HUNTER, et al v. TOWN OF MOCKSVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, et al

Filing 176

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE THOMAS D. SCHROEDER on 8/12/2016; that Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law as to Bralley is DENIED and Plaintiffs' motion for judgment and equitable relief (Doc. 169 ) is < b>GRANTED as set out herein. FURTHER that within ten days of this order the parties shall submit (jointly, if they agree) their calculation of the retirement and supplemental separation allowance owed to Plaintiffs Hunter, Medlin, and Donathan, as noted in this memorandum opinion. An appropriate judgment will be entered upon submission of these calculations. (Sheets, Jamie)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
KENNETH L. HUNTER, RICK A.
DONATHAN, and JERRY D. MEDLIN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TOWN OF MOCKSVILLE, NORTH
CAROLINA, et al.,
Defendants.

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12cv333

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.
In December 2011, Defendants Town of Mocksville (“Town”),
Robert W. Cook, its administrative police chief at the time, and
Christine W. Bralley, its town manager, terminated Plaintiffs
Kenneth L. Hunter, Rick A. Donathan, and Jerry D. Medlin from
their

positions

as

Department (“MPD”).

officers

with

the

Mocksville

Police

Plaintiffs subsequently brought this action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for wrongful discharge in violation of
their First Amendment rights and State-law claims for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy.
trial,

a

jury

found

in

favor

of

Following an eight-day

Plaintiffs

on

all

claims.

Before the court now is Bralley’s renewed motion for judgment as
a matter of law, on which the court reserved ruling at trial,
and

Plaintiffs’

motion

for

equitable

relief,

either reinstatement or front pay (Doc. 169).

in

the

form

of

The motions are

fully briefed and are ready for resolution.
I.

BACKGROUND
The evidence at trial demonstrated that on December 14,

2011, Plaintiffs called the office of North Carolina Governor
Beverly

Purdue

and

reported

corruption

and

other

malfeasance

(including alleged misuse of authority and of alcohol by Chief
Cook, financial improprieties, and racial bias) within the MPD.
Approximately two weeks later, on December 29, 2011, Plaintiffs
were summarily terminated on the same afternoon.

Donathan had

been promoted to lieutenant just one month prior, and it was the
first time that then-Chief Cook had ever terminated an officer.
Rather, the chief had always allowed officers to voluntarily
resign, including one officer who had been involved in a hitand-run while intoxicated and on duty.
trial
claimed

was

why

they

The central question at

the

Plaintiffs

were

terminated.

were

terminated

for

exercising

Plaintiffs
their

First

Amendment rights, whereas Defendants claimed the officers were
terminated

for

poor

performance.

The

jury

believed

the

Plaintiffs, making separate determinations of liability against
the Town, Chief Cook, and Bralley.

(Doc. 167.)

Based on its finding of liability, the jury awarded Hunter
$805,706, Medlin $288,293, and Donathan $310,830 in compensatory

2

(including back pay 1) damages.

(Id. at 2, 4, 6.)

The jury

awarded each Plaintiff $10,000 in punitive damages separately
against Chief Cook and Bralley.

(Id.)

Based on the court’s

submission of the issue of front pay to the jury on an advisory
basis under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c), the jury also
recommended an advisory front pay award of $388,125 for Hunter,
$857,403 for Medlin, and $1,353,585 for Donathan.

(Id.)

At the close of evidence, Defendants renewed their motion
for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 50.

The court found that there was sufficient

evidence against the Town and Chief Cook to send the issue to
the jury but reserved ruling on whether Bralley was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Defendants

now

ask

this

court

to

find

that

there

was

insufficient evidence to submit the issue to the jury as to her.
(Doc. 170 at 1-4.)
equitable

relief

of

Plaintiffs oppose this request and move for
either

reinstatement

jury’s advisory verdict on front pay.

1

or

adoption

of

the

(Docs. 171, 173.)

Defendants acknowledged at trial that back pay was an issue for the
jury on the State-law claim.
The court raised the issue of whether
back pay was an equitable remedy for the court on the federal claim,
but Defendants waived any objection to the jury deciding back pay as
to both the federal and State-law claims.

3

II.

ANALYSIS
A.

Bralley’s Rule 50 Motion

Judgment

as

a

matter

of

law

is

appropriate

where

a

plaintiff has been fully heard on an issue but has failed to
produce sufficient evidence for a jury to find for the party.
Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

50(a);

Reeves

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000).

v.

Sanderson

Plumbing

Prods.,

The standard for judgment as a

matter of law under Rule 50(a) mirrors the standard for granting
summary

judgment

same.’”

“such

that

‘the

inquiry

under

each

is

the

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986)).

The court is to

“review the record as a whole” but “must disregard all evidence
favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to
believe.”

Id. at 151.

All reasonable inferences must be drawn

in favor of the nonmoving party, and the court is not permitted
to make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.

Id.

at 150.
At

the

summary

judgment

stage,

this

court

rejected

Defendants’ claim that there was insufficient direct evidence of
retaliation.
evidence

is

circumstantial.

(Doc.
not

95

at

7-8.)

insufficient

(Id.)

The

court

merely

explained

because

it

that
is

“The law gives no greater weight to

direct evidence over circumstantial evidence, and circumstantial
evidence is frequently relied on in employment retaliation or
4

discrimination cases because often only the defendants know the
true motivation for their conduct.”

(Id. (citing Dey v. Colt

Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 & n.12 (7th Cir. 1994)).)
In light of the sequence of events and the forecast of evidence
presented by Plaintiffs, this court found that “plaintiffs ha[d]
offered sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that the
Town fired them for reporting to the Governor’s office that the
Mocksville

Police

other issues.”
Here,

Department

was

renew

at

summary

judgment.

insufficient

direct

evidence

Plaintiffs’

corruption

and

(Id. at 8.)

Defendants

rejected

experiencing

call

to

the

substantially
They
that

governor’s

the

same

argument

contend

that

there

was

Bralley

was

aware

of

office.

(Doc.

170

at

2

(“Plaintiffs did not even attempt to present any direct evidence
that Bralley was aware that they called the Governor’s office,
or anyone else, to report the alleged criminal misconduct.”).)
Plaintiffs’ evidence at trial, however, mirrored the forecast of
evidence at summary judgment and was sufficient to sustain a
verdict by a reasonable jury against Bralley.

