FLORES v. COLVIN
Filing
15
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 02/29/2016; that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 11 ) be DENIED, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 13 ) be GRANTED and the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld. (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
REBA FLORES,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant
t13CV513
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Reba Flores brought this action to obtain review of a ftnal decision of the
Commissioner
of Social Secutity denying her claims for a Period of Disability, Disability
Insutance Benefits, and Supplemental Security Income. The
Cout
has before
it the cetified
administtative record and ctoss-motions for judgment. (Docket Entries 11, 1,3.) For the
reasons stated herein, the Court recommends that PlaintifPs Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Docket
Ettty
11) be denied, and Defendant's Motion for Judgment on rhe
Pleadings Q)ocket Entry 13) be granted.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security Disability benefits and Supplement
Security Income benefits on February 11,2009.
denied initially and upon teconsideration.
1
Çl
(fr. 235-36,89-92.)r The applications
were
151-54,166-70.) Plaintiff requested ahearit'tg
Transcript citations refer to the administrative record.
before an -A.dministrative LawJudge
201.0, the,A.LJ
(',{LJ'). Çr. 171,-72.) After ahearing, on August
detetmined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the r{,ct. (Tr. 93-105.) Plaintiff
submitted a timely appeal
to the Appeals Council.
Çr
21,5-1,7.) The Appeals Council
remanded the claim for futher ptoceedings with speci{ìc instructions to the
13.) A second headng was held on May 9,201,2, before a different
201.2, the
27,
ALJ. Çr.
1,1,2-
ALJ (Tr 1.) OnJuly 11,
ALJ issued an unfavorable decision denying benefits. (Tr. 67-80.) Ptaintiff
submitted a timely appeal to the,{ppeals Council. Qr. 62-63.) Or Apdl 24,2013,the Appeals
Counsel denied Plaintiffs request for review of the decision.
became the Commissionet's fìnal decision
404.981, and
41, 6.1,
Çr
56-61,.) The ALJ's decision
fot purposes of judicial review 20 C.F.R.
SS
481.
II.
STANDARD FOR REVIEW
The scope of judicial review of the Commissionet's final decision is specific and
narrow. Smith
u.
Schweiker,7gstr.2d343,345 (4th Cir. 1936). Review is limited to determining
if there is substantial evidence in the recotd to support the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C.
$
a05O; Huntera. Su//iuan,993F.2d31.,34 (4th Cir. 1,992);Hay u. Salliuan,g}7 F.2d1,453,1,456
(4th Cir. 1990). In teviewing for substantial evidence, the Court does not re-weigh conflicting
evidence, make ctedibility determinations,
or
substitute
its judgment for that of
the
Commissioner. Craig u. Chater,76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1,996). The issue before the Court,
thetefote, is not whethet Plaintiff is disabled but whether the Commissioner's finding that she
2
is not disabled is suppotted by substantial evidence and was reached based upon â correct
application of the relevant law. Qd.)
III.
THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION
At the initial hearing, the -ALJ followed the well-established five-step sequential
to ascertain whether the claimant is disabled, which is set forth in 20 C.F.R.
41,6.920.
See
Albright u. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec.
Admin.,
17
4 tr.3d 473,
47
SS
analysis
404.1520 and
5 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). The
ALJ determined at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
the alleged onset date of October 10,2006.
(Ir. 9S.) Next the ALJ found at step two that
Plaintiff had the following severe impaitments: diabetes mellitus with pedpheral neuropathy,
obesity, hypertension, and anxiety-related disotder with generalized depression. (Id.)
,\t
step
three, the,A.LJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
listed in, ot medically equal to, one listed in Appendix
1.
