THOMPSON et al v. MISSION ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL, LLC

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 11/14/2013 as et out herein. RECOMMENDED that Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Docket Entry 10 ) be GRANTED and this action be TRANSFERRED to the Eastern District of Virginia.(Taylor, Abby)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ESTATE OF' CAPTAIN DAVID
JOHNPAUL THOMPSON, by and
thtough EMILY THOMPSON,
Executot, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

MISSION ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL,
LLC,
Defendant.

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1:1,1,CY547

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint

in this matter on July 1.1,, 2011., asserting

wtongfui death, negligence, loss of consottium and breach
Defendant Mission Essential Personnel, LLC

before the court on Defendant's motion

to

of

contract claims against

("MEP"). pocket Entry 1.) The mattet
dismiss pursuant

to

Fedetal Rule

is

of Civil

Procedute 12þ)Ø fot lack of petsonal jurisdiction. (Docket Etttry 10.) Plaintiffs have fìled
a response

in opposition to this motion. Q)ocket Entry 16.) On Âugust 1.4,201'3, ahearing

was held regarding Defendant's motion. The matter was taken undet advísement. Fot the

following reasons, the court will tecommend that Defendant's motion to dismiss be gtanted
and that the action be transfetted to the Eastetn District of Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1,691,.

$

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are Emily Thompson as the executor

fot the Estate of

JohnPaul Thompson, Matk Decoteau as the executor for the Estate

Captain David

of Tacttcal PSYOPS

Teams Specialist Matc P. Decoteau, and Chief Warcant Officet Thomas Russell and Tina
Russell, indtvidually and as parents and next friends of theit minot children, SKR, ATR and

ARR. (Compl.

nT,

2-4, Docket Entry

1.)

Captatn Thompson and Chief Wanant Offìcer

Thomas Russell were deployed with their division

of the United States Special Forces to

Afghanistan. (Id. Íl1) Marc P. Decoteau was a United States Army Specialist who was also
deployed to -Afghanistan. Qd

fl4)

Captain Thompson and Specialist Decoteau were killed

on January 29, 2010, when Nasir Ahmadi, a linguist employed by Defendant, opened

fte

on

the base of Sayed Abad neat the offìce of the team's Tacttcal Operations Centet. Qd.

]n

T-

36,) Chief Russell suffeted severe injudes dudng the incident. (Id.)
Defendant is an Ohio limited liability company based in Columbus,

Matc D. Peltiet tf 8, Docket Entry

1,1,-1,.)

Ohio. (Decl. of

MEP is in the specialized business of rectuiting,

vetting and training qual-ifìed linguists who ate then deployed overseas. (Compl. IlT 5, 7.) A

numbet of MEP's executives are located
Chantilly, Vitginia. (Peltiet Decl.

atound the wodd. (Id.

11

in its National Capital Region headquattets in

10.) Defendant employs more than 7,000 professionals

Í17.) Defendant

v/ere permanently assigned locations

concedes to having, at most, eight employees who

in Notth

Caro)tna ftom 2006 through 201.1, and to

having apptoximately one hundred and eighty-thtee employees tempotadly assigned to
military bases in North Carohnaatvarying times and duration. (Def.'s Reply at 4, Docket

Entty 19; see also Def.'s Ex. E, Âpp. Â, Docket E.rtty

2

1,9-1,.)

A tectuiter for Defendant

also

worked from his Notth Caroltna home. (Id.; ve aU'oDef.'s Ex. E, App.A

to

evidence provided by Plaintiffs, Defendant has ptovided support

^t21,.)

for

Accotding

sevetal ,{.rmy

projects at Fort Bngg and Camp MacIQll fot periods ranging fuom a few days to two years.
(Pls.' Mem.
1,7

in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 4, Docket Entry 16; Ex. C at 5, Docket Etrtty

-3.)