Critically, in

addition to establishing close proximity between the call and
their terminations, Plaintiffs presented evidence from which a
reasonably

jury

could

infer

that

Bralley

was

aware

of

Plaintiffs,

the

Plaintiffs’ involvement in the call.
Viewed

in

the

light

most
5

favorable

to

evidence at trial showed the following:

Hunter, Medlin, and

Donathan had been officers with the MPD for twenty-seven years,
five years, and thirteen years, respectively.

Their written

service

and

records

were

essentially

unblemished,

received several awards and commendations.

they

had

In December 2011,

Plaintiffs set out to expose what they viewed as corruption and
other

malfeasance

efforts

in

anonymous,

the

MPD.

Hunter

In

had

an

his

effort

to

daughter

disposable, prepaid “TracFone” cellphone.

keep

their

purchase

a

On December 14, 2011,

Plaintiffs used the TracFone to call the governor’s office and
report the alleged corruption.

The governor’s office in turn

noted Plaintiffs’ complaint and communicated the TracFone number
to the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (“SBI”) for
follow-up.
Between December 19 and 22, Medlin observed SBI Agent D.J.
Smith enter the MPD holding a small slip of paper.

Agent Smith

asked to speak with Chief Cook, but instead spoke with Cook’s
second-in-command, Daniel Matthews.

Medlin heard Matthews call

to the secretary to get Chief Cook on the phone.
Cook

was

reached

by

phone,

Medlin

Matthews rush out of the MPD together.
to

believe

that

Plaintiffs’

observed

After Chief

Agent

Smith

and

This activity led Medlin

involvement

in

the

call

to

the

governor’s office had been exposed.
Davie

County

Sheriff

Deputy
6

Chris

Shuskey

established

a

second link between the TracFone number and the MPD.

In the

week before Christmas 2011, Agent Smith gave the TracFone number
to Deputy Shuskey and explained that the cellphone had been used
to allege misconduct against Chief Cook and the MPD.
Smith

asked

Shuskey

to

determine

the

owner

of

the

Agent
phone.

Shuskey ran the number through various databases and determined
that the subscriber was an Hispanic female.

He then contacted

MPD Detective Nelson Turrentine and relayed what Agent Smith had
communicated to him.

Detective Turrentine did not recognize the

number but he did recognize the name of the Hispanic female, who
had

recently

been

in

a

traffic

stop

with

Hunter’s

nephew.

Shuskey later communicated to Agent Smith that his investigation
suggested a connection to the nephew.

In addition, Detective

Turrentine testified at trial that if he knew he had a phone
number connected to allegations of corruption at the MPD, he
would be expected to provide it to Chief Cook.
Despite purchasing the TracFone to assure anonymity, Medlin
and Donathan inadvertently made calls to the TracFone from their
MPD-issued cell phones.
cellphone
Donathan

records
to

the

(Pl. Ex. 14.)

logged

TracFone.

these

Consequently, the Town’s

(Id.)

calls
The

and

tied

evidence

Medlin
showed

and
that

Bralley played a key role in obtaining these phone records just
before the terminations.
Bralley was Chief Cook’s immediate supervisor, and in that
7

capacity

she

Plaintiffs’

had

the

ultimate

termination.

authority

On

December

to
27,

approve
two

or

days

stop

before

Plaintiffs’ terminations, Bralley made at least six calls to
Sprint, the cellphone service provider, in an effort to obtain
the

Town’s

telephone

billing

statement

for

the

November

December 2011 (“December statement”) billing period.

to

Absent her

calls to Sprint, Bralley would not ordinarily expect to receive
the December statement until it would arrive by mail a couple of
days later.
Sprint

(Pl. Ex. 14.)

representative,

Further, while talking with the

Bralley

did

not

provide

a

call-back

number and resisted providing the phone number on the account.
Bralley ultimately gained expedited access to the December
statement, which was dated December 27.

The statement detailed

multiple

between

outgoing

and

incoming

calls

Medlin’s

Donathan’s MPD-issued cellphones and the TracFone.
(MOCK

2173,

Donathan

2178).)

used

his

Moreover,
cell

phone

Bralley

told

thirty-seven

(Pl. Ex. 14

Chief
hours,

and

Cook

that

which

was

reflected by the December statement and ultimately was asserted
as a ground for his termination.

(Id. (Mock 2153).)

Bralley

conceded that she made an extraordinary effort to obtain the
December statement, but nevertheless attributed her urgency to a
six-month review of the Town’s cellphone plan that was underway.
The jury, however, was not required to credit this testimony.
It instead could have inferred that her actions showed urgency
8

to determine whether any MPD officer (other than Hunter, who was
implicated by the Shuskey-Turrentine inquiry) was connected to
the TracFone.
Moreover, Bralley’s review of the December Sprint statement
for

links

to

the

TracFone

was

important

to

Chief

Cook’s

liability, as it provided an evidentiary basis for the chief’s
knowledge

of

TracFone. 2

and

Donathan’s

with

the

For example, Medlin’s and Donathan’s termination

listed

termination.

“Been

Insubordinate”

(Pl. Exs. 13, 30.)

“Rumored

False

Deter

mental

ground

for

termination.

(Pl.

his
to

the

MPD

on

the

as

a

ground

for

their

Hunter’s termination notice

listed

memorandum

involvement

And the circumstantial evidence against Chief Cook

was strong.
notices

Medlin’s

day

[sic]
Ex.
of

information”

22.)

Chief

Plaintiffs’

as

a

Cook’s

termination

warned remaining officers that “[a]ny further rumors will be
dealt

with

swiftly.”

(Pl.

Ex.

26.)

Davie

County

District

Attorney Gary Frank even testified that Chief Cook called him
the day after Plaintiffs’ termination and said “you just can’t
have people constantly undercutting you and causing problems.”

2

There was evidence that Hunter and Medlin were close. Therefore, one
plausible theory is that Chief Cook inferred Medlin’s involvement in
the call from Hunter’s involvement (as revealed by the ShuskeyTurrentine inquiry).
But Donathan was not so inherently linked.
In
fact, there was evidence that a month before Donathan’s termination
Chief Cook promoted him to lieutenant and told him to keep in line
with the politics of the MPD.

9

Accordingly,

the

totality

of

the

evidence

presented

at

trial, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, was
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Bralley knew of
Plaintiffs’ call to the governor’s office and would not have
terminated

Plaintiffs

but

for

it.

