JOYNER v. COLVIN

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATRE JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER, Signed on 04/17/2015. This Court RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability be REVERSED, and that this matter be REMANDED to the Commissioner. It is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment 10 should be GRANTED and Defendant's Motion for Judgment should be DENIED. Objections to R&R due by 05/04/2015. (Coyne, Michelle)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
BRENDA K. JOYNER,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,

Defendant.

1:13CY259

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Btenda I{. Joyner, brought this action pursuant to Section 205(9) of the Social
Security Act (the "Act"), as amended (42 U.S.C. $ a05(g)), tô obtain review of a ftnal decision

of the Commissioner of Social Secutity denying her claims for a Period of Disability ("POD")
and Disability Insurance Benefits

("DIB") undet Tide II of the Act. The Coutt has before it

the certifìed administtative record and ctoss-motions fot judgment.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff protectively filed an application for a POD and DIB on July 7 , 2009 alleging
disability onset date of March 23,2006. Qr. 1,4, 131-38.)1 The application was denied

initially and again upon reconsideration. (Id. at 69-85.) Plaintiff then requested
before an Administtative Law Judge

(",\LJ").

Plaintiff, her attorney, and a vocational expett
that Plaintiff was not disabled undet the
1

,{.ct.

(Id. at

8.)

('1/E").
Qd. at

Ttanscript citations refer to the administrative recotd.

a headng

A.t the July 7 , 2011. heanng were

Qd.

at29-56.) The ALJ detetmined

14-24.) On January 31, 2013 the

a

,{.ppeals Council denied Plaintiffls request for teview, making the

Commissioner's final decision for purposes of

AIJ's determination the

teview. (Id- at1,-5.)

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was 48 yeats old on Decembet

31

, 2010 , the date last insuted

She had at least a high school education and was able

.

(Id. at 1.6, 23 .)

to communicate in English. (Id. at23.)
(

III. STANDARD FOR REVIEW
The Commissionet held that Plaintiff was not undet a disability within the meaning
the

of

,{.ct. Undet 42 U.S.C. $ 405(9), the scope of judicial teview of the Commissionet's final

decision is specific and

narow.

Smith u. Schweiker,795

F.2d 343,345 (4th Cir. 1986). This

Court's teview of that decision is limited to determining whethet there is substantial evidence

in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. $ a05(g); Hønter

u. Sulliuan,

993 tr.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992); Hals u. Sulliuan, 907 F.2d 1.453, 1,456 (4th Cir. 1990).
Substantial evidence is "such televant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support

(1971)).

a

It

conclusioî."
"consists

H/,/nter, 993

F.2d at 34 (crttng Nchardnn

u. Perales,402

U.S. 389, 401.

of more than a mere scintilla" "but may be somewhat less than

preponderance." Id. (quolng

L"aws u. Celebre77e, 368

a

F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)).

The Commissionet must make fìndings of fact and resolve conflicts in the evidence.

HoJ¡907 F.2d

ñ

41456

(citing Kingu. Calfano,599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979)). The Coutt

does not conduct a de novo teview
Schweiker,795 F.2d

of the

evidence

not of the Commissioner's fìndings.

at 345. In reviewing fot substantial evidence, the Court does not

undetake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, to make ctedibility determinations, or to substitute

2

its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Craig

u. Chater,

7

6 tr.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. '1996)

(citing Ha1s,907 F.2d at 1,456). 'lX/hete conflicting evidence allows teasonable minds to

diffet as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the
[Commissionet] (ot the [Commissioner's] desþate, the -ÀLJ)." Cmig76tr.3d at 589 (quoting
IYalker u. Bowen, 834 tr.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1,987)). The denial

only
See

if no reasonable mind could accept

Nchardson u. Perales,

402U.5. 389,

401.

of benefìts will be reversed

the tecotd as adequate to support the detetmination.

(1.971). The issue before the Court, therefore, is not

whether Plaintiff is disabled, but whether the Comrnissionet's finding that Plaintiff is not
disabled

is

suppotted

by

application of the relevant

substantial evidence and was teached based upon

law.

See

id.; Cofman

u.

a

correct

Bowen,829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1,987)

IV. THE ALJ'S DISCUSSION
The Social Security Regulations define "disability" fot the purpose of obtaining
disability benefits as the "inability
medically determinable physical

to do any

substantial gainful activity by teason

ot mental impairment2 which

of any

can be expected to tesult in

death ot which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months. ,, 20 C.F.R.

