JONES v. CHANDRASUWAN et al
Filing
27
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN JR. on 12/30/2015; that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 8 ) is GRANTED and that this case is DISMISSED. The claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and any state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. To the extent required by any state law or rule of procedure, the dismissal of any state law claims without prejudice is intended to pe rmit Plaintiff to re-file those claims in state court should he choose to do so. FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend (Doc. 23 ) is DENIED AS MOOT. A judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order will be entered contemporaneously herewith. (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STANLEY JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
LANNA CHANDRASUWAN and
BRIAN HOLBROOK, in their
individual capacities,
Defendants.
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1:13CV385
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
Presently before this court is a Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 8) filed jointly by Defendants Lanna Chandrasuwan
and Brian Holbrook (collectively, “Defendants”).
Plaintiff
Stanley Jones (“Plaintiff”) has responded in opposition (Doc.
13), and Defendants have replied (Doc. 15).
Plaintiff alleges
damages under two causes of action: a state law malicious
prosecution claim (Count I) and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights (Count II).
Defendants, who are both North Carolina probation officers,
assert they did not violate Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights,
or, alternatively, qualified immunity shields them from
liability.
Upon the request of this court (Doc. 16), both
parties filed supplemental briefing on several issues.
This
motion is now ripe for adjudication, and for the reasons that
follow, Defendants’ motion will be granted.
I.
FACTS
The following facts are undisputed.
In October of 2009,
Plaintiff, a public school teacher, was arrested and charged
with offenses stemming from improper relations with a student.
(Complaint (“Compl.”) (Doc. 3) ¶¶ 6–7; Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’
Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Resp.”), Aff. of Stanley Jones (“Jones
Aff.”) (Doc. 13-1) ¶ 5.)
In July 2010, Plaintiff accepted a
plea in his criminal case. (Jones Aff. (Doc. 13-1) ¶ 10.)
As a
result of the plea, Plaintiff was given a suspended sentence and
placed on probation for two years. (Id.)
As one of the conditions of his probation, the Guilford
County Superior Court ordered that Plaintiff pay $471.50 in
court costs and fines, with the schedule of payment to be
determined by a probation officer.
13-3) at 1.)
(Pl.’s Resp., Judgment (Doc.
Along with the judgment, the clerk of court gave
Plaintiff a “Bill of Costs” with a due-by date of “7/7/2012.”
(Jones Aff. (Doc. 13-1) ¶¶ 12, 14.).
After entering his plea,
Plaintiff had an intake meeting with a North Carolina probation
officer.
(Id. ¶ 11.)
Both parties agree that Plaintiff, at
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that meeting, did not complete a DCC-2,1 the internal form that
the Department of Community Corrections (“DCC”) uses to set up a
payment schedule.
During the pendency of the criminal charges, Plaintiff
resigned his teaching position and began working for a mobile
phone company, Prime Communications, in its Greensboro, North
Carolina store.
(Id. ¶¶ 6–7.)
Three months before he accepted
his plea, Plaintiff was promoted and transferred to a position
with Prime Communications in Augusta, Georgia.
(Id. ¶¶ 8–9.)
Because of the move, the superior court allowed Plaintiff
to transfer his supervision from North Carolina to Georgia.
(Id. ¶ 10.)
In light of Plaintiff’s North Carolina conviction
and Georgia residency, the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender
Supervision (“Interstate Compact” or “ICAOS”) governed
Plaintiff’s multi-state probation.
(See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of
Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mem.”), Aff. of Karl Waller (“Waller
Aff.”) (Doc. 9-2) ¶ 5.)
The Interstate Compact is a formal
agreement between all fifty states allowing for the transfer of
1
Plaintiff says he “was not given nor did [he] sign a form
‘DCC-2.’” (Jones Aff. (Doc. 13-1) ¶ 16.) Defendants claim that
Plaintiff signed a DCC-2 form but left before completing the
form’s substantive components. (Defs.’ Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.’s
Mot. to Amend, Aff. of LeTonia Williams (“Williams’ Aff.”) Doc.
25-2) ¶ 20.)
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probation supervision between states for adult offenders.2 (Id.
¶¶ 5–8.)
Pursuant to the terms of the Interstate Compact, North
Carolina, the “sending state,” retained revocation and
enforcement authority over Plaintiff’s probation while Georgia,
the “receiving state,” supervised the probation.
12.)
(Id. ¶¶ 11–
Plaintiff paid his monthly supervision fee to Georgia;
however, the authority and responsibility to collect the $471.50
remained with North Carolina.
(Jones Aff. (Doc. 13-1) ¶¶ 18–
20.)
In late 2010, Prime Communications transferred Plaintiff to
a new position in Savannah, Georgia.
(Id. ¶ 21.)
Plaintiff had
his probation transferred to the Savannah office, and Jeff
Kreiss was assigned as Plaintiff’s new probation officer.
¶¶ 20–24.)
(Id.
Throughout his residency in Georgia, there were no
reported violations of Plaintiff’s probation from the Georgia
authorities.
