HUGER v. ANDERSON
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 7/7/2014, RECOMMENDING that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry 18 ) be granted in part and denied in part, in that, t o the extent the Complaint alleges an official capacity claim(s) against Defendant, the Court should dismiss such claim(s), but the Court should allow the individual capacity claim(s) to proceed. ORDERING that this case shall proceed on the Standard Case-Management Track under this Court's Local Rule 26.1(a)(1). The Parties shall serve initial disclosures required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A) and shall file any motions to amend pleadings (including to add parties) by Augus t 7, 2014, with any motion filed after that date subject to both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a) (2) and 16(b)(4). The Parties shall serve any expert disclosures required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(A)-(C) by October 7, 2014. All discovery shall end by November 7, 2014. At this point, the Court will not require mediation. (Lloyd, Donna)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SHELDON L. HUGER,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER M.D. ANDERSON,
Defendant.
1:12CV1242
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court for a recommended ruling on
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry 18) at 1). (See Docket
Entry dated June 5, 2014.)
For the reasons that follow, the
instant Motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
Background
Plaintiff commenced this case by filing a pro se prisoner form
Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendant acted with
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s safety in allowing another
inmate
to
attack
Plaintiff.
(Docket
Entry
2
at
3.)1
The
“Statement of Claim” section of Plaintiff’s Complaint states in its
entirety:
On 10-9-12, [Plaintiff] was injured because [Defendant],
of the Cabarrus County Jail, allowed an inmate, Demarlow
Perry, to exit his cell at the same time that [Plaintiff]
was also out of [his] cell, because [Plaintiff] was a
1
Page citations for this document refer to the pagination
in the CM/ECF footer, rather than the pre-printed pagination on the
form document.
jail
trustee,
allowing
inmate
Perry
to
attack
[Plaintiff].
This incident should have never occured
[sic] because:
(1) Inmate Perry and [Plaintiff] have been on “keep
separate” since August 2012 because inmate Perry
assaulted [Plaintiff] at that time;
(2) Inmate Perry is on “keep separate” from everyone in
the jail because he has assaulted other inmates by
sucker-punching them, causing severe damage.
(3) [Defendant] knew that inmate Perry has the
reputation for assaulting other inmates for nothing
at all. Therefore, since so many detainees were
assaulted by inmate Perry, jail officers must have
known that detainees faced a “substantial risk of
serious harm,” which makes [Defendant’s] actions
deliberate and pervasive.
(Id.)
The Complaint states that “Plaintiff is seeking monetary
relief in the amount of $20,000.00 for injuries to the head, neck,
hips,
feet,
hands
and
face.
Also
for
pain
and
suffering,
humiliation, shock, post traumatic stress disorder and punitive and
exemplary damages.”
(Id. at 4.)
Defendant filed the instant
Motion (Docket Entry 18) to which Plaintiff has not responded (see
Docket Entries dated May 5, 2014, to present).2
Discussion
Defendant seeks dismissal for “lack of personal jurisdiction
over [] [D]efendant, lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
2
Under this Court’s Local Rules, failure to respond to a
motion generally warrants granting the relief requested.
See
M.D.N.C. LR7.3(k) (“If a respondent fails to file a response within
the time required by this rule, the motion will be considered and
decided as an uncontested motion, and ordinarily will be granted
without further notice.”). However, in the context of “motions to
dismiss, . . . the district court nevertheless has an obligation to
review the motions to ensure that dismissal is proper.” Stevenson
v. City of Seat Pleasant, Md., 743 F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4th Cir.
2014).
2
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant
to Rules 12(b)(1)[, ](2) and (6) respectively, of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.”
(Docket Entry 20 at 1.)
In that regard,
Defendant first argues that his alleged actions “are protected from
liability by the doctrine of governmental immunity, which is a bar
to
recovery
by
[]
[P]laintiff.
As
such,
[]
[P]laintiff’s
[C]omplaint should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction
over
[]
[D]efendant
and
lack
of
subject
matter
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (2), respectively.”
jurisdiction
(Id. at 2; see
also id. at 2-3 (citing Moffit v. City of Asheville, 103 N.C. 237,
9 S.E. 695 (1889), as establishing “doctrine of governmental or
sovereign immunity”).)
Under
North
Carolina
law,
governmental
or
“[s]overeign
immunity ordinarily grants the state, its counties, and its public
officials, in their official capacity, an unqualified and absolute
immunity from law suits.”
Paquette v. County of Durham, 155 N.C.
App. 415, 418, 573 S.E.2d 715, 717 (2002). This immunity, however,
does not apply to actions pursuant to Section 1983.
See id. at 18-
19 (citing Corum v. University of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 772 (1992)
(“[U]nder the federal cases interpreting section 1983, sovereign
immunity alleged under state law is not a permissible defense to
section 1983 actions.”)); see also Martinez v. State of Cal., 444
U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1980) (“Conduct by persons acting under color of
state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . cannot be
3
immunized by state law.
