MAISHA v. THE UNIVERSITY OF CHAPEL HILL, et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE CATHERINE C. EAGLES on 3/27/2013; that (1) Defendants' motion to dismiss, (Doc. 6 ), is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows. (2) The following claims are DISMISSED: a. Title VI claims against the individual defendants; b. Fourteenth Amendment claims; c. Intentional discrimination claims brought pursuant to the North Carolina Constitution; d. Disparate impact claims; e. Copyright infringement claims; f. Claims of plagiarism and violation of academic integrity policy; g. Breach of employment contract claims; h. Breach of student-university contract claims; i. Intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against all defendants except Professors Fine and Hudgens in their individual capacities; and j. Negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against all defendants except Professors Fine, Hudgens, Preisser, and Qaqish in their individual capacities. (3) Defendants' motion is DENIED as to Mr. Maisha's negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against Professors Fine, Hudgens, Preisser, and Qaqish in their individual capacities and as to Mr. Maisha's intentional infliction of emotional distress claims agains t Professors Fine and Hudgens in their individual capacities. These claims may proceed. (4) The Title VI claim against UNC may proceed, as no motion to dismiss was made in connection with that claim. (5) Mr. Maisha's EEO claims are DISMISS ED. (6) Mr. Maisha is GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint including claims for a. Title VI violations against UNC; b. violations of the Fourteenth Amendment under § 1983 against the individual defendants; c. conversion agains t professors Fine and Hudgens in their individual capacities; d. negligent infliction of emotional distress against Professors Fine, Hudgens, Preisser, and Qaqish in their individual capacities; and e. intentional infliction of emotional distress ag ainst Professors Fine and Hudgens in their individual capacities. The motion to amend is otherwise denied and plaintiff shall not include any claims in the amended complaint other than those specifically authorized by this Order. Any Amended Complaint shall be filed no later than April 12, 2013. (Sheets, Jamie)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
MACKEAN P. NYANGWESO
MAISHA,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH
CAROLINA, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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1:12-CV-371
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Partial Dismissal. (Doc.
6.) Plaintiff MacKean P. Nyangweso Maisha, a former doctoral candidate in biostatistics at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, sued UNC and various UNC employees and
doctoral students for discriminating against him and prohibiting him from obtaining his Ph.D.
(Doc. 1.) The Court will grant the motion to dismiss in part, deny the motion in part, and grant
Mr. Maisha leave to file an amended complaint including the surviving claims.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Maisha transferred to UNC in 2004 to complete his doctorate degree in biostatistics.
(Doc. 1 at ¶ 18.) Over the next eight years, he experienced a series of difficulties and problems
with the university, the faculty, and other students, which the complaint sets forth in substantial
detail. Ultimately, when Mr. Maisha attempted to register for the Spring 2012 semester, he was
told he was no longer a student in the Department of Biostatistics. (Id. at ¶¶ 156-58.)
Mr. Maisha filed suit in this Court, asserting nine causes of action:
(1) “violation of equal educational opportunity,” pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (“EEO”), and the
Fourteenth Amendment;
(2) intentional discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the North
Carolina Constitution’s “law of the land” clause;
(3) disparate impact;
(4) copyright infringement;
(5) plagiarism and “violation of academic integrity policy”;
(6) breach of employment contract;
(7) breach of student-university contract;
(8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and
(9) negligent infliction of emotional distress.
(Id. at ¶¶ 176-234.)
Mr. Maisha seeks a “preliminary and permanent” injunction requiring UNC to re-enroll
him in the biostatistics Ph.D. program without requiring him to take the “DrPH Qualifying
Examination” and requiring the defendants to republish certain works with Mr. Maisha’s name
on them, as well as damages of $75,000 each from UNC, Professor Michael Hudgens, and
Professor Jason Fine and unspecified damages from all of the defendants. (Id. at pp. 31-32.)
The defendants seek to dismiss all claims except the Title VI claim against UNC.
ANALYSIS
I.
Equal Educational Opportunity Claims
Mr. Maisha appears to sue each defendant for discriminating against him, in violation of
Title VI, the Equal Employment Opportunities Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants
move to dismiss these claims except for Mr. Maisha’s Title VI claim against UNC.
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A. Equal Educational Opportunities Act
In his response to Defendants’ motion, Mr. Maisha requests to withdraw his EEO claims.