The events that transpired and led to Plaintiff’s arrest
for violating his probation began in early 2012, roughly seven
months before Plaintiff’s supervised release was to end.
According to Defendants, in January 2012, Jay Lynn, an official
2
The North Carolina General Assembly directed the Governor
to enter into the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender
Supervision in N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 148-65.5 et seq. For a
complete list of ICAOS Rules, see Interstate Comm’n for Adult
Offender Supervision, ICAOS Rules (2014), available at
http://www.interstatecompact.org/Legal/RulesStepbyStep.aspx.
-4-
in the North Carolina Interstate Compact Office (“NCICO”) in
Raleigh, conducted a routine review of Plaintiff’s probation
file.
(Waller Aff. (Doc. 9-2) ¶¶ 28–29.)
During the review,
Lynn determined that Plaintiff’s court costs and fines remained
unpaid.
(Id. ¶ 29.)
Lynn informed Karl Waller, the Interstate
Compact District Coordinator, of the unpaid costs and confirmed
this outstanding balance with Greensboro Chief Probation and
Parole Officer Brian Holbrook (“Defendant Holbrook”).
(Id.
¶¶ 4, 29.)
On January 25, 2012, after confirmation of this unpaid
balance, Waller sent a “compact action request” to the
Interstate Compact Office in Georgia (the “Georgia Compact
Office”) requesting Plaintiff to pay the outstanding $471.50 by
February 1, 2012.
(Id. ¶ 30.)
Waller included instructions to
pay the outstanding amount by mail.
(Id.)
On February 4, 2012,
the $471.50 in court costs and fines remained unpaid, and Waller
subsequently prepared an internal violation report based on
Plaintiff’s failure to pay the outstanding costs.
(Id. ¶ 32.)
On February 9, 2012, the Georgia Compact Office sent two
responses to the compact action request.
The first read as
follows: “Be advised the offender was instructed by his
supervision officer to make his payment to SC [superior court].
He stated he was going to contact his lawyer about this amount
owed & that he expires in July.”
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(Defs.’ Mem., First Compact
Action Request (Doc. 9-6).)
The second read as follows: “The
offender reported on this date & his supervising officer
instructedhim [sic] to make his payment.
I gave him the
information again of the amount owed & the address to mail the
payment.
He stated he will pay the balance off by the end of
the month.”
(Second Compact Action Request (Doc. 9-7).)
In mid-January of 2012, Waller turned the probation file
over to Defendant Holbrook to collect the outstanding $471.50.
On or after February 15, 2012, Defendant Holbrook instructed
Defendant Lanna Chandrasuwan (“Defendant Chandrasuwan”), a
probation officer under his supervision, to “follow up” with
Plaintiff about the probation violation. (Defs.’ Mem. (Doc. 9)
at 8; Aff. of Lanna Chandrasuwan (“Chandrasuwan Aff.”) (Doc.
9-13) ¶ 15.)
On March 8, 2012, Defendant Chandrasuwan unsuccessfully
attempted to directly reach Plaintiff at two phone numbers.
(Chandrasuwan Aff. (Doc. 9-13) ¶ 17.)
Plaintiff points out that
Defendant Chandrasuwan never contacted the Georgia Compact
Office concerning the violation, as required by the Interstate
Compact guidelines.
(See Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 13) at 6 (citing
ICAOS Rule 2.101(d)).)
On March 12, 2012, Defendant
Chandrasuwan attempted to directly notify Plaintiff by mail of
his need to contact her or return to the Greensboro Probation
Office to pay the outstanding fines within two weeks.
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(Chandrasuwan Aff. (Doc. 9-13) ¶ 19.) Also on March 12, 2012,
Defendant Chandrasuwan prepared a Violation Report stating that
Plaintiff had violated probation due to his failure to timely
pay the court costs.
(Id. ¶ 18.) On approximately March 27,
2012, “Chandrasuwan’s correspondence to Plaintiff had been
returned.” (Defs.’ Mem. (Doc. 9) at 8; Chandrasuwan Aff. (Doc.
9-13) ¶ 20.) On March 27, 2012, Defendant Chandrasuwan prepared
an Addendum Violation Report claiming that Plaintiff “had
absconded and was avoiding supervision.” (Chandrasuwan Aff.
(Doc. 9-13) ¶ 23.)
On March 27, 2012, Defendant Chandrasuwan appeared for a
probable cause hearing3 before a Magistrate Judge in Guilford
County, North Carolina, to secure an order for Plaintiff’s
3
Defendant Chandrasuwan refers to the hearing as “a
probable cause [hearing]” in her affidavit. Additionally, the
Department of Community Corrections Handbook says that the
standard is “probable cause.” N.C. Dep’t of Public Safety,
Community Corrections Policy & Procedures 230 (2012), available
at https://www.ncdps.gov/div/CC/Policy-ext.pdf. Nevertheless,
the actual court records are unclear as to what standard was
applied. The violation report, filed under oath, alleges the
violations as described specifically hereinafter. However, the
order simply recites that “the probation officer has provided
the court with a written statement, signed by the probation
officer, alleging that the defendant has violated specified
conditions of the defendant’s probation.” (Order for Arrest
(Doc. 9-11) at 2.) The statutes pursuant to which the finding
was made, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-305(b)(4), 15A-1345(a), also do
not mention probable cause as the standard. Section 15A-1345(a)
requires an order of the court be issued “upon the written
request of the probation officer, accompanied by a written
statement.” Section 15A-305(b)(4) simply states that “[a]n
order for arrest may be issued when . . . [a] defendant has
violated the conditions of probation.”