Futthermore, the record reflects that, ftom 2006

to

201,1,,

apptoximately $6.2 million in tevenue for task orders completed in

at 9-1.2, Docket

Enry

Defendant received

Noth Carolina. (E". E

1,9-1,.) Defendant's global revenue fu.om 2006

to

201,1 was almost $2

bil[on, and its rever].ue for work completed in the United States dudng the

same period was

apptoximately $184 milLon. (E,". S at3-4, Docket Er,tty 20-1,;Ex. G, Peltier Reply Decl. fl 7,

Docket Enry 1,9-3.) Plaintiffs assert that the amount of tevenue Defendant earned in Notth
Catoltna supports a finding that its contacts with the state wete systematic and continuous.
(Pls.' Mem.

in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 1.3-1,6, Docket Enry 16.) Defendant contends

that its revenue earned for performance in Notth Catolina represents less than 1 petcent

the MEP's global revenue and only 3.4 percent of its total revenue in the United

of

States.

(Def.'s Reply at 4.)

Plaintiffs assert that from January 2010 until January 2012, Defendant advettised
having an office in North Caroltna, specifically Fayetteville, Notth Carohna on its website.
(Pls.'Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at7; ¡ee al¡o}rlEP's Website, Ex. FI, Docket Entty
17

-8.) Plaintiffs also state that Defendant admitted in an answet filed in a 201.0 action in

fedetal coutt in Vitginia to having a major office in Fayetteville, Notth Carolina. (Id.;

rce

Ex. I

Noth

I

19, Docket Ent

y 1,7-9.) From January
J

2008

to 201,0, Defendant

used

aln

Carchna

in a naionwide recruiting campaign.

(Jee Recruiting ,\dvertisements,

Docket Entty 17-5.) Defendant also made public ânnouncements stating
offìce in Fayetteville, Nonh Caroüna.

(Jøe

it

Ex. E,

had a major

MEP Ptess Release, Ex. F, Docket E.ttty

1,7-6.)

Defendant admits that it is registered to do business in the state and appointed an agent for
service within the state.l (Def.'s Mem. at 14). Plaintiffs assert that Defendantutthzed tooms

at the Candlewood Suites in Jacksonville, North Catolina to house its employees. Plr.'
Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at1,0; Candlewood Documents, Ex. R, Docket Entry 18-

9.) Defendant argues that it does not have a¡ office in North Carohna. (Def.'s Reply at 4.)
Defendant states that it does not o-rr, ,.ur. or rent any property in North Carolina. (Peltier
Decl. fl 18, Docket Entry 1,1,-1,.) However, Defendant admits to providing hotel rooms fot
its linguist employees while they were temporadly assigned to military bases within the state.
(Def.'s Reply at 4;

see also

Ex. G, Peltier Reply Decl. fl 3, Docket Entry 1,9-3.) Âdditionally,

Defendant asserts that MEP's website had previously incottecdy listed North Caroltna as
state in which

II.

it had an offìce location. (Peluet Decl. fl 20; Docket Entty

a

1,1,-1,.)

DISCUSSION
Defendant has moved to dismiss pursuant to Fedetal Rule of Civil Procedute 12þ)(2)

fot lack of petsonal jutisdiction. On a Rule 12þ)(2) motion, a plainljff has the burden "to
prove gtounds fot judsdiction by a pteponderance of the evidence." Mllan Laboratorie¡,
u.

Ak7o, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Conbs

u.

Inc.

Bakker,886 F.2d 673, 676

t A.orporution's registration to do business in the state alone is not the decidingfactor on whrch
judsdiction should be determin ed. Røtlff u. Copper Laboratories Inc., 444 F .2d 7 45,7 48 (4th Clr. 1971).
InRatffi the corporation did not have an office, any rcal or personal property in the state. Id. It dtd
not have a bank account ot advertise within the state. Id, The court detetmined the mere fact of
registration was insufficient to detetmine judsdiction. ,I/.
4

