WILLIAMS v. COLVIN
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 11/06/2015; that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability be affirmed, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 11 ) be denied, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 14 ) be granted, and that this action be dismissed with prejudice. (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
BRIAN E. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.
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1:13CV236
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Brian E. Williams, brought this action pursuant to
the Social Security Act (the “Act”) to obtain judicial review of a
final decision of Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security,
denying Plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”)
and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).
(See Docket Entry 2.)
The Court has before it the certified administrative record (cited
herein as “Tr. __”), as well as the parties’ cross-motions for
judgment (Docket Entries 11, 14). For the reasons that follow, the
Court should enter judgment for Defendant.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging a disability onset
date of September 30, 2003.
(Tr. 246-55.)
Upon denial of those
applications initially (Tr. 118-19, 152-57) and on reconsideration
(Tr. 120-21, 162-69, 170-79), Plaintiff requested a hearing de novo
before
an
Administrative
Law
Judge
(“ALJ”)
(Tr.
180-81).
Plaintiff, his mother, his attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”)
attended
the
hearing.
(Tr.
42-91.)
The
ALJ
subsequently
determined that Plaintiff did not qualify as disabled under the
Act.
(Tr.
10-28.)
The
Appeals
Council
thereafter
denied
Plaintiff’s request for review, thus making the ALJ’s determination
the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial review.
(Tr. 1-5.)
In rendering that disability determination, the ALJ made the
following findings later adopted by the Commissioner:
1.
[Plaintiff] meets the insured status requirements of
the . . . Act through March 30, 2011.
. . .
2.
[Plaintiff] has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since September 30, 2003, the alleged onset
date.
. . .
3.
[Plaintiff] has the following severe impairments:
seizure disorder, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar
disorder, depression, personality disorder, anxiety
disorder, and substance addiction disorder.
. . .
4.
[Plaintiff] does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals
the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
. . .
5.
. . . [Plaintiff] has the residual functional
capacity to perform a full range of work at all
2
exertional levels but with the following nonexertional
limitations. [Plaintiff] can never climb ladders, ropes,
or scaffolds and must avoid even moderate exposure to
workplace hazards, such as unprotected heights and
dangerous machinery. [Plaintiff] requires work involving
only simple, routine, repetitive tasks in that he can
apply common sense understanding to carry out oral,
written, and diagrammatic instructions. [Plaintiff] is
limited to only occasional contact with co-workers and
the public. He also requires a stable work environment,
one with very few changes.
. . .
6.
[Plaintiff] is unable to perform his past relevant
work.
. . .
10. Considering [Plaintiff’s] age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there are
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that [Plaintiff] can perform.
. . .
11. [Plaintiff] has not been under a disability, as
defined in the . . . Act, from September 30, 2003,
through the date of this decision.
(Tr. 15-27 (internal parenthetical citations omitted).)1
DISCUSSION
Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits.”
1
Hines v.
Because the date last insured reflects the last day of the last calendar
quarter in which a claimant meets the requirements for entitlement to a period
of disability and disability insurance, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.102 (defining
“[q]uarter or calendar quarter” as “a period of three calendar months ending
March 31, June 30, September 30, or December 31 of any year”), 404.130
(explaining rules for determining disability insured status), the ALJ’s reference
to Plaintiff’s date last insured as March 30, 2011, rather than March 31, 2011,
constitutes a typographical error (see Tr. 15).
3
Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006).
However, “the scope
of . . . review of [such a] decision . . . is extremely limited.”
Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981).
In this case,
Plaintiff has not shown entitlement to relief under the extremely
limited review standard.
A.
Standard of Review
“[C]ourts are not to try [a Social Security] case de novo.”
Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974).
reviewing
court must
uphold
the
factual
findings
Instead, “a
of
the
ALJ
[underlying the denial of benefits] if they are supported by
substantial evidence and were reached through application of the
correct legal standard.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 561 (internal brackets
and quotation marks omitted).
“Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)).
“It consists of
more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less
than a preponderance.”
Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th
Cir. 2001) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).
“If
there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the
case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence.”
993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
4
Hunter,
“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the [C]ourt should not
undertake
to
re-weigh
conflicting
evidence,
make
credibility
determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ, as
adopted by the Social Security Commissioner].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at
176 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).
“Where
conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to
whether
a
claimant
is
disabled,
the
responsibility
for
that
decision falls on the [Social Security Commissioner] (or the ALJ).”
Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The issue before
[the Court], therefore, is not whether [the claimant] is disabled,
but whether the ALJ’s finding that [the claimant] is not disabled
is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a
correct application of the relevant law.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d
585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).
When confronting that issue, the Court must take note that
“[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving
a disability,” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981),
and that, in this context, “disability” means the “‘inability to
engage in
any
substantial
gainful
activity
by
reason
of
any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months,’” id.
5
(quoting
42
U.S.C.
§
423(d)(1)(A)).2
“To
regularize
the
adjudicative process, the Social Security Administration has . . .
promulgated . . . detailed regulations incorporating longstanding
medical-vocational evaluation policies that take into account a
claimant’s age, education, and work experience in addition to [the
claimant’s] medical condition.”
Id.
“These regulations establish
a ‘sequential evaluation process’ to determine whether a claimant
is disabled.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
This sequential evaluation process (“SEP”) has up to five
steps:
“The claimant (1) must not be engaged in ‘substantial
gainful activity,’ i.e., currently working; and (2) must have a
‘severe’ impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the ‘listings’ of
specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent
that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capacity
to (4) perform [the claimant’s] past work or (5) any other work.”
Albright v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 475 n.2
(4th Cir. 1999).3
A finding adverse to the claimant at any of
several points in the SEP forecloses an award and ends the inquiry.
For example, “[t]he first step determines whether the claimant is
2
The Act “comprises two disability benefits programs.
[DIB] . . .
provides benefits to disabled persons who have contributed to the program while
employed. [SSI] . . . provides benefits to indigent disabled persons. The
statutory definitions and the regulations . . . for determining disability
governing these two programs are, in all aspects relevant here, substantively
identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1 (internal citations omitted).
3
“Through the fourth step, the burden of production and proof is on the
claimant.
If the claimant reaches step five, the burden shifts to the
[government] . . . .” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal citations omitted).
6
engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’ If the claimant is
working, benefits are denied.
The second step determines if the
claimant is ‘severely’ disabled.
If not, benefits are denied.”
Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at
each of the first three steps, “the claimant is disabled.” Mastro,
270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and
two, but falters at step three, i.e., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment
is not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment,
the ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(‘RFC’).”
Id. at 179.4
Step four then requires the ALJ to assess
whether, based on that RFC, the claimant can “perform past relevant
work”; if so, the claimant does not qualify as disabled.
179-80.
Id. at
However, if the claimant establishes an inability to
return to prior work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step,
whereupon the ALJ must decide “whether the claimant is able to
perform other work considering both [the RFC] and [the claimant’s]
vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work experience)
4
“RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the
claimant’s] limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562 (noting that administrative
regulations require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained workrelated physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and
continuing basis . . . [which] means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an
equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted)). The
RFC includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses
the claimant’s “ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy
work,” as well as “nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or skin
impairments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only
after [the ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments and
any related symptoms (e.g., pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63.
7
to adjust to a new job.”
Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65.
If, at this
step, the government cannot carry its “evidentiary burden of
proving that
[the
claimant]
remains
able
to
work
other
jobs
available in the community,” the claimant qualifies as disabled.
Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.5
B.
