KNOTT v. COLVIN

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE THOMAS D. SCHROEDER on 6/2/2014; that Knott's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 10 ) is DENIED, the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 15 ) is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (Sheets, Jamie)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
DANA KNOTT,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

1:13CV332

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.
Plaintiff

Dana

Knott

brought

this

action

pursuant

to

Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”),

as

amended

(42

U.S.C.

§§

405(g)

and

1383(c)(3)),

to

obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security denying her claims for Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under, respectively,
Titles II and XVI of the Act.
cross-motions

for

administrative

record

review.

(Doc. 2.)

judgment
has

been

(Docs.

The parties have filed
10,

certified

15),
to

the

and

the

court

for

For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s

motion will be granted, Knott’s motion will be denied, and this
case will be dismissed.
I.

BACKGROUND
Knott

filed

her

application

for

Disability

Insurance

Benefits (“DIB”) on January 4, 2010, and her application for
Supplemental

Security

Income

(“SSI”)

on

January

alleging a disability onset date of March 6, 2007.
41.) 1

8,

2010,

(Tr. at 231-

Her applications were denied initially (id. at 125, 126)

and upon reconsideration (id. at 159, 160).

Thereafter, Knott

requested a hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”).
vocational

(Id. at 197-98.)
expert

August 25, 2011.

(“VE”),

Knott, along with her attorney and a
attended

(Id. at 45.)

the

subsequent

hearing

on

The ALJ ultimately determined

that Knott was not disabled within the meaning of the Act (id.
at 39) and, on February 19, 2013, the Appeals Council denied
Knott’s request for review of the decision, thereby making the
ALJ’s conclusion the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes
of judicial review (id. at 1-4). 2
In rendering his disability determination, the ALJ made the
following findings later adopted by the Commissioner:
1.

The claimant met the insured status requirements
of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2013.

2.

The claimant has not
gainful activity since

engaged in substantial
December 28, 2009, the

1

Transcript citations refer to the Administrative Transcript of Record
filed manually with the Commissioner’s Answer. (Doc. 6.)

2

A prior ALJ had determined on October 27, 2009, that Knott was
disabled under the meaning of the Act from March 6, 2007, through
February 25, 2009.
(Id. at 90.)
He then found Knott had medically
improved and was no longer disabled beginning on February 26, 2009.
(Id. at 93–94.)
The ALJ in this case adopted the prior ALJ’s
decision. (Id. at 33.)

2

amended alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et
seq., and 416.971 et seq.).
3.

The
claimant
has
the
following
severe
impairments:
injuries
from
a
motor
vehicle
accident including T4 and T6 burst fractures, C1
and C2 fractures, rib fractures and a liver
laceration,
depression
and
anxiety
(20
CFR
404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

. . . .
4.

The claimant does not have an impairment or
combination
of
impairments
that
meets
or
medically equals one of the listed impairments in
20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1520(d), 404.1525, 416.920(d), 416.925 and
416.926).

. . . .
5.

After careful consideration of the entire record,
the undersigned finds that the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform light
work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b)
except
that
the
claimant
should
perform simple repetitive tasks, which shall be
defined as jobs with a Specific Vocational
Profile level of no greater than one or two; and
the claimant should work only in a low stress
work environment, which shall be defined as work
that does not involve production pace or work
deadlines, and allows her to work at her own
pace, and have a predictable schedule.

. . . .
6.

The claimant is unable to perform any
relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

past

(Id. at 30-32, 38.)
The

ALJ

then

considered

Knott’s

age,

education,

work

experience, and the above residual functional capacity (“RFC”),
along

with

the

VE’s

testimony
3

regarding

these

factors,

and

determined

that

“there

are

jobs

that

exist

in

significant

numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform
(20

CFR

(Id. at

404.1569,
38.)

Thus,

404.1569(a),
the

ALJ

416.969,

determined

disabled under the meaning of the Act.
II.

and

416.969(a)).”

that

Knott

was

not

(Id. at 39.)

ANALYSIS
Federal

Security

law

“authorizes

Commissioner’s

judicial

denial

of

review

social

of

the

security

Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006).

Social

benefits.”
However,

“the scope of . . . review of [such an administrative] decision
. . . is extremely limited.”
(4th Cir. 1981).

Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144

“The courts are not to try the case de novo.”

Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974).