(4th Cir. 1989). However, where the court does not conduct an evidentiary hearine and
relies only on the pleadings and afftdavits, a plaintiff need only make

a

þrima facie showing

of

judsdiction. In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 61,9,628 (4th Cit. 1997). The district coutt, in
considedng such a motion, must draw all reasonable infetences arising ftom the proof, and

tesolve all factual disputes, in the plaintifÎs favor. Carefr:t of Md., Inc. u. Carefrst Pregnancl
Ctrs.,

[nt.,334 F.3d 390,396 (4th Cir. 2003)

The court must petform a two-step analysis when detetmining
judsdiction over a non-tesident defendant. Christian Sci. Bd.
Scieati¡t u.

of

if it

has petsonal

Dirs. of the First Charch of Christ,

No/an,259 F.3d 209,21,5 (4th Cir. 2001). "First, the exercise of jurisdiction must

be authodzed by the long-arm statute

of the forum state, and second, the exetcise of

personal jurisdiction must also compott

tequitements."

Id. Noth

with Fourteenth Amendment due

process

Catolina's long-arm statute states that the state has jurisdiction

over a defendant "engaged in substantial activity within this State, whether such activity is

wholly intetstate, intrastate, or otheru¡ise." N.C. Gen. Stat. S 1-75.4(1)(d) (2013). Notth
Catolina's long-arm statute "has been intetpreted to extend to the outer limits allowed by the

Due Ptocess Clause."

I-,e

Blea Corþ. u. Standard Cdþìtdl Grp., Int'., 11 F.

App'x377,379 (4th

Ctt. 2001). "Thus, the dual judsdictional tequi-rements collapse into a single inquiry as to
whether the defendant has such 'minimal contacts'with the fotum state that 'maintenance

the suit does not offend 'taditional notions

of fak play and substantial justice."'

tr.3d209,215 (4thCk.2001) (citing Int'lShoe

Co. u.IY/ashington,326U.5.31.0,31.6

Second, the court must determine that the exetcise

of

No/an,259

(1945).

of jutisdiction complies wrth the

tequitements of the Due Process Clause. "Due process tequires that in order to subject

5

a

defendant to personal judsdiction, the defendant must have 'certain minimum contacts with
fthe forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions

fair play and substantial justice."' Nicltols u. G.D.
1,993) (quoting

Int'l

ate equivalent

to physical

Shoe, 326

U.5.

^t

ptesence

Searle

of

dz Co.,991, F.2d 1,1.95,1199 (4th Cu.

31,6). "These contacts must be of such a level that they

in the forum

state so that

tt would be fair to hale a

defendant into court in the fotum based on any claim taised against the defendant no matter
where the facts undetlying the claim arose." Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings u. Schømann,474F.
S.rpp. 2d

7

58, 76 1 (À4.D.N. C. 2006) (citation omitted).

Since Intemational Shoe was decided, courts have distinguished between genetal and

specific jurisdiction. Coodlear Dunlop Tìres Operations, S.A. u. Brown, 131 S. Ct.2846,2853

Q011). Specific, or case-linked, judsdiction "depends on an'afltlta:dofn] between the forum
and the undetþing
subject

coritroversy' . that takes place in the forum

to the State's

Adjødicate:

A

Søgested

tegulation."2

State and is thetefote

Id. (quoting Von Mehren & Ttuatman,

Anaþsh,79 Harv. L. Rev.

11,21, 1136 (1,996)). Genetal

Jurisdicfion to

jurisdiction, on

the othet hand, may be asserted over a corporation of another state "when their affiliations

with the State ate so 'continuous and systematic' as to tendet them essentially at home in the
forum State."

Goodltear, 131 S.

Ct. at 2851. (cittng Int'l

Shoe,

326 U.S. at 317). Consistent with

the parties' briefs and atguments, the Court will focus its analysis on whethet MEP's
contacts with

Notth Carohna are suffìcient to confer genetal jutisdiction.