Consequently,

Bralley’s

renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law will be denied.
B.
Next,
equitable

Equitable Relief
the

court

relief.

must

Where

consider

a

plaintiff

Plaintiffs’
has

been

request
discharged

for
in

violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983, the law
seeks to place him in the position he would have occupied absent
the unconstitutional discharge.

See Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928

F.2d 1413, 1423 (4th Cir. 1991); Squires v. Bonser, 54 F.3d 168,
172 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Under Title VII, the statute’s make-whole
purpose ‘is shown by the very fact that Congress took care to
arm the courts with full equitable powers.’

The same is true

under § 1983.” (internal citations omitted)).

Reinstatement and

front pay fulfill the make-whole goal of § 1983 by accounting
for losses past the time of judgment.

See Uniroyal, 928 F.2d at

1423-24; Squires, 54 F.3d at 172-73; see also Pollard v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001) (“[F]ront pay is
simply money awarded for lost compensation during the period
between

judgment

reinstatement.”).

and

reinstatement

or

in

lieu

of

In the Fourth Circuit, both are considered
10

equitable remedies that must be decided by the court. 3

Uniroyal,

928 F.2d at 1424.
Reinstatement

is

the

much-preferred

remedy.

Id.

In

certain circumstances, however, reinstatement may be “impossible
or inappropriate.”

Id. at 1423.

Reinstatement has been found

to be “inappropriate when the litigation itself created such
animosity
employee

between

the

relationship

parties
was

that

irreparably

any

potential

damaged.”

employer-

Id.

(citing

Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp, 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir.
1984)); E.E.O.C. v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 763 F.2d
1166, 1172 (10th Cir. 1985).

It has also been found to be

inappropriate when there is no comparable position and creating
a

position

would

require

displacement

3

of

innocent

parties.

Although Plaintiffs concede that front pay on their federal claim was
an issue for the court, they contend that front pay on their State-law
claims was an issue for the jury. Plaintiffs rely on Blakeley v. Town
of Taylortown, 233 N.C. App. 441, 756 S.E.2d 878 (2014). There, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals found future lost wages to be a form
of actual damages. Id. at 451, 756 S.E.2d at 885-86. Other courts,
however, have recognized that front pay and future lost wages are
different remedies. See, e.g., Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d
944, 954 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he calculation of front pay differs
significantly from the calculation of lost future earnings.
Whereas
front pay compensates the plaintiff for earnings from her old job for
as long as she may have been expected to hold it, a lost future
earnings award compensates the plaintiff for the diminution in
expected earnings in all of her future jobs for as long as the
reputational or other injury may be expected to affect her
prospects.”). In fact, it is clear that front pay was not submitted
to the jury in Blakeley, as the plaintiff moved for “equitable relief
of front pay in lieu of reinstatement” after the jury returned its
verdict.
233 N.C. App. at 445, 756 S.E.2d at 881.
The court
therefore concludes that front pay is an equitable remedy for the
court to decide on Plaintiffs’ federal and State-law claims.

11

Uniroyal, 928 F.2d at 1423; Roush v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 10
F.3d 392, 398 (6th Cir. 1993) (reinstatement inappropriate where
“reinstatement

would

require

displacement

of

a

non-culpable

employee”).
A review of the complete record convinces the court that
reinstatement would be inappropriate in this case.
have

presented

evidence

that

there

is

no

Defendants

full-time

position

available in the Town and that the Town would have to terminate
current employees to reinstate Plaintiffs.
Doc. 170-2 at 1.)

(Doc. 170-1 at 1;

Defendants have also presented evidence that

a working relationship would be infeasible in light of all that
has

transpired.

(Doc.

170-1

at

1;

Doc.

170-2

at

1-2.)

Plaintiffs and several current MPD employees testified against
each other at trial, and Defendants have presented evidence that
mutual trust is vital to effective police work.
2.)

(Doc. 170-2 at

Although Cook is no longer the chief of the MPD, Bralley is

still the town manager.

(Id.)

obstacle to reinstatement.

This is perhaps the greatest

In fact, Plaintiffs acknowledge that

“reinstatement may not be feasible” “[u]nless the town decides
to terminate the employment of defendant Bralley or remove her
from

any

indirect.”

position

of

authority

over

plaintiffs,

(Doc. 175 at 2; Doc. 171 at 7.)

direct

or

The court is not

aware of any authority to require the Town to terminate Bralley,
and given her position as Town manager, this court is unaware of
12

any Town position that is not in her chain of command.
record,

the

parties

are

effectively

in

On this

agreement

that

reinstatement is infeasible, and the court agrees.
Because reinstatement is infeasible, the court must next
consider

if

and

to

what

extent

an

necessary to make Plaintiffs whole.
(stating

that

front

pay

may

of

front

pay

is

Uniroyal, 928 F.2d at 1424

serve

reinstatement is not practical).

award

as

a

substitute

where

Although the jury reached an

advisory verdict on a front pay award for each Plaintiff under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c), such an advisory verdict
“is of no binding legal significance,” and this court remains
obligated to make its own findings.

9 Charles A. Wright et al.,

Federal Practice & Procedure § 2335 (3d ed. 2008 and Supp. 2016)
(stating

that

courts

finding

that

deference

is

owed

to

an

advisory jury verdict “misconceive the function of an advisory
jury and seem to overlook the complete freedom the trial judge
has in using or disregarding its findings). 4
An award of front pay is inherently speculative because it
necessarily involves conjecture as to future events.

Uniroyal,

928 F.2d at 1423; Ford v. Rigidply Rafters, Inc., 984 F. Supp.
386,

392

(D.

Md.

1997).

These

include

questions

such

as

“whether the discharged employee will ever work again despite
4

Even if some deference were owed the advisory jury’s findings, the
court would still reach the same conclusions for the reasons noted.

13

his best efforts or will obtain gainful employment in two years,
or

immediately.”

potential

for

“tempered.”

a

Uniroyal,
windfall,

Id. at 1424.

providing

the

calculate

a

DiMario,

287

court

“with

reasonably
F.3d

928
the

use

at
of

1423.
front

Given
pay

must

its
be

A plaintiff bears the burden of
the

certain

1121,

F.2d

1129

essential
front

pay

(D.C.

Cir.

data

necessary

award,”
2002)

Peyton

to
v.

(citations

omitted), and courts “must judiciously scrutinize the record to
determine whether future events are sufficiently predictable to
justify” an award of front pay, Taylor v. Republic Servs., Inc.,
968 F. Supp. 2d 768, 802 (E.D. Va. 2013) (quoting Ford, 984 F.
Supp. at 392).
There is no bright line test for awarding front pay.
Uniroyal,

928

F.2d

at

1423.