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arrest based on multiple probation violations.
(Id. ¶¶ 23-25.)
In support of her petition for a probation violator arrest
warrant, Defendant Chandrasuwan presented both the March 12th
Violation Report and the March 27th Addendum Violation Report.
The Magistrate Judge subsequently issued an order for
Plaintiff’s arrest. (Order for Arrest and Supporting Violation
Reports (Doc. 9-11).)
Plaintiff does not dispute these facts recounting the
actions of the NCICO officers or Defendants Holbrook or
Chandrasuwan, arguing instead that these actions violated
procedural requirements. (See Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 13) at 4-8.)
Plaintiff does dispute the reports from the Georgia Compact
Office.
Plaintiff recalls a conversation with a representative
from the Georgia Compact Office consistent with the first
response to the compact action request.
¶¶ 25–27.)
(Jones Aff. (Doc. 13-1)
That is, Plaintiff recalls having a brief
conversation (lasting less than five minutes) where he stated
that he realized he still owed the money, that it was due by
July, and that he would contact his attorney to arrange for the
payment.
(Id.)
However, Plaintiff denies having a second conversation with
the representative from the Georgia Compact Office and contends
the second message was sent to “cover the compact officer’s duty
to provide the address to Plaintiff for sending payment.”
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(Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 13) at 5–6.)
Within a few days of the
meeting, Plaintiff asserts that he called his lawyer to confirm
the money was due in July and that the lawyer’s office could
make the payment to the clerk after it received the funds from
Plaintiff.
(Jones Aff. (Doc. 13-1) ¶ 28.)
Understanding that the $471.50 was not due until July,
Plaintiff continued his monthly visits with his Georgia
probation officer without paying the outstanding sum.
Plaintiff
had no other contact with the North Carolina probation officers
until his arrest in May 2012.
(Id. ¶ 29.)
Both parties agree that, on May 1, 2012, the United States
Marshal Service arrested Plaintiff.
¶ 43.)
(Jones Aff. (Doc. 13-1)
On May 2, 2012, Plaintiff paid the outstanding court
costs and fines.
(Id. ¶ 44.)
On May 7, 2012, Defendant
Holbrook secured an order dismissing the probation violation
charges and recalling Plaintiff’s order for arrest.
50.)
(Id. ¶¶ 48-
The state court charges were dismissed on May 7, 2012, and
Plaintiff was released from custody on May 8, 2012.
(Id. ¶¶ 45,
51.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where an examination of the
pleadings, affidavits, and other proper discovery materials
before this court demonstrates that no genuine issue of material
facts exists, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a
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matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
The moving party bears the burden
of initially demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
If the moving party
has met that burden, then the nonmoving party must persuade this
court that a genuine issue remains for trial.
When the moving party has carried its burden under
Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts. In the language of the Rule, the
nonmoving party must come forward with “specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586–87 (1986) (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, this
court is not to weigh the evidence, but rather must determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty
This court must view the
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing
inferences favorable to that party if such inferences are
reasonable.
Id. at 255.
However, there must be more than a
factual dispute; the fact in question must be material, and the
dispute must be genuine.
U.S. at 248.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson, 477
A dispute is only “genuine” if “the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.”
Id.
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III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ actions which led to his
arrest for a probation violation infringed upon his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures and
constitute malicious prosecution under North Carolina law.
This
court first analyzes the federal question contained in
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim (Count II), before taking up the state
law malicious prosecution claim (Count I).
A.
Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Claim
Section 1983 provides a method for citizens to vindicate
their federal constitutional and statutory rights against those
who, acting under the authority of state law, have violated
those rights.
42 U.S.C. § 1983; Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 271 (1994).
When subject to suit under § 1983, state and local
officials may assert qualified immunity to shield them from
liability for civil damages, “insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Therefore, in deciding
whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity,
this court must determine whether there was a violation of a
person’s constitutional rights and then analyze whether the
right was “clearly established” so that a reasonable officer
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would know that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
The
doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government officials
breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,” and
“protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.’”
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
____, ____, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (quoting Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
In Saucier, the Supreme Court required that courts first
analyze the threshold question of whether a constitutional right
had been violated before turning to the question of whether the
right was “clearly established.”
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
Since then, the Supreme Court has receded from the strict
sequential analysis of Saucier, allowing courts to exercise
their discretion on which analysis they take up first.