2

The facts of this case do not support the exercise of specific jurisdiction as the incident giving rise
to the litigation occurred on a milttary base in Afghanistan. (Compl. n1[ 33-37 .)
6

Ceneral Jarisdio'tion

A coutt will

Minirzam Contacts

-

have genetal judsdiction when the defendant corporation's continuous

"opetations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it
on causes of action arising ftom dealings entirely distinct ftom those activities." Id. In other
wotds, general judsdiction depends on a defendant's contacts with the forum state unrelated

to the claims at issue.

See Helicopteros Natioruales de

Colonbia, S.A. u. Ha//,466 U.S. 408,41,4-1,5,

n. 8, n. 9 (1,984). The "thteshold level fot minimum contacts to confet general judsdiction is
significantly higher than for specific jutisdiction." ESAB Grp. Inc. u. Centricatlnc., 1,26F.3d
61.7

, 623 (4th Cit. 1997). "The pandtsm forum for the exetcise of genetal jutisdiction is the

individual's domicile;

for

^

corporation,

cotpotation is fafuly tegatded as at home

it is

^n

equivalent place, one

." Good1ear, 1,37 S. Ct.

^t

in which

the

2853-54.

The court must considet the type of interactions with the fotum state in otder to
determine

if

cotporations.

sufficient contacts exist

to

establish genetal jutisdiction over foteign

Id. "A cotporation's 'continuous

activity of some sorts within a state . . . is

not enough to suppott the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to
that acttvity."' Id. at 2856

(quo:dLng

Int'l

Shoe,

326 U.S. at

318). Courts have considered

factors such as whether the ditectots conducted meetings, business cotrespondence,
banking, stock ttansfets, payment

of

salaties and the purchase

fotum state. Perkins u. BercgaetCon¡ol. Min. C0,,342U.5.437,445

of

machinery within the

(1,952); Good1tear,131 S. Ct.

^t2853-54.3

Plaintiffs' reliance on Boon Pørtners u. Aduanced Fin. Conceþts, to assert that this court should find
substantial acldvtty "if the aggregate contacts are substantial and continuous," is misplaced. Ph.'
Mem. at 1,3.) In Boon Pørlners, the coutt discussed that the state can use an "aggtegate of contacts

'

7

Fair Plry and SubstanîialJa:tiæ

After

analyzing the defendant's contacts,

a coutt must considet whethet

those

contacts with the forum state are sufficient to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant and

would comply with the tequirement of "fi::r play and substantial justice."
Rødrywic7,471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S.

^t

Burger King Corp.

u.

320). As stated by the

Fourth Citcuit Court of Appeals:

determining whether judsdiction is constitutionally
reasonable, we may evaluate the butden on the defendant, the
forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiffs
intetest in obtaining convenient and effective telief, the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtainihg the most
efficient tesolution of conttoversies, and the shared interest of
the several States in futthedng fundamental substantive social

In

policies.

Nolan, 259 F.3d

at

21,7 (citing Barger King 471, U.S.

at 477). The putpose of

teasonableness analysis is to ensure that jutisdictional tules are not "employed
as

the

in such a way

to make litigation 'so gtavely difficult and inconvenient' that a p^rq unfairly is at a'severe

disadvantage'in compatison to his opponent." Barger King
Bremen u. Zaþata Of-Shore

471.

U.S. at 478 (quoting M/S

C0.,407 U.S. 1, 1,8 (1,972).

with the United States" to obtain personal jutisdiction over a foreign defendant not incorporated in
the Uruted States utilizing the national contacts theory. 917 F.Supp. 392,397 (E.D.N.C. 1996). In
that case the coutt stated that "the national contacts theory tequires a due ptocess analysis
controlled by the Fifth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (citng Max
Daerwller Corþ. u. k Meyr,762tr.2d290,293-94 (3rd Cir. 1985), "[I]h" Fifth Amendment does not
also require an examination of the fairness of forcing a defendant to litigate in a patticulat state
because the encroachment by one state upon the sovereignty of another is not at i.ssue." Id. (citatton
omitted.)

