MONEYHAM v. ASTRUE
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by JUDGE LORETTA C. BIGGS on 3/24/2015, that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED; Ms. Moneyham's Motion for Judgment Reversing or Modifying the Decision of the Commissioner (Doc. 8 ) is DE NIED; the Commissioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 10 ) is GRANTED; and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. A Judgment dismissing this action will be entered contemporaneously with this Order. (Daniel, J)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
LAYCEE RENE MONEYHAM,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.
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1:12CV1174
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
LORETTA C. BIGGS, DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff Laycee Rene Moneyham (“Ms. Moneyham”) commenced this action on
October 31, 2012 to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying her claim for Supplemental Social Security benefits. (Doc. 2.) Before the
Court are Ms. Moneyham’s Motion for Judgment Reversing or Modifying the Decision of the
Commissioner and the Commissioner’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Docs. 8, 10.)
The Court heard oral arguments on the parties’ motions on March 17, 2015. For the reasons
set forth below, the Court denies Ms. Moneyham’s Motion and grants the Commissioner’s
Motion. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
I. Procedural History
On August 13, 2009, Ms. Moneyham filed an application for supplemental security
benefits, alleging a disability onset of June 15, 2008. (Tr. at 144-46. 1) Following a denial
initially and upon reconsideration by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), on May 6,
2010, Ms. Moneyham requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id.
at 108-10.) The hearing occurred on March 25, 2011 (id. at 114), and in a decision dated April
14, 2011, the ALJ denied Ms. Moneyham’s disability application. (Id. at 9, 23.) On June 15,
2011, Ms. Moneyham requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision (id. at 78), and on August 28, 2012, her request was denied (id. at 1), making the ALJ’s decision the
final decision of the Commissioner.
II. Standard of Review
This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits is authorized under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 471 (4th Cir. 2012). The scope of review,
however, is extremely limited. Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981). The role of
the reviewing court is not to “reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations,
or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th
Cir. 2005)(second alteration in original). Rather, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s
factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence and are free of legal error.
Hancock, 667 F.3d at 471. Substantial evidence is such “evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted). It is considered more than
“a scintilla of evidence” but is less “than a preponderance.” Id. “‘Where conflicting evidence
1
The transcript citations refer to the certified administrative record.
2
allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for
that decision falls on the [ALJ].’” Id. (quoting Johnson, 434 F.3d at 653 (alteration in original)).
III. SSA Five Step Process and the Decision of the ALJ
In evaluating disability claims, the Commissioner uses a five-step process. Hancock,
667 F.3d at 472. In sequence, the Commissioner asks “whether the claimant: (1) worked
during the alleged period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that
met or equaled the requirements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to [his or her] past
relevant work; and (5) if not, could perform any other work in the national economy.” Id.
The claimant bears the burden of production and proof in steps one through four; the burden
shifts to the Commissioner in step five “to produce evidence that other jobs exist in the
national economy that the claimant can perform considering [his or her] age, education, and
work experience.” Id. at 472-73. Before going from step three to step four, the Commissioner
assesses the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”), a determination of what work
the claimant is capable of doing. The RFC is used at step four and at step five when the claim
is evaluated at those steps. See 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4). If the ALJ finds
that the claimant has failed to satisfy any step of the process, the ALJ need not proceed to the
next step. Id.
Here, the ALJ found that Ms. Moneyham had not engaged in substantial activity since
the onset date through the date she was last insured (step one); had the following severe
impairments: bipolar disorder; impulse control disorder; learning problems; and borderline
intellectual functioning and anti-social behavior (step two); and that Ms. Moneyham’s
impairments, alone or in combination, did not meet or equal a listed impairment (step three).
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(Tr. at 14.) The ALJ then determined that Ms. Moneyham had the RFC to perform work at
all exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: simple, routine, repetitive
tasks in a low social, low stress environment. (Id. at 15.) The ALJ found that Ms. Moneyham
had no past relevant work (step four), but considering her age, education, work experience,
and RFC, a finding of not disabled would be directed by section 204.00 of the Medical
Vocational Grid Rules (“Grids”) (step five). (Id. at 22-23.) Because the ALJ concluded that
the non-exertional limitations had little effect on the occupational base for unskilled work at
all exertional levels, he found Ms. Moneyham not disabled. (Id. at 23.)