Accordingly, those claims will be dismissed.
B. Title VI
Title VI generally prohibits federally funded programs and activities from excluding any
person on the basis of race, color, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. “[I]ndividuals may not
be held liable for violations of Title VI because it prohibits discrimination only by recipients of
federal funding.” Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1169 & n.11 (11th Cir. 2003)
(collecting cases); see also Farmer v. Ramsay, 41 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592 (D. Md. 1999). Mr.
Maisha’s reliance on Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003), is misplaced, as the court
there did not reach the question of whether Title VI provides a cause of action against
individuals. Because the individual employee-defendants cannot be held liable under Title VI,
the Court will dismiss Mr. Maisha’s Title VI claims against all defendants except for UNC.
C. Fourteenth Amendment
Defendants move to dismiss Mr. Maisha’s Fourteenth Amendment claims on the ground
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a direct cause of action. In Mr. Maisha’s
response, he argues that the complaint gives fair notice that he brought his Fourteenth
Amendment claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, in the alternative, requests that the Court
take judicial notice of the § 1983 claim or grant him leave to amend his complaint to expressly
state the claim.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that leave to amend should be “freely
give[n] . . . when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A district court has broad
discretion to rule on a motion to amend and may deny such a motion “when the amendment
would be prejudicial to the opposing party, the moving party has acted in bad faith, or the
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amendment would be futile.” Equal Rights Ctr. v. Niles Bolton Assocs., 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th
Cir. 2010).
Defendants have offered no reason why Mr. Maisha should not be granted leave to
amend his complaint and the Court sees none. Defendants will not be prejudiced by the
amendment, as the factual basis for Mr. Maisha’s claim will not change. Defendants
acknowledge in their reply brief that a Fourteenth Amendment claim could be brought under §
1983. Such a claim, however, may only be brought against “persons.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Because “neither a State nor its officials acting in their
official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983,” Mr. Maisha may only bring a § 1983 Fourteenth
Amendment claim against the defendants he sues in their individual capacities. Id. Accordingly,
the Court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr. Maisha’s bare Fourteenth Amendment
claim without prejudice, grant Mr. Maisha leave to amend his complaint to bring his Fourteenth
Amendment claim pursuant to § 1983 against the individual defendants, and deny as futile Mr.
Maisha’s motion to amend as to UNC and the defendants sued in their official capacities.
II.
Intentional Discrimination
Mr. Maisha claims that the defendants discriminated against him in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the North Carolina Constitution’s “law of the land” clause. For the
reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendants’ motion as to Mr. Maisha’s Fourteenth
Amendment discrimination claim without prejudice and grants him leave to amend his complaint
to bring the claim under § 1983 against the appropriate individual defendants.
The Court also grants Defendants’ motion as to the discrimination claim brought pursuant
to the North Carolina Constitution. Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution
provides, in relevant part: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall
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any person be subjected to discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or national
origin.” N.C. Const. art. I, § 19.
“Claims brought under the North Carolina Constitution may be asserted only against state
officials acting in their official capacities.” Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 789 (4th Cir.
2004). Thus, Mr. Maisha’s discrimination claims brought against the individual defendants in
their individual capacities1 pursuant to the North Carolina Constitution are dismissed.
Defendants contend that Mr. Maisha’s claims against UNC and the individual defendants
in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment
protects states and state employees acting in their official capacities from suit in federal court.
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984), superseded on other
grounds by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
A state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to be sued in federal
court in one of two ways: (1) directly, by explicitly stating its intention to subject itself to suit in
federal court in a state statute or constitutional provision; or (2) by voluntarily participating in
federal spending programs, participation in which Congress has clearly conditioned on a state’s
waiver of its constitutional immunity. Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 550 (4th
Cir. 1999). “[A] court may not find a waiver absent an ‘unequivocal indication that the State
intends to consent to federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.’” Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.1 (1985),
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Mr. Maisha sued Professors Hudgens, Fine, Bahjat Qaqish, Gary Koch, Alisa Wolberg, and
John Preisser, as well as post-doctoral fellow Chenxi Li, in their individual capacities. (Doc. 1 at
¶¶ 6-10, 12-13.) The Court will also assume that Mr. Maisha sued doctoral student Michael
Hussey in his individual capacity, as Mr. Hussey does not appear to be an employee of UNC and,
therefore, could not have been sued in his official capacity. (See id. at ¶ 11.)