Instead,

“a reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ
[underlying the denial of benefits] if they are supported by
substantial evidence and were reached through application of the
correct legal standard.”

Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472

(4th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted) (internal brackets omitted)
(setting out the standards for judicial review).
evidence

means

‘such

relevant

evidence

as

a

“Substantial

reasonable

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”

mind

Hunter v.

Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)).

“[I]t consists of more than

a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a
4

preponderance.”

Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir.

2001) (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir.
1966)).

“If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a

verdict were the case before a jury, then there is substantial
evidence.”

Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34 (quoting Laws, 368 F.2d at

642) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court should
not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility
determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ,
as adopted by the Social Security Commissioner].”

Mastro, 270

F.3d at 176 (quoting Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir.
1996)) (internal brackets omitted).

“Where conflicting evidence

allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is
disabled,

the

responsibility

for

that

decision

[Social Security Commissioner or the ALJ].”

falls

on

the

Hancock, 667 F.3d

at 472 (quoting Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir.
2005)).

The issue before this court, therefore, “is not whether

[the claimant] is disabled, but whether the ALJ’s finding that
[the

claimant]

is

not

disabled

is

supported

by

substantial

evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the
relevant law.”

Craig, 76 F.3d at 589.

In undertaking this limited review, the court notes that in
administrative

proceedings,

“[a]

claimant

for

benefits bears the burden of proving a disability.”
5

disability
Hall v.

Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981).

In this context,

“disability” means the “‘inability to engage in any substantial
gainful

activity

by

reason

of

any

medically

determinable

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.’”

Id. (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). 3
“The

Commissioner

disability claims.”

uses

a

five-step

process

to

evaluate

Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (citing 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4)).
Under
this
process,
the
Commissioner
asks,
in
sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the
alleged period of disability; (2) had a severe
impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled
the requirements of a listed impairment; (4) could
return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not,
could perform any other work in the national economy.
Id.

The claimant bears the burden as to the first four steps,

but the Commissioner bears the burden as to the fifth step.

Id.

at 472-73.
In undertaking this sequential evaluation process, the five
steps are considered in turn, although a finding adverse to the
3

“The Social Security Act comprises two disability benefits programs.
The Social Security Disability Insurance Program . . . provides
benefits to disabled persons who have contributed to the program while
employed.
The Supplemental Security Income Program . . . provides
benefits to indigent disabled persons. The statutory definitions and
the regulations . . . for determining disability governing these two
programs are, in all aspects relevant here, substantively identical.”
Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1 (internal citations omitted).

6

claimant

at

either

of

the

first

two

steps

disability designation and ends the inquiry.

forecloses

a

In this regard,

“[t]he first step determines whether the claimant is engaged in
‘substantial gainful activity.’
benefits are denied.

If the claimant is working,

The second step determines if the claimant

is ‘severely’ disabled.

If not, benefits are denied.”

Bennett

v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
If a claimant carries her burden at each of the first two
steps and also meets her burden at step three of establishing an
impairment

that

meets

or

equals

an

impairment

listed

in

the

regulations, the claimant is disabled, and there is no need to
proceed to step four or five.
Alternatively,

if

a

claimant

See Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177.
clears

steps

one

and

two,

but

falters at step three, i.e., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment is
not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment,”
then

the

analysis

claimant’s RFC.

continues

Id. at 179. 4

and

the

ALJ

must

assess

the

Step four then requires the ALJ to

4

“RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the
claimant’s] limitations.”
Hines, 453 F.3d at 562 (noting that
administrative regulations require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability
to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work
setting on a regular and continuing basis . . . [which] means 8 hours
a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule” (internal
emphasis and quotation marks omitted)). The RFC includes a “physical
exertional or strength limitation” that assesses the claimant’s
“ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work,”
as well as “nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or skin
impairments).”
Hall, 658 F.2d at 265.
“RFC is to be determined by
the ALJ only after [the ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a

7

assess whether, based on that RFC, the claimant can “perform
past relevant work”; if so, the claimant does not qualify as
disabled.

Id. at 179-80.

However, if the claimant establishes

an inability to return to prior work based on that RFC, the
analysis proceeds to the fifth step, which shifts the burden of
proof and “requires the Commissioner to prove that a significant
number of jobs exist which the claimant could perform, despite
[the claimant’s] impairments.”