S

404.1505(a);

see

al¡o 42 U.S.C. S 423(dX1XÐ.

To meet this definition,

a claimant must have a severe impairment which makes it impossible to do ptevious work or

any other substantial gainful activity3 that exists

in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. S

'

A "physical ot mental impairment" is an impairment resulting from "anatomical, physiological, ot
psychological abnormalities which are demonsttable by medically acceptable clinical and labotatory
diagnostic techniques." 42U.5.C. S 423 (dX3)

t

"srrbstu.rtial gainful acttvity" is work that (1) involves petformrng significant or productive physical
or mental duties, and Q) is done (ot intended) for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1510.

404.1,505(a);

see

also

42U.5.C.

S

A.

423(dX2XÐ.

The Five-Step Sequential Analysis

The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential analysis to ascertain whether the claimant
is disabled, which is set
17

4 F.3d 473,

(1)

47

See

Albrightu. Comm'rof Soc. Sec. Admin.,

5 n.2 (4th Cn. 1,999). The ALJ must determine in sequence:

Whethet the claimant is engaged in substantal gainful activity
clatrnant is

Ø

foth in 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520.

working). If

so, the claimant is

(2.e.,

whether the

not disabled and the inquiry ends.

$Øhethet the claimant has a severe impairment.

If not, then the claimant

is not

disabled and the inquiry ends.

(3)

Whethet the impafument meets ot equals to medical crrteria of 20 C.F.R., Pat
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, which sets forth a list of impairments thatwarant

fìnding of disability without consideting vocational criteria.

If

so,

the claimant

a

is

disabled and the inqurry is halted.

(4)

W'hether the impairment prevents the clatrnant ftom performing past relevant

wotk. If not, the claimant

(5)

is not disabled and the inquiry is halted.

Whethet the claimant is able to petfotm any othet wotk considering both her
tesidual functional capacitya and het vocational abilities.

If

so, the claimant is

not disabled.

a

"Residual functional capacity" is the most a claìmantcan do in a work setting despite the physical and
mental limitations of her impairment and any related symptom (e.g., pan). See 20 C.F.R. S
404.L545(a)(1); see also Hines u Barruhart, 453 F.3d 559, 562 (4th Cir. 2006). The RFC includes both a
"physical exettional or sttength limitation" that assesses the claimant's "abiìity to do sedentary, light,
medium, heawy, or very heavy work," as well as "nonexertional lirnitations (mental, sensory or skin
impairments)." Hallu. Haris,658 F.2d 260,265 (4th Cir. 1981).
4

20 c.F.R.

S

404.1520.

Flete, the -ALJ

ftst detetmined

that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity from het alleged onset date of Match 23, 2006 through her date last insured of
Decembet 31, 2010. Qr. at 1.6.) The ALJ next found in step two that Plaintiff had the

following severe impaitments: left shoulder adhesive capsulitis teated surgically; dght
shouldet bursitis; left carpal tunnel syndrome with status post-surgical repair; fìbtomyalgia;
and depression. Qd.) Ât step three, the -A,LJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment

ot combination o[impaitments listed in, or medically equal to, one listed in Âppendix
^t

17

.) .{t step fout, the -{LJ concluded that Plaintiff was unable to perform

work.

(Id.

at22.) At step five, the ALJ determined

1.

Qd.

any past relevant

that considering Plaintiffs age, education,

work expetience, and RFC, thete were jobs in the national economy that she could petform.
(Id. at23.)

B.

Residual Functional Capacity Determination

Ptiot to step four, the ,\LJ determined Plaintiffs RFC based on his evaluation of the
evidence, including Plaintiffs testimony, and the fìndings
care

ptovidets.

Qd.

of tteating and examining health

at 1,9-22.) Based on the evidence as a whole, the ALJ determined that

Plaintiff retained the RFC to petform the following:
claimant ha[s] the tesidual capacity to petform less than the
full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1,567 þ) with the
abiliry to lift andf or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds
ftequently; sit, stand andf or walk 6 hours out of an 8-hout
workday, but will need to exetcise a sit-stand option every 30

F]h.

minutes; occasionally teach overhead; frequently but not
constant use of the upper extremities fot fine and gross
manipulation; occasionally balance, kneel and crouch;
occasionally climb nmpf staus, but never laddet/rope/scaffolds;
5

never crawl; ftequently stoop; and the need to avoid concenttated
exposure to hazards such as machinery and unptotected heights.
Due to pain and mental lirnitations, the claimant would be furthet
limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks such that she could
apply cofiunon sense understandiîgto caffy out oral, wdtten and
diagramrnatic instructions, take ctiticism from supetiots, and get
along with the public and coworkers.
(Id. at 1,5.)