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superseded on other grounds by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7, as recognized in Pandazides v. Va.
Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 831 (4th Cir. 1994)).
There is no indication that North Carolina has waived its immunity from claims brought
under the state constitution generally or under Article I, Section 19 specifically. See, e.g., Guseh
v. N.C. Cent. Univ., 423 F. Supp. 2d 550, 561 & n.6 (M.D.N.C. 2005), aff’d, 206 F. App’x 255
(4th Cir. 2006). Mr. Maisha’s references to Peters, 327 F.3d 307, and Title VI are not helpful, as
Congress’s abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to Title VI claims is
totally irrelevant to the state’s immunity from North Carolina constitutional claims brought in
federal court. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion with respect to Mr.
Maisha’s Article I, Section 19 claims.
III.
Disparate Impact
Mr. Maisha next claims that UNC’s policies had a disparate impact on Ph.D. candidates
of African dissent. Because there is no standalone “disparate impact” cause of action and
because, in his response to the motion, Mr. Maisha appears to be referencing Title VI,
specifically in the form of a “disparate treatment” claim, the Court will construe this claim as a
Title VI disparate impact claim.
To the extent Mr. Maisha brings a Title VI disparate impact claim, the United States
Supreme Court has held that Title VI does not create a private right of action for disparateimpact discrimination. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001); see Peters, 327 F.3d at
315.2 To the extent Mr. Maisha brings a distinguishable Title VI disparate treatment claim, it is
redundant to his first cause of action under Title VI, which the Court is dismissing except as
2
The case Mr. Maisha cites in support of his Title VI disparate impact or disparate treatment
claim, Elston v. Talladega Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394 (11th Cir. 1993), is a pre-Sandoval
case that assumed without deciding that a disparate impact analysis was proper, id. at 1406-07.
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against UNC. See discussion supra Part I.B. Thus, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion as
to Mr. Maisha’s disparate impact claims, without prejudice to his Title VI claim against UNC.
To the extent Mr. Maisha seeks to amend his complaint to include Title VI disparate treatment
claims, the Court will deny the motion as unnecessary.
IV.
Copyright Infringement
Mr. Maisha sues UNC, Professor Hudgens, Professor Fine, Mr. Li, and Mr. Hussey for
copyright infringement. “A plaintiff asserting a copyright infringement claim must show ‘(1)
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are
original.’” Pan-Am. Prods. & Holdings, LLC v. R.T.G. Furniture Corp., 825 F. Supp. 2d 664,
700 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361
(1991)). Mr. Maisha does not allege that he owns a valid copyright and he has cited no authority
for his argument that UNC’s Copyright Infringement Policy gives rise to a claim of copyright
infringement. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion as to the copyright claims.
V.
Plagiarism and Violation of Academic Integrity
In his “Plagerism [sic] and Violation of Academic Integrity Policy” claims, Mr. Maisha
seeks to recover from Professor Hudgens, Professor Fine, Mr. Li, and Mr. Hussey for violations
of UNC’s school policies. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 207-10.) Mr. Maisha cites nothing other than UNC’s
internal policies to support this claim. He does not allege that these policies constitute
enforceable promises to form the basis of a breach of contract claim. See McFadyen v. Duke
Univ., 786 F. Supp. 2d 887, 982 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (collecting cases), rev’d in part on other
grounds by Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636 (4th Cir. 2012). The Court finds no other authority
to support such a cause of action against the university and its employees.
Mr. Maisha requests leave to amend his complaint to allege conversion under North
Carolina law. To the extent he seeks to make such a claim against Professors Fine and Hudgens
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in their official capacities, the Court denies the motion as futile because North Carolina has not
waived sovereign immunity for the intentional tort of conversion. See DeMurry v. N.C. Dep’t of
Corr., 195 N.C. App. 485, 493, 673 S.E.2d 374, 381 (2009). With respect to Professors Fine and
Hudgens in their individual capacities, however, the factual basis for this claim is clear and there
is no evidence that Mr. Maisha acted in bad faith in omitting the claim from his complaint.
Accordingly, the Court will grant Mr. Maisha leave to amend his complaint to bring a conversion
claim against Professors Fine and Hudgens in their individual capacities.
