SIERRA v. HASSAN MD et al

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 01/17/2014; that the court GRANT Defendant Hassan's Motion to dismiss (Docket Entry 9 ) and GRANT Defendant Martin's Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry 18 ). (Garland, Leah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
JÂIME D. SIERRÂ,
Plaintiff,
\r

S,\MI HASS,\N, MD,

Ct AI.,

Defendants.

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1,:13CY29

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, a prisonet of the State of Notth Caroltna, seeks declat^tory relief and
monetaq/ damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 for alleged fedetal constitutional violations

telated to medical care while

in custody.

(See

motions to dismiss for failure to state a clakn.

Docket Entry

(Jae

2.)

Defendants have filed

Docket Entries 9, 18.) Fot the reâsons

that follow, Defendants'motions to dismiss should be gtanted.

I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed the instant complaint in this court onJantary 1,20"1.3. (Docket E.rtty

2.)

Named as Defendants are Billy Martin, nurse supervisot at Âlbemade Corectional

Institution (",{.CI"), and Dt. Sami Hassan, physician at ACI. Defendant Hassan filed his

motion to dismiss on March 12, 2013 Q)ocket Errt y 9) and Defendant Matin filed
separate

motion to dismiss on April 22,2013. (Docket Entry 18).

a

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard

of Review

is apptopdate pursuant to Fedetal Rule of Civil

Defendants argue that dismissal
Ptocedure 12(bX6).

,{ motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12þ)(6) tests the suffìciency

of

the complatnt. Edwards u. Ci4t of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,243 (1999). Â complaint that does

not "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a clakn to telief that

is

plausible on its face"' must be dismissed. Ashroft u. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678 Q009) (quoting
Be//

Atlantic u. Twombþ, 550 U.S. 544,570 Q007)). '.A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the coutt to dtaw the teasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct." Id.;

see also

Sinmons u. United Mortg. and L,oan Inu.,

LLC, 634 F.3d 754,768 (4th Cir. 201,1) ("Or a Rule 12þ)(6) motion, a complaint must be
dismissed

if it does not

allege enough facts

to state a claim to telief that is plausible on its

face.') (citations and quotations omitted). The "court accepts all well-pled facts as úue and
construes these facts

in the light most

"Iegal conclusions, elements

enhancementfJ

favotable

to the plain:J:ff," but does not

considet

of a cause of action, and bate assertions devoid of

unwaffanted inferences, unteasonable conclusions,

or

fact:ual

arguments."

Nemet Cherrolet, Ltd. u. Consumerffiirs.coril, 1nc.,591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations

omitted). In other words, the standard requites a plaintiff to arlculate facts, that, when
accepted as true, demonstrate the plaintiff has stated

entided to telief. Frand¡ u. Giacomelli,588 F.3d 1,86,
U.S. at 678,andTwornbþ,550 U.S. at 557).

2

a clairr- that makes it plausible he is

'1.93

(4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556

Pro se complaints

^re

to be liberally

construed

in assessing

sufficiency undet the

Federal Rules of Civil Ptocedute. Erickson u. Pardus,551 U.S. 89,94 Q007). Howevet, even

under this liberal consttuction, "generosity is not fantasy," aÍrd the court is not expected to
plead a plainttf?s claim for

him.

Bender u. Søbarban Hosþ., Inc., 159

F.3d 186, 1,92 (4th

Ct.

1ee8).

B. Deliberate Indifference
InFarrneru. Brennan,511 U.S. 825 (1,994), the Supreme Coutt held that the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution "imposes duties on þrison] offìcials who must ptovide
humane conditions

of

confinement; ptison officials must ensure that inmates receive

adequate food, clothing, sheltet, and medical cate, and must take reasonable measures to
guârantee the safety of the inmates." Id. at 832 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

successful Eighth ,{mendment claim contains

two elements: the depdvation must

A

be,

objectively, "sufficiently serious," and the pdson official must have demonstrated

^

"deliberate indiffetence to inmate health ot safety." Id. at834.