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Pearson
However, even as it
receded from Saucier, the Pearson Court recognized the benefits
of first determining whether a constitutional violation occurred
before turning to whether the right was clearly established,
indicating that it “often may be difficult to decide whether a
right is clearly established without deciding precisely what the
existing constitutional right happens to be.”
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 236
For this reason, this court
will first examine whether Plaintiff’s arrest on a probation
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violator warrant violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights
before turning to an analysis of whether the right Plaintiff
asserts was clearly established.
i.
No Violation of a Constitutional Right
In addressing whether a constitutional violation has
occurred, this court must first question whether Plaintiff’s
arrest on a probation violator warrant infringed upon
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizures.
Because Defendants had a reasonable belief that
Plaintiff had violated a condition of his probation, this court
finds that Plaintiff’s arrest did not violate Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.
In all candor, this court has some concern about what
Fourth Amendment protections may be applicable to a probationer
in advance of a probation violation proceeding.
Before this
court requested supplemental briefs, both parties based their
arguments on the presence or absence of probable cause,
believing that probable cause was the controlling standard.
(See, e.g., Compl. (Doc. 3) ¶ 54; Defs.’ Mem. (Doc. 9) at 10.)
However, in Plaintiff’s supplemental brief, Plaintiff concedes
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that the arrest must only have been based on reasonable
suspicion.4
(Pl.’s Supplemental Br. (Doc. 21) at 7.)
Any difficulty the parties had in identifying the correct
standard stems from the fact that this area of the Fourth
Amendment is particularly murky.
While the Fourth Amendment
provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause,” the Supreme Court has recognized that probationers, like
parolees, “do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to which every
citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly
dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.”
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (alteration in
original) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480
(1972)).
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit has long held that
parole and probation violator warrants are different from
warrants issued for those charged with a crime.
See Jarman v.
United States, 92 F.2d 309, 311 (4th Cir. 1937) (finding a
parole violator warrant satisfies two purposes: “to restore [the
parolee] to actual custody” and “to advise him of the purpose of
his reincarceration”).
4
Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to reflect this
standard. (Doc. 23.) This court has not ruled on Plaintiff’s
motion to amend, but for the purposes of considering this
motion, this court has considered the issues in light of the
reasonable suspicion standard. However, because this court
ultimately finds it appropriate to grant summary judgment in
this matter even after considering Plaintiff’s new position,
this court finds that additional amendments would be futile and
will deny the Motion to Amend as moot.
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The Supreme Court has outlined what due process rights
probationers have during a probation revocation proceeding, see
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), but this court has not
found any cases clearly establishing the applicable
constitutional standard on which a probationer may be arrested
for a suspected probation violation.
See Owens-El v. Brunson,
Civil No. WDQ-11-0523, 2011 WL 6651330 (D. Md. Dec. 14, 2011),
aff'd, 477 F. App'x 27 (4th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that neither
the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has announced the
applicable standard).
Additionally, the federal and state statutes seem to apply
different standards.
For federal probationers, 18 U.S.C. § 3606
provides that “[i]f there is probable cause to believe that a
probationer or a person on supervised release has violated a
condition of his probation or release, he may be arrested.”
In
the North Carolina probation system, section 15A-1345(a) of the
North Carolina General Statutes only requires a written
statement from the probation officer for arrest on a violation.
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Ultimately, this court remains unsure whether the reasonable
suspicion standard urged by the parties clearly applies.5
Nevertheless, this court finds that the Fourth Amendment
reasonable suspicion standard advanced by the parties does have
some logical force when applied in this area.
First, the
Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit have determined that
probationers’ homes can be searched based on reasonable
suspicion, even though a warrant to search the home of a citizen
not on probation would require probable cause.
United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2001); United States v. Midgette,
478 F.3d 616, 625 (4th Cir. 2007).
Because the contours of both
the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment are
5
Because probationers are not entitled to the “full
panoply” of Fourth Amendment rights, it is not altogether clear
that “reasonableness” in the specific context of probation
supervision requires justification for issuing a probation
violator warrant. To satisfy procedural due process
requirements, the Supreme Court has identified two distinct
components in making the decision to revoke probation: “(1) a
retrospective factual question whether the probationer has
violated a condition of probation; and (2) a discretionary
determination by the sentencing authority whether violation of a
condition warrants revocation of probation.” Black v. Romano,
471 U.S. 606, 611 (1985). In making decisions concerning the
rights of probationers, the Supreme Court has “sought to
accommodate these interests while avoiding the imposition of
rigid requirements that would threaten the informal nature of
probation revocation proceedings.” Id. Thus, although the
Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion standard as derived from
the cases described herein does have some logical force, the
“informal nature of probation revocation proceedings” and
“avoiding the imposition of rigid requirements” could suggest
other constitutional standards apply.
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based on reasonableness, see Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. ____,
____, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013), it follows that the same
level of suspicion that can justify a search of a probationer’s
home could justify the arrest of a probationer on suspicion of a
probation violation.
Cf. Knights, 534 U.S. at 121 (“Although
the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of
probability embodied in the term ‘probable cause,’ a lesser
degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of
governmental and private interests makes such a standard
reasonable.”); Knox v. Smith, 342 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2003)
(finding that, as in Knights, the balance of governmental and
private interests justified the arrest of a parolee based on
reasonable suspicion).