As to Mr. Li and Mr. Hussey, who were sued in their individual capacities, the Court
denies the motion as futile. Mr. Maisha has not alleged that they took any action at all, much
less an action that constituted wrongful conversion. (See Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 145-46, 149 (alleging that
Professors Fine and Hudgens stole Mr. Maisha’s work and added Mr. Li’s name to it); id. at ¶
152 (alleging that Mr. Maisha’s name was dropped from an article and Mr. Hussey’s name was
added before it was published)); see Gallimore v. Sink, 27 N.C. App. 65, 67, 218 S.E.2d 181, 183
(1975) (explaining that one of the “essential elements” necessary in a complaint for conversion is
“wrongful conversion by defendant” (emphasis added)).
In sum, the Court grants Defendants’ motion as to Mr. Maisha’s claims for plagiarism
and violation of academic integrity. The Court grants Mr. Maisha leave to amend his complaint
to bring conversion claims against Professors Fine and Hudgens in their individual capacities and
denies as futile Mr. Maisha’s motion to amend as to Professors Fine and Hudgens in their official
capacities and as to Mr. Li and Mr. Hussey.
VI.
Breach of Contract
Mr. Maisha appears to have sued only UNC for breach of his employment contract and
his student-university contract. To the extent he meant to bring these claims against any of the
individual defendants, that effort fails because he has not alleged the existence of any contracts
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between himself and any of the individual defendants. Because North Carolina has not waived
its sovereign immunity from suit in federal court for breach of contract actions, see, e.g., N.
Carolina Supported Emp’t v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 5:10-CV-135-FL, 2010
WL 4696556, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 12, 2010) (citing Hooper v. North Carolina, 379 F. Supp. 2d
804, 812 (M.D.N.C. 2005)), the Eleventh Amendment bars his contract claims against UNC.
Contrary to Mr. Maisha’s contention in response to the motion, supplemental jurisdiction does
not override an Eleventh Amendment bar. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121. Accordingly, the
Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr. Maisha’s breach of contract claims.
VII.
Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Finally, Mr. Maisha claims that all the defendants are liable for intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress. To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a
plaintiff must allege that the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct “which is
intended to cause and does in fact cause . . . severe emotional distress.” Waddle v. Sparks, 331
N.C. 73, 82, 414 S.E.2d 22, 27 (1992). To state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) the defendant negligently engaged in conduct, (2) it was
reasonably foreseeable that such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress . . . ,
and (3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress.” Johnson v. Ruark
Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 327 N.C. 283, 304, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (1990).
A. Claims Against Persons in their Official Capacities
Because North Carolina has not waived its sovereign immunity for claims of intentional
or negligent infliction of emotional distress, Mr. Maisha’s claims against Defendants in their
official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Phillips v. N.C. A&T State Univ.,
No. 1:09CV227, 2009 WL 5215377, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 28, 2009). Accordingly, the Court
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will grant the motion to dismiss Mr. Maisha’s intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress as to all defendants sued in their official capacities.
B. Claims Against Persons in their Individual Capacities
1. Professor Koch, Professor Wolberg, Mr. Li, and Mr. Hussey
Mr. Maisha’s claims against these defendants in their individual capacities fail because
he has not alleged they engaged in any specific conduct which would give rise to a claim for
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. While the complaint is full of details, it
is often vague as to who took what action. See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th
Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is particularly important [where defendants include a government agency and a
number of government actors sued in their individual capacities] that the complaint make clear
exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as
to the basis of the claims against him or her, as distinguished from collective actions against the
state.”); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (2007); Bryant v. Wells
Fargo Bank, No. 5:10-CV-00237-D, 2012 WL 642524, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 5, 2012). For
example, a number of paragraphs reference the “Director of Graduate Admissions (DGA),” but
that person is never identified. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 21-22, 24.) Further, Mr. Maisha makes no specific
allegations as to Professor Koch, Professor Wolberg, Mr. Li, or Mr. Hussey. Accordingly, the
Court will grant the motion to dismiss Mr. Maisha’s intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress as to Professor Koch, Professor Wolberg, Mr. Li, and Mr. Hussey in their
individual capacities.