“The

appropriate

method

See
for

addressing the difficult question of providing a remedy that
anticipates potential future losses requires an analysis of all
the circumstances existing at the time of trial . . .”

Id.

“The Fourth Circuit has not specifically enumerated a list of
factors to consider in deciding to award front pay.”
F. Supp. at 392; Taylor, 968 F. Supp. 2d at 802.

Ford, 984

Other courts,

however, including a meticulous survey by the Northern District
of Iowa in Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (N.D.
Iowa 1998), have looked to the following non-exhaustive list of
factors:
14

•

The plaintiff’s age. “The longer a proposed front pay
period, the more speculative the damages become.” McKnight
v. GM, 973 F.2d 1366, 1372 (7th Cir. 1992); Uniroyal, 928
F.2d at 1424 (“If a plaintiff is close to retirement, front
pay may be the only practical approach.”); Peyton, 287 F.3d
at 1128-29; Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1280 (D.C.
Cir. 1995); Ogden, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-15; Ford, 984 F.
Supp. at 392 (considering the “time period of the award”).

•

The length of time the plaintiff was employed by the
defendant employer. The longer the plaintiff was employed,
the more reasonable it is to infer that the plaintiff would
have continued with the defendant employer absent unlawful
discharge.
See Barbour, 48 F.3d at 1280; Ogden, 29 F.
Supp. 2d at 1012-15, 1017 (collecting cases).

•

The likelihood the plaintiff’s employment would have
continued absent the discrimination. If the record evidence
suggests the plaintiff would have been unlikely to remain
in the position even absent the unlawful discharge, this
weighs against a front pay award. See Barbour, 48 F.3d at
1280; Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923
(6th Cir. 1984) (noting circumstances made it possible the
plaintiff would have been lawfully terminated prior to his
mandatory retirement date); Ogden, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 101215 (collecting cases).

•

The length of time it will take the plaintiff, using
reasonable effort, to secure comparable employment. If the
plaintiff has the skill set and qualifications to secure
comparable employment through reasonable effort moving
forward, then this weighs against a long term front pay
award. See Barbour, 48 F.3d at 1280; Ogden, 29 F. Supp. 2d
at 1012-15 (collecting cases); Ford, 984 F. Supp. at 392;
Snow v. Pillsbury Co., 650 F. Supp. 299, 300 (D. Minn.
1986).
If the plaintiff has become incapacitated by the
employer’s wrongful conduct, a long term award may be
warranted.
See Gotthardt v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
191 F.3d 1148, 1156-57 (9th Cir 1999).

•

The plaintiff’s work life expectancy.
An award beyond a
plaintiff’s work life expectancy is more speculative than
an award within it. See Ogden, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-15
(collecting cases).

15

•

The length of time other employees typically held the
position lost. If the position is not typically held for a
long duration or beyond a certain age, this weighs against
a front pay award beyond that term.
See Barbour, 48 F.3d
at 1280; Ogden, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-15.

•

The plaintiff’s status as an at-will employee.
F. Supp. 2d at 1012-15 (collecting cases).

•

The plaintiff’s ability to work, including the ability to
work for the defendant employer. Id.

•

The plaintiff’s subjective intention to remain in the
position.
If the plaintiff intended to remain in the
position long term, then a front pay award is more
reasonable.
See Barbour, 48 F.3d at 1280; Ford, 984 F.
Supp. at 392; and

•

The plaintiff’s efforts to mitigate damages.
If the
defendant can show that the plaintiff failed to make a
reasonable effort to mitigate damages, then an award of
front pay is inappropriate. See Barbour, 48 F.3d at 1280;
Ogden, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-15, 1018 (collecting cases) 5;
Ford, 984 F. Supp. at 389.

Ogden, 29

With these factors in mind, the court turns to an analysis
of

all

the

circumstances

existing

at

the

time

of

trial

to

determine what, if any, front pay award should be made to each
Plaintiff.

Uniroyal, 928 F.2d at 1423.
1.

Hunter

Age and work life expectancy: Hunter was age fifty-four at
the time of his termination and fifty-nine at the time of trial.
(Pl. Exs. 37A-2, 37A-6b.)

The jury recommended a front pay

5

Ogden indicated that some courts have considered an award of punitive
damages to be relevant to the appropriateness of front pay. However,
this court agrees with Ogden that punitive damages are intended to
punish and deter the defendant, whereas an award of front pay is
intended to make the plaintiff whole. 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1019.

16

award

of

5.35

years

until

Hunter

reached

expectancy of 64.39 in the year 2021.
37A-6b.)
See

his

work

life

(Doc. 167 at 2; Pl. Ex.

Hunter’s age weighs in favor of a front pay award.

Uniroyal,

928

F.2d

at

1423

(“[W]hen

the

period

for

reinstatement was expected to be a relatively short one, such as
if the plaintiff was close to retirement, the strong preference
in favor of reinstatement has been found to be neutralized by
the increased certainty of the potential loss of pay, permitting
consideration of a front pay award.”); Davis, 742 F.2d at 923
(upholding front pay award to fifty-nine year-old, but noting
that

awarding

front

pay

to

forty-one

year-old

until

time

he

qualifies for a pension might be unwarranted).
Length of time employed: At the time of his termination,
Hunter had served in the MPD for twenty-seven years.

He was

three months from being eligible to retire and three years from
being eligible to retire with full retirement status.
at 4; Doc. 175 at 4.)

(Doc. 172

The long duration of Hunter’s service and

his proximity to retirement weigh in favor of a front pay award.
Likelihood of continued employment, ability to work, and
status as at-will employee:
the

time

Plaintiffs’

of

his
call

Hunter was a major in the MPD at

termination.
to

the

In

November

governor’s

office,

2011,
Chief

before
Cook

reorganized the MPD chain of command and removed Hunter from
supervising

other

officers.

(Pl.
17

Ex.

11.)

Chief

Cook

attributed this change to officer complaints of an inability to
work for Hunter.

This reorganization (which Hunter viewed as a

demotion) occurred prior to the call to the governor’s office
and therefore could not have been caused by it.

This is some

evidence that Hunter’s status at the MPD was trending downward
prior to his having engaged in the protected activity.