Hines, 453 F.3d at 563.

making

ALJ

this

determination,

the

must

decide

“whether

In
the

claimant is able to perform other work considering both [the
claimant’s

RFC]

and

[the

claimant’s]

vocational

capabilities

(age, education, and past work experience) to adjust to a new
job.”

Hall,

Commissioner

658

F.2d

cannot

at

carry

264-65.

her

If,

“evidentiary

at

this

burden

step,
of

the

proving

that [the claimant] remains able to work other jobs available in
the community,” the claimant qualifies as disabled.

Hines, 453

F.3d at 567.
In
engaged

the
in

present

case,

“substantial

alleged onset date.

the

ALJ

gainful

found

activity”

(Tr. at 30.)

that

since

ALJ

further

determined

that

had

her

amended

Knott

At step two,

suffered

from

claimant’s impairments and any related symptoms (e.g., pain).”
453 F.3d at 562-63.

8

not

She therefore met her burden

at step one of the sequential evaluation process.
the

Knott

the

Hines,

following

severe

impairments

resulting

from

a

motor

vehicle

accident: T4 and T6 burst fractures, C1 and C2 fractures, rib
fractures, a liver laceration, depression, and anxiety.

(Id.)

The ALJ found at step three that these impairments did not meet
or

medically

equal

a

disability

listing.

(Id.

at

31.)

Accordingly, he assessed Knott’s RFC and determined that she
could

perform

light

work

with

some

further

limitations,

including that she could only perform simple repetitive tasks
and had to work in a low-stress environment.

(Id. at 32.)

Because Knott’s past relevant work as a cosmetologist does not
meet those criteria, the ALJ found at step four that she could
not return to that work.

(Id. at 38.)

Thus, the burden

shifted to the Commissioner to prove that a “significant number
of

jobs

exist

impairments.”

which

[Knott]

could

Hines, 453 F.3d at 563.

perform,

despite

[her]

The ALJ then relied on

the testimony of the VE and determined that Knott could perform
the

jobs

operator.

of

ticket-taker,

(Tr. at 39.)

marker,

and

photocopy

machine

Thus, the ALJ concluded that Knott was

not disabled under the Act.

(Id.)

Knott first argues that this case must be remanded because
the ALJ never made a credibility judgment on a medical source
statement

(“MSS”)

submitted

by

her

treating

Oudeh, after the ALJ handed down his decision.
Tr. at 487-93 (MSS).)

physician,

Dr.

(Doc. 11 at 4-7;

The Appeals Council made the MSS part of
9

the record but found that it provided no basis to alter the
ALJ’s decision.

(Tr. at 5.)

In the MSS, Dr. Oudeh opined that

Knott “could not be productive in an 8 hour work day with her
condition,” she could never lift weight more than a gallon of
milk, never balance or stoop, needed frequent breaks from either
standing

or

restrictions.

sitting,

and

had

(Id. at 487-93.)

several

other

disabling

The MSS was presumably intended

to address the ALJ’s observation that Dr. Oudeh’s prior opinion
“was not functional in nature and did not describe [Knott’s]
abilities and limitations for specific work-related activities.”
(Id. at 34.)

The Commissioner argues that, even had the ALJ

considered the MSS, the ALJ’s decision would have been the same
because:

(1)

the

limitations

Dr.

Oudeh

noted

were

already

accounted for in the ALJ’s RFC finding; (2) the ALJ already
considered such limitations when he made his initial decision;
and (3) the evidence was so one-sided that Dr. Oudeh’s MSS would
not have changed the outcome.

(Doc. 17 at 6-11.)

Knott relies on Meyer v. Astrue, where the Fourth Circuit
required remand because new evidence from a treating physician
was presented after the ALJ’s decision and the ALJ thus never
determined
2011).

its

credibility.

662

F.3d

700,

706–07

(4th

Cir.

In Meyer, a physician who performed back surgery on the

claimant at first declined to provide opinion evidence to the
ALJ.

Id. at 703.

After the ALJ rendered a decision denying
10

disability, the physician submitted an MSS.
Appeals

Council

found

no

reason

to

Id. at 704.

depart

judgment, and the Magistrate Judge agreed.

from

Id.

the

The
ALJ’s

The district

court then entered a final order adopting the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation.

Id.

The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded,

in part because the ALJ had not had the opportunity to conduct
fact finding regarding the physician’s additional MSS.