C.

Past Relevant Work

The ,ALJ found in step four that Plaintiff could not perform past relevant work as
matedal handler, secudty guard, knitting machine operator, and yatn

D.

winder.

423(dX5); 20 C.F.R.

S

(Id. at 22.)

Adiustment to Other Work

The claimant bears the initial burden of ptoving the existence of
S

a

a

disability. 42U.5.C.

404.1512; Smfth u. Calfano,592F.2d 1235,1236 (4th Ctr. 1,979). Once

the claimant has established at step fout that she cannot do any wotk she has done in the past
because

of het severe impairments, the burden shifts to the Commissiofler at step five to show

that jobs exist

in signifìcant

numbers

perfotm consistent with her RFC,

in the nauonal economy which the claimant

age, education, and past

work experience

.

could

Hanter,993 F.2d

at 35; ll/ilsorc u. Califano, 61.7 F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 1980). Here, the ALJ found that given

Plaintifls age, education, wotk experience, and RFC, there were othet jobs existing in
signifìcant numbets

in the national economy that she could petfotm such as a marke4

photocopy machine operator, and ticket taker. Qd. at 23.)

V.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raises a single issue, asserting that the .{LJ's decision is not suppoted by

6

substantial evidence. (Docket Etrtty 11, at

4.)

Nevertheless, this ovetarching issue breaks

down into numerous sub-issues loosely gtouped into contentions that the AIJ erred in setting
PlaintifPs RFC and in determining Plaintiffs credibility. (Id. at 4-1,4.)

I.

The ALJ's RFC Assessment Is Not Supported by Substantial Evidence.

In pettinentpaLït, Plaintiff

lo¡,a-a

asserts that the functional limitations

state consultative medical

ALJ's RFC determination. (Id. at

s¡2mi¡s¡-attributed to Plaintiff

7.)

which Dr. RamnikJ.

are inconsistent

v/ith the

This is problematic, Plaintiff continues, because the

,\LJ's decision fails to either explain this inconsistency or to adequately explain the weight
atúibuted to Dt. Zota's opinion. Qtl.) Likewise, Plaintiff faults the -ALJ for failing to addtess
a statement by

Plaintifls tteating physician-Dt. Steven T. Âlexands¡-¡L1'à¡

she should use a

walker/wheelchait. (Id. at 9-1,1,.) This is ptoblematic, Plaintiff continues, because this
accommodation was necessary to help prevent falls due to weakness. (Id. at 11.) Fot the
following reasons, the undersigned concludes that remand is ptoper.
The

-A,LJ

must corìsider opinions ptovided by medical soutces "togethet with the rest

of the relevant evidence." 20 C.F'.R. S 404.1,527þ); Social Secutity Ruling ("SSR") 96-8p,
auailable

at L996 WL 37 4184, at x7 . The ALJ must also address those opinions

and-if

they

conflict with the adjudicator's assessment of the RFC-must explain why the opinions wete

not adopted. SSR 96-8p,

auailable

.{dministration regulations, "[u]nless

at 1996 WL
^

3741,84,

at *7. Under Social Security

tre lng source's opinion is given controlling weight,

the administrative law judge must explain in the decision the weight given to the opinions of
State agency medical or psychological consultant or other program physician, psychologist,

7

a

ot

other medical specialist, as the adminisuative law judge must do for any opinions ftom treating
sources, nontreating sources, and other nonexamining sources who do not work

fot

[the

Social Security ,\dministrationl." 20 C.F.R. S 404.1527(e)(Z)(r). See also SSR 96-8p
(concluding that "[t]he RFC assessment must always considet and address medical source

opinions" and "[i]f the RFC assessmerìt conflicts with an opinion ftom
adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted"). The

if fìndings

are

a medical source, the

Cout "cannot determine

unsuppoted by substantial evidence unless the Secretary explicitly indicates the

weight given to all of the relevant evidence." Gordon u. Schweiker,725 F.2d 231, 235-36 (4th

Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, an ÅLJ need riot discuss each item of evidence in the tecord, but
instead may limit explanation

of the weight given "to obviously probative exhibits." Id.