This

weighs somewhat against a front pay award.
There was also evidence that in December 2011 Hunter had
allowed a local business owner, who (unbeknownst to Hunter) was
under investigation by the Davie County Sheriff, to walk out of
Hunter’s
explained

MPD

office

that

this

with

illegal

decision

drugs.

reflected

Although
the

fact

Hunter

that

the

controlled substance had only recently been scheduled as illegal
and the business owner (who consequently sought to return them
for a refund) lacked the requisite intent, Chief Cook could have
fired him on this basis.

In fact, in light of Hunter’s status

as an at-will employee, Chief Cook could have fired Hunter for
any reason other than the unlawful reason the jury found was the
basis for his termination.

This also weighs somewhat against a

front pay award.
On the other hand and aside from these incidents, Hunter’s
service record was effectively unblemished and in fact supported
by several awards and commendations.

Moreover, the evidence

showed that Chief Cook had never terminated an officer of the
18

MPD.
For

And this was not due to a perfectly-behaved department.
example,

one

MPD

officer

was

involved

in

a

hit-and-run

accident while intoxicated and on duty but was not disciplined;
instead, he was ordered not to return to work until he was
sober.
at

Another time, the same officer recklessly pointed a gun

random

members

of

the

public

because they were “looking at him.”
allowed to voluntarily resign.

walking

down

the

sidewalk

That officer was eventually

The evidence showed that Chief

Cook was willing to tolerate a lot of behavior, but just not, as
the jury found, a call to the governor’s office about corruption
in the MPD implicating the chief.

This strongly suggests that

if Hunter had accepted his new non-supervisory position in the
MPD, he likely would not have been terminated.

This weighs in

favor of a front pay award.
Despite his current age of fifty-nine, it also appears that
Hunter is still capable of doing the job from which he was
terminated.

He

responsibilities

has
at

asked

the

for

time

reinstatement.

Hunter’s

his

included

of

termination

overseeing the MPD vehicle fleet, training officers, and working
cases.

(Pl. Ex. 11.)

responsibilities,

as

This represented a decrease in Hunter’s
he

previously

supervising other officers.
to

suggest

become

that

incapable

Hunter
of

had

(Pl. Ex. 9.)

presently

performing
19

is

these

been

tasked

with

There is no evidence

incapable
tasks.

or
This

soon

will

weighs

in

favor of a front pay award.
Ability to obtain comparable employment and the plaintiff’s
efforts

to

termination,

mitigate
Hunter

damages:

began

enforcement positions.

to

Three

look

for

months

other

after

supervisory

his
law

He applied to over sixty law enforcement

agencies across the state.

(Pl. Ex. 24.)

received three to five applications.

In response, he

All of the positions were

entry level, did not offer comparable salary, were located far
away, and would have required Hunter to uproot himself and his
young

son

from

Mocksville.

He

did

not

receive

a

single

interview or job offer for a position comparable to the one he
lost.

But even if he had, the MPD indicated on Hunter’s F5

personnel form that he was not eligible for rehire.

The F5 form

is sent to the agency that oversees police officers in North
Carolina and would have been available to prospective employers.
Plaintiffs’ police expert testified that this alone would stand
as

a

substantial

barrier

to

gaining

employment

with

another

agency.
Nine

months

after

his

termination,

balance of his retirement account.

Hunter

withdrew

the

Defendants contend that by

withdrawing his retirement benefits, Hunter retired (Doc. 172 at
4) and that any liability is precluded beyond the date of this
event (Doc. 170 at 8).

Defendants argue that Hunter’s behavior

is analogous to that in Roush v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 10 F.3d
20

392

(6th

Cir.

1993).

In

Roush,

the

plaintiff

comparable job following her wrongful discharge.

obtained

a

Id. at 400.

When her new employer reduced her hours, she elected to receive
social

security

employment.

Id.

benefits

rather

than

seeking

alternative

The court found front pay to be inappropriate

as a matter of law in light of this fact.

Id.

Here, by

contrast, Hunter applied to dozens of agencies across the state
but eventually was forced to accept that, in light of his age,
prior position, and termination, the only way to sustain himself
and

his

young

son

was

to

withdraw

his

retirement

benefits.

Prior to the withdrawal of funds, Hunter was living in a motel,
and he has now depleted his retirement account.

Hunter credibly

denied that he had actually retired or voluntarily taken himself
out of the workforce.
Hunter

continued

to
and

As he had done before his termination,
obtain

supplemental

teaching

classes

income
a

local

refereeing

sporting

events

college.

These activities were not sufficient to sustain Hunter

once he lost his job at the MPD.

at

by

community

In light of the evidence

presented at trial, Defendants have failed to show that Hunter
“did not exert reasonable efforts to mitigate [his] damages,”
Edwards v. Sch. Bd. of City of Norton, Va., 658 F.2d 951, 956
(4th Cir. 1981), or that the withdrawal of his retirement funds
stands as a bar to an award of front pay.

21

Length of time other employees typically held the position
lost and subjective intention to remain:

Plaintiffs’ expert has

pegged Hunter’s work life expectancy to the work life expectancy
of all active males.
that

this

is

(Pl. Ex. 37A-2 n.6.)

inappropriate

because

Defendants contend

police

officers

retire at earlier ages than the average active male.
at 5.)

tend

to

(Doc. 172

This may be true, but Defendants have not cited to any

persuasive evidence to support this claim.
during

cross-examination

Defendants
officers

asked

to

whether

retire

at

of
it

a

(E.g., id.)

Plaintiffs’
is

“fairly

“fairly

young

Rather,

police

typical”
age.”

expert,

for

police

Contrary

to

agreeing, the expert instead denied knowing whether that was
typical

or

not.

As

a

result,

this

court

has

no

reliable

evidence on how long other employees typically held the position
that

Hunter

lost.

What

the

court

does

have

is

conflicting

evidence on how long Hunter intended to remain at the MPD.

On

cross-examination, Hunter testified that his goal was to “stay
to reach 30 years [of service] and retire.”

This testimony

suggests a front pay award is unwarranted, as Hunter’s back pay
award covered the date he would have reached thirty years of
service

on

October

28,

2015.

On

redirect,

however,

Hunter

testified that, while he would have been eligible to retire with
thirty

years

of

service,

his

intention

at

the

time

of

his

termination was to stay with the MPD for as long as he possibly
22

could.

Hunter thus argues that a front pay award to his work

life expectancy of 64.39 is warranted.
Based

on

all

the

evidence

presented,

including

Hunter’s

reduction in responsibilities within the MPD, the court finds
that a front pay award between these two dates – that is, just
past age 62 - is proper.

