MAISHA v. THE UNIVERSITY OF CHAPEL HILL, et al
Filing
73
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE CATHERINE C. EAGLES on 1/22/2015; The defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claims, (Doc. 43 ), is GRANTED. The exhibits Mr. Maisha filed with his substitute brie f at Docket 64 -1 are STRICKEN from the record. In view of the substitute brief at Docket 64 and the rules violations in the original brief at Docket 53 , the original brief at Docket 53 is STRICKEN from the record. The motion for summary judgment as to the defendants' counterclaim, (Doc. 46 ), remains under advisement. (Sheets, Jamie)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
MACKEAN P. NYANGWESO
MAISHA,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH
CAROLINA, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1:12-CV-371
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge.
The plaintiff, Mackean P. Nyangweso Maisha, sued the University of North
Carolina and several UNC professors and officials over his treatment while a graduate
student at UNC. Mr. Maisha’s remaining claims are a Title VI claim against UNC based
on racial and national origin discrimination and § 1983 claims and emotional distress
claims against Professor Jason Fine and Professor Michael Hudgens. Because Mr.
Maisha has not presented sufficient admissible evidence to support any of his claims, the
Court will grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
FACTS
Background
In summarizing the relevant facts, the Court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, Mr. Maisha. The Court has not considered “facts” set
forth in the briefs that are not supported by citations to admissible evidence.
Mr. Maisha repeatedly cites the amended complaint as evidence of the “facts”
stated.1 (See generally Doc. 64.) Unless the defendants admitted the alleged fact in their
answer, (Doc. 26), the Court has not considered unverified statements in the amended
complaint. (Doc. 14.) These allegations are not under oath and are not evidence.
Higgins v. Scherr, 837 F.2d 155, 156-57 (4th Cir. 1988). Nor has the Court considered
inadmissible hearsay, as indicated in the Court’s Order granting in part the defendants’
motion to strike. (Doc. 72.)
The Court also has not considered exhibits Mr. Maisha submitted with his
substitute brief. (See Doc. 64-1.) The Order allowing Mr. Maisha to submit a substitute
brief did not allow him to submit additional evidence. (See Doc. 63.) To consider this
evidence would be to reward Mr. Maisha for violating the Local Rules, see L.R. 7.3(f),
(g), and would be unfair to the defendants, who wrote a reply brief based on the evidence
originally submitted. Therefore, the Court strikes the exhibits Mr. Maisha filed with his
substitute brief at Docket 64-1.
Finally, the Court will not scour the record—which, even as limited above,
constitutes hundreds of pages—to find evidence to support or refute a party’s factual
statements. See Stephenson v. Pfizer Inc., No. 1:13cv147, 2014 WL 4410580, at *1 n.1
(M.D.N.C. Sept. 8, 2014) (noting that the Court has no obligation to “investigat[e] the
basis of claimed facts”); Hughes v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No. 1:12CV717, 2014 WL
1
While the defendants occasionally did this as well, (see Doc. 44 at 3-4), those “facts” were
generally background in nature. The defendants overwhelmingly supported their factual
assertions with specific and accurate citations to admissible evidence.
2
906220, at *1 n.1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2014) (“A party should not expect a court to do the
work that it elected not to do.”); see also Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th
Cir. 2001) (noting that “a court is not required to scour the record in search of evidence to
defeat a motion for summary judgment” (internal quotation marks omitted)). While the
Court has relied on the parties to direct the Court’s attention to the relevant evidence, the
Court has accepted the actual evidence and not the parties’ characterization of that
evidence, which, in Mr. Maisha’s case, is often inaccurate and exaggerated.
Finally, the Court has recited only material facts. There are some disputed facts
related to Mr. Maisha’s tenure as a UNC student, but they are irrelevant to the matters at
issue. The Court has examined all the proffered evidence carefully but sees no need to
include a complicated review of Mr. Maisha’s academic career when that review would
serve no purpose.