(citation omitted). Furthermote, an ALJ's failure to expressly state the weight given to

a

medical opinion may be hatmless error, when the opinion is not televant to the disabiìity
detetminatiorl ot when it is consistent with the ALJ's RFC determination.s
Here,

Dl

Zota examined Plaintiff on February 2, 201,0. Çt. 293.) Plaintiffs chief

complaints were bursitis and tendonitis in her right shoulder.

Qtí)

She also complained

of

difficulty taising her arm overhead, athdtis in het lower back, and diffìculty with ptolonged
standirig, sitting, and

walking. Qd) Plaintiff also repotted "no Medicaid or no

health

financial\y," reported that she had not seen a doctor lately, but repotted futther that she had
seen one the previous year, when she had been given shots

5

in het right shouldet.

(Id.)

Barnbart,434 F.3d 650, 655-56 (4th Cir. 2005) (concluding that coutt need not
evaluate propriety of weight given to treating physician opinion that was submitted after date last
insured and "rìot relevant" to the claimed pedod of disabiliry).
See, e.g., Johnson u.

8

,\dditionally, Dr. Zota's examination tevealed, in pertinent part, that while Plaintiff was not
using an assistive device, she had a slow gait, with slow shot steps, and difficulties walking on
heel and toe, squatting and rising, and taising her atm ovethead. (Id. at 294.)

Dn Zota then issued her "summary, diagnosis, and prognosis"

This 47-year old white female hete for

as

follows:

Disability

evaluation. Suffering from tendonitis butsitis, both shoulders,
dght worse than left, multilevel degenerative disc disease on
lumbar spine. Based on this evaluation, this impafument may
affect her ability to prolonged sitting, standing, maybe about
fìfteen minutes, walking about thtee to four blocks,lifting limited
to 25 pounds, and some problems raising atm ovethead and
sustaining position. No ptoblem to heat, speak ot ttavel.
(I't.)

The ALJ, in rendering his decision, did not explicidy attdbute any weight to Dt. Zota's

opinion, but did reference it and chancterize it as follows

In a consultative report dated February 2, 201.0, Dr. Ramnik

J.

Zota, M.D., teponed ongoing bilatetal shouldet pain, left worse
than dght, as well as back pain. (Exhibit 7F) Her most
pronounced deficits wete noted to be her diffìculty in taising the
left aïm overhead and sustaining position. (Exhibit 7tr)
Nevertheless, Dr. Zota found the claimant was capable of sitting
and standing about 15 minutes each, walking about 3 to 4 blocks,
and lifting up to a maximum of 25 pounds (Exhibit 7tr) On
examination, the claimant also did not require an assistive device
fot ambulation and had normal gdp sttength, normal ability to
petfotm dextetous movements of the hands, no welling ot
deformity of the lowet extremities bilatetally with normal rzr.ge
of motion, normal cervical spine, negative straight leg taising,
grossly intact cratial nerves, normal motor functions, power,
tone, and reflexes in all fout exttemities and intact sensotT
system. (Exhibits 6F'& 7F)

(rr.20.)

9

The AIJ's treatment of Dt. Zota's opinion is troubling. This is because nowhere in his
decision does the ÂLJ specifically assett the weight he is attdbuting

the Â,LJ had adopted all of

it.

Of course,

as noted,

if

Dt. Zota's ptoposed limitations in detetmining PlaintifFs RFC

evaluation, the ertor might well be harmless. After all,

Zota's proposed limitations into Plaintiffs RFC,

attdbuted significant weight

to

if

the ALJ explicitly incorporated Dr.

it would then be

clear that the ALJ had

those proposed limitations. Instead, here, the ALJ

incorporated almost all of Dr. Zota's limitations in PlaintifPs RFC, with one notable exception.
Specifically, as demonstrated above, Dr. Zota expressed a concern that Plaintiff may
have difficulty sitting or standing fot more than fìfteen minutes at a

nme. The ALJ apparently

recognized this as well, because he charactertzedDnZota's opinion as opining that Plaintiff

might have difficulty sitting or standing for more than fifteen minutes at a ttme. Nevertheless,
while the,\LJ incorporated a sit/stand option in Plaintiffs RFC, presumably based at least in
part on Dt. Zota's recoûunendation, the

AIJ

silendy passed ovet

Dt. Zota's conclusion that

Plaintiff might struggle if required to sit or stand more than fifteen minutes at a tkne. Rather
than incorpotate a sit/stand limitation

in Plaintiffs RFC petmitting Plaintiff to

between sitting and standing at will,

or in fifteen minute increments, the ALJ

altetnate
instead

incorpotated a sit/stand limitation in PlaintifPs RFC permitting Plaintiff to do so in thirty
minute increments.