I

Anaþsis

Ptaintiffs argue four primary reasons

to suppott this Coutt's

exetcise

of

genetal

judsdiction over MEP: (1) Defendant had numerous employees wotking within the state; (2)

Defendant earned substantial revenue thtoirgh its involvement

in Notth

Catoltna;

(3)

Defendant advertised to the public as having a "major office in North Catoltna;" and (4)
Defendant had been "doing business" within the fotum state'

First, Plaintiffs assert that this court has genetal jutisdiction based on the employees

who work in North Carolina. (Pls.' Sut-Reply in Opp't to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 7,
Docket E.rry 20.) MEP contracts to perform duties in connection with military bases, some

of which are located in North Carolina. (Def.'s Reply at 3.) Most of MEP's employees
transient and are only present in North Carolina
Defendant's employees being present

fot tratning putposes. (Id.)

in the forum

state

ate

Therefote,

fot training is insufficient to

establish general judsdiction. Helicoþtero:,466 U. S. at 41.6. Furtbermore, Plaintiffs'assertion

that there were full-time employees that wete tesidents of Notth Caroltna is also insufficient
to establish general jurisdiction. The Fourth Citcuit has pteviously addtessed the issue of instate residents. See Nichols u. G.D. Searle dz Co., 991. F.2d 1,1,95, 1'200 (4th Cir. 1,993)

(declining Maryland general jurisdiction whete a company had seventeen

to

twenty-one

employees that wete residents in the state and a district manager.)

Next, Plaintiffs assert that the revenue Defendant earns in North Caroltna and the
number of employees that are employed within the state support the argument that MEP is

a

major employer in North Carolina. The Coutt notes that Defendant's tevenue eatned ftom
perfotmance in North Carolina represents less than 1 petcent of the company's total revenue

9

and approximately 3.4 percent of its United States revenue. (Def.'s Reply at

the court looked at the âmount of money

^s

3.) In

Nichol:,

a f^ctot in their detetmination. Nìchols, 991.

F.2d at1,200. The Fourth Circuit found thatMaryland lacked judsdiction over a foteign
corporation which eatned between nine million and thitteen million dollars in annual sales in
Maryland tepresenting two petcent

of the company's

ovetall revenue.

(Id.) Since the

decision in Nichols, the bat for determining genetal jurisdiction has been taised to a test

of

whether "the defendant is fairly regarded as being at home." Good1ear,131 S. Ct. at2853-54.
While Defendant did derive revenue from interactions in Notth Caroltna, those activities do
not tise to the level of MEP being "at home" in this State.

Plaintiffs assert that the percentage of ovetall tevenue is immaterial and cite several
cases

in support of this proposition. The

analysis

in the câses upon which Plaintiffs

rely,

however, is dependent on Virginia's long-atm statute which ptovides that the state may
exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations "'causing inyury in this State to any petson . .

[*ho]

engages

in any othet persistent course of conduct, ot detives ¡ab¡tantial

goods used or consumed or services rendered in this State."'

Aþ*

reueruue

.

ftom

Realt1 Corp. u. J.F. Zook,

Inc., 493 F.2d 818, 821. (4th Clr. 1972) (quoting Va. Code Ann. $ 8-81'.2 (^X5)) (emphasis
added); accord Beuerþ Hill¡ Fan Co. u. Royl Souereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1569 (Fed. Ck. 1,994);
¡ee also

Va. Code Ann. $ 8.01,-328.1,

holdings are limited

to

assessing

(\ùØest

2009) (cutrent Virginia Long-Arm Statute), These

if a foteign cotpotation eatned substantial revenue in

Virginia, not whether there were substanral contacts with the fotum state.
Plaintiffs reliance upon them is misplaced.

10

Id.

Thetefote,

Plaintiffs reliance on Lakin

u. Prudential Securities, 1nc.,348

F.3d704 (8th Cir. 2003) is

likewise unavailing. The Løkin court found that the percentages genetally were itrelevant.