Accordingly, the court finds that a

front pay award of $193,676 6 (equal to 2.75 years of front pay)
is appropriate. 7

(See Pl. Ex. 37A-6b); Snow, 650 F. Supp. at

300-01 (awarding three years of front pay).
2.

Medlin

Age and work life expectancy: Medlin was age forty-four at
the time of his termination and forty-nine at the time of trial.
(Pl. Exs. 37C-2, 37C-6b.)
award

of

13.75

years

-

The jury recommended a front pay
until

Medlin

expectancy of 62.09 in the year 2029.
37C-6b.)

reached

his

work

life

(Doc. 167 at 6; Pl. Ex.

Generally, lifetime awards of front pay are disfavored

for plaintiffs in their forties.

See, e.g., Dotson v. Pfizer,

6

This figure represents the present value of lost earnings and
benefits for 2.75 years of front pay.
(See Doc. 37A-6b.)
It also
appears that Hunter would be entitled to the present value of the loss
of retirement benefits (Id. (Ex. 7)) for the 2.75 year front pay
period. These calculations are not readily apparent from the evidence
submitted by the parties.
As noted in the order at the end of this
memorandum opinion, therefore, the parties are invited to submit this
amount to the court within ten days.
7

In evaluating all the evidence presented, the court has considered
the testimony as to the psychological effects Hunter claims the
discharge had on him.

23

Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 300 (4th Cir. 2009); Peyton, 287 F.3d at
1130 (“[C]ourts seem to agree that plaintiffs in their forties
are

too

young

for

lifetime

front

pay

awards.”

(citations

omitted)); Davis, 742 F.2d at 923 (“[T]he award of front pay to
a discriminatorily discharged 41 year old employee until such
time as he qualifies for a pension might be unwarranted.

On the

other hand, the failure to make such an award for an employee
age 63, likewise discriminatorily discharged, might be an abuse
of

discretion.”);

Stafford

v.

Elec.

Data

Sys.

Corp.,

749

F.

Supp. 781, 788-89 (E.D. Mich. 1990); Foit v. Suburban Bancorp,
549 F. Supp. 264, 267 (D. Md. 1982) (“[T]he plaintiff’s argument
that at age 49 his number of employable years is limited is
somewhat hard to swallow.”).

Medlin’s relative youth therefore

weighs against an extended front pay award.
Length of time employed: At the time of his termination,
Medlin had served in the MPD for over five years. 8

For almost

the last four years of his tenure at the MPD, Medlin served as a
detective.

The duration of Medlin’s service weighs somewhat in

favor of a front pay award.
Likelihood of continued employment, ability to work, and
status as at-will employee:

Medlin was a MPD detective at the

8

Plaintiffs contend that Medlin had served as a detective of the MPD
for seven years. (Doc. 175 at 3.) His testimony made clear that he
“accepted a position at [the] Mocksville Police Department June 26,
2006,” and was terminated on December 29, 2011.

24

time of his termination.

(Pl. Ex. 11.)

His service record was

effectively unblemished, and he had received several awards and
commendations.
rates

among

Medlin had one of the highest case clearance

MPD

detectives.

Unlike

Hunter,

Medlin

was

not

affected in rank or stature by the November 2011 restructuring. 9
(Pl.

Ex.

11.)

His

status

as

an

at-will

employee

made

him

subject to discharge for any lawful reason but, as noted above,
Chief

Cook

had

never

terminated

Plaintiffs’ terminations.
not that,

but

for

his

an

MPD

officer

prior

to

Accordingly, it is more likely than

wrongful

discharge,

Medlin

would

have

remained a detective with the MPD for the foreseeable future.
Ability to obtain comparable employment and the plaintiff’s
efforts to mitigate damages: Following his termination from the
MPD, Medlin applied to over twenty law enforcement agencies for
predominantly entry level positions.

Medlin continued to pursue

these applications for more than a year.

He targeted agencies

within driving distance of his home in Mocksville because his
children

were

administrative

in

school

assistant

at

and
a

his

wife

had

Winston-Salem

job

radiology

His efforts led to two phone calls in response.
9

a

as

an

office.

One was from

In 2009, Medlin made certain allegations of impropriety against Chief
Cook to Bralley. (Pl. Ex. 3.) As a result, Chief Cook demoted him to
patrol.
(Pl. Ex. 4.)
Medlin filed a formal grievance with Bralley
and she subsequently reinstated him as a detective.
(Pl. Ex. 5.)
This incident occurred years prior to Medlin’s termination and does
not support an inference that Medlin would have been lawfully
terminated notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ call to the governor’s office.

25

the Asheboro Police Department (“APD”), which showed interest
but would have required Medlin to live within twenty minutes of
its

department

located

about

an

hour

away

from

Mocksville.

Medlin viewed this opportunity as infeasible given that it would
have required him to uproot his family.
The second phone call was from the Winston-Salem Police
Department

(“WSPD”).

During

a

phone

conversation,

a

WSPD

recruiter told Medlin that if he were to receive a position at
the WSPD he would have to complete their six- to eight-month
academy.

The recruiter never offered Medlin a job or invited

him to attend the academy; he was merely describing openings and
the process to apply.

Medlin decided not to pursue a position

at the WSPD for at least two reasons.
WSPD

academy,

he

would

have

been

First, by attending the
repeating

the

basic

law

enforcement training (“BLET”) certification that he had already
completed prior to working for the MPD.

Second, because Medlin

paid for his BLET training prior to working for the MPD, he
assumed the six to eight months at the WSPD academy would be
unpaid.

This belief was likely erroneous, as Plaintiffs’ police

expert testified that large agencies such as the WSPD actually
pay for and provide benefits to individuals completing BLET.
Medlin conceded that he did not ask the WSPD recruiter whether
such pay and benefits would have been provided and, if that were

26

the

case,

in

hindsight

he

should

have

investigated

the

WSPD

opportunity further.
After following up on his law enforcement applications for
over a year, Medlin felt compelled to withdraw his retirement
funds

in

2013

and

started

a

bail

bondsman

business.

The

business started off well but has “dropped off considerably”
over time.

Medlin attributes this drop off to local knowledge

about the stated reason for his termination and the Davie County
sheriff’s statement to deputies not to work with him.

Medlin is

still a licensed bondsman and still operates his bail bondsman
business.