IV. Discussion
a.
The ALJ did not err in finding that Ms. Moneyham’s non-exertional
limitations did not erode the occupational base for unskilled work.
Ms. Moneyham first takes issue with the ALJ’s decision not to obtain vocational
testimony. Because she had non-exertional limitations, Ms. Moneyham contends that the
ALJ’s reliance on the Grids was improper.
At the fifth step of the sequential evaluation, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to
show that other work exists in the national economy which the claimant can perform. Pass v.
Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995). When a claimant has non-exertional impairments
or a combination of non-exertional and exertional impairments that prevent him or her from
performing a full range of work at a given exertional level, the Commissioner generally cannot
rely on the Grids alone. Aistrop v. Barnhart, 36 F. App'x 145, 146-47(4th Cir. 2002). Rather,
the Commissioner may need to consult a vocational expert to prove that the claimant can
perform specific jobs that exist in the national economy. Id. However, a vocational expert
need not be consulted if the ALJ determines that the additional limitations have little to no
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effect on the occupational job base. See Adkins v. Astrue, 2011 WL 652508, at *4 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 10, 2011) (“[W]here a claimant's non-exertional limitations have a minimal effect on his
exertional occupational base, then a finding guided by the Grids is sufficient, and testimony
by a [vocational expert] is unnecessary.”)
In this case, the ALJ found that Ms. Moneyham’s mental and emotional limitations did
not erode the occupational base for unskilled work. The basic demands of unskilled work
include the ability to “understand, carry out, and remember simple instructions; to respond
appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and to deal with changes
in a routine work setting.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *4.
Although a substantial loss in a claimant’s ability to meet any of these basic abilities would
limit the occupational base for unskilled work, the ALJ found that Ms. Moneyham’s nonexertional limitations were consistent with the demands of unskilled work. (Tr. at 15, 23.)
Therefore, under these circumstances, the ALJ did not err in consulting the Grids and deciding
against obtaining testimony from a vocational expert. See Jaynes v. Colvin, No. 1:12-CV-168,
2014 WL 3109243, at *4 (M.D.N.C. July 8, 2014) (limitation to simple, routine, and repetitive
tasks (“SRRT”) in a low-stress environment with low social interaction did not erode job base
for medium work and thus does not prevent an ALJ from relying on the Grids); Livingston v.
Colvin, No. 3:13-CV-233, 2014 WL 496484, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2014) (“Plaintiff argues
that the ALJ finding that her RFC for light work was limited to SRRTs prevented the ALJ
from relying on the Grids in determining whether work existed in significant numbers in the
national economy that she could perform . . . A limitation to SRRTs does not prevent an ALJ
from relying on the Grids.”); Scott v. Cohin, No. 1:12-CV-170, 2013 WL 3927607, at *6
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(W.D.N.C. July 29, 2013) (“[L]imitation to simple, unskilled, entry level work that allows for
less stress work without public contact or significant interaction with others would not
significantly erode the occupational base represented by the Grids”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); Eason v. Astrue, No. 2:07-CV-00030-FL, 2008 WL 4108084, at
*16(E.D.N.C. Aug. 29, 2008) (finding no error in ALJ's reliance on the Grids where the ALJ
found claimant capable of the mental activities required by unskilled work—understanding,
remembering and carrying out simple instructions and making simple work-related decisions).
b.
The ALJ’s Paragraph B Findings are Supported by Substantial Evidence.
Ms. Moneyham next contends that the ALJ erred in evaluating the Paragraph B criteria
at steps two and three. Among other things, Ms. Moneyham points to what she believes are
inconsistences between evidence related to the ALJ’s Paragraph B findings and evidence
related to the RFC. Ms. Moneyham’s argument reflects a misunderstanding of the five-step
sequential process.