Id. at709. The coutt, focusing on the undedying source of contacts within the forum state,

found that the defendant's contacts wete substanttal because the defendanthad ten million
dollats in liens on thousands of pieces of teal ptoperty in Missouti. Id. at709-1.0. The coutt

also found that Missouri had general judsdiction because the defendant would tely on
Missouri's courts to enforce liens with Missouti residents. Id. at71,0. The coutt's analysis in

Løkin, however,
percentage

is not binding on this court. The Fourth Circuit has analyzed

of revenue earned within the forum state comparcd to the company's overall

percentage earned
991,

F.2d

the

^t

^s

a factor in detetmining

if

the forum has general judsdiction. Nichol:,

1.200 (finding that where purchases are

"too insignificant" when consideted

as

a

percentage of a cotpotation's total putchases, genefal jutisdiction not ptesent).

Plainuffs assert that MEP should be subject

to

general jutisdiction because

Defendant stated on its website and in court that Defendant had a "major offìce in Notth

Caroltna." \)Øhen analyzing general jurisdiction, the coutt must considet the evidence of
Defendant's business interactions within the state and detetmine
consideted a "majot

office." In

Per,kiru¡,

if

those actions would be

the defendant's ptesident kept company files,

supervised all his employees and conducted all company business from an office

in Ohio

which gave the state enough contacts to conclude that the company was subject to genetal
judsdiction

.

Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447

-448. Here, Defendant has not established a petmânent

offìce within the state. Defendant utilizes space within the military installations in which it is
assigned and

it rented suites at a local hotel, Candlewood, while its employees were being
1,1,

trained. Although most,
organizattons,

it

if not alI, of Defendant's

bears noting that

if

customets are government

ot military

any potential customet, whethet government or

individual, searched fot an office or a representative of MEP in North Catolina, they would
most likely not find one. Instead, the website directs users

to corfiact infotmation for MEP

in eithet Ohio ot Vitginia. All of these actions are inconsistent with a business that has a
major office

in the state to

establish genetal judsdiction despite Defendant's statements

advertising a "major offìce" in
had an office in

Noth

Carcltna and its statement to the Virginia court that

North Caroltna.

Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant conducted suffìcient business
establish general judsdiction. Plaintiffs rely on Taaqon u.

tr3d

1,163 (9th

it

P'l.

in this state

to

Reltnold: Tobacco Conpary4433

Cir. 2006) which found that a Notth Carohna company was subject to

genetal jutisdiction

in the state of Washington. Taaqon is distinguishable from the present

case because the

Ninth Circuit relied on Washington's service of process statute to

determine

if general judsdiction applied. Id. (cittng

Wash. Rev. Code S 4.28.080(10)). The

ìTashington statute allows the state to have genetal judsdiction over a cotpotation that is

"'doing business' in the state."

TaaTon, 433 F.3d

at

1,1,69

(citing

88 !Øash. 2d 50 (1977)). Therefore, the Court only consideted

conduct was sufficient

Crose u. Volkswagonwerk

if

AC,

the foreign cotpotation's

to conclude it was "doing business" in the

state and not whethet

there were substantial contacts within the forum state to comply with the requirements

of

Due Ptocess. Unlike the state of ìTashington, North Carcltna's long-arm statute only states

it

has jurisdiction over a defendant "engaged

in substanttal actviry within this State, whethet

1,2

such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate or otherwise." N.C. Gen. Stat S 1-75.4(1Xd)
(201,3). Thetefote, Plaintiffs'teliance upon Taaqon is unavailing.

In view of the high standard set by the Supreme Coutt and the Fedetal Circuit, the
presence

of judsdiction in the instant

case

is admittedly a close question. Based upon the

facts presented, however, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated by a ptepondetance

of

the

evidence that this court has petsonal judsdiction over Defendant. While not dispositive, the

fact that MEP has dedved such a small petcentage of its total revenue from work perfotmed

in North Carohna certainly catries much weight. Defendant admittedly has contacts with the

forum state that are more significant than simple solicitation, yet those contacts

aÍe

insufficient to quali$r North Carohna as Defendant's place of business or a place whete
Defendant is "fairly regarded as being at home." Goodltear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54. Therefote,

there are insufficient minimum contacts by Defendant
continuous.4

Id.

to be deemed systematic and

Hence, for the fotegoing reasons, the coutt concludes that Defendant is

not subject to the petsonal jurisdiction of this court.
Trantfer Par:aarut to 28 U.S.C.