However, Plaintiffs’ financial expert testified that

his business was not profitable, and Medlin showed a loss from
it on his tax returns.
Defendants

contend

that

Medlin

has

“abandoned”

his

bail

bondsman business and that his failure to more vigorously pursue
an opportunity with the WSPD precludes an award of front pay.
(Doc. 170 at 8.)
context.

The court disagrees given the surrounding

As noted above, Medlin has not abandoned his bail

bondsman business; it is just unprofitable, and he is taking a
loss from it.

Moreover, Medlin’s application to the WSPD does

not present a situation where Medlin “refus[ed] a substantially
equivalent job.”
Inc.,

822

plaintiff’s

F.2d

Dominic v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York,
1249,

refusal

of

1258
a

(2d

Cir.

1987)

substantially
27

(stating

equivalent

that

job

a

would

constitute a failure to mitigate damages and foreclose any front
pay award).

Medlin never received an interview, an invitation

to the WSPD academy, or a job offer from the WSPD.

Medlin’s

conversation with the WSPD recruiter occurred relatively early
in his mitigation efforts.

He had applied to approximately two

dozen agencies and had yet to realize the true effect of his
termination on his future job prospects.

As a result, he quite

reasonably assumed that the position at the WSPD requiring six
to eight months of retraining would not be his only opportunity.
Moreover, given that Medlin had previously paid for his own BLET
training and only worked in small agencies, his assumption that
he

would

not

be

paid

to

complete

the

WSPD

academy

was

not

unreasonable and thus not a liability severing event.
Nevertheless, the fact that Medlin’s bail bondsman business
was once profitable and his dealings with the WSPD are relevant
to the appropriate duration of any front pay that is awarded.
See Dominic, 822 F.2d at 1258 (“[T]he court must estimate the
plaintiff’s ability to mitigate damages in the future. . . .
[The district court did not abuse its discretion] in finding
that

two

years

was

a

reasonable

amount

of

time

for

[the

plaintiff] to find comparable employment.”); Mattenson v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 438 F.3d 673, 771 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding
that

a

fifty-one

year-old

plaintiff’s

failure

to

obtain

a

position based on twenty-three applications did not entitle him
28

to a front pay award until age sixty-five “in order that he can
play

golf

eight

hours

a

day”);

Snow,

650

(“[P]laintiff can secure other employment.

F.

Supp.

at

300

He looks presentable

and healthy. . . . [A]n award of almost nine years would be
inappropriate

and

speculative.”).

Despite

his

F5

indicating

that he was ineligible for rehire, Medlin received interest from
two police agencies soon after being terminated.

His prospects

have only improved as a result of the jury’s verdict in this
case,

as

any

cloud

over

his

reputation

as

a

result

of

his

termination and this litigation should be lifted by the jury’s
finding that he was wrongfully discharged.

The fact that he had

the skill and ability to start a business that was at least
temporarily

profitable

also

speaks

to

his

future

prospects.

Accordingly, although Defendants have failed to show that Medlin
“did not exert reasonable efforts to mitigate [his] damages,”
Edwards, 658 F.2d at 956, Medlin’s age and mitigation efforts
suggest that his prospects of obtaining comparable employment
moving forward are good.

In light of these factors, a long term

front pay award would create a substantial risk of a windfall
for Medlin.
Length of time other employees typically held the position
lost and subjective intention to remain:

As noted above, there

is no evidence of how long other employees typically held the
position

that

Medlin

lost.

All
29

the

available

evidence,

including the fact that Chief Cook had never terminated an MPD
police officer, suggests that Medlin would likely have remained
with the MPD for the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, Medlin’s

relative youth and the circumstances surrounding his mitigation
efforts weigh strongly against a long term front pay award.
The totality of the evidence suggests that Medlin will be
able

to

secure

comparable

reasonable diligence.

employment

moving

forward

through

The court therefore considers a front pay

award of $85,360 10 (equal to 1.75 years of front pay) to be
appropriate. 11
two

year

See, e.g., Dominic, 822 F.2d at 1258 (upholding

front

pay

award);

Snow,

650

F.

Supp.

at

300-01

(awarding three years of front pay); Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln
Nat’l Corp, 649 F. Supp. 647, 664 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (awarding two
years of front pay), aff’d, 834 F.2d 1373 (7th Cir. 1987).
3.

Donathan

Age and work life expectancy: Donathan was age thirty-six
at the time of his termination and forty-one at the time of

10

This figure represents the present value of lost earnings and
benefits for 1.75 years of front pay.
(See Doc. 37C-6b.)
It also
appears that Medlin would be entitled to the present value of the loss
of retirement benefits (Id. (Ex. 7)) and loss of supplemental
separation allowance (id. (Ex. 8)) for the 1.75 year front pay period.
As noted in the court’s order, the parties are invited to submit this
amount to the court within ten days.
11

In evaluating all of the evidence presented, the court has
considered testimony that Medlin is currently being treated for an
anxiety disorder and a major depressive disorder as a result of his
discharge.

30

trial.

(Pl. Exs. 37B-2, 37B-6b.)

The jury recommended a front

pay award of 19.73 years until Donathan reaches his work life
expectancy of age 60.50 in the year 2035.
Ex. 37B-6b.)

(Doc. 167 at 4; Pl.

As noted above, lifetime awards of front pay are

disfavored for plaintiffs in their forties.

See, e.g., Dotson,

558 F.3d at 300; Peyton, 287 F.3d at 1130; Davis, 742 F.2d at
923; Stafford, 749 F. Supp. at 788-89; Foit, 549 F. Supp. at
267.

Donathan’s youth, even as compared to Medlin’s, weighs

strongly against a long term front pay award.
Length of time employed: At the time of his termination,
Donathan had served in the MPD for approximately thirteen years.
(Doc. 175 at 5.)

The duration of Donathan’s service weighs in

favor of a front pay award.
Likelihood of continued employment, ability to work, and
status as at-will employee:

Donathan was a lieutenant in the

MPD at the time of his termination, having been promoted one
month prior to his termination as part of the November 2011
restructuring, and Chief Cook told him he hoped to see him in a
captain’s position one day.

(Pl. Ex. 11.)

Donathan’s service

record was effectively unblemished, and he had received several
awards and commendations, including an award for “officer of the
year” in 2000.
never

He was an at-will employee, but Chief Cook had

terminated

terminations.

an

MPD

officer

prior

to

Plaintiffs’

Accordingly, it is more likely than not that, but
31

for his wrongful discharge, Donathan would have remained as a
lieutenant with the MPD for the foreseeable future.
Ability to obtain comparable employment and the plaintiff’s
efforts to mitigate damages: Following his termination, Donathan
applied

to

twenty-eight

state.

