 claims protects government officials from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Doe ex rel. Johnson v. South
Carolina Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 169 (4th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, given the absence
of a constitutional violation by any of the other Defendants, as
discussed below, they are likewise entitled to qualified immunity.
Plaintiff also cannot succeed on any official capacity claim
against Defendants, because such a claim would amount to one
against a State, which cannot proceed under Section 1983. See Will
v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“We hold
that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official
capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”).
11

(Id. at 9.)

Finally, the Complaint alleges that Defendant Jones

was “responsible for makeing [sic] sure that all the transport
vehicles [were] safe to transport inmates in” and that he “chose to
ignore” the danger presented by the stairs and failed to correct
it.

(Id.)
As an initial matter, the record contains no evidence that

Defendants
incident.

Harron

and

Jones

were

involved

in

the

Only Defendants Patterson and Martin were present when

Plaintiff sustained his injuries.
6.)

personally

(See Docket Entry 41-1 at 1, 4,

Furthermore, no evidence indicates that Defendants Harron and

Jones interacted with the vehicle in question.
Additionally, although supervisory liability may exist under
Section 1983 where
(1) [] the supervisor had actual or constructive
knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct
that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of
constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff;
(2) [] the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so
inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and
(3) [] there was an affirmative causal link between the
supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional
injury suffered by the plaintiff,
Shaw

v.

13

Shroud,

F.3d

791,

799

(4th

Cir.

1994)

(internal

quotation marks omitted), the record does not reflect the existence
of these factors.

Fundamentally, no record evidence suggests

Defendants Harron and Jones knew of any unsafe conditions in the
transport vehicles.
supra

Section

Furthermore, as discussed previously, see

III.A.,

Plaintiff
12

suffered

no

underlying

constitutional injury at the hands of those individuals supervised
by Defendants Harron and Jones (i.e., Defendants Patterson and
Martin).

To the extent Defendants Herron and Jones’ liability

arises solely from their alleged legal responsibility for the
actions of Defendants Patterson and Martin, Plaintiff’s claim(s)
against Defendants Herron and Jones must also fail.

Huggins v.

Weider, 105 F. App’x 503, 505 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Young v. City
of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 579 (4th Cir. 2001)) (“There can be
no liability under § 1983 on the part of a supervisory official in
the absence of a constitutional violation on the part of those
supervised.”).

In sum, nothing on the record would allow a

reasonable factfinder to conclude that Defendants Harron or Jones
acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s safety.
C.

Defendants Lewis and Keller

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendants Robert Lewis,
Director of Prisons (Docket Entry 2 at 2), and Alvin Keller, Jr.,
Secretary of Department of Correction (id.

at 3), knew that

shackles catching on van steps posed a problem throughout the state
prison system, primarily because several inmates had filed suits
against the Department of Correction after suffering injuries when
their shackles became entangled with van steps.

(Id. at 8-10.)

The Complaint further alleges that both Defendants Lewis and Keller
knew “there was no policy set in place to order transport officers
to use available restraints/connector chain[s] while transporting

13

inmates from one destination to another to keep inmates [sic]
shackles from dragging on the floor/ground.”
id. at 9.)

(Id. at 8; see also

The Complaint contends that, had Defendants Lewis and

Keller imposed such a policy, the incident at issue in the instant
case would not have occurred.

(Id. at 8-10.)

First, as discussed above, see supra, Section III.B., “[t]here
can be no liability under § 1983 on the part of a supervisory
official in the absence of a constitutional violation on the part
of those supervised.”
Defendants

Patterson

Huggins, 105 F. App’x at 505.
and

Martin

did

not

violate

Because

Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights, Plaintiff’s claim(s) against Defendants
Lewis and Keller, in their capacity as supervisors, must fail.
Further, also discussed previously, see supra, Section III.B.,
supervisor liability under § 1983 is very limited. The record does
not reflect the existence of any of the factors required for
supervisor

liability

in

Shaw;

i.e.,

actual

or

constructive

knowledge that a subordinate “was engaged in conduct that posed a
pervasive

and

unreasonable

risk

of

constitutional

injury

to

citizens like the plaintiff,” a response “so inadequate as to show
deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged
offensive practices,” and “an affirmative causal link between the
supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury
suffered by the plaintiff,” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799.

14

Plaintiff argues that two prior similar cases, Thames v. North
Carolina Dep’t of Corr., No. COA09-1376, 205 N.C. App. 469 (table),
698

S.E.2d

201

(table),

2010

WL

2817034

(July

20,

2010)

(unpublished), and Dubose v. North Carolina Dep’t of Corr., No.
COA09-571, 205 N.C. App. 320 (table), 697 S.E.2d 525 (table), 2010
WL 2650627 (July 6, 2010) (unpublished), both involving prisoners’
shackles catching on van steps as they exited the vehicle, put
Defendants

(at

least

Defendants

Lewis

and

Keller)

on

notice

concerning the danger of van steps to shackled prisoners (thus
satisfying the first Shaw factor).