Assignment of Error
In Plaintiff’s sole assignment of error, he contends that the
ALJ erred in analyzing Plaintiff’s mental impairments in three
respects:
(1)
the
ALJ
improperly
evaluated
the
opinions
of
Plaintiff’s treating therapist, Katina Dial-Scott (Docket Entry 12
at 4-9); (2) the ALJ “did not adequately address [Plaintiff’s
Global Assessment of Functioning (‘GAF’)] scores” (id. at 10); and
(3) the
ALJ
[Plaintiff’s]
failed to
sufficiently
hallucinations
on
his
consider
“the
ability
to
effects
work”
of
(id.).
Plaintiff’s contentions do not warrant relief.
1.
Treating Therapist’s Opinion
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ should have assigned more
weight to the opinions of treating therapist, Ms. Dial-Scott, who
completed a “Medical Statement Concerning Schizophrenia for Social
5
A claimant thus can qualify as disabled via two paths through the SEP.
The first path requires resolution of the questions at steps one, two, and three
in the claimant’s favor, whereas, on the second path, the claimant must prevail
at steps one, two, four, and five. Some short-hand judicial characterizations
of the SEP appear to gloss over the fact that an adverse finding against a
claimant on step three does not terminate the analysis. See, e.g., Hunter, 993
F.2d at 35 (“If the ALJ finds that a claimant has not satisfied any step of the
process, review does not proceed to the next step.”).
8
Security Disability Claim” (“Medical Statement”) on June 15, 2012.
(Id. at 4-5 (citing Tr. 548-50).)
According to Plaintiff, the VE
“testified that the functional limitations described by [Ms. DialScott] would render [Plaintiff] disabled from working.”
(Id. at 4
(citing Tr. 88-89).) Plaintiff further asserts that “[t]he reasons
the ALJ cited for rejecting [Ms. Dial-Scott’s] opinion are not
persuasive.”
(Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff faults the ALJ for relying
upon an emergency room record from April 2012 which reflected that
Plaintiff remained alert and oriented, as “[n]either of th[o]se
conditions indicate[d] how [Plaintiff’s] schizophrenia and bipolar
[disorder] are affecting him.”
also
challenges
the
ALJ’s
(Id. (citing Tr. 24).)
observation
that
Ms.
Plaintiff
Dial-Scott’s
opinions did “not refer to specific treatment notes to support the
conclusions provided” (Tr. 24), because “the regulations do not
require [Ms. Dial-Scott’s] opinions to include citations to her own
medical records – her opinion need only be supported by the medical
record” (Docket Entry 12 at 5 (citing Social Security Ruling 0603p, Titles II and XVI: Considering Opinions and Other Evidence
from Sources Who Are Not “Acceptable Medical Sources” in Disability
Claims; Considering Decisions on Disability by Other Governmental
and Nongovernmental Agencies, 2006 WL 2329939 (Aug. 9, 2006) (“SSR
06-03p”) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527)).
As
an
initial
matter,
the
ALJ
correctly
recognized
the
possibility that Ms. Dial-Scott did not constitute an “acceptable
9
medical source” under the regulations.
(See Tr. 24 (noting “that
it is not clear that Ms. [Dial-]Scott is an acceptable medical
source”).) The regulations categorize therapists such as Ms. DialScott
as
“[o]ther
sources,”
20
C.F.R.
§§
404.1513(d)(1),
416.913(d)(1), rather than “acceptable medical sources,” 20 C.F.R.
§§
404.1513(a),
“[l]icensed
physicians”
psychologists”).
distinction
416.913(a)
(defined
and
to
include,
“[l]icensed
or
inter
alia,
certified
SSR 06-03p addresses the significance of the
between
“acceptable
medical
sources”
and
“other
sources” as follows:
The distinction between “acceptable medical sources” and
other health care providers who are not “acceptable
medical sources” is necessary for three reasons. First,
we need evidence from “acceptable medical sources” to
establish the existence of a medically determinable
impairment.
See 20 [C.F.R. §§] 404.1513(a) and
416.913(a). Second, only “acceptable medical sources”
can give us medical opinions.