Undisputed Facts
It appears undisputed that Mr. Maisha2 is a black man originally from Africa.3 He
was a graduate student in the DrPH program in UNC’s Biostatistics Department in May
2006. (Doc. 43-26 at 17.) DrPH students must pass the “Qualifying Exam” within their
first four years and must pass it before beginning dissertation research. (Doc. 43-1 at
¶ 32; Doc. 43-24 at 153-54, 165; Doc. 43-25 at 8-9.) Mr. Maisha failed the Qualifying
2
During the events at issue, the plaintiff appears to have gone by the name Peter Nyangweso.
(E.g., Doc. 53-1 at 1, 3; Doc. 54 at 3-6; Doc. 54-1 at 1.) The Court will refer to him by the name
he used in the complaint. (See Doc. 1.)
3
Neither party provided a clear citation to evidence of this fact, but as best the Court can tell
it is undisputed.
3
Exam in August 2006 due to administrative errors by UNC, (Doc. 43-1 at ¶¶ 14-15; Doc.
43-17 at 6), so UNC agreed to “re-start the clock” on Mr. Maisha’s deadline to pass,
giving him until the fall of 2012, rather than the fall of 2010. (Doc. 43-25 at 8-9; Doc.
53-1 at p. 18 ¶ 38.) As of the fall of 2010, Mr. Maisha had not passed the Qualifying
Exam. (Doc. 43-1 at ¶ 50; Doc. 43-5 at ¶ 24; Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 21.)
Dr. Michael Kosorok, Chair of the Biostatistics Department, allowed Mr. Maisha
to conduct “informal dissertation research” with Professors Fine and Hudgens as he
prepared for the Exam. (Doc. 43-1 at ¶ 31; Doc. 43-5 at ¶ 12; Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 8.) In 2008,
the professors and Mr. Maisha picked a research topic, and Mr. Maisha began
contributing to Professor Fine’s HIV research. (Doc. 43-5 at ¶¶ 13-14; Doc. 43-7 at ¶¶ 910, 15.) The professors told Mr. Maisha several times that he must take and pass the
Qualifying Exam in August 2010 or they would not continue to work with him on
research. (Doc. 43-5 at ¶¶ 16-22; Doc. 43-7 at ¶¶ 14-20.) Several times the professors
and Dr. Kosorok reminded Mr. Maisha of the Exam and offered to help him prepare.
(See Doc. 43-5 at ¶ 20; Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 18; Doc. 43-20 at 1, 3; Doc. 43-1 at ¶ 47; Doc. 4324 at 198-200.) Mr. Maisha did not take the August 2010 Exam, (Doc. 43-1 at ¶ 50; Doc.
43-5 at ¶ 24; Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 21), and Professor Fine told Mr. Maisha that he and Professor
Hudgens would no longer work with him. (Doc. 43-24 at 201.)
Mr. Maisha registered for BIOS 994, a dissertation-level research class taught by
Professor Fine, for the Fall 2010 semester. (Doc. 43-7 at ¶¶ 11, 27.) Students must have
passed the Qualifying Exam to take BIOS 994. (Doc. 43-1 at ¶ 43; Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 27;
Doc. 43-25 at 8-9.) Even though Mr. Maisha was not eligible to take the course,
4
Professor Fine gave Mr. Maisha a passing grade because he “felt sympathy for him and
wanted to give him time to figure out his next steps.” (Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 27.)
Though he still had not passed the Qualifying Exam, Mr. Maisha again registered
for BIOS 994 for the Spring 2011 semester. (Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 28.) In January 2011,
Professor Fine told Mr. Maisha this was inappropriate. (Doc. 43-23 at 1.) In March, Mr.
Maisha emailed Professor Hudgens and requested more data for his research, (Doc. 43-20
at 7), and Professor Hudgens reminded Mr. Maisha that he and Professor Fine were no
longer his research advisors and that he should not continue working on the study. (Doc.
43-19 at 1.) Mr. Maisha did not drop BIOS 994 by the deadline, and Professor Fine gave
him a grade of “Incomplete.” (Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 28; Doc. 43-23 at 3.)