(Tr. 98) At step four, the ÂLJ
determined that Plaintiff tetained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perfotm light
work. (It. 99.) The ÂLJ found that Plaintiff was limited to: standing or walking for six hours
in an eight hout wotkday; required
a cane
for walking more than short distances; needed the
opportunity to stand and sttetch at het workstation at 30-minute intervals; should be limited
to never climbing ladders, topes, and scaffolds;
occasionally climbing ramps and stairs;
occasionally balancing and stoopin$ avoiding concentrated exposure to hazards and work at
heights; she requires restroom access in the work arca; and she can perform simple, routine,
and repetitive task, in a low stress work environment with limited public contact.
a
J
(Ir.
99-100.)
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform any of her past relevant work. (Tr.
1,04.)
,{t
step five, the ,{.LJ determined that there were iobs which Plaintiff could perform
consistent with her RFC, age, education, and work experience. (Id.)
As noted, the Appeals Council next granted Plaintiffs request for review. In its
decision, the,{.ppeals Council vacated the hearing decision and remanded the case to the ALJ
for resolution tequiring the ALJ to: 1) give further consideration to the effects of Plaintiffs
obesity with respect to her ability to work; 2) futther evaluate Plaintiffs subjective complaints;
3) futher consider Plaintiffs RFC and to cite specific evidence in support of the
assessed
limitations; and 4) to obtain evidence from a vocational expert to clarifii the effect of the
assessed
limitations on the claimant's occupational base.
(Ir.
113.)
On remand, another,{LJ addressed these issues. First, the ALJ addressed Plaintiffs
obesity.
(Ir. 75.) The ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff
weight fluctuated over the years bur the
weight itself was not disabling. (Id.) The ALJ stated that Ms. Flores was able to complete
light house wotk and that exercising twice
a week increased
her energy. Qd) Next, the ALJ
described the symptoms and limitations that Plaintiff testified about attÅal.
Çt.7Q
Then
the ALJ evaluated the symptoms and limitations based on the record, laboratory findings, and
hospital records. (Tt. 75-77.) The ALJ found that "the objective evidence showed
stabiltzanon of the claimant's physical and mental symptoms." (Tr. 78.) Lastly, a vocational
expert testifìed that even
considerable number
if
Plaintiff could only
of jobs in the national
4
lift
and carry 10 pounds, there were
economy available
to Plaintiff. (Tr.
a
80.)
Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id.)
TheAIJ'. decision on
remand became the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review.
IV.
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal. First Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ ered in failing
to comply with the Appeals Council's prior remand order. Next Plaintiff contends that the
ÂLJ failed to explain the weight given to the opinions of
a
consultative examiner. ,{s explained
below, the unders€rìed concludes that the ALJ complied with the -Appeals Council's remand
otdet, and that the,A.LJ propetly evaluated the medical opinions in the record.
A. Claim One
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to comply with the Remand Order from the
Appeals Council. (Docket Entry 1,2 at
2.) In pertinent p^rt, Plaintiff, contests
credibility analysis, contending that the
the ALJ's
AU, (1) failed to propedy consider the effects
PlaintifPs medications have on her ability to work; Q) falled to address Plaintiffs efforts to
seek medical support
to telieve her symptoms; and (3) faited to consider possible explanations
fot Plaintiffs noncompliance with medical treatment.
Qd. at
5.) Âs explained below, the ALJ's
credibility analysis was legally correct and supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiffs
ftst contention is that the ALJ's credibility analysis is not based on
substantial evidence because he did not consider how the side effects of Plaintiffs medication
affect her ability to
work.
Q)ocket E.ttty 12 at
5.) In
Craig u. Chater, the Fourth Circuit
ptovided a two-part test for evaluating a claknant's statements about symptoms. 76 F'.3d 585,
5
589 (4th Cir. 1996). First, there must be "the existence of a medical impairment(s) which
results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities and which tvuld reasonabþ
be expected îo
prodaæ
the
pain or olher ymþtorzs alleged." Id. at 594 (quotations and citations omitted)
(emphasis in the original).