Thus, without explanation, the ALJ doubled the frequency of the sit/stand option
contemplated by

Dr. Zota. The Court is unwilling to simply presume this unexplained

10

deviation from Dr. Zota's opinion is harmless.ó The ALJ's failute to explain his deviation

from Dt. Zota's opinion in this regard also tequires the undersigned to speculate
this deviation u/as intentional or an oversight.

as to

whether

It is thus uncleat whethet Plaintiffls

RFC is

suppotted by substantial evidence as to the sit/stand testriction.T

The Commissioner, on the other hand, disagtees and sees no meaningful eror hete,

contending that the essence of

Dr. Zota's

restriction

is that thete be no prolorcged

sitting/standing. (Docket Entry 1,4 at 1,2.) Here, the commissioner contends, the ALJ
addtessed

Dl

Zota's concern that Plaintiff not be required to engage in ptolonged sitting or

standing by incorporaing in the RFC a thirty minute sit/stand resttiction.

(Itl.)

Howevet,

this argument entirely omits a salient feature of Dt. Zota's opinion, his concetn that Plaintiff
o

The Court observes that about two-thirds of the way through her admrnistrative hearing, itself just
shy of thirty minutes, Plaintiff asked to stand up, which she proceeded to do with the aid of het
husband. (Tr. 51.) In his decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff less than entirely ctedible, in part because
at her hearing she was assisted in walking and standing by her husband, which the ALJ considered
"inconsistent with the record." [r.21..) Howevet, as explained throughout this Recommendation,

uncleat whether the ALJ, in teaching this conclusion, considered Dt. ,A.lexander's
walker/wheelchair recommendation (discussed further below) and also Dl Zota's fifteen minute
sit/stand recommendation (discussed further above), because he never discussed either in his
decision. Â ptopetly aniculated analysis of Dr. Alexander's walket/wheelchait recommendation and
also Dr. Zota's frfteen minute sit/stand recommendation is thus also televant to a credibiJity
detetmination supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ etted in finding
her less than entirely credible because he failed to take into consideration het inability to pay for
medical experìses. pocket Entry 1,1 at7 .) This argument may well have some metit, howevet, it can
be considered further on temand and the Court need not tesolve this issue hete.

it is

7

*1.1 (NI.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2012)
(remanding, in paft because, "[t]he ALJ failed to address Dr. Weiss's opinions that Plaintiff tequired an
at-will sit/stand option (as opposed to a sit/stand option every 30 minutes)") with Bon/lo u. Astrae,No.
07-CV-02396-CMA,2009 SøL 995724, *10 @. Colo. Apr 1,3,2009) (frnding no eÍror whete "in his
RFC assessment, the ,{.LJ specifically found that Plarntiff could sit/stand for only thirty minutes at a
Compare Seaman u. Astrue,

No. 4:11-cv-988, 2012 WL

1,466607

,

ú

tjme.... [and] theALJ's RFC mirrors Dr. Lindell's opinion on this limitation.") ffirned376Fed.
App'* 847 (1Oth Ct.2010); seealsoDehatcheu. Heckler,71,5 F.2d 148, 150 (4th Cit. 1983) ('Judicial
review of an administrative decision is impossible without an adequate explanation of that decision by
the adminisúatot.").
11.

m^y have diffìculty sittìng ot standing fot longet than fifteen minute increments. The RFC "is
the most [a claimant] can still do despite þer] limitations." 20 C.F.R.

S

404.1545. If the

-ALJ

is inclined to partially discount Dr. Zota's opinion, he cettainly may do so, howevet, he must
also anchor this decision in substantial recotd evidence and articulate it in his decision.s

There is an additional omission in the ALJ's decision which

futhet undetmines

the

Coutt's confidence that the AIJ's RFC is suppoted by substantial evidence. Dr. Alexandet,

Plaintiffs treating physician, told her to obtain a walker or a wheelchair in March of 201,1,. (It.