Mr. Maisha again registered for BIOS 994 for the Fall 2011 semester. (Doc. 43-7
at ¶ 29; Doc. 43-23 at 3.) In September 2011, Professor Fine told Mr. Maisha to drop the
course because he did not have permission to take it. (Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 29; Doc. 43-23 at
3.) Professor Fine reminded Mr. Maisha that he had a grade of “Incomplete” for Spring
2011 BIOS 994 and said the grade would automatically become a failing grade if Mr.
Maisha did not contact him. (Doc. 43-23 at 3.) Professor Fine cautioned Mr. Maisha that
he might lose his graduate-student status if this happened. (Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 29; Doc. 43-23
at 3.)
The University administratively dropped Mr. Maisha from Fall 2011 BIOS 994 on
September 14, 2011. (Doc. 43-21 at 6, 7.) For reasons not clear from the record, Mr.
Maisha was not administratively dropped from Spring 2011 BIOS 994 until sometime in
Spring 2012. (Doc. 43-1 at ¶ 55; Doc. 43-23 at 4; Doc. 43-21 at 3-5.)
5
Graduate students at UNC must register for a minimum number of credit hours per
semester to remain enrolled. (Doc. 43-4 at ¶ 3; Doc. 43-16 at 27.) In September 2011,
once Mr. Maisha was dropped from Fall 2011 BIOS 994, he was not registered for
enough hours to remain enrolled at UNC, which also meant he was no longer eligible for
financial aid. (Doc. 43-4 at ¶¶ 3-6; Doc. 43-8 at ¶ 12; Doc. 43-16 at 27.)
Mr. Maisha was not required to take BIOS 994 to remain a graduate student. (See
Doc. 43-16 at 27; Doc. 43-1 at ¶ 56; Doc. 43-4 at ¶ 6.) He was eligible to take other
courses in 2011, but it does not appear that he did. (Doc. 43-1 at ¶ 56; Doc. 43-4 at ¶ 6;
Doc. 43-21 at 3.) Instead, from August 1, 2010, until July 2013, Mr. Maisha was
enrolled in a graduate program in mathematics at the University of Oslo, where he was
also employed full-time. (Doc. 43-10.)
The Court will address additional undisputed facts as the need arises.
ANALYSIS
I.
Title VI Claim
Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” 4 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. To recover for a Title VI violation, a plaintiff
must demonstrate intentional discrimination, see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,
280 (2001), by either presenting direct evidence of racial or national origin discrimination
4
In its answer, UNC admitted that it received federal financial assistance. (Doc. 26 at ¶ 179;
see also Doc. 14 at ¶ 179.)
6
or proceeding under the burden-shifting scheme in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Middlebrooks v. Univ. of Md., 166 F.3d 1209 (table), 1999 WL
7860, at *4 (4th Cir. Jan. 11, 1999); Jane v. Bowman Gray Sch. of Med.-N.C. Baptist
Hosp., 211 F. Supp. 2d 678, 690-91 (M.D.N.C. 2002).
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas
test in the context of a graduate program, a plaintiff must show that he: (1) is a member
of a protected class; (2) was qualified for continued participation in the graduate
program; (3) was treated differently from similarly situated students who were not
members of the protected class; and (4) was dismissed from the program despite his
qualifications. See Middlebrooks, 1999 WL 7860, at *5; Elliott v. Del. State Univ., 879
F. Supp. 2d 438, 443 (D. Del. 2012). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse action. Middlebrooks, 1999 WL 7860, at *4. If the defendant provides such
evidence, “the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason is a
pretext [for] discrimination.” Id.
Mr. Maisha contends that UNC discriminated against him based on his race and
national origin when: (1) UNC refused to let him take BIOS 994, dropped him from the
course, and then dismissed him from the DrPH program; (2) Professors Fine and
Hudgens submitted a paper for publication without listing Mr. Maisha as a co-author; and
(3) the Professors gave datasets to a white student and prevented Mr. Maisha from using
them. (See Doc. 64 at 17, 23-28.) Finally, Mr. Maisha asserts that UNC dismissed him
from the program in retaliation for filing complaints. (Doc. 64 at 29-30.)
