LONG v. LIBERTYWOOD NURSING CENTER et al

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN JR. on 1/28/2014, that Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 13 , as more specifically stated in Doc. 14 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is DENIE D as to Plaintiff's claim of retaliation in violation of Title VII as described in the Complaint and related attachment. The motion is GRANTED as to any other claim for relief. FURTHER, that Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Defendants William Schutz and Debbie Draughn, and those Defendants are DISMISSED from this action. (Daniel, J)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

BRIDGET M. LONG,
Plaintiff,
v.
LIBERTYWOOD NURSING CENTER,
WILLIAM SCHULTZ, and DEBBIE
DRAUGHN,
Defendants.

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1:13CV315

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint on
April 17, 2013, and named as Defendants Libertywood Nursing
Center, William Schutz and Debbie Draughn.
2).)

(Complaint (Doc.

The Complaint contains only limited allegations,

specifically:
Defendant violated my Equal Employment opportunity law
privileges when the decision was made to not give me
work as other situated employees, then I was told I
was fired, and subsequently other white females were
hired doing the same job that I was doing, but my
employer could find no work for me at Libertywood
Nursing Center.
(Id. at 2.)

The relief requested includes “all relief granted

by the 1991 Civil Rights Act for intentional employment
discrimination that was imposed by me by Libertywood Nursing

Center management.”

(Id. at 4.)

Attached to the back of the

Complaint is an EEOC Determination as to Charge No. 435-201200928 and a copy of the original Charge of Discrimination in
EEOC Charge No. 435-2012-00928.

Although the “Determination”

suggests that Plaintiff filed EEOC charges in 2010 and 2011, the
only EEOC charge attached to the Complaint was signed on
October 4, 2012, and received by the EEOC on October 9, 2012.
(Id., Attach., Charge of Discrimination (Doc. 2-1) at 2.)
In response to the Complaint, Defendants filed an Answer
including a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc.
13 at 1.)

In the brief in support of the motion to dismiss

(Defs.‟ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 14)), Defendants
allege the following grounds for dismissal1:
1.

The Complaint fails to state a claim as to the

individual defendants and should therefore be dismissed. (Id. at
4-5).

Defendants‟ motion is filed as part of the answer and
simply alleges that the Complaint is subject to dismissal
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The specific grounds for
the motion are set out in the brief but are not completely
clear. Local Rule 7.3(b) requires that “[a]ll motions shall
state with particularity the grounds therefor, . . .” Defendants
are directed to follow that rule in the future, as the required
practice aids opposing parties and this court in a determination
of the specific grounds for a motion as well as providing a
clear record and basis for a ruling of the court.
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2.

Plaintiff‟s action against the corporate defendant

should be dismissed for failure to plead exhaustion before the
EEOC.

(Id. at 5-6).
3.

Plaintiff‟s Complaint fails to allege a claim under

Title VII because Plaintiff fails to state her race, that she is
a member of a protected class, or that she was performing her
job at a level that met the legitimate job expectations.

(Id.

at 7.)
Plaintiff has responded to Defendants‟ motion and the
issues are ripe for ruling.

Because this is a pro se Complaint,

and to be liberally construed, this court finds that Defendants‟
motion should be granted in part and denied in part for the
following reasons.
Analysis
As Defendants note, this court is required to liberally
construe pro se pleadings and “a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Plaintiff‟s Complaint is completely bare bones and
certainly not a pleading format which is condoned or encouraged
in this court, even for a pro se litigant.
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However, Plaintiff

did include, as an attachment to the Complaint, a copy of the
EEOC charge filed on October 9, 2012.

(Doc. 2-1 at 2.)

“Generally, a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may rely on
only the complaint and its proper attachments.

A court is

permitted, however, to rely on „documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take
judicial notice.‟”

Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d

333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)(citations omitted).

See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to
a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”).
Including consideration of Plaintiff‟s allegations contained in
the Charge of Discrimination (Doc. 2-1 at 2), this court finds
that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled one claim of unlawful
retaliation in violation of Title VII as to Libertywood Nursing
Center, Inc.
I.

Claim for Retaliation Under Title III

To establish a prima facie claim for retaliation in
violation of Title VII, a plaintiff must allege (1) that she
engaged in protected activity; (2) that the employer took an
adverse employment action against her; and (3) that a causal
link exists between the protected activity and the adverse
action.

Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th
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Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. ____, 131 S. Ct. 3059 (2011).
A liberal construction of the complaint as well as the
allegations contained in Plaintiff‟s Charge of Discrimination
attached to the Complaint (Doc. 2-1 at 2) lead this court to
conclude that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a claim under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for retaliation by her
employer.
When analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the pleading setting
forth the claim must be “liberally construed” in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, and allegations made therein
should be taken as true.
421 (1969).

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,

A court should not grant the motion if the

plaintiff can show “any set of facts consistent with the
allegations in the complaint.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 563 (2007) (citations omitted).

A plaintiff need not

plead detailed evidentiary facts, and a complaint is sufficient
if it will give a defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff‟s
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.
Holshouser, 575 F.2d 461, 464 (4th Cir. 1978).

See Bolding v.
A “plaintiff‟s

obligation to provide the „grounds‟ of his „entitle[ment] to
relief‟ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

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formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff‟s Complaint and the attachment allege that
Plaintiff filed charges with the EEOC about her treatment, that
she was thereafter not scheduled to work or allowed to return to
work, and that other employees were discharged and new people
hired even though Plaintiff was told there was no work available
for her.

Although limited, these allegations are sufficient to

state a claim under the liberal construction rules applicable to
pro se parties.
II.

Defendants’ Other Objections to the Complaint

Defendants also allege that Plaintiff failed to plead
exhaustion before the EEOC.

Generally, exhaustion is a

prerequisite to filing a claim under Title VII.

Jones v.

Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009)(“Before a
plaintiff may file suit under Title VII or the ADEA, he is
required to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC [Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission].”).

“[A] failure by the

plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies concerning a Title
VII claim deprives the federal courts of subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim.”

Id.

However, that requirement is

construed differently for a retaliation claim and not always
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required within that context.

See id.; Nealon v. Stone, 958

F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 1992).

Defendants have not addressed

the possible application of this exception to Plaintiff‟s
Complaint.

Nevertheless, in response to Defendants‟ motion to

dismiss, Plaintiff did file the Notice of Right to Sue
reflecting exhaustion as to the Charge of Discrimination
attached to the Complaint.

Because this is a pro se complaint,

this court declines to dismiss this action for retaliation based
upon a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Plaintiff

has filed the Notice of Right to Sue letter reflecting
exhaustion as to the sole claim alleged in the Complaint.
However, to the extent any prior claims of discrimination were
not described in the Complaint in any form, they are not
considered alleged or a basis for relief in this case.
In light of this court‟s construction of Plaintiff‟s
Complaint, this court also finds that any claims as to the
individual Defendants should be dismissed.

The plain language

of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) makes it unlawful for any employer to
discriminate against any employee.

“These amendments to the

remedial scheme thus suggest that Congress only intended
employers to be liable for Title VII violations.”

Lissau v. S.

Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1998).
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Furthermore, “supervisors are not liable in their individual
capacities for Title VII violations.”

Id.

Plaintiff has not

alleged any fact to suggest that William Schutz and Debbie
Draughn were anything other than, at most, supervisory
employees.

As a result, their motion to dismiss should be

granted and the claims against the two individual Defendants
shall be dismissed.
Finally, Defendants have objected to Plaintiff‟s affidavit
(Doc. 17) and Plaintiff‟s arguments and statements as to matters
outside the record and contained in the response (Doc. 16).
(See Defs.‟ Mem. in Reply to Pl.‟s Resp. to Defs.‟ Mot. to
Dismiss (Doc. 19) at 1.)

This court has considered the filing

of the Notice of Right to Sue letter (Doc. 17-2) as part of the
record.

However, although this court has reviewed Plaintiff‟s

other allegations in an effort to determine whether other claims
may have been intended or alleged, this court agrees with
Defendants that the affidavit and certain factual allegations in
the response should not be considered at this stage.

None of

the allegations contained in the affidavit suggest that
Plaintiff should be provided an opportunity to amend the
Complaint before this Order is entered.

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Additionally, the

Determination (Doc. 16 at 4; Doc. 2-1 at 1) should not have been
filed with this court and has not been considered by this court.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants‟ motion to dismiss
(Doc. 13, as more specifically stated in Doc. 14) is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART.

The motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff‟s

claim of retaliation in violation of Title VII as described in
the Complaint and related attachment.

The motion is GRANTED as

to any other claim for relief.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants‟ motion to dismiss is
GRANTED as to Defendants William Schutz and Debbie Draughn, and
those Defendants are hereby DISMISSED from this action.
This the 28th day of January, 2014.

_______________________________________
United States District Judge

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