See 20 [C.F.R. §§]
404.1527(a)(2)
and
416.927(a)(2).
Third,
only
“acceptable medical sources” can be considered treating
sources, as defined in 20 [C.F.R. §§] 404.1502 and
416.902, whose medical opinions may be entitled to
controlling weight. See 20 [C.F.R. §§] 404.1527(d) and
416.927(d).
SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2 (emphasis added).
In light of
the reduced deference owed to the opinions of “other sources,” the
ALJ did not err by failing to give Ms. Dial-Scott’s opinions
controlling weight.6
6
Notably, the record neither reflects nor does Plaintiff argue (see Docket
Entry 12 at 4-9) that Ms. Dial-Scott worked so closely under a psychiatrist’s or
psychologist’s supervision that she offered her opinions while acting as the
agent of an acceptable medical source. See generally Taylor v. Commissioner of
10
Moreover, the ALJ’s analysis of Ms. Dial-Scott’s opinions
comports with the regulations and SSR 06-03p. After discussing the
contents of Ms. Dial-Scott’s opinion, the ALJ concluded as follows:
The undersigned notes that it is not clear that Ms.
[Dial-]Scott is an acceptable medical source, but that in
light of her status as a treating source this opinion is
given some weight.
This opinion, consisting primarily of checked responses,
does not refer to specific treatment notes to support the
conclusions provided. Nor is [Plaintiff’s] past history
of
alcohol
and drug
use,
as
well
as
medical
noncompliance, assessed here. The undersigned notes that
two months prior to this opinion, when [Plaintiff] was
seen for his reported seizure, he was seen as alert and
oriented, appropriately responsive, and with no evidence
of thought disturbances. Accepting that [Plaintiff] does
have limitations in terms of dealing with detailed
instructions and public contact, the limitations of the
RFC particularly concerning only occasional interpersonal
contact and for simple tasks, would appear to address her
concerns.
(Tr. 24-25 (internal citation to the record omitted) (emphasis
added).)
The above-quoted language makes clear that, contrary to
Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ did not “reject[]” Ms. Dial-Scott’s
opinion (see Docket Entry 12 at 5), but rather gave the opinion
“some weight” (Tr. 24), and accommodated Ms. Dial-Scott’s opinions
regarding
Plaintiff’s
limited
ability
to
deal
with
detailed
Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that nurse
practitioner could qualify as “acceptable medical source” where she worked under
physician’s close supervision such that she acted as physician’s agent); Padrta
v. Colvin, No. 3:12–CV–01521–KI, 2014 WL 1236185, at *6 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2014)
(unpublished) (holding where “[t]here is no evidence that the nurse practitioner
work[ed] closely with and [wa]s supervised by an acceptable medical source[,]
. . . the ALJ is only required to give a germane reason to reject [the nurse
practitioner’s] opinion”).
11
instructions and the public (Tr. 25).
Further, although Plaintiff
faults the ALJ for relying on Plaintiff’s status as alert and
oriented at his April 2012 hospital visit (see Docket Entry 12 at
5), the ALJ also noted Plaintiff’s responsiveness and lack of
thought disturbances at that visit (see Tr. 24).
Moreover, although Plaintiff claims that “the regulations do
not require [Ms. Dial-Scott’s] opinion to include citation to her
own medical records” (Docket Entry 12 at 5), SSR 06-03p makes
abundantly clear that the ALJ should consider the degree to which
a treating source supports and explains his or her opinions in
assigning weight to such opinions:
Although the factors in 20 [C.F.R. §§] 404.1527(d) and
416.927(d) explicitly apply only to the evaluation of
medical opinions from “acceptable medical sources,” these
same factors can be applied to opinion evidence from
“other sources.”