7
A. BIOS 994 and the DrPH Program
Mr. Maisha has produced no direct evidence connecting the decisions to drop him
from BIOS 994 and terminate his enrollment in the DrPH program to his race or national
origin. He has presented no admissible evidence of statements by any professor or
administrator indicating bias or prejudice against persons of Mr. Maisha’s race or
national origin.5 His personal belief that these events were motivated by discrimination is
insufficient. See Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th
Cir. 1995) (noting that the “mere incantation” of discriminatory intent does not “operate
as a talisman” to defeat summary judgment).
Mr. Maisha has also failed on two fronts to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under McDonnell Douglas. First, Mr. Maisha has not shown he was
qualified for continued participation in the program. See Middlebrooks, 1999 WL 7860,
at *5. In the face of detailed affidavits from several witnesses about Mr. Maisha’s failure
to comply with the program’s requirements, Mr. Maisha has proffered only his own
opinion that he was qualified for continued enrollment. See Evans v. Techs. Applications
& Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960-61 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that it is “the perception of the
decision maker” that is relevant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff.)
5
He cites only two comments indirectly related to his national origin. (See Doc. 53-1 at p.
19 ¶ 45; Doc. 65-1 at 4.) One comment is inadmissible because Mr. Maisha did not disclose it
when specifically asked to detail ways UNC officials discriminated against him. (See Doc. 72 at
2-3, 5.) The other comment was made in 2004, (Doc. 65-1 at 4), which is outside the statute of
limitations. (See Doc. 25 at 3.) In any event, stray and isolated remarks not made in the context
of negative treatment are insufficient to show discrimination. See Brinkley v. Harbour
Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 608 (4th Cir. 1999).
8
Mr. Maisha contends that it was improper for UNC to require him to stop his
dissertation research in 2010 when he still had two years to pass the Qualifying Exam.
(Doc. 64 at 23, 28; see Doc. 43-24 at 198-200.) However, nothing about UNC’s
extension to take the Qualifying Exam gave Mr. Maisha the right to ignore other
requirements, such as the requirement that he pass the Qualifying Exam before enrolling
in dissertation-level classes or starting formal dissertation research, or that he enroll in
enough credit hours. (See Doc. 43-16 at 27; Doc. 43-24 at 198-200.)
While professors and administrators granted Mr. Maisha exceptions to some of the
usual rules in an effort to maintain his progress through the DrPH program, this does not
obligate UNC to excuse Mr. Maisha forever from complying with its reasonable rules
designed to move students toward completing their degrees. Nor does it mean that Mr.
Maisha could ignore the program’s requirements in favor of his own preferred timetable.
Mr. Maisha’s own opinions about how the DrPH program should work are irrelevant; it is
the perception of the decision makers that matters. See Evans, 80 F.3d at 960-61.
The evidence is undisputed that Mr. Maisha repeatedly attempted to enroll in
BIOS 994 even though he was not eligible, that UNC officials repeatedly told him this
was improper and offered to speak with him about his courses, that for over a year Mr.
Maisha did not enroll in any UNC courses he was qualified to take, (see Doc. 43-21 at 3),
and that Mr. Maisha’s failure to enroll in proper courses resulted in his dismissal from the
program. Thus, Mr. Maisha was not qualified for continued participation in the DrPH
program, and his Title VI claim fails. See Middlebrooks, 1999 WL 7860, at *5; see also
9
Davis v. Univ. of N.C., 263 F.3d 95, 102 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[Courts] generally accord great
deference to a school’s determination of the qualifications of a hopeful student.”).
Second, Mr. Maisha has presented no evidence that he was treated differently from
similarly situated students. See Elliott, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 443; Ratliff v. Wake Forest
Baptist Med. Ctr., No. 1:13CV991, 2014 WL 197809, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 14, 2014)
(opinion of Auld, M.J.), appeal dismissed, 570 F. App’x 282 (4th Cir. 2014) (mem.). He
has identified no student who was allowed to conduct formal dissertation research or
register for dissertation-level courses without first passing the Qualifying Exam or
without permission from the professor. He has identified no student who was not
enrolled in enough credit hours, yet was allowed to continue in the program.