As stated in the ALJ’s decision, “[t]he limitations identified in the ‘paragraph B’ criteria
are not a residual functional capacity assessment but are used to rate the severity of a mental
impairment at steps 2 and 3. The mental residual functional capacity at steps 4 and 5 of the
sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment[.]” (Tr. at 15.) See SSR 968p (“The adjudicator must remember that the limitations identified in the ‘paragraph B’ and
‘paragraph C’ criteria are not an RFC assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental
impairment(s) at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation process. The mental RFC
assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed
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assessment . . . .”); Hagan v. Colvin, No. 5:13–CV–01090–DCN, 2014 WL 4063139, at *3
(D.S.C. Aug. 15, 2014).
Here, the ALJ adopted Dr. Parsley’s Psychiatric Review Technique Form (“PRTF”) in
his Paragraph B analysis (Tr. at 14-15), which relates to the severity of Ms. Moneyham’s
impairments at steps two and three. Dr. Parsley’s Mental Residual Functional Capacity
Assessment (“MRFC”) is a separate evaluation that pertains to Ms. Moneyham’s functional
capabilities at the RFC stage (Id. at 481-83).
In other words, the two are different
assessments. 2 See SSR 96-8p. Further, the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Moneyham had mild
restrictions in social functioning is not necessarily inconsistent with Dr. Ricketson’s
assessment because Dr. Ricketson concluded that “it may take at least 3-6 months to help
stabilize” Ms. Moneyham, “at which time she may be a candidate for vocational rehabilitation
services . . . [She] is functioning at a relatively competitive level with nonverbal materials and
these assets need to be pursued, which would also probably contribute to improved selfconcept and less frustration.” 3 (Tr. at 453-54.) Although Dr. Clifford noted that she had
marked difficulty interacting with others, that assessment was based on the sequential
This argument also fails because the section of the MRFC that Ms. Moneyham references
(“Summary Conclusions” within Section 1) is not the ALJ’s RFC. The RFC is in Section 3. (See 48183); see also SSA’s Program Operations Manual System 25020.010.B.1; Taylor v. Astrue, No.5:10–CV–
263–FL, 2011 WL 1599679, at *11 n. 7 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 23, 2011) (noting “the severity ratings found
in the ‘B’ criteria of the PRT form and Section 1 of the MRFC form do not equate to a mental RFC
assessment”), adopted, 2011 WL 1599667 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 26, 2011).
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It also appears that Ms. Moneyham references those sections of Dr. Ricketson’s assessment that
contain her own subjective reports of difficulties with social interactions (Tr. at 448-50). See Morris v.
Barnhart, No. 03-1332, 2003 WL 22436040, at *4 (3d Oct. 28, 2003)(“[T]he mere memorialization of
a claimant’s subjective statements in a medical report does not elevate those statements to medical
opinion.”)(quoting Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 590 n.2 (4th Cir. 1996)).
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evaluation for children’s claims (id. at 361-66), which differs from the adult sequential
evaluation process and occurred three years before the alleged onset date. 4
While Ms. Moneyham may disagree with the ALJ’s Paragraph B findings, they are
supported by Dr. Parsley’s PRTF where he noted, among other things, that Ms. Moneyham
has only mild restrictions in social functioning and difficulty concentrating. (Tr. at 495.) Dr.
Parsley went on to explain that Ms. Moneyham’s depressive symptoms would affect her ability
to interact with her supervisors and peers, but she would be able to function in a limited social
setting. (Id. at 497.)
Similarly, the ALJ’s findings are supported by the psychological
evaluation done by state examiner, Dr. Harris-Britt, who noted that, although Ms. Moneyham
“may have some difficulties interacting appropriately with peers and responding appropriately
to supervision,” “she was polite, cooperative, and seemed to understand and follow
directions.” (Id. at 478-80.) Dr. Harris-Britt also noted that Ms. Moneyham is able to
understand and retain simple instructions and to perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks.
(Tr. at 480.) Additional support for the ALJ’s Paragraph B analysis include Ms. Moneyham’s
report to Dr. Harris-Britt that she babysat her four-year old nephew and two-year old niece
for approximately two hours each evening. (Id. at 477.)