These factors represent basic
principles that apply to the consideration of all
opinions from medical sources who are not “acceptable
medical sources” as well as from “other sources,” such as
teachers and school counselors, who have seen the
individual in their professional capacity. These factors
include:
• How long the source has known and how
frequently the source has seen the individual;
• How consistent the opinion is with other
evidence;
• The degree to which the source presents
relevant evidence to support an opinion;
• How well the source explains the opinion;
12
• Whether the source has a specialty or area
of expertise related to the individual's
impairment(s); and
• Any other factors that tend to support or
refute the opinion.
SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *4-5 (emphasis added).
The ALJ
correctly noted that Ms. Dial-Scott’s opinions consisted, in large
part, of checked boxes without specific reference to treatment
notes to support those opinions (see Tr. 24), and did not err by
taking that lack of explanation and support into account.
The Court should find no error in the ALJ’s consideration of
Ms. Dial-Scott’s opinions.
2.
GAF Scores
Next, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ “did not adequately
address [Plaintiff’s GAF] scores in his decision.”
12 at 10.)
(Docket Entry
According to Plaintiff, his GAF scores consistently
ranged between 40 and 50, which “denotes ‘serious symptoms’ . . .
or any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school
functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job)” and reflected
“a sustained inability to work.”
(Id. at 9-10 (citing American
Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders 34 (4th ed. text rev. 2000) (“DSM-IV-TR”)).)7
7
The GAF is a numeric scale from 0 to 100 representing a clinician’s
judgment of an individual’s social, occupational and school functioning “on a
hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness.” DSM-IV-TR at 32.
13
Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ did discuss many of
Plaintiff’s GAF scores in his decision (see Tr. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24)
including scores as low as 25 (see Tr. 20) and as high as 55
(see Tr. 20, 22, 23).
Moreover, Plaintiff does not explain how the
ALJ’s further consideration of Plaintiff’s GAF scores would have
altered the mental RFC in this case.
10.)
(See Docket Entry 12 at 9-
In addition, the ALJ correctly noted the Social Security
Administration’s stance on GAF scores in effect at the time of his
decision:
The Social Security Administration has not endorsed the
GAF scale for use in Social Security and SSI disability
claims, as GAF scores do not have a direct correlation to
the severity requirements for Social Security mental
disorder listings. See 65 Fed. Reg. 50764-65, 2000 WL
1173632 (Aug. 21, 2000). However a GAF score can still
be of assistance to an [ALJ] in formulating a claimant’s
[RFC].
(Tr. 20 n.1.)8
Further, the ALJ indicated that he had carefully
considered the entire record (see Tr. 18), and labored under no
8
After the ALJ issued his decision, the Social Security Administration
issued Administrative Message 13066 (“AM–13066”), effective on July 22, 2013,
which clarified its position on the relevance of GAF scores: “[W]hen it comes
from an acceptable medical source, a GAF rating is a medical opinion . . . . An
[ALJ] considers a GAF score with all of the relevant evidence in the case file
and weighs a GAF rating as required by 20 [C.F.R.] §§ 404.1527(c) and 416.927(c).
. . . [A] GAF needs supporting evidence to be given much weight. By itself, the
GAF cannot be used to ‘raise’ or ‘lower’ someone’s level of function. The GAF
is only a snapshot opinion about the level of functioning. It is one opinion
that we consider with all the evidence about a person’s functioning. Unless the
clinician clearly explains the reasons behind his or her GAF rating, and the
period to which the rating applies, it does not provide a reliable longitudinal
picture of the claimant’s mental functioning for a disability analysis.”).
Notably, the Fifth Edition of the DSM published in 2013 has modified the
multiaxial assessment system espoused by the DSM–IV-TR, including discontinuing
use of the GAF score. See American Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders 16 (5th ed. 2013).
14
obligation to discuss every piece of evidence in the record, see
Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Diaz v.
Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 308 (7th Cir. 1995).
Under
these
circumstances,
the
ALJ
did
not
err
in
his
consideration of Plaintiff’s GAF scores.