Mr. Maisha contends that a white student, L.L., “was permitted to sit for [the
Preliminary Exam] in October of 2011, without successfully passing the [Qualifying
Exam].”6 (Doc. 64 at 12.) Mr. Maisha only cites his amended complaint in support, (see
Doc. 64 at 12), and that is not evidence. Higgins, 837 F.2d at 156-57. Moreover, L.L.
testified to passing the Qualifying Exam in 2007 and taking the Preliminary Exam in
2010. (Doc. 60-1 at ¶¶ 5-7.) Mr. Maisha has not presented evidence that gives rise to a
genuine issue of fact that UNC treated similarly situated students of different races or
national origins differently, and his Title VI claim fails. See Carr v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. Sys. of Ga., 249 F. App’x 146, 149-50 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming summary
6
Students must pass the Qualifying Exam before taking the Preliminary Exam. (Doc. 43-1 at
¶¶ 33-34; Doc. 43-24 at 153-54; Doc. 43-25 at 8-9.)
10
judgment for the defendant because none of the plaintiff’s proffered student-comparators
had her same disciplinary history).
B. The Fine/Hudgens Research Paper
Mr. Maisha contends that UNC discriminated against him when Professors Fine
and Hudgens submitted a research paper for publication without listing him as a coauthor. (Doc. 64 at 17.) Mr. Maisha contributed to Professor Fine’s HIV research from
approximately the fall of 2008 to the summer of 2010. (Doc. 43-5 at ¶¶ 12-18; Doc. 43-7
at ¶¶ 8-9, 15-16.) In July 2010, Professors Fine and Hudgens submitted a research paper
to a journal and listed Mr. Maisha as a co-author. (Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 17; Doc. 43-18 at 31.)
In September 2010, the journal’s editors rejected the paper but indicated they would
consider a revised version. (Doc. 43-5 at ¶ 30; Doc. 43-19 at 4, 8.)
Starting in October 2010, the Professors, along with Dr. L., a post-doctoral
researcher, and S.L., a graduate student, worked on revisions; Mr. Maisha did not assist.
(Doc. 43-5 at ¶ 32; Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 34; Doc. 43-18 at 77.) The professors submitted the
revised paper in November 2011, (Doc. 43-5 at ¶ 33; Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 35); they listed Dr. L.
as a co-author and credited Mr. Maisha and S.L. in the acknowledgements. (Doc. 43-18
at 57, 77.) In March 2012, Professor Fine contacted Mr. Maisha to discuss authorship of
the yet unpublished revised paper, (Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 39; Doc. 43-19 at 11), but Mr. Maisha
never responded. (Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 39.) The paper was published in March 2014. (Doc.
43-5 at ¶ 37; Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 39; Doc. 43-18 at 98.)
Mr. Maisha has offered no evidence that the professors’ decision to list him in the
acknowledgements rather than as a co-author was based on discriminatory animus. As
11
noted, he has produced no direct evidence that either professor was biased against
persons of his race or national origin. Nor has he established a prima facie case of
discrimination, as he has failed to present any evidence beyond his own opinion that his
work on the revised paper was sufficient to justify listing him as a co-author, and he has
presented no evidence of another student in a similar circumstance who was listed as a
co-author. Finally, he has not rebutted the Professors’ explanations, who testified that:
(1) “[t]he revised paper contained a significant amount of new material that [Mr. Maisha]
had not worked on,” (Doc. 43-5 at ¶ 34; Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 36); (2) Dr. L. made “key
theoretical insights that served as underpinnings of the revision,” (Doc. 43-5 at ¶ 32; Doc.
43-7 at ¶ 34); and (3) the revised paper was nearly fifty percent longer, with twelve pages
of new material. (Doc. 43-5 at ¶ 34(h); Doc. 43-7 at ¶ 36(h).) A UNC review panel also
found that the decision “not to list [Mr. Maisha] as a co-author on [the revised paper]
appear[ed] to be an unbiased one based on the use of reasonable professional criteria.”
(Doc. 43-26 at 15.)