Id. at

706–07.
Although

remand

is

required

in

some

circumstances,

the

Fourth Circuit noted, “the lack of such additional fact finding
does not render judicial review ‘impossible’ — as long as the
record provides ‘an adequate explanation of [the Commissioner's]
decision.’”
148,

150

Id. at 707 (quoting DeLoatche v. Heckler, 715 F.2d

(4th

Cir.

1983)).

Thus,

if

substantial

evidence

supports the ALJ’s findings, introduction of new evidence after
the decision does not necessitate remand.

Id. (citing Smith v.

Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638-39 (4th Cir. 1996)).
consideration

of

the

record

as

a

whole

“Conversely, when
revealed

that

new

evidence from a treating physician was not controverted by other
evidence in the record,” remand is appropriate.

Id. (citing

Wilkins v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 953 F.2d 93,
96 (4th Cir. 1991)).
remand
helpful

to

the

when

ALJ
the

“[A]nalysis from the Appeals Council or
for

new

such

analysis

evidence
11

would

constitutes

be
the

particularly
only

record

evidence as to the opinion of the treating physician.”

Id. at

706.
The
Meyer.

situation

here

is

slightly

different

from

that

in

The ALJ’s record in Meyer contained no opinion from the

claimant’s treating physician and no medical opinion evidence in
support

of

the

ALJ’s

conclusion

–

creating

what

Circuit characterized as an “evidentiary gap.”

the

Fourth

Meyer, 662 F.3d

at 707 (“The ALJ emphasized that the record before it lacked
‘restrictions placed on the claimant by a treating physician,’
suggesting

that

decision.”). 5

this

evidentiary

gap

played

a

role

in

its

Here, in contrast, the record contained, and the

ALJ considered, a previous (September 10, 2010) note from Dr.
Oudeh

and

gave

Significantly,

it

the

little
ALJ

weight. 6

gave

three

discounting Dr. Oudeh’s opinion.

(Tr.

at

separate

34,
reasons

411.)
for

First, he found the opinion

“neither consistent with the overall objective medical evidence,
nor

with

[Knott’s]

[Dr.

Oudeh’s]

physical

treating

examinations

notes,

were

that

generally

showed

that

unremarkable,”

5

In Meyer, the only medical opinion evidence submitted to the ALJ was
the report of a doctor who concluded, contrary to the ALJ’s decision,
that Meyer could not perform light work. However, the ALJ gave that
report little weight and instead relied upon scant objective evidence.
Id. at 703.
6

Dr. Oudeh’s note stated “[i]n my personal opinion [Knott] will not be
a candidate for any rehabilitation at this point and will be disabled
for the rest of her life.”
(Tr. at 411.)
It also noted Knott’s
history of back and neck pain as well as depression and anxiety.
(Id.)

12

(Id. (citing id. at 411-44, 451-84)), and it conflicted with
other opinion evidence to which the ALJ assigned great weight
(see id. at 34-38).

Second, the ALJ noted, the opinion was not

functional in nature.

(Id. at 34.)

Finally, he found that Dr.

Oudeh’s conclusions on dispositive issues, such as whether Knott
is disabled, are reserved to the Commissioner and not entitled
to any weight.

(Id.)

Thus, Dr. Oudeh’s failure to provide a functional analysis
was an additional justification for the ALJ’s determination that
the

opinion

decision

merited

that

the

little
ALJ

weight.

independently

It

is

clear

discounted

from

Dr.

the

Oudeh’s

initial opinion because he found it to be contrary to both the
doctor’s own treatment notes and the opinions of other doctors.
(Tr. at 34.)

Had the ALJ stopped there, Meyer would be of

little help to Knott because the new evidence would not change
the

fact

that

substantial

objective

contradicts Dr. Oudeh’s opinion. 7
required

on

this

record,

and

subjective

evidence

A conclusion that remand is

therefore,

would

be

tantamount

to

penalizing the ALJ for including additional reasons in support
of his decision to accord little weight to the opinion.

Meyer

does not demand such a result.
7

Such evidence would then not be “material” under Meyer because there
would not be “a reasonable possibility that [the evidence] would have
changed the outcome.” 662 F.3d at 705 (quoting Wilkins, 953 F.2d at
96).
This is particularly true because, as discussed infra, the ALJ
was entitled to rely upon the opinions of two non-examining physicians
because they were consistent with the record as a whole.