A construction of the federal statute
which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect
would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the
supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper
construction may be enforced.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
North Carolina immunity doctrines do not, therefore, divest this
Court of either personal jurisdiction over Defendant or subject
matter jurisdiction over this action.
Nevertheless,
to
the
extent
Plaintiff
intended
that
the
Complaint assert a claim(s) against Defendant in his official
capacity, such claim(s) cannot go forward.
Section 1983 does
contemplate suits against local governmental entities and their
officials (Docket Entry 20 at 1 (identifying Defendant as “a
detention officer at the Cabarrus County Detention Center”)).
See
Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
However, under Section 1983, “claims against officers in their
official capacities are claims against the entities for which the
officers were acting. . . . [T]o establish liability on behalf of
the entity, it must be shown that the actions of the officers were
unconstitutional and were taken pursuant to a custom or policy of
the entity.”
Giancola v. State of W. Va. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 830
F.2d 547, 550 (4th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
Because the
Complaint fails to allege that Defendant acted pursuant to any
custom or policy of the Cabarrus County Detention Center (see
4
Docket Entry 2 at 3), the Court should dismiss any claim(s) against
Defendant in his official capacity.
However, dismissal of any official capacity claim(s) does not,
as Defendant supposes, end Plaintiff’s suit.
Defendant contends
that “he was sued in his official capacity as a detention officer.”
(Docket Entry 20 at 2 (emphasis added).)
As grounds for that
contention, Defendant argues that, “[a]bsent some clear indication
to the contrary, it is presumed that the defendant is sued in only
his official capacity.”
(Id. (citing Mullis v. Sechrest, 347 N.C.
548, 495 S.E.2d 721 (1998)).)
Although such a presumption may
exist under North Carolina law, it does not apply in the context of
a Section 1983 suit in this Court.
“[A] plaintiff need not plead expressly the capacity in which
he is suing a defendant in order to state a cause of action under
§ 1983.”
Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1995).
Moreover,
when a plaintiff does not allege capacity specifically,
the court must examine the nature of the plaintiff’s
claims, the relief sought, and the course of proceedings
to determine whether a state official is being sued in a
personal capacity. One factor indicating that suit has
been filed in such a manner might be the plaintiff’s
failure to allege that the defendant acted in accordance
with a governmental policy or custom, or the lack of
indicia of such a policy or custom on the face of the
complaint.
Id. at 61 (internal citations omitted).
The instant Complaint fails to specify the capacity under
which Plaintiff seeks to sue Defendant.
5
(See Docket Entry 2 at 1-
4.)
However, it also lacks any allegation that Defendant acted in
accordance with any policy or custom of his employer.
(Id. at 3.)
To the contrary, it contends that Defendant knew to keep Plaintiff
and another inmate apart, apparently pursuant to the policy of
Defendant’s employer, but failed to conform to said policy despite
knowing the dangers.
(Id.)
That circumstance indicates that Plaintiff intended to sue
Defendant in his individual capacity. Similarly, the fact that the
Complaint seeks punitive damages (see id. at 4), relief unavailable
against Defendant in his official capacity, see State ex rel.
Wellington v. Antonelli, No. 1:01CV01088, 2002 WL 31875504, at *4
(M.D.N.C. Dec. 20, 2002) (unpublished) (Osteen, Sr., J.) (“Under
§ 1983, [the] [p]laintiffs may not recover punitive damages from
the County, nor from the sheriff and his deputies in their official
capacities.”) (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453
U.S. 247, 271 (1981)), reflects an intent by Plaintiff to sue
Defendant in his individual capacity.
In sum, based on the
Complaint, the Court can “ascertain[] fairly” that “[P]aintiff[]
inten[ded] to hold [] [D]efendant personally liable,” Biggs, 66
F.3d at 61.
The Court therefore should allow Plaintiff’s claim(s)
against Defendant in his individual capacity to proceed.
Defendant also argues that the Complaint fails to state a
claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
said
Rule,
a
complaint
falls
(Docket Entry 20 at 3.)
short
6
if
it
does
not
Under
“contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
This standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Id.
In other words, “the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id.
“[D]etermining whether a complaint states on its face a
plausible claim for relief and therefore can survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion . . . requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.”
F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
Francis v. Giacomelli, 588
Moreover, although the Supreme
Court has reiterated the importance of affording pro se litigants
the benefit of liberal construction, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine Twombly’s requirement
that
a
pleading
contain
more
than
labels
and
conclusions,”
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (applying Twombly in dismissing
pro se complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Off. of
Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se complaint
7
. . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’
But even a pro se complainant must
plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than
the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S.
at 94, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, respectively)).
Defendant’s argument in full states:
In addition, the [C]omplaint states no claim upon which
relief may be granted.
There are some bare-boned
allegations concerning a physical altercation in which
[P]laintiff was allegedly involved with another inmate,
but the [C]omplaint alleges no specific facts to support
his claims that [D]efendant’s negligent behavior was the
proximate cause of his injuries. Since the [C]omplaint
states no viable claim for negligence, it should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6).
(Id.)