C. Access to Research Data
Mr. Maisha contends that UNC “refused to supply [him] with research data like
other similarly situated students, beginning in the fall of 2010 and continuing through
January of 2012.” (Doc. 64 at 23.) In support, he cites Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, (see Doc. 64
at 23), which is a 2008 letter to his attorney from UNC’s attorney. (See Doc. 53-1 at 12.) That letter does not include any evidence that UNC or any professor withheld any
research data from Mr. Maisha or provided data to other students, and does not even
mention Mr. Maisha’s claims to that effect. (See Doc. 53-1 at 1-2.) The Court is not
12
required to scour the record to develop and find support for this argument, which Mr.
Maisha makes only in passing. See Ritchie, 242 F.3d at 723.
D. Retaliation
Mr. Maisha also asserts a retaliation claim under Title VI, contending that UNC’s
adverse actions against him were in retaliation to complaints he filed against the
Biostatistics Department between 2006 and 2011. (Doc. 64 at 29-30.) He has produced
no evidence of a causal connection between his complaints and UNC’s actions. See
Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 320 & n.15 (4th Cir. 2003) (listing the elements of a Title
VI retaliation claim). To the contrary, the undisputed evidence shows that professors
gave Mr. Maisha multiple chances to take the Qualifying Exam and offered to help him
prepare for that exam many times. They warned him that he might lose his graduatestudent status if he did not enroll in appropriate courses or take the Exam. Despite this,
Mr. Maisha did not consult his professors about how to continue his studies at UNC, did
not enroll in classes he was authorized to take, and did not take the Exam. Instead, he
enrolled full-time in a graduate program at another university. There is no evidence of
retaliation.
E. Conclusion
Title VI does not require UNC to run its graduate programs in a way that Mr.
Maisha or any other student would prefer. Mr. Maisha’s opinion that UNC made
decisions about when he should take the Qualifying Exam, who should get authorship
credit on research papers, whether he should be allowed to enroll in dissertation-level
research courses, and his dismissal from the program because of his race or national
13
origin are not supported by any admissible evidence and do not give rise to a disputed
question of material fact in his Title VI claim.7
Mr. Maisha’s claims boil down to contentions that he was treated unfairly,
irrationally, and unjustly; that he was the victim of academic politics, professional
disputes, and miscommunications; and that UNC required compliance with policies he
did not like. Title VI does not protect against these things, even assuming his contentions
are true. Rather, Title VI protects covered students from illegal discrimination. Mr.
Maisha has not shown that here, and his Title VI claim fails.
II.
Section 1983 Claims
It is unclear what constitutional right Mr. Maisha claims Professors Fine and
Hudgens violated, but it appears to be a substantive due process right and perhaps a
property right in his research.8 (Doc. 64 at 33-34.) To bring a due process claim, a
plaintiff must first show that he was deprived of a constitutionally protected interest,
7
Even assuming Mr. Maisha made out a prima facie case of discrimination, UNC has offered
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions against Mr. Maisha, namely his failure to
meet program qualifications or make meaningful contributions to the revised paper, and Mr.
Maisha has offered no evidence that these reasons are a pretext. See Villanueva v. Wellesley
Coll., 930 F.2d 124, 129 (1st Cir. 1991) (requiring a plaintiff prove the defendant’s proffered
reasons are “obviously weak or implausible” or that the defendant’s standards were “manifestly
unequally applied”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 861 (1991); see also Regents of Univ. of Mich. v.
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (noting that judges should show “great respect for the faculty’s
professional judgment” when reviewing “a genuinely academic decision”).
8
Mr. Maisha says he “asserts both a due process claim and an equal protection claim.” (Doc.
64 at 31.) But his brief does not clearly distinguish these claims and focuses mainly on his
property interests in his research. (See Doc. 64 at 31-34.) Nonetheless, any equal protection
claim fails because Mr. Maisha has not shown that he was treated differently from other similarly
situated individuals as a result of intentional discrimination. See Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726,
730-31 (4th Cir. 2002); see also discussion supra.