3.
Hallucinations
Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to “adequately
address[]
the
effects
ability to work.”
of
[Plaintiff’s]
hallucinations
(Docket Entry 12 at 10.)
on
his
Plaintiff emphasizes
that his hallucinations constituted “one of the main reasons he was
fired from several jobs,” “occurred on a daily basis,” and “were
not relieved with medication.”
(Id. (citing Tr. 57).)
Plaintiff
faults the ALJ for “only consider[ing] [Plaintiff’s] depression and
social problems when assessing the RFC.”
(Id.)
A review of the ALJ’s decision reflects that the ALJ expressly
considered Plaintiff’s alleged visual and auditory hallucinations
multiple times in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s RFC.
The ALJ
referenced Plaintiff’s hearing testimony that he sees “things” (Tr.
19 (referring to Tr. 56)), his denial of auditory hallucinations
during his October 2009 inpatient mental health treatment (Tr. 20
(citing Tr. 389)), his endorsement in November 2009 of auditory and
visual hallucinations (Tr. 21 (citing Tr. 484)), his reports in
June 2010 of delusions and hearing voices (id. (citing Tr. 492)),
his claim of auditory and visual hallucinations in July 2010 after
15
running out of his medications, along with his acknowledgment that
medication had helped, although not completely stopped, the voices
(Tr. 22 (citing Tr. 504)), his report later in July 2010 that he
had been doing well since starting his medication and that the
voices had decreased considerably (id. (citing Tr. 502)), his
denial in August 2010 of active hallucinations (id. (citing Tr.
501)), his statement in May 2011 that he sees “dragons” when very
angry with certain others (id. (citing Tr. 535)), his report in
August 2011 that the voices never went away in conjunction with his
admission that he had run out of Depakote for three days (id.
(citing Tr. 534)), his claim in January 2012 of continued voices
(id. (citing 533)), his endorsement in July 2012 of auditory
hallucinations (id. (citing Tr. 552)), and his statement in March
2011
to
a
consultative
examiner
that
he
sees
“shadows”
and
experiences daily auditory hallucinations (id. (citing Tr. 515)).
After considering this evidence, the ALJ concluded as follows:
[Plaintiff] alleges that he is unable to work due to
hallucinations and problems controlling his anger. The
record shows that his mental state is capable of
improvement through medication. Progress notes of August
12, 2010, from Community Innovations, show[] that
[Plaintiff] was tolerating his medications . . . and that
he denied any active hallucinations. However [Plaintiff]
has often been non-compliant with both medication and
appointments.
. . .
Of course, one of the most significant factors is that
despite [Plaintiff’s] report of hallucinations, anger
control issues, and problems being around people, he is
16
apparently deemed safe enough to be responsible for his
two young sons after they come home from school.
Similarly, [Plaintiff] has been able to maintain a
relationship with a girlfriend, and to engage in social
activities such as going to a relative’s house to watch
sports.
These factors do not suggest a level of
impairment sufficient to preclude all employment.
(Tr. 23-24 (internal record citations omitted).)
The ALJ also
evaluated the opinion evidence relating to Plaintiff’s mental
impairments, including testimony and a Third Party Function Report
from Plaintiff’s mother (see Tr. 24-26), before concluding that
Plaintiff remained capable, despite his claimed hallucinations, of
performing “simple, routine, repetitive tasks in a stable work
environment and with only occasional contact with co-workers and
the public” (Tr. 26).
The
ALJ’s
decision
thus
demonstrates
that
he
adequately
considered Plaintiff’s alleged hallucinations and their impact on
his ability to work, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
findings in that regard.
In sum, Plaintiff’s assignment of error lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not established an error warranting remand.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision
finding no disability be affirmed, that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Judgment on
the
Pleadings
(Docket
17
Entry
11)
be
denied,
that
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 14)
be granted, and that this action be dismissed with prejudice.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
November 6, 2015
18
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