[

1631

If

it

lacks jutisdiction over a case "the court shall,

a district court fìnds that

if it is in

the interest of justice, transfer such action . . . to any other such coutt in which the action . .

could have been brought at the time

it

was fìled. . .

may, on its own initiative, transfet an action
Donouan,

No. 12-00384 (CKK) , 2102 WL

."

28 U.S,C. S 1631.

,\ disttict

to cure want of jurisdiction.

3291,830, at

court

Halim

u.

* 2 (D.D.C. J"ly 1,, 201,3) ("\Mhile

a

See

Since there are insufficient minimum contacts to wataLrLt exetcise of personal judsdiction, it is not
necessaq/ for this Court to address the factots of "fz:n play and substantial justice," See I-.¿snick u'
Hollingsworth dv Vo¡e C0.,35 F.3d 939, 945 (4th Ctr. 1994).
o

-l

.

Court may on its own initiative ttansfet an aclon undet 28 U.S.C. S 1631, the law of this
Circuit also holds that ¡ua tponte transfers putsuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1631 ate committed to the
discretion of the District Coun where no party has moved to ttansfet a case btought in the

wrong jurisdiction.")(intetnal quotation and citation omitted). "The phrase 'if

it is in

the

interest of justice' telates to claims which are nonfrivolous and as such should be decided on
the

medts."

1,7, 201,3).

Reaue! u. Hagel,

No. 5:12-CV-795-FL,

201,3

VL

5674981., at x3

(E.D.N.C. Oct.

"Plaintiffs erroneous filing in the wtong court is 'just the type of good faith

mistake that Congtess intended for 28 U.S.C. S 1631 to temedy." (citing McCoo/< Metals
u.

Ll-C

Altoa, Lnc.,249 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Crr.2001).

Here, Defendant concedes that jurisdiction would be ptopet in the Eastetn District

of Virginia.

(See

Def. Mem. at15, Docket Entry 11.) Defendant's National Capital Region

Headquarters is located in Vfuginia and many of the potential witnesses are located in that

state. Plaintiffs' claims ate nonfrivolous and cleatly should be decided on the merits. \X4rile

Plaintiffs erred in detetmining the proper disttict in which to file, to dismiss the case and
requite Plaintiffs to start ovet in another disttict would pena\ze Plaintiffs unfairly. As such,
this coutt fìnds that it is in the interest of justice to ttansfer the case putsuant to 28 U.S.C.
1,631,

to the Eastern District of Virginia, where Defendant's National Capital

S

Region

Headquarters are located.

III.

CONCLUSION

Cateful considetation

of the tecotd in this case compels the conclusion

Defendant did not purposefully avail itself
State of

of the privilege of conducting activities in

that
the

Notth Caroltna. This Coutt fìnds that Defendant's coritacts, even taken in the light

14

most favorable to Plaintif{ demonstrate minimal relation to the State of North Carohna and
ate insufficient to w^u^nt a finding of petsonal jutisdiction. Accordingly, the Coutt finds
dismissal is appropriate. However, as acknowledged by Defendant and

justice, petsonal jurisdiction

Thetefore,

in the interest of

in this matter would lie in the Eastern Disttict of Virginia.

IT IS RECOMMENDED

petsonal judsdiction (Docket

that Defendant's motion to dismiss fot lack of

Entty 10) be GRANTED and this action

TRANSFERRED to the Eastetn District of Vitginia.

Uni

Novembet 14,2013
Durham, Notth Caroltna

15

e bster
oe L.
States Magisttate Judge

be