MCCAULEY v. COLVIN
Filing
16
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on signed 6/24/2016. For the reasons stated herein, this Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Reversing the Commissioner (Docket Entry 10 ) be DENIED, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 14 ) be GRANTED, and that the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld. (Daniel, J)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ALF'RED E. McCAULEY,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
V
CAROLYN !ø. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
1:1,3CY534
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintif{ Alfted E. McCauley,
seeks review
of a [tnaI decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security denying his claims for a pedod of disability and disabitity insurance benefits
("DIB"). The Coutt
has befote
it the certified administrative record and cross-motions for
judgment. (Docket Entries 8, 10, 14.) Fot reasons discussed below, it is recommended that
Plaintiffs motion for judgment reversing the Commissioner be denied, Defendant's motion
fot judgment on the pleadings be granted, and that the Commissioner's decision be affrmed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff applied for DIB on or about June2,201.0, alleging a disability onset date of
November
L, 2006. (It.
123-26.)
t His application
was denied initiatly and upon
I Transcrþt citations refer to the sealed administrative record which was filed v¡ith Defendant's
Answer, (Docket Entry 8,)
1
reconsideratton. (fr. 65-68; 72-75.) Thereafter, Plaintiff requested
an
Administrative LawJudge
headng on Apdl 1.6,201,2.
(.'ALJ').
Qr
Çr.7 6-77
a hearing de
.) Plaintiff and his attorney appeared at the
35-46.) ,{. decision was issued on May
the denial of Ptaintiffs application fot
Council denied Plaintiffs request
novo befote
1.4,201,2, upholding
DIB. Çr. 21,-27.) Ot Apdl 23, 201,3, the Appeals
fot teview of the
decision, theteby making the ALJ's
determination the Commissioner's fìnal decision for purposes of judicial
teview. Gt.
7-9.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The scope of judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is specific and
narrow: Smith u. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cu. 1986). Review is limited to
determining
if
there is substantial evidence
decision. 42 U.S.C.
$
in the tecord to support the Commissioner's
a05G); Hanteru. Sallìuan,gg3F.2d31,,34 (4th Cir. 1992); Hay
907 F.2ð 1453,1,456 (4th Cir.
u. Sølliuaa,
1990). In reviewing fot substanttal evidence, the Cout
does
not re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment
for that of the Commissioner. Craig u. Chater,76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). The
before the Court, therefore,
issue
is not whether Plaintiff is disabled but whether the
Commissioner's finding that he is not disabled is suppotted by substantial evidence and was
reached based upon a cotrect application of the relevant
III. THE
law.
Id.
ALJ'S DISCUSSION
The ALJ followed the well-established five-step sequential analysis to ascettain whether
Plaintiff is disabled, which is set foth in 20 C.F.R.
Sec,
Adnin.,
17
S 404.1520
.
See
Albrìght u. Comm'r of Soe
4 F.3d 473, 47 5 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). In rendedng his disabüity detetmination,
2
the ALJ made the following findings later adopted by Defendant:
1.
The claimant last met the insured status tequirements of the Social Security
Act fthe "Act"] on Decembet 31, 2010.
2.
The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period
from his amended alleged onset date of November 1'9, 2009 through his
date last insured IDLII of Decemb er 31., 201,0 Q0 CFR 404.1 57 1. er seq.).
3. Thtough the date last insured, the clumant has the following severe
impairments: chronic low back pain, herniated disc, ar.d herntated disc in
neck and left knee (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
4.
Through the date last insured, the clumant did not have an impairment ot
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the sevetity of
one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix L
(20 CFR 404.1520(d),404.1,525 and 404.1526).
5. After careful
consideration of the entire Íecord, the undersigned finds that,
through the [DLI], the claimant had the residual functional capacity IRtrC]
to perform the full range of light wotk as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b).
The claimant had the ability to lift and car'¡ up to 20 pounds occasionally
and L0 pounds frequently, as well as sit, stand and walk 6 hours in an B-hour
wotkday. The claimant should avoid climbing and concentrated exposure
to heights andhazardous machinery.
Çt23-24.)
In tight of the above fìndings regarding Plainuffs RFC, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff was unable to perfotm his past relevant work as a dishwashet.
also found that Plaintiff, who was 47 years old on the
individual. (Id. (cit:ng 20 C.F.R.
S
Qr26.)
The AIJ
DLI, met the definition of a younger
404.1563). Finally, the ALJ noted that transfetability of
õ
J
job skills was not an issue in the case because PlaintifPs past relevant work was unskilled' (Id.)