"Deliberate indifference is

not meet

it."

^

very high standrd-^ showing of mete negligence will

Grajtson u. Peed, 195 F'.3d

692, 695 (4th Cit. 1999). Rather, the "delibetate

indifference" prong requ ites Plaintiff to make "two showings:"

First, the evidence must show that the official in question subjectively
recognized a substantial dsk of harm. It is not enough that the officers ¡hoald
haue recogntzed it; they actually must have petceived the dsk. Second, the
evidence must show that the official in question subjectively tecognized that
his actions were inappfopri^te in light of that dsk. As with the subjective
awareness element, it is not enough that the official shoald haue recogtized that
his action wete inapptoptiate; the offìcial actually mast
actions wete insufficient.

J

haue

tecognized that his

Parish ex re/. I-ee u. Cleueland,372 F.3d 294,303 (4th Cir. 2004) (intetnal citations and
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). "The subjective component thetefore sets

a pattctlarly high bat to recovery." Iko u. Shreue, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cit.
"'Delibetate indifference entails something more than mere negligence.

Smith,71tr3d 1.62,1,66 (4th Cir.
prison official know

1,995) (quoting Farwer 511 U.S. at

incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as

Shaþ.ka

835). "It requires that

of and distegard the objectively setious condition,

of hattn." Id. To constitute deliberate indifference, "the

..."'

2008).
a.

a

medical need, ot risk

treatment must be so grossly

to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to

fundamental fairness." Miltier u. Beom, 896 tr.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990).1 Thus, "mere
negligence or malpractice" does not constitute delibetate indifference. Id. at 852. Similatly,
"[d]isagteements between an inr,rrate a¡d a physician over the inmate's proper medical care

do not state a S 1983 claim unless exceptional circumstances are alleged." If/right u. Collins,
766 F.2d 841,849 (4th Cir. 1985).

It is well

settled, therefote, that a medical need serious

enough to give dse to a constitutional claim involves a condition that places the inmate at

a

substantial dsk of sedous harm, usually loss of life or peffianent disability, or a condition for

which lack of treatment perpetuates severe paín. Farwer,

51"1.

U.S. at 832-35.

C. Allegations in PlaintifPs Complaint
Plaintiff alleges that he was scheduled fot an appointment with Coastal Eat Nose and

Thtoat Âssociates, PLLC ("Coastal") in New Betn, Notth Carobna on Match 29,
(Compl. fl5, DocketF,ntry

2.) Plaintiff

201.1..

missed the appointment and was never told why he

missed the appointment, rìor was he told any informalon regarding rescheduling the
Miltierhas been overruledby f-armerto the extent that it allowed a finding of deliberate indifference
upon constructive knowledge, but it is still good law for the proposition cited.
1

4

appointment. (Id.) He alleges that because of his chtonic ear ptoblems, he is supposed to
have regulat e n checkups every six months

. Qd) Plaintiff indicated

that dudng the odginal

evaluation at Coastal, he had akeady lost some of his headng. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he

has filed numerous sick requests, and on July

'1.0, 201,1,,

he filed a grievance about this

problem at the Tabor Conectional Institution which was denied. (Id.) Ovet a ye

t

later, he

also filed a gdevance at ACI which was also dened.2 (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that as a tesult of his ear problems, he has akeady lost some headng.

Qd.) Plaintiff states that this will ruin his cateet as a singer and songwriter. (Id.) Plaintiff
alleges that

Dr. Flassan "refuses to schedule fPlaintiffl to see an

doctot that pra;ctices medicine

^t

ear

specialist. He is the only

this facility." (Id.) He further alleges that "Billie Mattin

RN is the Nursing Supervisor who is responsible fot scheduling inmates sick-calls and
appointments" and that this individual is not willing to assist Plaintiff. Qd.) Plaintiff seeks
declantory relief from the Court ordedng that Plaintiff be seen by an ear specialist every six

months and he also seeks monetary damages resulting from "medical neglect causing
fPlaintiffs] loss of headng." (Id.n6.)