386.) Yet, the ALJ never mentions this in his decision,

again leaving the undetsigned to

speculate as to whether this omission is intentional (that is, whether the ALJ implicitly tejected

the accommodation) or inadvertent (that is, whether the

AIJ

simply neglected to considet it).

The undetsigned is unwilling to deem the omission harmless, especially given

Dr

concerns regarding Plaintiffs ability to sit/stand fot more than fìfteen minutes at a

lJ;me.e

Nor does Defendant's

response

to the ALJ's omission of Dt.

Zota's

Alexandet's

recommendation that Plaintiff use a wheel chair/walket meaningfully addtess the Coutt's

concerns. Defendant contends that Dr. Ålexander's advice that Plaintiff obtain

a

wheelchaitf walker was inconsistent with other additional findings Dt. Âlexander made upon

t The ALJ's thirty minute sit/stand option was pÍesented in a hypothetical to the VE.
GR. 53-55.)
Consequently, the VE's testimony that Plaintiff could petfotm work as a matket, photocopy machine
operator, and ticket taker was premised on the ability to sit and stand fot thirty minute inctements. It
is not clear from the record if those positions would accommodate a Ftfteen minute sit/stand option.
As mentioned eadier, the burden at this step falls on the Commissioner.
o

Platnnff also correctly points out that a second state consultative examiner found that she could only
squat one-qvatter while holding on to het husband. (Docket Entty 11 at 9 citing Tr. 302.) Whjle
evidence such as this does seem relevant to Plaintiffs ability to sit and stand, the ALJ did not mention
it in his decision.
12

examination. (Docket E.rtty

14

at6)

However, the ALJ never addressed these othet findings

in his decision. Âs explained eadier, it is not the ptovince of the Court to teview the evidence
de novo, reconcile evidence, or fìnd facts in the
because

ftst instance. That is the duty of the .ALJ and

it is not cleat whether the ÂLJ meaningfully dischatged this duty here, temand is the

better course.

In short, the Commissioner must consider "all the evidence and explain on the recotd
the reasons for þet] findings, including the reason for rejecting televant evidence in suppot

the claim. Even

if

of

legitimate reasons exist for tejecting or discounting certain evidence, the

fCommissioner] cannot do so fot no reason ot for the wtong reason."

Kirug u.

Calfano, 615

F.2d 1018, 1,020 (4th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). The ÂLJ's duty of explanation is satisfìed

"$]f a reviewing court can discern 'what the ALJ did and why he did
Co.

u.

it."'

Pinel Moantain Coal

Ma1s,176 F.3d753,762 n.10 (4th Cir. 1,999). Here, because the ALJ failed to ptovide

suffìcient explanation to suppott his RFC assessment, the Coutt "cannot tell whether [hrs]
decision is based on substantial evidence." Cook u. Hetkler,783 F.2d 1168, 1172 (4th Cu.

1986). None of this necessatily means that Plaintiff is disabled undet the -dct and the
undersigned exptesses no opinion on that matter. Nevetheless, the undetsigned concludes

that the proper course here is to remand this mattet for futther administrative ptoceedings.

The Court declines consideration of the additional issues raised by Plaintiff at this time.
Hancock u. Barnhaft, 206

F. Srrpp. 2d 757,763-764 CX/.D. Ya. 2002) (on temand, the priot

decision of no pteclusive effect, as it is vacated and the new hearing is conducted).

13

VI. CONCLUSION
After a careful consideration of the evidence of recotd, the Court fìnds that

the

Commissioner's decision is not suppoted by substantial evidence. Accotdingly, this Cout

RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability be REVERSED,
and the matter be

REMANDED to the Commissionet under

senterice four of 42 U.S.C.

S

a05(g). The Commissionet should be ditected to temand the matter to the ALJ fot futher
administtative action as set out above.

To this extent, Plaintiffs Motion fot Judgment

Reversing the Commission (Docket Entry 10) should be

GR{NTED and

Motion forJudgment on the Pleadings pocket Entry 13) be DENIED.

L ñ'etxter
State s

Dutham, North Caro\na

Apdl 1.7,2015

14

i\lryistmte Jutlgp

Defendant's