The Complaint does not purport to state a claim for
negligence; rather, given the benefit of liberal construction, it
alleges
that
Defendant
exhibited
deliberate
indifference
Plaintiff’s safety in violation of the Constitution.
Entry 2 at 3.)
to
(See Docket
“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody
and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon
it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his
safety and general well-being.”
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989).
In other words,
“when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so
restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to
care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his
basic human needs — e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
8
and reasonable safety — it transgresses the substantive limits on
state action set by . . . the Due Process Clause.”
Id. at 200
(emphasis added).
However, not every injury suffered by a prisoner or detainee
“translates into constitutional liability for prison [or jail]
officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
Plaintiff thus cannot maintain a
constitutional claim against Defendant merely based on allegations
that he negligently failed to protect Plaintiff from an unsafe
condition because “deliberate indifference describes a state of
mind more blameworthy than negligence,” id. at 835.
Instead, this standard applies:
First, a constitutional violation occurs only where the
deprivation alleged is “objectively, sufficiently
serious.”
For a claim based on a failure to prevent
harm, a [plaintiff] must show that he [was] detained or
incarcerated “under conditions posing a substantial risk
of serious harm.” . . . Second, an official must have
“a
sufficiently
culpable
state
of
mind.”
In
prison[/jail]-conditions cases, the requisite state of
mind is “deliberate indifference.”
Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388-89 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834) (internal citations and secondary internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).3
3
The Complaint does not make clear whether Plaintiff’s
custody arose from a conviction, such that the Eighth Amendment
(made applicable to local governmental officials through the
Fourteenth Amendment) protected him, or from pre-trial detention,
such that the Fourteenth Amendment protected him directly. (See
Docket Entry 2.)
As the Fourth Circuit has observed, Farmer
(continued...)
9
In the instant case, the Complaint alleges facts sufficient,
if true, to show that Defendant exposed Plaintiff to a substantial
risk of serious harm with the requisite state of mind.
It asserts
that inmate Perry was on “keep separate” because he had assaulted
inmates (including Plaintiff) in the past.
(Docket Entry 2 at 3.)
It further alleges that Defendant “knew that inmate Perry has the
reputation
for
assaulting
other
inmates”
and
that
Defendant
nevertheless allowed Defendant and inmate Perry out of their cells
at the same time, enabling inmate Perry to attack Plaintiff. (Id.)
In addition, it implies that Plaintiff received injuries to his
head, neck, hips, feet, hands, and face as a result of the attack.
(Id. at 4.)
If, as the Complaint alleges, Defendant knew the risk
inmate Perry presented to Plaintiff and allowed Perry access to
Plaintiff despite that risk, Plaintiff has stated a claim under
Section 1983.
See, e.g., Pressly v. Hutto, 816 F.2d 977, 979 (4th
Cir. 1987) (recognizing constitutional right of inmate to freedom
“from physical harm at the hands of fellow inmates resulting from
3
(...continued)
“addressed only the duties of ‘prison officials’ under the Eighth
Amendment. Farmer, however, merely defined the term ‘deliberate
indifference,’ a standard previously employed by the Supreme Court
in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), and its progeny. See
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829. Farmer in no way undermined [the Fourth
Circuit’s prior] holding . . . that the same ‘deliberate
indifference’ standard applies to both inmates and pretrial
detainees.
Indeed, other circuits have imported the Farmer
framework into cases involving pretrial detainees.” Brown, 240
F.3d at 388 n.6 (internal parallel citations omitted).
The
prisoner/detainee distinction thus does not affect the analysis of
this issue.
10
the deliberate or callous indifference of prison officials to
specific known risks of such harm”).
As to Plaintiff’s surviving individual capacity claim(s), the
Court will exercise its discretion to enter a Scheduling Order
without holding an Initial Pretrial Conference.
See M.D.N.C. LR
16.1(a) (“[C]ases brought by pro se plaintiffs shall be governed by
a scheduling order entered by the Court after an initial pretrial
conference, unless the Court determines, in its discretion, that no
conference
is
necessary.”
(internal
parentheses
and
italics
omitted)).
Specifically, the case should proceed on the Standard
case-management track, see M.D.N.C. LR 26.1(a)(1).
Conclusion
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a
Section 1983 claim against Defendant in his individual capacity.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
(Docket Entry 18) be granted in part and denied in part, in that,
to the extent the Complaint alleges an official capacity claim(s)
against Defendant, the Court should dismiss such claim(s), but the
Court should allow the individual capacity claim(s) to proceed.
IT IS ORDERED that this case shall proceed on the Standard
Case-Management Track under this Court’s Local Rule 26.1(a)(1).
The Parties shall serve initial disclosures required by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A) and shall file any motions to
amend pleadings (including to add parties) by August 7, 2014, with
11
any motion filed after that date subject to both Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) and 16(b)(4). The Parties shall serve any
expert disclosures required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)(2)(A)-(C) by October 7, 2014.
November 7, 2014.
All discovery shall end by
At this point, the Court will not require
mediation.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
July 7, 2014
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