D. Analysis
1. Failure to State a Claim
Defendant Hassan

As pointed out by Defendant Hassan, Plaintiffs complaint fails to

assert

constitutional violations. There is quite simply nothing in the complaint which shows that

Dr. Hassan's conduct amounted to deliberate indifference to
2 It

^

setious medical need. At

from the Complaint that Plaintiff missed his scheduled appointment while at Tzbor
Correctional Institution. At some point, he was transferred from that prison to ÂCI.
appears

5

most, Plaintiff appears to have a difference

in opinion with Dt. Hassan on the issue of

refering Plaintiff to an ear specialist. The only allegation against Dr. Hassan is that
refuses to schedule Plaintiff an appointment with

^î

e

t specialist,

he

but Plaintiff ptovides no

insight as to why Dr. Hassan would not schedule an appointment for him to be seen by an
ear specialist. Moreover, there

^te

rro allegations to suggest that

Dt.

Hassan believed failure

to refet Plaintiff to an ear specialist would result in substantial dsk of harm. The fact that
Plaintiff disagrees with the treatment or medical judgment of Dt. Flassan is not sufficient to
state a claim

of

deliberate indiffetence.

Johnson u. puinones,

See

Esnlle a. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 1.05-06 (1,976);

145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cit. 1998). Simply put, "[t]he courts will not

intervene upon allegations

of mere

States u. Clawson,650 F'.3d 530,

negligence, mistake

ot diffetence of opinion."

United

538 (4th Cir. 201,1) (quoting Bowringu. Godwin,55l F.2d 44,

47-48 (4th Cr.1,977)). The allegations

in the complaint

Flassan ignored any serious medical needs

and Twombþ, Plunuffs complaint as

are

insufficient to show that Dt.

of Plaintiff. Thus, under the standards of Iqbal

to Dt. Hassan does not "contain suffìcient factual

mattet, accepted as true, to state aclakn thatis plausible onits face." Iqbal,556 U.S.

^t678.

Defendaú Mafün

Likewise, Plaintiffs complaint fails

to

assert

a

claim against Defendant Martin.

Plaintiffs sole allegation against Defendant Martin is that she is the nutsing supervisot who
is unwilling to assist

him. There

^re

rro allegations

of

any

wtongful conduct by Defendant

Mattin that dses to a level of constitutional violations. Âgain, Plaintiff appears to

disagree

with the course of treatment afforded to him which could arguably amount to

mere

more. ,\s previously stated, "mere negligence or malptactice"

does

negligence, but nothing

6

not constitute deliberate indifference. Miltier, 896 tr.2d at 852. Construing the facts in the
light most favotable to Plaintiff, the complaint fails to state a claim against Defendant Martin
"that is plausible on its face." Iqbal,556 U.S.

^t678.

2. Supervisory Liability
Defendant Martin alleges that Plaintiff failed to state a clatm fot supervisory liability
against

her. Defendant Matin may not be held liable based upon a theory of

søperior, because respondeat saperior generally

resþondeat

is inapplicable to $ 1983 suits. Iqbal,556 U.S. at

676; Monell u. Dep't of Social Seras.,436 U.S. 658,694 (1978). Flowever, a supervisor may be

liable for the actions of a subordinate if:
(1) the supervisot had acttal or constructive knowledge that his subotdinate
v/as engaged in conduct that posed "a pervasive and uffeasonable risk" of
constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff;

Q) the supervisot's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show
"deliberate indiffetence to or tacit authoÅzatton of the alleged offensive
ptactices;" and

(3) thete was an "afftmaive causal link" between the supervisor's inaction
and the partcular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Shaw a. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791,,799 (4th

Cir. 1994). Supervisory liability is not established

merely by demonstrating that a subordinate was deliberately indifferent
medical needs. Miltier, 896 F.2d

^t

854. Futhermore, in medical cate claims, supervisory

officials may rely upon the judgment
treatment.

to a plaintiffs

of the medical staff to determine the course of

See ìd.