If
the ALJ determines that such an impairment exists, the second
partof the test then requires him to consider allavailable evidence, including the claimant's
statements about pain, in order to detetmine whether a person is disabled. Id. at 595-96;20
C.F.R. SS 416.929(c)(4) and a0a.1529(c)@. While the ALJ must consider the plaintiffs
statements and other subjective evidence at step two, he need not credit them to the extent
they conflict with the objective medical evidence
or to the extent that the underþing
impairment could not reasonably be expected to cause the symptoms alleged. Id. at 596.
Relevant evidence for this inquiry includes the plaintiffs "medical historf, medical signs, and
laboratory findings," id. at 595,as well as various regulatory factors.2 The regulations do not
mandate that the ALJ discuss all these factors in the decision. See, e.!., Bageft u. Astrue,
5:08-CV-165-D, 2009
ffl.
No.
1438209, at *9 (E.D.N.C. May 20,2009) (unpublished).
2
The regulatoty factots ate: (i) the claimant's daiþ activities; (ü) the location, duration, frequency, and
intensity of the claimant's pain or other symptoms; (ui) precþitating and aggravatjng factors; (rv) th.
type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the claimant takes or has taken to
alleviate pain or other symptoms; (v) tteatment, other than medication, the claimant receives or has
received for relief of pain or other symptoms; (vi) any measures the claimzntuses or has used to relieve
pain or other symptoms; and (vü) other factots-concerning the claimant's functional limitations and
restrictions due to pain or othet symptoms. 20 C.F.R. $ a16.929(c) (3). See ¿/s¿ SSR 96-7p,1996 !ØL
374786, at +3 (listing factors "the adjudicator must consider in addition to the objective medical
evidence when assessing the credibility of an individual's statements').
6
Here, the ALJ finds that Plaintiffs "medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected
to
cause the alleged symptoms;" but the statements regarding the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects were not credible. Qr.74-75.) Plaintiff contends
that the ALJ's decision is not based on substantial evidence because he failed to consider how
her medication may affect het ability to
work. (Docket Enry 12 at 5-6.) For the following
reasons, Plaintiff s argument is unpersuasive.
F'irst, the regulations do not mandate that the ,{LJ formalistically discuss all
regulatory factots in a decision. Rathet, the ALJ is only required to consider them.
Edwards u. Coluin,
No. 1:12-CV-1249, 2014 wL
444206'1,,
of the
See, e.g.,
âr x3 (À,{.D.N.C. Sept. 9,
201,4);
Bageît,2009WL 1438209, at *9. Consequently, an,{.LJ's putported "faiI:ute" to walk through
each of the credibility factors does not warrant a rcmarrd where, as here, the bases for his
decision is apparent.
Bamhart,21,4Fed.
See Cichocki u.
Astrwe,534 Fed. App'* 71,75-76 Qd Cu.2013); Clary
App'* 479,482 (5th Cir. 2007). To the extent Plaintiff
u.
suggests otherwise,
she is mistaken.
Second, the
ALJ explicitly discussed Plaintiffs activities of daily living, which
explained, is a relevant regulatory
as
factor. For example, the ALJ explained how Plaintiff
tepotted that she could handle her personal carc without help and could complete light
housework. (Tt. 75.) The tecord also indicates that she exercised twice per week and had
increased energy. (Id.)
7
Third, the ALJ also considered the medical history, laboratory fìndings, and medical
signs as to Plaintiffs impairments. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff testified that her blood
pressure remained high and caused het to experience some shortness of breath and headaches.
Qr 7 a.) However, the ALJ found that, after being instructed
her diet, Plaintiff lost weight and her blood pressure fell. As
to increase exercise and to watch
a
result, complaints of headaches,
dizziness, and upper extremity numbness were at a minimal.
pain, palpitations, or shortness
(Ir. 75.)
Moreover, no chest
of bteath were teported. (Id.) The ALJ
Plaintiffs testimony that
she expedenced symptoms
depression and anxiety
(Tt 74.) The ALJ noted that after she applied for
also addressed
of crying spells and lack of focus due to
had not received treatment from a mental health professional.