(See Docket Entry 44 at 4-5

(citing id. at 16-19); see also Docket Entry 45-1 at 2-3; Docket
Entry 48 at 2.) In both prior cases, the North Carolina Department
of Correction was the only named Defendant; none of the Defendants
in the instant case were parties.

See Thames, 2010 WL 2817034, at

*1; Dubose, 2010 WL 2650627, at *1.

In addition, the instant

record lacks any evidence that the vehicles at issue in the prior
cases were equipped in the same manner as the van from which
Plaintiff fell.

These prior cases therefore do not show knowledge

on the part of Defendants Lewis and Keller of any pervasive and
unreasonable risk of constitutional injury in this case.4

4

Plaintiff also points to the alleged letter from North
Carolina Prisoner Legal Services which, in relevant part, states:
“‘[W]e are concerned about this issue because we have had many
prisoners contact us with similar stories.
We plan to write a
letter to the DOC to make them aware of the situation and ask them
to make system-wide changes the [sic] way prisoners exit vans to
(continued...)
15

D.

Adequacy of Medical Treatment

The Complaint arguably alleges that Plaintiff suffered from
inadequate dental treatment. (See Docket Entry 2 at 5-6, 11.) “To
establish

that

a

health

care

provider’s

actions

constitute

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the treatment
must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to
shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.”
Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990).

“‘[E]ven if

a prison doctor is mistaken or negligent in his diagnosis or
treatment, no constitutional issue is raised absent evidence of
abuse, intentional mistreatment, or denial of medical attention.’”
Parson v. Terrell, No. 1:13-cv-48-RJC, 2013 WL 1196600, at *3
(W.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2013) (unpublished) (alteration in original)
(quoting Stokes v. Hurdle, 393 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D. Md. 1975),
aff’d,

535

F.2d

“[d]isagreements

1250

between

(4th
an

Cir.

inmate

4

1976)).

and

a

Furthermore,

physician

over

the

(...continued)
prevent falls from happening in the future.’” (Docket Entry 44 at
2 (quoting id. at 20).) Plaintiff argues that “[i]f inmates in
fact contacted prisoner legal services in the past about similar
incidentces [sic] and North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services
investigated it they would have first had to exhaust the grievance
remedy procedure.” (Id.) However, this letter does not in any way
support a conclusion that any Defendants knew about an ongoing
problem with prison vans. Moreover, the letter indicates that the
organization declined to take Plaintiff’s case, referencing the
North Carolina Court of Appeal’s decision against the plaintiff in
Thomas and stating that “if [Plaintiff] filed a lawsuit the court
would again decide that the DOC was not negligent and would dismiss
[Plaintiff’s] case.” (Id. at 20.)
16

inmate’s proper medical care do not state a § 1983 claim unless
exceptional circumstances are alleged.”

Wright v. Collins, 766

F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985).
In the instant case, the record evinces no medical treatment
that rises to the level of deliberate indifference.

To the

contrary, Plaintiff received treatment from a dentist shortly after
his fall and several times in the subsequent days.
Entry 41-5 at 1-2, 9, 11-12.)

(See Docket

A prison dentist familiar with

Plaintiff’s file averred that his “impression is that [Plaintiff]
received the appropriate treatment for the injuries sustained in
June 2010 consistent with community standards.”
has provided no evidence to the contrary.

(Id.)

Plaintiff

Furthermore, to the

extent Plaintiff disagreed with the treatment he received at the
hands of prison dentists, such disagreement, without more, cannot
sustain his claim, see Wright, 766 F.2d at 849.

Finally, although

the Complaint includes a significant discussion of the medical
attention Plaintiff received (see Docket Entry 2 at 5-6) and
demands additional treatment (id. at 11), Plaintiff subsequently
disavowed any claim in that regard:
with [his] medical needs.

“Defendants had nothing to do

If Plaintiff wanted to hold someone

accountable for his medical needs he would have sued the medical
staff.

Plaintiff is sueing [sic] for deliberate indifference on

the basis that [] [D]efendants actually knew of the substantial

17

risk of serious harm, and failed to respond reasonably.”

(Docket

Entry 45 at 4.)
III.

Conclusion

Defendants have identified an absence of evidence to support
Plaintiff’s case and Plaintiff has failed to “set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,” Matsushita
Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 586-87.
IT

IS

THEREFORE

RECOMMENDED

that

Defendants’

Motion

for

Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 40) be granted.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend
(Docket Entry 36) be denied as moot.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine
(Docket Entry 39) be denied as moot.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
August 21, 2013

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