(Pl. Ex. 31.)

law

enforcement

agencies

across

the

He decided not to pursue an application

with the Statesville Police Department (“SPD”) after learning
that

officers

months

after

Burlington

were

required

his

termination,

Police

Department

to

share

take-home

Donathan

(“BPD”)

as

was
a

cars.
hired

patrol

Eight
by

the

officer.

Because the BPD required officers to live within thirty minutes
of

the

city

Burlington. 12

of

Burlington,

Donathan

for

his

wife

moved

to

Donathan listed his family’s house for sale in

Mocksville, but it did not sell.
paying

and

rent

in

Burlington,

He testified that, between
paying

for

a

mortgage

in

Mocksville, and his other costs of living, his expenses were
substantially greater than what he was making at the BPD. This
caused him to leave the BPD after six months and seek more
sustainable employment.

In the interim, Donathan stayed on as a

reserve officer with the BPD and applied to police departments

12

Donathan owned a graphics design business that he sold to another
individual when he moved to Burlington.
Donathan testified that the
business was more of a hobby than a money-maker. His wife testified
that she worked at the business but “didn’t get a paycheck.”
Defendants failed to establish that the graphics design business was a
viable alternative to moving to Burlington.

32

near

Mocksville.

Salisbury

He

Police

Department

received

interviews

Department,

(“KPD”).

His

and

the

interviews

from

job

offer

from

any

agency

and

SPD,

Kernersville
went

well

termination and this litigation were raised.
a

the

the

Police

until

his

He did not receive

eventually

retirement benefits to sustain his family.

withdrew

his

Donathan has since

begun a school program in computer programming and coding.
Defendants contend that Donathan’s voluntary departure from
the BPD and failure to pursue a position with the SPD bars any
front pay award.

(Doc. 170 at 8.)

The court disagrees.

It is

true that Defendants’ cross-examination of Plaintiffs’ financial
expert

demonstrated

that

Donathan’s

losses

would

have

been

smaller had he remained with the BPD, but it did not show that
continuing with the BPD was sustainable for Donathan.

Donathan

left the BPD because his house would not sell and his living
expenses

exceeded

his

pay.

The

court

does

not

find

it

unreasonable that he reduced his status to that of a reserve
officer,

moved

expenses,

and

back

sought

to
other

Mocksville
employment

to
in

reduce
hopes

duplicative
of

finding

a

sustainable financial situation for his family.
Donathan’s failure to pursue an application with the SPD in
the first instance also does not bar a front pay award.

First,

as Donathan testified, the SPD had a hiring freeze in effect at
this

time.

Second,

this

decision
33

occurred

during

the

same

application process that resulted in a job offer from the BPD.
Finally, even if Donathan did make a mistake by not pursuing an
application

with

the

SPD

in

the

first

instance,

repeat this mistake after leaving the BPD.

he

did

not

He applied to and

interviewed with the SPD but was not offered a position.
Nevertheless, as with Medlin, the fact that Donathan was
hired

by

the

BPD

soon

after

his

termination,

received

three

local interviews after leaving the BPD, and attended school for
computer programing is relevant to the appropriate duration of
any front pay that is awarded.
Snow, 650 F. Supp. at 300.

See Dominic, 822 F.2d at 1258;

Donathan’s F5 may have indicated

that he was ineligible for rehire, but this did not prevent him
from being
skills.
his

by

the

BPD

in

light

of

his

age

and

other

The cloud of this litigation that potentially affected

interview

lifted.
was

hired

with

the

SPD,

Salsbury

PD,

and

KPD

has

been

The jury has vindicated his rights and declared that he

wrongfully

terminated.

This

can

only

employment prospects in law enforcement.

help

his

future

Moreover, a long term

front pay award would create a significant risk of a windfall
given

that

programming.

he

is

currently

pursuing

a

career

in

computer

The court views these factors as weighing against

a long term front pay award.
Length of time other employees typically held the position
lost and subjective intention to remain: Once again, there is no
34

evidence of how long other employees typically held the position
that Donathan lost.

All the available evidence, including the

fact that Chief Cook had never terminated an MPD police officer,
suggests that Donathan would likely have remained with the MPD
for the foreseeable future.

Still, Donathan’s youth, employment

at the BPD, and subsequent education weigh strongly against a
long term front pay award.
The

totality

of

the

evidence

suggests

that

through

reasonable diligence Donathan will be able to secure comparable
employment

moving

forward.

The

court

therefore

considers

a

front pay award of $89,063 13 (equal to 1.75 years of front pay)
to be appropriate. 14
years); Snow,

650

See, e.g., Dominic, 822 F.2d at 1258 (two
F.

Supp.

at

300-01

(three

years);

Reeder-

Baker, 649 F. Supp. at 664 (two years).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated,
IT
judgment

IS
as

THEREFORE

ORDERED

a

of

matter

law

that
as

to

Defendants’
Bralley

is

motion

for

DENIED

and

13

This figure represents the present value of lost earnings and
benefits for 1.75 years of front pay.
(See Doc. 37B-6b.)
It also
appears that Donathan would be entitled to the present value of the
loss of retirement benefit (Id. (Ex. 7)) and loss of supplemental
separation allowance (id. (Ex. 8)) for the 1.75 year front pay period.
As with the other Plaintiffs, the parties are invited to submit this
calculation to the court within ten days.
14

In evaluating of all the evidence presented, the court has
considered testimony that Donathan suffers anxiety and depression as a
result of his discharge.

35

Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment and equitable relief (Doc. 169)
is GRANTED.

Plaintiff Hunter is awarded 2.75 years of front pay

in the amount of $193,676, plus any retirement benefit to be
determined by the court; Plaintiff Medlin is awarded 1.75 years
of front pay in the amount of $85,360, plus any retirement and
supplemental separation allowance to be determined by the court;
and Plaintiff Donathan is awarded 1.75 years of front pay in the
amount

of

$89,063,

plus

any

retirement

and

supplemental

separation allowance to be determined by the court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within ten days of this order
the

parties

calculation

shall
of

the

submit

(jointly,

retirement

and

if

they

agree)

supplemental

their

separation

allowance owed to Plaintiffs Hunter, Medlin, and Donathan, as
noted in this memorandum opinion.

An appropriate judgment will

be entered upon submission of these calculations.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
August 12, 2016

36