Second, allowing arrests for state probation violations
based on reasonable suspicion is supported by court decisions
affirming various parole and probation violator warrants based
on less than probable cause. For instance, courts have found
that state parole violator warrants can be issued on less than
probable cause. Knox, 342 F.3d at 657; see also United States ex
rel. Nicholson v. Dillard, 102 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1939)
(finding that a parole violator warrant “is not to be judged by
the same standards as a warrant for the arrest of one merely
charged with [a] crime or a warrant for the search and seizure
of property”). Additionally, courts have found that federal
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probation violator warrants are different from traditional
arrest warrants and do not require the traditional components of
a warrant, such as sworn facts given under oath or affirmation.
See United States v. Garcia-Avalino, 444 F.3d 444 (5th Cir.
2006) (finding that a probation violator warrant can be issued
without being based on sworn facts).
But see United States v.
Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that
traditional warrant requirements are implied with the use of the
word “warrant” in the federal probation statute).
These cases
suggest that Plaintiff has a viable argument that probation
violator warrants may be based on an officer’s reasonable
suspicion of a probation violation.
Therefore, for purposes of this motion only, this court
will evaluate Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment based upon
Plaintiff’s contention that the reasonable suspicion standard
applies.
As a result, this court examines whether, at the time
of Plaintiff’s arrest, Defendants had a reasonable suspicion
that Plaintiff had violated a condition of his probation.
To determine whether a search or seizure is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, this court “examin[es] the totality
of the circumstances.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 118 (citing Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)).
“The concept of reasonable
suspicion, like probable cause, is not ‘readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’”
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United States
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S., 213, 232 (1983)).
Nonetheless, the critical question is
whether, based on the facts available at the time of the
seizure, “[an] officer has a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”
United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Specifically, an officer’s reasonable suspicion “may be based
simply upon a tip that has ‘some particular indicia of
reliability.’”
Midgette, 478 F.3d at 625 (quoting United States
v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 324-26 (4th Cir. 2004)) (finding that
a tip from a fellow police officer that probationer was carrying
a weapon justified a probation officer’s search of the
probationer).
In this case, the undisputed facts and the disputed facts
taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff indicate that it
was reasonable for Defendants to conclude that Plaintiff was in
violation of the conditions of his probation.
To determine the
reasonableness of each Defendant’s actions, this court must
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consider the facts as they were available to each officer at the
time of the arrest.6
Defendant Holbrook first became involved in Plaintiff’s
supervision -- other than confirming that Plaintiff had not paid
the court costs and fines as required by the judgment -- when he
received the violation report from Karl Waller. (Waller Aff.
(Doc. 9-2) ¶¶ 29, 33.)
Karl Waller is the Interstate Compact
District Coordinator, charged with coordinating all
communications with out-of-state authorities.
not a party to this action.
(Id. ¶ 4.)
He is
The February 4, 2012 violation
report received by Defendant Holbrook was prepared by Waller and
reported that Plaintiff had not paid the court costs and fines
in accordance with the conditions of his probation.
(Id. ¶ 32.)
In mid-February, Defendant Holbrook received another
communication from Waller, stating the monetary condition was
still unmet.
(See id. ¶ 33.)
6
Defendants sought Plaintiff’s arrest for violation of two
different conditions of his probation: (1) non-payment of fines
and court costs and (2) absconding supervision. (Order for
Arrest and Supporting Violation Reports (Doc. 9-11).) After
Plaintiff paid the amount due and after learning that Plaintiff
had permission from the Georgia Probation Office to move his
residence, Defendant Holbrook wrote to the Guilford County
Superior Court asking that the violation report be dismissed.
(Letter from Brian Holbrook (Doc. 13-4).) Assuming without
finding that Defendants may not have had reasonable suspicion to
believe that Plaintiff was absconding, Plaintiff’s arrest was
not unreasonable, because it was supported by reasonable
suspicion that Plaintiff was in violation of the monetary
condition of his probation.
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Defendant Chandrasuwan first became involved in Plaintiff’s
supervision when Defendant Holbrook told her that Plaintiff was
in violation of his probation by not making payment.
(Chandrasuwan Aff. (Doc. 9-13) ¶ 15.)
Defendant Holbrook
directed her to follow up with Plaintiff about payment.
(Id.
¶ 16.)
For both Defendants, the reports of the NCICO formed the
basis for their belief that Plaintiff was in violation of his
probation.
Because Plaintiff was a North Carolina probationer
but was residing in Georgia, the NCICO was solely responsible
for communicating with probation officials in Georgia who were
supervising Plaintiff on behalf of North Carolina.
See ICAOS
Rule 2.101(b) (“All formal written, electronic, and oral
communication regarding an offender under this compact shall be
made only through the office of a state’s compact administrator
or the compact administrator’s designated deputies.”).
Because
of the pivotal role the NCICO plays in communicating between
Georgia and North Carolina, the reports of the NCICO carry
“indicia of reliability.”