14
which is something to which a plaintiff has “a legitimate claim of entitlement” rather than
“an abstract need or desire” or “a unilateral expectation.” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 577 (1972).
Mr. Maisha contends that Professors Fine and Hudgens violated his due process
rights by “refusing to provide him with . . . data for his dissertation research,” (Doc. 64 at
31), and by “turn[ing] [his] work over to a white male student for him to complete as his
own.” (Doc. 64 at 33.) He cites nothing in the record to support these assertions, and the
Court is not required to scour the record. See Ritchie, 242 F.3d at 723. He cites no cases
for the proposition that the Constitution requires university professors to provide research
data to students who are not on track to receive their degrees or to only allow one student
to write about a certain topic or to use a large dataset.
Finally, Mr. Maisha contends that he had a protected interest “in being an advisee
and lead author on the paper Professors Fine and Hudgens published without him.” (Doc.
64 at 34.) He cites no case for the proposition that the Constitution requires university
professors to work with students who do not comply with university rules or that a
professor must list a student as a co-author on a research paper when the student did not
work on significant revisions to the paper.
Even assuming Mr. Maisha had a protected interest at stake, the Professors’
decisions do not appear to be “such a substantial departure from accepted academic
norms as to demonstrate that [they] did not exercise professional judgment.” Regents of
15
Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 227 (1985).9 For these reasons, the Court will
grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Mr. Maisha’s § 1983 claims.
III.
Emotional Distress Claims
Mr. Maisha asserts claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress against Professors Fine and Hudgens in their individual capacities. (Doc. 14 at
¶¶ 192-200; Doc. 64 at 34-40.) For both claims, a plaintiff must prove the defendant’s
actions caused severe emotional distress. See Waddle v. Sparks, 331 N.C. 73, 82, 414
S.E.2d 22, 27 (1992) (listing the elements of an IIED claim); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics
& Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 327 N.C. 283, 304, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (1990) (listing the
elements of an NIED claim). “Severe emotional distress” means “any . . . type of severe
and disabling emotional or mental condition [that] may be generally recognized and
diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.” Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at
97; see also Waddle, 331 N.C. at 83, 414 S.E.2d at 27 (adopting this definition for IIED).
Mr. Maisha has produced no evidence that he suffered serious emotional distress
to the extent required under North Carolina law. See Waddle, 331 N.C. at 83-84, 414
S.E.2d at 27-28 (requiring a “high standard of proof” of severe emotional distress). From
August 2010 to July 2013, Mr. Maisha was enrolled and employed full-time at the
University of Oslo. (Doc. 43-10 at ¶¶ 3-4; see also Doc. 53-1 at p. 27 ¶¶ 100-03; Doc.
9
Moreover, § 1983 due process claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas
framework. McCray v. Pee Dee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 263 F. App’x 301, 305 (4th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 554 U.S. 918 (2008). As discussed supra, Mr. Maisha has presented no direct
evidence of discrimination and cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and
Professors Fine and Hudgens provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions.
16
57-3 at 4-5.) Even though his compensation included health benefits, (Doc. 43-10 at ¶ 4;
but see Doc. 43-15 at 7), Mr. Maisha never sought or received medical treatment or a
diagnosis from a psychiatrist or psychologist and produced no medical records to support
his claim of severe emotional distress. See Waddle, 331 N.C. at 85, 414 S.E.2d at 28;
(Doc. 43-15 at 7-8.) There is no evidence he ever took any medicine for his distress, cf.