13

Next, Knott contends the ALJ failed to account for some of
her non-exertional limitations in the RFC and failed to mention
them in the hypothetical question he posed to the VE.
at 7-13.)

(Doc. 11

She particularly contends that six limitations were

excluded: (1) Dr. Alan Cohen’s opinion that Knott had a very
limited range of motion in the neck (Tr. at 403); (2) Dr. April
L. Strobel-Nuss’ findings that Knott was “somewhat capable of
interacting

appropriately

[with]

coworkers”

and

that

she

was

limited to simple routine repetitive tasks (“SRRTs”) in a “lowsocial setting” (id. at 108); (3) Dr. Atul Kantesaria’s opinion
that Knott’s ability to perform SRRTs was mildly-to-moderately
limited (id. at 400) and that she had some mental limitations
(id. at 399); (4) Knott’s moderate limitation in concentration;
(5)

Dr.

weakened

Cohen’s
when

and

Dr.

sustained

Oudeh’s
(id.

at

opinions
404,

that

453);

Knott’s

and

(6)

grip

Knott’s

severe pain.
The

first,

second,

and

fifth

of

these

contentions

are

unpersuasive because, even assuming the ALJ erred, such error
was

harmless

and

remand

is

not

required.

See

Mickles

v.

Shalala, 29 F.3d 918, 921 (4th Cir. 1994) (opinion of Hall, J.)
(holding that remand is not appropriate where the ALJ would have
reached

the

same

conclusion

despite

his

error);

Harvey

v.

Colvin, No. 5:13-CV-392-BO, 2014 WL 1912100, at *2 (E.D.N.C. May
13, 2014).

Any error regarding the range-of-motion of Knott’s
14

neck would be harmless because the VE testified that performance
of the three jobs she identified in the national economy would
not be affected by a limited range-of-motion.

(Tr. at 80.)

With respect to Knott’s social capabilities, the jobs of marker
and photocopy machine operator do not require a high degree of
social

interaction.

(“DOT”),

Marker,

671802; id.,

DOT

See
Code

Dictionary

of

209.587-034,

Photocopying-Machine

Occupational

available

Operator,

DOT

at

Code

Titles
1991

WL

207.685-

014, available at 1991 WL 671745; Farnsworth v. Astrue, 604 F.
Supp. 2d 828, 858 (N.D. W. Va. 2009) (finding that error is
harmless

when

“there

is

no

evidence

the

inclusion

of

the

limitation in the hypothetical to the VE would have resulted in
a different finding by the ALJ regarding the availability of
jobs in the national economy”).

Similarly, the jobs cited do

not require the ability to maintain a strong, sustained grip, so
any

error

harmless.
1991

WL

regarding

the

strength

of

Knott’s

grip

was

also

See DOT, Marker, DOT Code 209.587-034, available at
671802;

id.,

Photocopying-Machine

Operator,

DOT

Code

207.685-014, available at 1991 WL 671745; id., Ticket Taker, DOT
Code 344.667-010, available at 1991 WL 672863.
The
Commissioner
conclusions

third

contention

notes,
of

Drs.

the

ALJ

is

likewise

was

Strobel-Nuss

entitled
and

determined that Knott could perform SRRTs.
15

misplaced;
to

as

the

on

the

Rapp,

who

rely

Mitchel

(See Tr. 107-08,

152-56.)

Because

objective

evidence,

this
it

conclusion

cannot

be

is

consistent

disturbed.

See

with

the

Gordon

v.

Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
ALJ is entitled to rely on the testimony of a non-examining
physician when it is consistent with the record, even if an
examining physician disagrees).

As for the fourth argument, the

Commissioner

the

question

is

correct

correctly

limitation

by

that

accounted

restricting

her

RFC

for
to

and

the

Knott’s

“simple

hypothetical
concentration

repetitive

(Tr. at 32 (RFC), 78 (hypothetical question).)

tasks.”

See Hawley v.

Astrue, No. 1:09CV246, 2012 WL 1268475, at *7-8 (M.D.N.C. Apr.
16, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 3584340 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 2012)
(rejecting the claimant’s argument that a limitation preventing
him

from

performing

SRRTs

and

limiting

his

interaction

with

others insufficiently accounted for his intellectual deficit and
concentration problems). 8
Knott’s sixth argument, that the ALJ failed to account for
her

complaints

of

severe

pain,

also

fails.