For these reasons, the ALJ’s
Paragraph B analysis is not inconsistent with the other evidence in the record and is supported
by Drs. Parsley’s and Harris-Britt’s assessments.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(steps in evaluating children’s disability: (1) whether child is engaging in
substantial gainful activity; (2) must have severe medical impairment; (3) and whether the impairment
meets, medically equals, or functionally equals listing considering the six domains 20 C.F.R. § 416.926);
Tingle ex rel. D.B. v. Colvin, 2013 WL 5594700, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 11, 2013)(noting that the factors in
determining adult disability are different form factors in determining child disability).
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c. The ALJ did not Err in Evaluating the Medical Opinions
Ms. Moneyham argues that Dr. Parsley’s November, 2009 MRFC should not have been
given significant weight. The ALJ gave Dr. Parsley’s opinion significant weight based on the
premise that Dr. Parsley reviewed Ms. Moneyham’s entire medical file. (Tr. at 22.) Ms.
Moneyham correctly points out that Dr. Parsley did not review her records from Duke
University Medical Center.
However, the fact that a medical reviewer did not have access to all the evidence at
the time of assessment is not by itself error, particularly where, as in this case, the ALJ reviewed
the entire record. See Thacker v. Astrue, No. 3:11-CV-246, 2011 WL 7154218, at *6 (W.D.N.C.
Nov. 28, 2011) (“The fact that the state agency physician did not have access to the entire
evidentiary record-because the record was incomplete a[t] the time of the assessment-is
inconsequential as the ALJ considered the entire evidentiary record and substantial evidence
supports his determination.”). Not only did the ALJ discuss Ms. Moneyham’s records from
Duke University Medical Center, we find that these records are not particularly helpful to her
argument. Ms. Moneyham’s Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score was 50 on
August 9, 2009 (Tr. at 505), but it steadily improved over several visits, ending at a 74 in
November, 2010. 5 (Id. at 517, 519, 524, 527, 530, 533.) The ALJ noted that Ms. Moneyham
“The GAF is a scale ranging from zero to one hundred used to rate an individual's psychological,
social, and occupational functioning. Scores between 41 and 50 indicate serious symptoms (such as
suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) or any serious impairment in social,
occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job). Scores between 51–60
indicate moderate symptoms or moderate difficulties in social, occupational, or school functioning.
Scores between 61 and 70 indicate mild symptoms or some difficulty in social, occupational, or school
functioning.” Breed v. Colvin, No. 1:10-CV-583, 2013 WL 3717740, at *10 n.10 (M.D.N.C. July, 2013)
(internal citations omitted)(citing Am. Psychiatric Assoc, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders 32–34 (4th Ed., Text Revision 2000)).
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reported improvement in her concentration and mood and felt less sad when she took her
medication and discontinued marijuana use. (Id. at 21, 515, 518, 523, 526, 532-33.) The ALJ
also noted that Ms. Moneyham expressed interest in pursuing a job and living on her own.
(Id. at 21, 512, 518-19.) As such, Ms. Moneyham has failed to show any harm in the ALJ’s
decision to assign significant weight to Dr. Parsley’s assessment. 6
Ms. Moneyham also maintains that the ALJ erred in giving significant weight to the
opinions of Drs. Harris-Britt, Clougherty, and Ricketson and Ms. Mansour.
The ALJ
explained that he was assigning significant weight to the opinions of these providers because
they examined Ms. Moneyham and had reviewed her entire medical file. (Tr. at 22.)
Ms.
Moneyham, once again, urges this Court to find error in the ALJ’s evaluation of these opinions
because none of these providers reviewed the Duke Medical Center records. Ms. Moneyham
further submits that there is no evidence that Dr. Harris-Britt examined the entire file. 7
As discussed above, the fact that these examiners did not have access to all the medical
records at the time of their examinations is not by itself error. See Thacker, 2011 WL 7154218,
at *6. The ALJ considered their evaluations. (Tr. at 17-18.) Nor is Dr. Ricketson’s evaluation
inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC finding because Dr. Ricketson’s evaluation dealt with the
Ms. Moneyham also suggests that Dr. Parsley did not review documents from Ms. Mansour and Dr.
Solomon, among others. However, Dr. Parsley referenced her IQ scores from these examinations.
(See 497, 355, 439.) These records also predate her alleged onset date of June 15, 2008.