Waddle, 331 N.C. at 85, 414 S.E.2d at 28, or that he suffered from disabling
psychological problems. See id. While “[p]roof of severe emotional distress does not
necessarily require medical evidence or testimony,” there must be “real evidence of
severe emotional distress.” Pacheco v. Rogers & Breece, Inc., 157 N.C. App. 445, 450,
579 S.E.2d 505, 508 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
While Mr. Maisha has presented evidence that he had some anxiety and trouble
sleeping, (Doc. 53-1 at p. 14 ¶ 18, p. 23 ¶ 70), that alone does not qualify as severe
emotional distress. See Johnson v. Scott, 137 N.C. App. 534, 539-40, 528 S.E.2d 402,
405 (2000). Nor does his evidence that he was under stress rise to the level of “severe
emotional distress” as defined by North Carolina law. See, e.g., Estate of Hendrickson ex
rel. Hendrickson v. Genesis Health Venture, Inc., 151 N.C. App. 139, 156-57, 565 S.E.2d
254, 265 (2002) (holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s directed
verdict where the plaintiff presented evidence that she had nightmares and trouble
sleeping, but did not take time off work due to emotional problems), disc. rev. denied,
356 N.C. 299, 570 S.E.2d 504 (2002) (mem.); Fox-Kirk v. Hannon, 142 N.C App. 267,
282, 542 S.E.2d 346, 356 (2001) (affirming summary judgment for the defendant where
the plaintiff had not sought or received medical treatment or diagnosis in the two years
17
since the accident), disc. rev. denied, 353 N.C. 725, 551 S.E.2d 437 (2001) (mem.);
Johnson, 137 N.C. App. at 539-40, 528 S.E.2d at 405 (affirming summary judgment for
the defendant where the plaintiffs presented evidence that they had nightmares and
trouble sleeping, but neither was diagnosed by a doctor as suffering from a severe mental
condition). In the absence of any evidence to support them, Mr. Maisha’s emotional
distress claims fail.10
IV.
UNC’s Counterclaim
UNC has also filed a motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim against
Mr. Maisha for money had and received. (Doc. 46.) The Court has not yet considered
the merits of this motion, which will remain under advisement. In the meantime, the case
is removed from the April 2015 trial calendar. If the parties have not yet mediated, now
is a good time. If they have mediated, the Court directs counsel to confer about whether
they might agree to a consent resolution to this counterclaim.
10
The Court struck testimony from three witnesses who purported to diagnose Mr. Maisha
with depression and anxiety-related disorders for various reasons, as set forth in a separate Order.
(Doc. 72 at 8-10, 12-15.) Moreover, the cases cited in Mr. Maisha’s brief indicate that perhaps
his counsel misapprehends the difference between a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary
judgment. Throughout his discussion of the emotional distress claims, counsel repeatedly cites
North Carolina cases concluding that a plaintiff stated a claim for relief. (See Doc. 64 at 38-39
(citing Barbier v. Durham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 225 F. Supp. 2d 617 (M.D.N.C. 2002), McAllister
v. Ha, 347 N.C. 638, 496 S.E.2d 577 (1998), Acosta v. Byrum, 180 N.C. App. 562, 638 S.E.2d
246 (2006), and Johnson v. First Union Corp., 128 N.C. App. 450, 496 S.E.2d 1 (1998)).) To
defeat a motion for summary judgment, however, the non-moving party must present more than
“mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another,” Othentec Ltd. v. Phelan, 526
F.3d 135, 140 (4th Cir. 2008), and the Court has the “affirmative obligation” to “prevent
factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” Felty v. Graves-Humphreys
Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18
To be clear, the Court does not require the parties to agree to anything and is
merely directing them to explore the possibility. If the parties do resolve the
counterclaim while the summary judgment motion is under advisement, they are directed
to promptly advise the Court. Otherwise, the Court will enter an order as time permits.
V.
Conclusion
Because Mr. Maisha has presented no admissible evidence of discrimination and
has not established a prima facie case of discrimination, and because he has not presented
sufficient evidence of severe emotional distress, the Court will grant the defendants’
motion for summary judgment as to all of Mr. Maisha’s remaining claims.
It is ORDERED that:
1. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claims,
(Doc. 43), is GRANTED.
2. The exhibits Mr. Maisha filed with his substitute brief at Docket 64-1 are
STRICKEN from the record.
3. In view of the substitute brief at Docket 64 and the rules violations in the
original brief at Docket 53, the original brief at Docket 53 is STRICKEN from
the record.
4. The motion for summary judgment as to the defendants’ counterclaim, (Doc.
46), remains under advisement.
This the 22nd day of January, 2015.
__________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
19
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?