2. Professor Kosorok, Ms. Hobgood, Mr. Zentz, and Professor Cai
Mr. Maisha makes specific allegations as to Professor Kosorok, registrar Melissa
Hobgood, IT systems administrator Scott Zentz, and Professor Jianwan Cai. However, although
he seeks damages from them, he has explicitly sued them in their official capacities only. See,
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e.g., Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr. v. Walker, No. 2:06-0890, 2007 WL 1575060, at *3 (S.D.W.
Va. May 30, 2007) (dismissing claim for damages against state officials where “plaintiff could
not have been more explicit in stating that ‘defendants are sued in their official capacities’”
(alteration omitted)). For clarity, the Court will dismiss any claims against these defendants in
their individual capacities.
3. Professor Hudgens, Professor Fine, Professor Qaqish, and Professor Preisser
As to the remaining defendants sued in their individual capacities—Professors Hudgens,
Fine, Qaqish, and Preisser—Mr. Maisha’s complaint alleges the following:
Professors Hudgens and Fine, Mr. Maisha’s dissertation research advisors, (Doc. 1 at
¶ 86), refused to meet with him to discuss research plans. (Id. at ¶ 113.) Instead,
Professor Hudgens started working on a similar topic with a Caucasian student using
research that he was withholding from Mr. Maisha. (Id. at ¶¶ 122-23, 125-26.)
Professors Hudgens and Fine stole Mr. Maisha’s dissertation research and published
it as their own work without attribution to Mr. Maisha. (Id. at ¶¶ 138-39, 145, 149.)
Professor Qaqish told Ms. Hobgood that Mr. Maisha “is a terrible student who missed
many classes.” (Id. at ¶ 32 (alterations omitted).)
Professor Preisser improperly awarded Mr. Maisha a grade of 70% on a homework
assignment, when Mr. Maisha had actually earned a grade of 87.5%. (Id. at ¶¶ 6466.) Professor Preisser elevated a Caucasian student’s grade from 70% to 80% on the
same assignment. (Id. at ¶ 67.)
a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct that is “so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club
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Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 493, 340 S.E.2d 116, 123 (1986). “Whether the conduct alleged is
sufficiently ‘extreme and outrageous’ to support such an action is a question of law.” Kovack v.
Streets & Aves. Rest. Corp., No. 1:00CV145, 2001 WL 604179, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2001)
(citing Lenins v. K-Mart Corp., 98 N.C. App. 590, 599, 391 S.E.2d 843, 848 (1990)).
The alleged actions of Professor Qaqish and Professor Preisser do not rise to the level of
utterly intolerable or “beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Hogan, 79 N.C. App at 493, 340
S.E.2d at 123; see Johnson v. Bollinger, 86 N.C. App. 1, 3, 356 S.E.2d 378, 380 (1987) (“‘The
liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppressions, or other trivialities.’” (quoting Briggs v. Rosenthal, 73 N.C. App. 672, 677, 327
S.E.2d 308, 311 (1985))); see also Sabrowski v. Albani-Bayeux, Inc., No. 1:02CV00728, 2003
WL 23018827, at *3-4 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 19, 2003) (finding allegations that defendants made false
and defamatory statements about plaintiffs not sufficient to state a claim of extreme and
outrageous conduct); Swaim v. Westchester Acad., 208 F. Supp. 2d 579, 589-90 (M.D.N.C.
2002) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr.
Maisha’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against Professor Qaqish and
Professor Preisser.
It is a closer question as to the allegations against Professor Fine and Professor Hudgens.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has held in a different context that allegations of fraudulent
misrepresentation and concealment of facts done with the intent to inflict anxiety and distress
upon the plaintiff was sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Johnson v. First Union Corp., 128 N.C. App. 450, 457, 496 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1998) (holding
allegations that workers’ compensation insurance carrier filed false papers with N.C. Industrial
Commission sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Here, Mr.
Maisha alleges that Professors Fine and Hudgens stole his academic research and published it
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under their names. This seems similar to the allegations in Johnson, and the Court will allow
these claims to go forward, without prejudice to reconsidering the situation at summary
judgment.
b. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
As to the negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against Professors Fine,
Hudgens, Qaqish, and Preisser in their individual capacities, Defendants contend that Mr. Maisha
does not allege that Defendants’ conduct caused severe emotional distress. Severe emotional
distress is “‘any emotional or mental disorder, such as, for example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic
depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition
which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.’” Waddle,
331 N.C. at 83, 414 S.E.2d at 27 (quoting Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97).
Whether a defendant’s conduct caused a plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress is a question
for the trier of fact, and it is sufficient that the plaintiff’s allegations give the defendant “notice of
the nature and basis of [the] claim so as to enable him to answer and prepare for trial.”