Hypothetical

questions to a VE must set out all of a claimant’s impairments,
Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1989), but they need
only include those impairments which the ALJ finds credible, see
Cranfill

v.

Colvin,

No.

1:10CV925,

8

2013

WL

1736597,

at

*3

Moreover, the ALJ also limited Knott to work in a low-stress
environment without deadlines, further accounting for her limitation
in concentration.

16

(M.D.N.C. Apr. 9, 2013) (citing Mickles, 29 F.3d at 929 n.7
(Luttig,

J.,

concurring

in

the

judgment)).

Because

the

ALJ

found that Knott’s allegations of pain were not credible to the
extent they conflicted with the RFC assessment (Tr. at 36), the
ALJ

did

not

have

to

include

those

subjective

complaints

either the hypothetical question or the RFC calculation.

in

Thus,

unless the ALJ failed to properly assess Knott’s credibility,
there was no reversible error.
To this end, Knott argues that “[t]he ALJ erred by failing
to make a specific finding as to the degree to which [her] pain
allegations were credible.”
correctly

followed

claimant’s

the

credibility

(Doc. 11 at 14.)

two-step
set

out

procedure
in

However, the ALJ
for

Craig.

At

determining
step

one,

a

the

claimant must produce “objective medical evidence showing ‘the
existence

of

anatomical,

a

medical

physiological,

impairment(s)
or

which

psychological

results

from

abnormalities

and

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other
symptoms alleged.’”

Craig, 76 F.3d at 594 (quoting 20 C.F.R.

§§ 416.929(b) & 404.1529(b)) (emphasis in original).
claimant

clears

that

hurdle,

the

ALJ

then

must

If the
make

credibility judgment, taking into account
all the available evidence, including the claimant's
medical
history,
medical
signs,
and
laboratory
findings; any objective medical evidence of pain . . .
and any other evidence relevant to the severity of the
impairment, such as evidence of the claimant's daily
17

a

activities, specific descriptions of the pain, and any
medical treatment taken to alleviate it.
Id.

at

595

(citing

404.1529(c)(1)-(3))

20

C.F.R.

(internal

§§

quotation

416.929(c)(1)-(3)
marks

and

&

citations

omitted).
Here, the ALJ determined at step one that Knott’s medical
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged
symptoms.

(Tr.

considered

all

at

of

36.)

the

At

evidence

step
and

two,

however,

determined

the

that

ALJ

Knott’s

allegations were not credible to the extent they deviated from
the RFC.

(Id.)

This was not error.

See Chavis v. Colvin, No.

1:11CV771, 2013 WL 7853486, at *8-9 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2013).
Knott’s argument misinterprets the Craig process; at step one,
the ALJ does not determine whether a claimant’s statements are
credible, but only whether objective evidence shows that one of
her medical impairments could cause the alleged symptoms.

A

positive finding at step one says nothing about the credibility
of the claimant’s statements.
the

ALJ

never

made

a

Moreover, Knott’s assertion that

finding

on

testimony was credible is inaccurate.

the

degree

to

which

her

The ALJ determined that

her testimony was not credible to the extent it differed from
the RFC.

This finding was sufficient to satisfy Craig.

Chavis, 2013 WL 7853486, at *8.

Cf.

Notably, the ALJ gave specific

findings as to why he found Knott’s pain symptoms not credible

18

to the extent they differed from the RFC.

(Tr. 37-38.)

Thus,

review of the ALJ’s credibility assessment is possible despite
the conclusory nature of his Craig step-two finding. 9

The ALJ’s

credibility judgments will not be disturbed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the court finds that the factual
findings of the ALJ, which were adopted by the Commissioner, are
supported

by

substantial

evidence

and

were

reached

through

application of the correct legal standard.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Knott’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings (Doc. 10) is DENIED, the Commissioner’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 15) is GRANTED, and this action
is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

/s/
Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
June 2, 2014

9

Because of these specific observations, this case differs from recent
cases criticizing an ALJ’s conclusory finding that a claimant was not
credible to the extent her testimony was inconsistent with the ALJ’s
RFC because such statements thwart meaningful judicial review.
See,
e.g., Garcia v. Colvin, 741 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 2013) (admonishing
ALJ for employing a “boilerplate cart-before-the-horse credibility
formula” which does not allow for meaningful judicial review); see
also Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2012)
(describing such a conclusory finding as “opaque boilerplate” and
“meaningless”).

19