BROWNE v. THE PANTRY, INC.
Filing
16
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER signed by JUDGE CATHERINE C. EAGLES on 10/28/2011, that the Motion to Approve Settlement (Doc. 10 ) is GRANTED, the Motion to Seal Settlement Agreement (Doc. 10 ) is DENIED, and the Motion to Enter Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice (Doc. 10 ) is GRANTED. (Daniel, J)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
JOSEPH BROWNE
Plaintiff,
v.
THE PANTRY, INC.,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1:11-cv-587
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Joint Motion to Approve Settlement, Motion to Seal
Settlement Agreement, and Motion to Enter Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice. (Doc. 10.)
The Court has reviewed the Motion, the sealed exhibit, and the briefs filed by the parties arguing
why the settlement should be sealed and has heard oral argument from counsel. The Court finds
that the parties have not met their burden to establish why the settlement agreement should be
sealed and denies the Motion to Seal. The Court further finds that the settlement is fair and
reasonable and should be approved.
The Plaintiff filed his Complaint in Guilford County Superior Court, alleging violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act. The
Defendant removed the case to this Court. (Doc. 1.) The parties began settlement negotiations
and resolved the matter soon after an answer was filed. On September 21, 2011, the parties filed
the instant Motion. (Doc. 10.)
“The general rule is that the record of a judicial proceeding is public.” Jessup v. Luther,
277 F.3d 926, 927 (7th Cir. 2002). “The public's right of access to judicial records and
documents may be abrogated only in unusual circumstances.” Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys.
Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 1988). This does not mean, however, that all documents filed
with a court must always be made public. As the Stone court explained:
The common law presumes a right to inspect and copy judicial
records and documents. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,
435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S. Ct. 1306, 1311, 55 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1978).
The common law presumption of access may be overcome if
competing interests outweigh the interest in access, and a court’s
denial of access is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. See
Rushford v. The New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253
(4th Cir. 1988); In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th
Cir. 1986).
Where the First Amendment guarantees access, on the other hand,
access may be denied only on the basis of a compelling
governmental interest, and only if the denial is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest. Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253 (citing PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510, 104 S. Ct.
819, 824, 78 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1984)).
Stone, 855 F.2d at 180. Before granting a motion to seal, a court must determine if the source of
the public’s right to access the documents is derived from the common law or from the First
Amendment. Id.
Some courts have found that motions to seal settlements in FLSA cases are governed by
the common-law right of access to the courts. E.g., Boone v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603,
609 (E.D. Va. 1999). Other courts have applied the higher standard imposed under the First
Amendment. E.g., In re Dollar Gen. Stores FLSA Litig., Nos. 5:09-MD-1500, 4:09-CV-57-BR,
4:09-CV-58-BR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95016, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 24, 2011).
The Court need not decide whether settlement agreements in FLSA cases are governed
by a stricter First Amendment right of access because the parties have not met the burden
required under the common-law standard. Courts in recent years have been virtually unanimous
2
in finding that settlements under the FLSA should not be sealed in the ordinary course. E.g., Joo
v. Kitchen Table, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 643, 646-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (collecting cases).
“Parties are typically permitted, and often encouraged, to reach private settlements.”
Baker v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 2:10cv199, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5208, at *5 (E.D. Va. Jan. 19,
2011). Settlements of FLSA cases are different, however, because those cases cannot be settled
without a court finding that the settlement is fair and reasonable. See, e.g., Lynn’s Food Stores,
Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1982).
The requirement for court approval reflects an interest in transparency in these cases. A
settlement agreement requiring court approval is a judicial record, which the common law
presumes to be a public document. Jessup, 277 F.2d at 928, 929; Boone, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 609.
This presumption is particularly strong for FLSA settlements. Stalnaker v. Novar Corp., 293 F.
Supp. 2d 1260, 1263 (M.D. Ala. 2003). As recently noted in Poulin v. Gen. Dynamics Shared
Res., Inc., No. 3:09-cv-00058, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40226 (W.D. Va. Apr. 23, 2010):
Given the unmistakably remedial public policy underlying the
FLSA, and considering the statute’s prohibition of a private waiver
of these statutory rights and requirement that any such waiver be
supervised, the public’s right of access to judicial records and
documents applies with particular force to settlement agreements
in FLSA wage settlement cases.
Poulin, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40226, at *13; accord Tabor v. Fox, No. 5:09-CV-338-BR, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60839, at *5 (E.D.N.C. June 17, 2010); Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp.
2d 1227, 1245 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (“The presumption that the record of a judicial proceeding
remains public is surely most strong when the right at issue is of a private-public character, as the
Supreme Court has described employee rights under the FLSA.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 1986).
3
The only reasons the parties have put forth in support of their motion to seal are that the
underlying settlement agreement contains a confidentiality provision and that a related case filed
in another court was settled under seal. The parties’ own agreement has routinely been held to
be insufficient to overcome the presumption of public access, even under the lower common-law
standard. E.g., Baker, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5208, at *11-12; Poulin v. Gen. Dynamics Shared
Res., Inc. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29478, at *8 (W.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2010). The Court is not
aware of the circumstances before the other court that sealed a settlement in the related case, and
the order sealing the settlement gave no details. The parties have cited no FLSA case in support
of their position, and the cases the court has located that allow FLSA settlements to remain
sealed involve agreements containing detailed business information that is ordinarily kept
confidential. E.g., In re Dollar Gen. Stores, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95016, at *5-7. Thus, the
Court concludes that the Motion to Seal should be denied.
At the hearing, the parties agreed that if the Court was not willing to grant the Motion to
Seal, they still wanted to proceed with the settlement agreement. The parties explained fully the
nature of the controversy, which focuses primarily on whether the Plaintiff was an exempt
employee and the method of calculating overtime pay. They further explained the way the
settlement amount was calculated. At the hearing through counsel, the Defendant articulated the
reasons for disputing the Plaintiff’s right to overtime, and the Plaintiff articulated his reasons for
believing he is entitled to overtime. The Court finds the settlement amount to be a reasonable
compromise over contested issues. The Court further finds the amount of the attorneys’ fees to
be reasonable.
4
It is therefore ORDERED that the Motion to Approve Settlement (Doc. 10) is
GRANTED, the Motion to Seal Settlement Agreement (Doc. 10) is DENIED, and the Motion to
Enter Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice (Doc. 10) is GRANTED.
This the 28th day of October, 2011.
__________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?