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Ms. Moneyham’s supporting brief states: “And while Dr. Britt simply stated that ‘collateral records
accompanied this referral’ were among the sources of information for her report, there is no evidence
she examined the “entire file” as claimed by the ALJ.” (Doc. 9 at 11.) This allegation is merely
conclusory in nature and fails to set forth any supporting facts.
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severity of Ms. Moneyham’s symptoms at steps two and three. 8 (Tr. at 448-54.) Likewise, Dr.
Harris-Britt’s finding that Ms. Moneyham would likely have difficulty interacting with peers is
not inconsistent with the ALJ’s finding that she had mild restrictions in social functioning or
his RFC determination which limited her to a low social environment. Accordingly, there is
no error in the weight the ALJ accorded the opinions of these providers.
D.
The ALJ’s Credibility Determinations are Supported by Substantial Evidence
Ms. Moneyham finally disputes the ALJ’s evaluation of her and her mother’s credibility.
She maintains that the ALJ failed to articulate the reasons for his credibility findings as required
under SSR 96-7p.
The Fourth Circuit outlined a two-part test for evaluating issues of credibility. Craig,
76 F.3d at 594-95; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2.
“First, there must be objective medical evidence showing ‘the existence of a medical
impairment(s) which results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities
and which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’”
Craig, 76 F.3d at 594 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b)).
If the first step is
satisfied, as it was in this case (Tr. at 22), then step two requires the ALJ to evaluate the
intensity and persistence of pain and the extent to which it affects a claimant’s ability to work.
Craig, 76 F.3d at 594. The ALJ must consider “‘all the available evidence’ . . . and any other
Although Ms. Moneyham points to what she believes are several problems and inconsistencies with
the ALJ’s decision, this Court’s review is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
findings. This Court has already determined that the ALJ’s Paragraph B findings are supported by
substantial evidence. Moreover, the ALJ discussed Ms. Moneyham’s functional literacy issues, in that
he found her learning problems to be severe impairments, and considered these impairments when
formulating the RFC. (Tr. at 18-21).
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evidence relevant to the severity of the impairment, such as evidence of the claimant’s daily
activities, specific descriptions of the pain, and any medical treatment taken to alleviate it.” Id.
at 595 (internal citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c). The ALJ may
not discredit a claimant solely because her subjective complaints are not substantiated by
objective medical evidence. See Craig, 67 F.3d at 595-96. However, neither is the ALJ obligated
to accept the claimant’s statements at face value; rather, the ALJ “must make a finding on the
credibility of the individual’s statements based on consideration of the entire case record.”
SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *3.
In this case, the ALJ discussed Ms. Moneyham’s and her mother’s hearing testimony,
Ms. Moneyham’s medical record, her functional limitations, and symptoms. (Tr. at 16-22.) In
doing so, he pointed to evidence that Ms. Moneyham could follow directions (id. at 18-22);
she could function at a competitive level (id. at 18); she wanted to participate in vocational
rehabilitation (id. at 19); she was in a six-year relationship (id. at 21); she babysat her niece and
nephew (id.); and her mood and concentration improved when she took her medication (id.).
As such, it is not the role of the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.
Johnson, 434 F.3d at 653. It is the ALJ that has the opportunity to observe the claimant to
assess her credibility. Shively v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1984). Thus, the ALJ’s
credibility determination “should be accepted by the reviewing court absent ‘exceptional
circumstances.’” Meadows v. Astrue, No. 5:11-CV-00063, 2012 WL 3542536, at *9 (W.D.Va.
Aug. 15, 2012)(quoting Eldeco, Inc. v. NLRB, 132 F.3d 1007, 1010 (4th Cir. 1997)). Because
there is ample evidence supporting the ALJ’s credibility determinations, which are entitled to
great deference, remand is not warranted.
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For the reasons set forth above, the Court enters the following:
Order
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is
AFFIRMED; Ms. Moneyham’s Motion for Judgment Reversing or Modifying the Decision
of the Commissioner (Doc. 8) is DENIED; the Commissioner’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Doc. 10) is GRANTED; and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. A
Judgment dismissing this action will be entered contemporaneously with this Order.
This, the 24th day of March, 2015.
/s/ Loretta C. Biggs
United States District Judge
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