Qr76.)
disability Plaintiff
The ÂLJ reasoned
that "tecords from her primary care physician showed intermittent complaints of depression,
mental status examinations generally showed normal mood and, affect."
(Id.)
The .,\LJ also
noted that any mental health impairments were stabilized with Lexapro "without any notable
changes
in dosage." (fr. 76,78.)
Additionally, the ALJ considered location, duration, frequency, intensity, and
precipitating and aggravating factors alleged by Plaintiff as to the pain resulting from her
symptoms. Plaintiff teported that her high sugar caused frequent urination, lightheadedness,
and poor sleep.
(It. 75.) Howevet, treatment notes indicated that after medication
adjustments and exercise, Plaintiff reported that she felt better and had more energy.
,{.dditionally, the ,{LJ addressed Plaintiffs testimony of back and leg pain by indicating that
I
the pain was stabilized with medication. (Tt.
74,76.) The ALJ
level was only reported to be 2 out of 10 athet last office
also noted that
visit. (Ir.
Plaintiffs pain
76.)
The ALJ also considered Plaintiffs treatment, dosage, a¡d side effects from
medication. The ALJ acknowledged Plaintiffls testimony that het medication caused dizziness.
Plaintiff contends that "[t]he
she was
AU . . . disregarded þer] medicine side-effects by stating that
still able to drive to town." (Docket Ent"y 12 at 6.) Flowever, at the hearing Plaintiff
testified that although she was afraid to drive because
which is five miles from where she lives.
[t32.)
of
dszziness, she usually drives to town
The ALJ correctly summarized Plaintiffs
testimony by stating that Plaintiffs medications caused side effects, but she was still able to
drive.
[t.7Q
The ALJ also noted that
in 201,0, acute hyperglycemia
caused
Plaintiff to be
taken to the emergency room. (Tt. 75.) However, Plaintiff stated that she had not been taking
her medication or exercising as directed. Qd.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ contadicted himself with respect to discussing whether
Plaintiffs medication caused side effects. (Docket Entry
1,2
at 6.) According to Plaintiff, the
ALJ stated that Plaintiff testified that her medication caused dtzziness; but later, in the
same
decision, the ALJ stated that no side effects of the medication were reported. Qd.) However,
the alleged inconsistent statements do not call into question whether the ALJ's decision is
based on substantial evidence.
'Víhen
asked at the hearing whether she experiences side effects
ftom het medication, Plaintiff answered "þ]eah, somewhat; dialrhea,
sometimes . . .
."
CIt.
38.) There
nausea, dizziness
is only one othet document addressing side effects in the
9
record. During an evalua:j.on conducted by Dr. Atienza, Plaintiff reported that het medication
causes migraine headaches and dizziness.
(Ir. 551.) The Court is left to guess as to the
sevetity, duration, and ftequency of these side effects. Further, Plaintiff does not meaningfully
explain why the evidence as a whole cannot support the,{,LJ's determination. Plaintiff merely
states that the ÂLJ's credibility analysis is not based on substantial evidence because he did
not consider how the side effects of Plaintiffs medication affect her ability to work. (Docket
Entry 12 at 5.)
Even
if
the
AU did make inconsistent statements
regarding the side effects
of
Plaintiffs medication, the ,{.LJ's alleged mistake is harmless. "Errors are harmless in social
security cases when it is inconceivable that a diffetent administrative conclusion would have
been teached absent the
effor." Møllang
O4.D.N.C. Feb. 20, 201,4). Even
u. Coluin,
No. 1:10CV961,201,4WL 689755, at*9
if the ALJ did make inconsistent
statements "the ALJ's
credibility determination would remain supported by substantjal evidence in light of the
rìumerous othet factors and large body of medical recotds and other evidence upon which
þe] based þs] determinatio¡."
x1
TomasseÍti
u.