See Midgette, 478 F.3d at 625.
Therefore, Defendants reasonably relied on the information they
received from the NCICO officers, and these reports formed a
sufficient basis for the officers to reasonably believe that
Plaintiff was in violation of his probation and should be
arrested.
See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229-33
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(1985) (finding that officers are entitled to act on the reports
of other officers so long as the officer who issues the report
had a sufficient basis for making the report); McInnis v. Maine,
638 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2011) (Souter, J., sitting by
designation) (finding, that a probation officer’s statement that
a probationer was violating a condition of probation was, by
itself, sufficient to form a reasonable basis to arrest the
probationer, even when the probation department mistakenly
believed that plaintiff’s probation period was still ongoing);
cf. United States v. Ramos-Cruz, 667 F.3d 487, 502 (4th Cir.
2012) (relying on the reports of colleagues was a sufficient
basis for supporting a showing of probable cause).7
Additionally, the reports of the NCICO were corroborated by
several sources: (1) Defendants were aware that the judgment
against Plaintiff indicated that he was required to pay $471.50
at a schedule determined by probation officers (see Defs.’ Mem.,
7
Defendants could also have relied on the responses from
the Georgia Compact Office, indicating that Plaintiff was aware
of the responsibility to make payment and planned to pay by the
end of January as a particularized and reasonable basis for
believing that Plaintiff had violated a condition of his
probation. Plaintiff disputes that he made such representations
to members of the Georgia Compact Office, claiming that he never
said he would pay by the end of January. However, Plaintiff’s
dispute of these facts is irrelevant because the “totality of
the circumstances” analysis examines what the officers knew at
the time of the seizure and determines whether the belief was
reasonable based on those facts. Plaintiff has advanced no
reason why Defendants should not have trusted the Georgia
Compact Office reports.
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Aff. of Brian Holbrook (“Holbrook Aff.”) (Doc. 9-8) ¶ 8); and
(2) the Guilford County Clerk of Court represented to Defendant
Holbrook that Plaintiff’s status was unpaid (id. ¶ 16).
These
facts corroborate the information communicated to Defendants by
NCICO officials and make it reasonable for Defendants to have
relied on such reports.
Therefore, based on the undisputed
reports of the NCICO, there is no genuine dispute that
Defendants had a particularized and objective basis for
believing that Plaintiff had violated a condition of his
probation.
Plaintiff makes two major arguments to assert that his
arrest was unreasonable when viewed through the totality of the
circumstances.
Both arguments revolve around the fact that
probation officers did not complete a “DCC-2” form as required
by internal DCC procedures.
As explained herein, Plaintiff’s
arguments do not establish that Defendants lacked reasonable
suspicion to arrest Plaintiff for a probation violation.
First, Plaintiff asserts that the directive of the
probation office that Plaintiff pay his costs prior to July 2012
was not a valid condition of his probation, and as a result,
Defendants could not use a violation of that condition to
justify Plaintiff’s arrest.
Plaintiff argues that the original
due date for Plaintiff’s payment of court costs was July 2012,
as indicated on the Bill of Cost.
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(Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 13) at 17;
Bill of Cost (Doc. 13-2).)
Thus, when the probation office set
the due date at a point before July 2012, Defendants “modified”
his probation.
Pointing to section 15A-1343(c) of the North
Carolina General Statutes, Plaintiff argues that he was entitled
to “a written statement setting forth the modifications” to his
probation.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(c).
Defendants did
not provide written notice signed by Plaintiff of the due date
for payment, and as a result, Plaintiff argues that Defendants
improperly modified the conditions of probation and invalidated
the condition.
(Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 13) at 11-15.)
Therefore,
Plaintiff argues that his failure to pay could not serve as the
basis for believing that Plaintiff had violated his probation.
However, it is not clear whether the new due date set by
the probation office was a “modification” of Plaintiff’s
probation.
First, Defendants argue that the “Bill of Cost” was
not part of the judgment against Plaintiff but rather a document
produced by the clerk’s office for Plaintiff’s convenience.
(Defs.’ Reply to the Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. 15)
at 4 n.2.)
Therefore, any deviation from the date on the Bill
of Cost was not a modification of the conditions of probation.
Second, Defendants point to the probation office’s power to set
the payment schedule as evidence that setting a due date does
not constitute a “modification” of the conditions of probation.
In its judgment against Plaintiff, the superior court delegated
-24-
the authority to set the payment schedule to Plaintiff’s
probation officer.
(Judgment (Doc. 13-3) at 1.)
The North
Carolina probation statute gives courts the power to delegate
this responsibility to probation officers.
§ 15A-1343(g).
See N.C. Gen. Stat.
Section 15A-1343(g) does not explicitly require
that any change in the payment schedule be delivered in writing,
require judicial approval for any changes in the payment
schedule, or place any other limits on the discretion of the
probation officer in setting the payment schedule.
See id.