McAllister v. Ha, 347 N.C. 638, 646, 496 S.E.2d 577, 583 (1998) (quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Maisha claims that Defendants’ conduct caused him “extreme anxiety, sleeplessness,
and undue worry with respect to completion of his doctoral degree and future employment
prospects.” (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 224, 228.) These allegations, combined with Mr. Maisha’s other
factual claims, place the individual defendants on notice of the nature of his claims. See Barbier
v. Durham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 225 F. Supp. 2d 617, 628-29 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (recognizing
anxiety as a medical condition and finding sufficient plaintiff’s allegation that she suffered
“severe emotional distress, anxiety, and anguish which caused her to seek medical attention”);
McAllister, 347 N.C. at 646, 496 S.E.2d at 583 (finding sufficient allegation that defendant’s
negligence caused plaintiff “extreme mental and emotional distress”); Acosta v. Byrum, 180 N.C.
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App. 562, 570, 638 S.E.2d 246, 252 (2006) (finding sufficient allegation that “defendant’s
negligence caused severe emotional distress, humiliation, and mental anguish”).
The defendants have not challenged the sufficiency of the allegations as to the other
elements of this cause of action. Thus, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion as to Mr.
Maisha’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against Professors Hudgens, Fine,
Qaqish, and Preisser in their individual capacities.
CONCLUSION
The Court will grant Defendants’ motion as to Mr. Maisha’s Title VI claims against the
individual defendants; Fourteenth Amendment claims; intentional discrimination claims brought
pursuant to the North Carolina Constitution; disparate impact claims; copyright infringement
claims; plagiarism and violation of academic integrity claims; breach of contract claims;
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against all defendants except for Professors
Fine and Hudgens in their individual capacities; and negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims against all defendants except for Professors Fine, Hudgens, Preisser, and Qaqish in their
individual capacities. Defendants’ motion is denied as to Mr. Maisha’s intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims against Professors Fine and Hudgens and as to Mr. Maisha’s negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims against Professors Fine, Hudgens, Preisser, and Qaqish in
their individual capacities.
The Court will dismiss Mr. Maisha’s EEO claims pursuant to his request. Mr. Maisha is
granted leave to file an amended complaint including his surviving claims as outlined below.
It is therefore ORDERED that:
(1) Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Doc. 6), is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part,
as follows.
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(2) The following claims are DISMISSED:
a. Title VI claims against the individual defendants;
b. Fourteenth Amendment claims;
c. Intentional discrimination claims brought pursuant to the North Carolina
Constitution;
d. Disparate impact claims;
e. Copyright infringement claims;
f. Claims of plagiarism and violation of academic integrity policy;
g. Breach of employment contract claims;
h. Breach of student-university contract claims;
i. Intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against all defendants except
Professors Fine and Hudgens in their individual capacities; and
j. Negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against all defendants except
Professors Fine, Hudgens, Preisser, and Qaqish in their individual capacities.
(3) Defendants’ motion is DENIED as to Mr. Maisha’s negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims against Professors Fine, Hudgens, Preisser, and Qaqish in their
individual capacities and as to Mr. Maisha’s intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims against Professors Fine and Hudgens in their individual capacities.
These claims may proceed.
(4) The Title VI claim against UNC may proceed, as no motion to dismiss was made in
connection with that claim.
(5) Mr. Maisha’s EEO claims are DISMISSED.
(6) Mr. Maisha is GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint including claims for
a. Title VI violations against UNC;
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b. violations of the Fourteenth Amendment under § 1983 against the individual
defendants;
c. conversion against Professors Fine and Hudgens in their individual capacities;
d. negligent infliction of emotional distress against Professors Fine, Hudgens,
Preisser, and Qaqish in their individual capacities; and
e. intentional infliction of emotional distress against Professors Fine and Hudgens in
their individual capacities.
The motion to amend is otherwise denied and plaintiff shall not include any claims in the
amended complaint other than those specifically authorized by this Order. Any Amended
Complaint shall be filed no later than April 12, 2013.
This the 27th day of March, 2013.
__________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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