Aúraq No. 7:11-CV-88-D,201,2WL 4321646, at
1 (E,.D.N.C. Aug. 22, 2012) report and reconmendation
adopted,
No. 7:11-CV-88-D,
4321,632 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 201,2); Mallang,201.4WL 689755, at *9
("[{ny
201,2
WL
failure on the
part of the ALJ to develop the recotd futther here is ultimately harmless âs there is no reason
to believe that but for the alleged effor this case would resolve differently."). Here, the ALJ's
findings that: PlaintifPs weight itself was not disabling, symptoms resulting from hypertension
l0
were reduced, symptoms telated to diabetes improved, her back and knee pain level was only
2 out of 10 at her latest office visit, and her mental impairments were stabilized with
medication arc all supported by substantial evidence. Qr.75-78.) Thus, "there is no reason
to believe that but fot the presumed error, this case would resolve differently." Tomr
No. 1:10CV856, 201,4WL 509195, at*10 (I4.D.N.C. Feb. 7,
adopted,
No. 1:10CV856, 2014 WL
1,338270 (À4.D.N.C.
u. Coluin,
201,4) reþort and rewnmendation
Apr. 1, 2014). For all these reasons,
Plaintiffs argument lacks merit.
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to recognize her persistent efforts to
medical support to relieve het symptoms. (Docket
seek
Etrry 12 at 5,7.) Accotding to SSR 96-
7p, "a longitudinal medical record demonstrating an individual's attempts to seek medical
Úeatment for pain or other symptoms . . . lends support to an individual's allegations of intense
and persistent pain or other symptoms . . .
."
SSR
96-7p,1.996WL
3741,86
x7
$uly 2,1,996).
Âdditionally, SSR 96-7p states that "the individual's statements may be less credible if the level
or ftequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints, or if the medical reports
ot records show that the individual is not following the treatment as prescribed and there are
no good reâsons for this failute."
Id. Plaintiff makes two
arguments regarding the ALJ's
alleged failure to comply with SSR 96-7p. Q)ocket Entry 1,2 at7 -8.) First, Plaintiff contends,
the ALJ failed to consider her effotts to seek medical support. (Id. at
7.)
Second, Plaintiff
argues that the ÂLJ violated SSR 96-7p by not considering possible explanations regarding her
noncompliance with medical treatment. (Id. at7-8.)
11
To suppott het frst argument, Plaintiff contends that her substantial medical record,
"fd]espite the limitation of possessing no health insurance and being denied for Medicaid,"
indicates that she sought all medical assistance reasonably available to her. Qd. at 5.) Plaintiffs
argument is misplaced. The ALJ's decision expressly acknowledges Plaintiffs constant effort
to
seek medical
support. The ALJ stated that "[t]he longitudinal record showed a history of
toutine and conservative treatmentaftet the alleged onset date." (Tr.7S.) This indicates that
PlaintifPs effots to seek medical support were considered; however, the
AIJ determined that
the lack of severity of her treatment only requited "routine and conservative. treatment." (Id.)
Therefore, SSR 96-7p is satisfied because Plaintiffs efforts to seek medical assistance were
considered in the,tLJ's evaluation.
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ violated SSR 96-7p by not considedng possible
explanations tegarding why she did not comply with medical treatment. Id. at7-S. SSR 96-7p
also states that an ALJ should consider reasons why a complainant does not comply with
medical treatment including financial reasons, side effects ensuing from medication, and
religious reasons. SSR 96-7p , 1996 WL 37 41.86, at *7 -8. The ALJ complied with SSR 96-7p
by indicating several instances where Plaintiff did not comply with her medication treatment
because she ran out of multiple types of medication on more than one occasion. (Tr. 75.) The
ALJ also stated that, on other occasions, Plaintiff admitted that she was not "taking her
[medication] as directed." Çt.75-76.) Furthermore, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff "did not
teceive aîy fte tment from a mental health professional,and based on the limited evidence
t2
avarlable, het symptoms were stabilized" when she took her
medication. (Tr. 78.) Therefore,
the reasons why Plaintiff was not compþing with prescribed treatment were addressed by the
,TLJ.