Accordingly, Defendants argue that setting the due dates for
payment in February 2012 was not a modification of Plaintiff’s
conditions of probation, and Plaintiff’s lack of payment could
serve as a reasonable basis for believing that Plaintiff
violated his probation.
Both of the arguments appear to be plausible from the
reading of the statute, and no North Carolina court has
determined whether a probation officer’s changing of the due
date noted in the Bill of Cost, pursuant to the powers delegated
to that probation officer by the court, constitutes a
“modification” of a condition of probation that requires written
notice.
The cases cited by Plaintiff do not provide guidance on
the issue.
Instead, the cases Plaintiff cites involve a state
court adding an additional condition of probation or making a
material change to an existing condition without providing
-25-
written notice, rather than the probation office exercising its
discretion in implementing a condition based on the court’s
original delegation of that discretion.
See State v. Seek, 152
N.C. App. 237, 238, 566 S.E.2d 750, 751 (2002) (recognizing an
ineffective modification when the trial court struck language
from the original conditions of probation so that the condition
that the probationer not “reside in any household with a minor
child other than his own” became such that the probationer could
not “reside in any household with a minor child”); State v.
Suggs, 92 N.C. App. 112, 113, 373 S.E.2d 687, 688 (1988)
(finding an ineffective modification when a state court added a
condition of probation that the probationer surrender his
driver’s license and not operate a motor vehicle on a public
highway for a period of six months without providing written
notice).
Confronted with an unclear issue of state law, this court
is hesitant to forecast how the state courts would resolve this
ambiguity.
See R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496, 500-01 (1941).
However, in this matter, the unclear issue
of state law does not prevent this court from determining
whether Defendants had a sufficient basis for believing
Plaintiff violated his probation.
The “totality of the
circumstances” analysis examines whether the facts as they were
known to the Defendants formed a particularized and reasonable
-26-
basis for Defendants’ belief.
434 (4th Cir. 1996).
Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429,
As mentioned above, Defendants believed
that Plaintiff was in violation of his conditions of probation
based on the reports of NCICO officers, the judgment in place
against Plaintiff, and the representations of the clerk of court
that the amount remained unpaid.
Plaintiff has cited no
authority to suggest that the probation officers had a duty to
look beyond the judgment rendered against Plaintiff and the
representations of NCICO officers to determine if the monetary
condition was valid.
Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ failure to comply
with DCC procedures makes the seizure unreasonable under Griffin
v. Wisconsin.
Plaintiff correctly points out that, in Griffin,
the Supreme Court affirmed the system of warrantless searches of
probationers created by Wisconsin’s probation regulations.
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880.
See
The Supreme Court found that the
“special needs” of monitoring probationers justified this system
of warrantless searches.
Id. at 875-80; see also Midgette, 478
F.3d at 623-24 (affirming North Carolina’s system of warrantless
searches of probationers on similar grounds).
For a search to
be justified under the “special needs” exception, the search
must comply with the regulations set forth within the system of
warrantless searches.
See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880.
Based on
this requirement set forth in Griffin, Plaintiff claims that,
-27-
because Defendants did not comply with the DCC-2 requirement set
out in internal DCC regulations, the seizure cannot be
reasonable.
(Pl.’s Supplemental Br. (Doc. 21) at 7-9.)
However, Plaintiff’s reliance on Griffin is misplaced.
Griffin was a “special needs” case where the plaintiff was
challenging the constitutionality of Wisconsin’s system of
warrantless searches of probationers.
875-76.
See Griffin, 483 U.S. at
In this case, Plaintiff is only challenging his arrest
and questioning whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, there was sufficient justification for the arrest
on a probation violation.
Therefore, this case is more similar
to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Knights.
See Knights, 534
U.S. at 117-18 (going beyond the holding in Griffin to find that
the totality of the circumstances justified a warrantless search
of probationer’s home without relying on the “special needs”
exception to the Fourth Amendment); see also United States v.
Warren, 566 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that the
Griffin and Knights exceptions are often “conflated”).
Plaintiff’s arrest was “reasonable under the traditional
Fourth Amendment approach of examining the totality of the
circumstances,” and as a result, the question of whether
Defendants complied with all requirements of the probation
system -- although it is a material issue in a “special needs”
-28-
analysis -- is not dispositive here.
See Knights, 534 U.S. at
118 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because there are no genuine issues on whether Defendants
possessed reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff has violated a
condition of his probation, it is proper for this court to find
that no constitutional violation occurred8 and grant summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.
ii.
No Clearly Established Right
Having found that no constitutional right was violated,
this court need not delve into the question of whether the right
to be arrested on a probation violator warrant only upon
reasonable suspicion was “clearly established” at the time of
Defendants’ action.
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.