To the extent Plaintiff

asserts that Defendant Mattin's liability

is premised on the

actions of her subotdinates, Plaintiffs chim fails. Thete is nothing in the Complaint alleging

Defendant Mattin's knowledge of wrongful conduct by subordinates, nor are thete factual
7

allegations to support "tacit at;rthoÅza:iLon" on the part of Defendant Martin. Moteover, the
evidence suggests that Defendant Mattin's knowledge stems ftom het response to Plaintiffs
Grievance No. 1347 in which it was noted that no sick calls were made in the year 201'1', and

that Plaintiff was last seen tegarding eat ptoblems on -August 22,2012.3 (Compl. at 6.) By
responding to the grievance, it appears that Defendant Mattin's involvement is limited to the

administrative temedy procedure, which falls shot of engagement necessaLty fot supervisory

liability.

Paige u. Kupec,

No. Civ.4.,\W-02-3430,2003 ìØL 23274357, at*1 @. Md. Mat.

31,,2003) (unpubüshed opinion) ,
see

al¡o Knowles u. I-ewh, Case

dd,70 F. App'x'1.47 (4th Cir. JuIy 31,2003) þet

curiam);

No. 5:1.1,-CT-31"13-FL,201,2WL 363724L, at x5 @.D.N.C. Äug.

22, 201,2) (unpublished opinion). Based upon the fotegoing, Plaintiff has failed to state a
supervisory liabiJity claim against Defendant Martin.

3. Qualifred Immunity
Defendant Martin also assetts that she is entided

to the protections of

qualified

immunity. Under the doctrine of qualifìed immunity, "govetnment offìcials perfotming
discretionary functions generally ate shielded from liability fot civil damages insofar as theit

conduct does not violate cleady established statutory
reasonable person would have

ot constitutional rþhts of which a

known." Harlow u. Fitqgerald,457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus,

the traditional two-step qualifìed immunity inquiry requires a court to determine:
whether the official violated a constitutional flght; and
"cleatly established" at the time of its violation.

3

if

(1)

so, (2) whether the tight was

See, e.g., Rock

þr Ufr-UMBC

u. Hrabowsk'i,

Documents attached to the complaint may be considered in ruling on a modon to dismiss.
Kensingron Volanteer Fire Dep't, Inc. u. Montgomerl CntJ., Md, 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cu. 2012) (intemal
quotadons omitted).
8

411 Fed.

App'* 541., 546-47 (4th Cft. 201,0) (unpublished opinion). In evaluating qualified

immunity, a court initially may detetmine whether the plaintiff has alleged ot shown
violation of a constitutional nght at all..

See Pearson u.

a

Callahan,555 U.S. 223 Q009).a Furthet,

"þ]ecause qualified immunity is designed to shield officers not only ftom liability but ftom

the butdens of litigation, its establishment at the pleading or sünmary judgment stage has
been specifically encourage

d."

Pritchett

u.

Aford,973 F.2d 307 , 3L3 (4th Cir. 1,992).

Having found that Plaintiff has not stated a claim fot a constitutional violation, this
court finds that Defendant Martin is entitled to qualified immunity.

3d

41.2,41,5

See

Abnry u. Coe,493 F.

(4th Ck. 2007) ("If [an officer] did not violate any right, he is hatdly in need of

any immunity and the analysis ends dght then and there.").

III.

CONCLUSION
For all these reasons,

IT IS RECOMMENDED

that the court GRANT Defendant

Hassan's Motion to dismiss (Docket E.ttty 9) and GRANT Defendant Martin's Motion to

Dismiss Q)ocket Entry 18).

L l$l¡'çh,ster
Stutrr hkgistrrte Jud¡p

Dutham, North Carohna
January 1.7,20'1.4

a In Pearsoz, the Supreme Court overruled the mandatory two-step sequence

adopted in Saucier u.
Katqr533 U.S. 194 Q001)tnanalyzrngqualifiedirnmunity. Thus, afterPearson, courts atefree"to
exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances . . . ." 555 U.S. at 236.
9