Plaintiff also contends that the ÂLJ failed to meet the conditions in SSR 32-59 which
authorizes the ALJ
to deny benefits based on a claimants failure to follow
treatment. (Docket Ent"y
1,2
prescribed
at 8.) Pursuant to SSR 82-59 a claimant that neglects to follow
prescribed treatment that would restore the claimant's ability to wotk is not disabled. SSR 8259,'1,982W1- 31,384 *1 (1982). Four conditions must be satisfied to make this determination.
Id. However,
SSR 82-59 only applies when an individual has a disability but refuses to undergo
treatment, without a justifiable reason, that could remedy the disability. Snith u. Coluin,No.
1,:1,2CY1,247
, 2015 \XlL
3505201., at
*5 n.7 (À4.D.N.C.
June 3, 201,5) (finding that SSR 82-59
only applies when the ALJ has determined an individual "would be found disabled under the
Act") (quotation and citation omitted); Hanþt
1,874979, at
*6
u. Coluin,
No. 1:12-CV-00395-GCM, 2014 WL
[X/.D.N.C. lt4.ay 9,201,4) (fìnding that SSR 82-59 only applies when plaintiffs
failure to follow the ptescribed tteatment is the deciding factor in determining whether the
claimant is disabled). Hete, neither,{LJ found that Plaintiff would be disabled in the absence
of treatment. (Tr. 80, 1 05.) Therefore, SSR 82-59 does not apply. Hamb1, 2014 WL
187 497 9 ,
at*6.
Lastly, after the briefìng was filed in this case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
issued a published decision tegatding the two part credibility assessment. Ma¡tio u. Coluin,780
13
tr.3d 632 (4th Cir. 201,5). Masdo-in pertinent
patt-
concluded that an ALJ ered by using,
atpart two of the credibility assessment, "boilerplate" languase that "the claimant's statements
concetning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
þs
painf arc not credible to the
extent they ate inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity âssessment." Id. at
639. The Masdo Court
reasoned that this method "'gets things backwards' by implying that
ability to work is determined ftst and is then used to determine the claimant's credtl:1hty." Id.
(quoting Bjornson
u.
Astrue,671, F.3d 640,644-45 (7th Cir. 201,2)). Instead, "the ÂLJ here should
have compated fthe claimant's] alleged functional limitations from pain to the other evidence
in the record, not to fthe claimant's] residual functional capacity." Id. However, this is not
the end of the analysis. The Court further reasoned that "[t]he Â.LJ's eror would be harmless
if
he ptoperly analyzed credibility elsewhere." Mascio,780 F.3d
^t639,
Hete, the ALJ erted in the instânt case by considedng the credibility of Plaintiffs
testimony through the use of the same objectionable "boilerplate" language used in Masdo.
Qr.74-75.) However,
as previously discussed above the ALJ's creditability analysis is
discussed in detail elsewhere.
[r
74-78.) Immediately after using the boilerplate language,
the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff alleged function limitations based on Plaintjffs hearing testimony,
"medical signs, . . .Iabontory findings and other evidence" in the record.
^t639.
Mastio,780 F.3d
First, the ALJ listed the symptoms and limitations that Plaintiff testified about at ttial.
Çn7a.) Next,
78).
See
the ALJ evaluated the symptoms based on the evidence in the record.