However, because
Plaintiff first asserted in his complaint that he had a clearly
8
Additionally, that Defendants (1) did not complete a DCC-2
and (2) attempted to reach Plaintiff personally rather than
contacting the Georgia Compact Office (a violation of ICAOS Rule
2.101(d)) do not give rise to a § 1983 claim for denying due
process in this instance. “An agency's violation of its
regulations is not unconstitutional unless the regulations are
necessary to afford due process.” Bowens v. North Carolina
Dep’t of Human Resources, 710 F.2d 1015, 1019 (4th Cir. 1983);
see also Morris v. City of Danville, 744 F.2d 1041, 1048 n.9
(4th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he mere fact that a state agency violates
its own procedures does not, ipso facto, mean that it has
contravened federal due process requirements.”). The Supreme
Court has specified what procedural due process requirements
that probationers are entitled to receive before probation is
revoked, see Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 781-82, and Plaintiff has
not shown that the internal regulations he accuses Defendants of
violating were necessary to afford Plaintiff due process.
-29-
established right not to be arrested on a probation violator
warrant without probable cause, there is a lingering question of
whether probationers have a clearly established right to be
arrested for a probation violation only if the officer has
probable cause to believe he is in violation of his probation.
Finding that this right is not clearly established, this court
determines that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity,
even if there was some sort of constitutional violation.
When examining whether government officials are entitled to
qualified immunity, courts must determine whether a government
official’s conduct violates “clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
In determining whether a
right was “clearly established,” the “contours of the right must
be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.”
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
Anderson
As stated earlier, in
making this determination, courts can be sure that qualified
immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.”
Malley, 475 U.S. at 341; Willingham
v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2005).
In this case, Plaintiff has not shown a clearly established
right to be arrested on a probation violator warrant only when a
probation officer has probable cause.
-30-
As mentioned above, there
are no cases from the Fourth Circuit clarifying the level of
justification required for arrests of probationers for probation
violations, see Owens-El v. Brunson, Civil No.
WDQ-11-0523,
2011 WL 6651330 (D. Md. Dec. 14, 2011), aff'd, 477 F. App'x 27
(4th Cir. 2012), and the Supreme Court has continually confirmed
that probationers do not enjoy the full panoply of rights that
other citizens enjoy.
See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874; see also
Knights, 534 U.S. at 121-22 (finding that probationers’ homes
may be searched on reasonable suspicion).
Without any clear law
demonstrating that probationers may only be arrested based upon
probable cause, it would not have been apparent to a reasonable
officer in Defendants’ position that Plaintiff’s arrest violated
his rights.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s arguments do not establish that
Defendants were “plainly incompetent” or “knowingly violated the
law” in making the decision to arrest Plaintiff for a probation
violation.
Even assuming that Plaintiff’s interpretation of
state law on the modification issue is correct and probation
officers improperly modified Plaintiff’s probation without
giving written notice, this would not prevent Defendants from
being shielded by qualified immunity.
The qualified immunity
analysis examines what a reasonable officer would know at the
time of the alleged violation.
See Malley, 475 U.S. at 341.
Just because Plaintiff interprets the North Carolina statutes to
-31-
require a DCC-2 or other written notice when probation officers
exercise their discretion in setting a payment schedule does not
mean that a reasonable probation officer would interpret the law
in the same way.
As stated above, Defendants were both told by NCICO
officials that Plaintiff had agreed to pay the costs as directed
and that Plaintiff had not paid at the time the probation
violator warrant was issued.
“Under these facts and in light of
the parties’ reasonable, yet differing interpretations” of the
probation modification requirements, the factual allegations do
not establish that a reasonable officer in Defendants’ position
would have been “plainly incompetent or would have knowingly
violated the law” in making the decision to seek and obtain an
order to arrest Plaintiff for a probation violation.
See Spiker
v. Alleghany Cnty. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 920 F. Supp. 2d
580, 603-04 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (finding that probation officers
were entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 action
challenging the arrest of a probationer for not registering as a
sex offender, even though the probation office had not fulfilled
its legal duty of warning probationer that he must register),
aff’d sub nom. Spiker v. Whittaker, 553 F. App’x. 275 (3d Cir.
2014).
Therefore, it appears that Defendants acted reasonably in
determining that Plaintiff was in violation of his probation,
-32-
and based on the facts as they appeared to Defendants at the
time of the arrest, it would not have been apparent to either
probation officer that his or her actions violated a clearly
established Constitutional right.
As a result, Defendants would
both be entitled to qualified immunity if they indeed violated
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Therefore, summary
judgment is appropriate.
B.
Malicious Prosecution Claim
After granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983
claim, this court has discretion on whether to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction on the remaining malicious prosecution
claim that is based on state law.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c).
However, because the federal claim has been dismissed before
trial, the supplemental jurisdiction statute -- and the Supreme
Court decision it codified -- has directed that the state claim
be dismissed as well.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
Therefore, this
court dismisses Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim.
IV.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 8) is GRANTED and that this case is DISMISSED.
The claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE and any state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
To the extent required by any state law or rule of
-33-
procedure, the dismissal of any state law claims without
prejudice is intended to permit Plaintiff to re-file those
claims in state court should he choose to do so.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend
(Doc. 23) is DENIED AS MOOT.
A judgment consistent with this
Memorandum Opinion and Order will be entered contemporaneously
herewith.
This the 30th day of December, 2014.
_______________________________________
United States District Judge
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