I-"ongu. Coluin,
Qt.74-
No. 1:13CV659, 201,5wL1646985, at *1 (À,{.D.N.C. Apr.'1,4,201,5) ('.,{ftet
T4
using the 'boilerplate'language, the ALJ identified medical evidence, objective observations
of
Plaintiffs tteating medical ptovidets, and Plaintiffs own ptevious admissions concerning his
mild level of pain and what he was able to do to find that Plaintiffs statements about his pain
were not credible."); Cantrell u. Coluin, No. 1:14-CV-104-RJC-DSC, 201,5WL7444633, at*5
CX/.D.N.C. Nov. 23,2015) ("Despite using boiletplate language, the ALJ's analysis explains
his credibility findings in gteat detail, which the Court finds to be supported by the eviden...');
Unares u. Coluin, No.5:14-CV-00120,2015
\)fL
4389533, at
*6
CX/.D.N.C. July 17,201,5)
(concluding that the ,\LJ conducted a proper Masdo evaluation by "consider[ing] Plaintiffls
personal testimony, her daily activities, medical source statements, and tteatment records in
making his determination"). Additionally, the,{LJ stated that based on "the medical evidence
and the claimant's testimony[,]" Plaintiffls claims are only parttally credible. (Tr. 78.) The ALJ
futhet reasoned that Plaintiff was able to sit through
a
more than thirty minute long hearing
with non-observable problems or signs of side effects from medication. Qd.) This
case is
distinguished from Mascio because the Á.LJ's evaluation of Plaintìffls credibility is based on her
personal testimony, observations of Plainttff at the headng, het daily activities, medical source
statements, and treatment records. Thus, the ALJ's use
Masdo is harmless error because he
of boilelplate language
as used in
"ptopeÃy analyzed credibility elsewhete." Mavio, 780 F.3d
at 639.
l5
B. Claim Two
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to evaluate and weigh the medical
assessments conducted by
Dr. Atienza. (Docket Entry 12 at8-1,0.) Plaintiff contends that on
two occasions Dt. Auenza detetmined that Plaintiff had "resistance to flexion/extension of
the elbow joints, positive bilateral straight leg taise tests at less than 30 degrees, and reduced
knee range
of motion." (d. at 8-9.) Plaintiffs claim lacks merit
assessment is not a medical
opinion. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R.
S
6440299, at x2 flX/.D.N.C. Dec. 21,,201,1).
Dr. Atienza's
404.1527(c), the ALJ must weigh
evely medical opinion received tegardless of its source. Collin¡
WL
because
u.
Astrue, No. 1:10CV1.89,2011
A medical opinion has a distinct definition.
"Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable
medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity
of
fthe claimant's]
impairment(s), including fthe claimant's] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the
claimant] c
n still do despite impafument(s), and [the claimant's]
physical
or
mental
restrictions;' 20 C.F'.R. S 404.1,527 (^)Q).
Here, Dr. ,\tienza's assessments were merely physical examinations.
(Ir.
545-50, 810-
16.) The assessments did not provide an opinion about how Ms. Flore's symptoms affect her
ability to function for the purpose of being gainfully employed.3 Euerett u. Coluin, No. 3:14-
CV-00017-FDW, 201,4
3
WL
6387604,
at *4 (W.D.N.C. Nov.
1,4, 201,4) (finding that
Notwithstanding such, the ALJ still considered Dr. ,{.tienza's examinations at step-two and in the
AIJ'r RFC findings. (Tr. 77,76.)
l6
a
physician's report was
not a medical opinion
examination and did not conduct
u.
a
because he only conducted
a
physical
diagnostic test and did not make objective findings); Mitchell
Astrae, No. 2:11-CV-00056-MR, 201,3WL 678068, at *5 [X/.D.N.C. Feb. 25, 201,3) (finding
that a the physician's statement was not a medical opinion because
it did "not
reflect his
judgment about the sevedty of the [p]laintiffs impairment or his physical resttictions"). Thus,
the ALJ was not obligated to weigh Dr. Atienzâ's examinations.
V.
CONCLUSION
After a cateful consideration of the evidence of record, the Court finds that the
Commissionet's decision
is suppotted by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this Court
RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffls Motion forJudgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry
11)
be DENIED, Defendant's Motion fot Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 13) be
GRANTED and the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld.
e bster
United tates District Court Judge
February 29,2016
Durham, North Carohna
l7
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