Based upon PlaintifPs age, education, wotk expetience, and his RFC, the ALJ concluded that
"there wete jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claknant
could have performed" thtough the
DLI.
(Id. (ctttng20 C.F'.R.
SS
404.1569 and a0a.1,569(a))).
,\ccordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not undet a "disability," as defined in the
Act, from his amended alleged onset date through December 31,
201,0, the
DLI.
Çr.27.)
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner ered in determining that he was not disabled
for purposes of the A.ct. (Docket Entry
11). Plaintiff
raises three
arguments. First, Plaintiff
contends that the ALJ "faiIed to propedy detetmine the weight to be given [to] the opinions
fofl both Dr. Pool and Dr. Lucas." (Id. at 6.) Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in
limiting his consideration of Plaintiffs disability to only the pedod priot to the date last
insured. (Id. at 6-7 .) Lastly, he contends that the ALJ failed to explain why Plaintiff did not
meet Listing1..02A. Qd. at8-9.)
A. Opinions of Dr. Henry Pool and Dr. Michael Lucas
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to determine the weight to be given to treating
physicians Henry Pool, M.D. ("Dt. Pool") and Michael Lucas, M.D.
5.)
("Dt.Lucas").
(Id. at3-
Plaintiff asserts this ârgument by compating the ALJ's decision to give Dr. Lucas'opinion
"signifìcant" weight to the ALJ's decision to give Dr. Pool "little weight" when both physicians
faited to indicate Plaintiffs ability to
lift,
carfy, sit, stand
orwalk.
(Id.
at3.)
Piaintiff furthet
argues that both Dr. Pool and Dr. Lucas' opinions are "inconsistent with each othet" such
4
that neither should receive controlling weight; as such, the ALJ should have engaged in futther
consideration
to determine the weight to be given to each doctor. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiffs
atgument fails.
The "úeating physician rule," 20 C.F.R. S 404.1,527(.X2), generally ptovides more
weight to the opinion of a treating source, because
ít
may "provide a detailed, longitudinal
pictute of fthe claimant's] medical impafumentþ) fwhich] may bdng a unique perspective to
the medical evidence." 20 C.F.R. S 404.1,527(r)Q)., An ALJ refusing to accord conttolling
weight to the medical opinion of a treattng physician must consider various "factors" to
detetmine how much weight to give
it.
Id. S 404.1,521(c)Q)-(). These factors include: (i) the
frequency of examination and the length, nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (ü)
the evidence in support of the tteating physician's opinion; (rü) the consistency of the opinion
with the record
as a
whole; (iv) whether the opinion is from a specialist; and (v) othet factots
btought to the Social Security Administation's attention that tend to support or contradict
the
opinion.
1/.
Significantly, as subsections (2) thtough (4) of the rule desctibe in great detail, a tteating
source's opinion, like all medical opinions, must be both well-supported by medical signs and
'
SSR
96ap provides that "[c]ontrolling weight mây not be given to z úeatinE source's
medical
opinion unless the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical andlabontory diagnostic
techniques." SSR 96-2p,1996 ffl. 3741.88, at *1 (fuly 2,1996). However, where "atreat:rngsource's
medical opinion is well-supported and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case
tecord, it must be given conttolling weight[.]" Id. SSR 96-5p provides futhet that "tteatjrtE sorüce
opinions on issues tesewed to the Commissioner are never entitled to controlling weight ot special
signifi.cance." SSR 96-5p, 1996 lØL 374783, at*7. However, "opinions from any medical sorúce
about issues teserved to the Commissioner must never be þored, and . the notice of the
detetmination or decision must explain the consideration given to the tteating source's opinion(s)."
Id.
5
laboratory findings as well as consistent with the othet substantial evidence in the case tecotd.
Id. S 404.1,521(c)Q)-().
"Flf
u physician's
opinion is not suppotted by clinical evidence or
it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it
should be accorded significantly
weight." Craig 76 F.3d at 590; accord Mastro ,. , þftl, 270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cit.
if
less
2001).
Opinions by physicians regarding the ultimate issue of whethet aplaintsff is disabled within
the meaning of the Act never receive conttolling weight because the decision on that issue
remains fot the Commissioner alone. 20 C.F.R.
S
404.1527(d).
Here, substantial evidence supports the weight given to each of Plaintiffs treating
physicians. The ALJ explicitly concluded the following tegatding Dr. Lucas' treatment of
Plaintiff: "Significant weight is . . . given to the opinion of claimant's tteating physician, Dt.
Lucas, who indicated in August, November, and Decembet 201,0, that the claimant had no
conttaindication to gainful employment and no wotk testtictions."
decision
Çr. 25.) The ALJ's
is suppotted by treâtment tecords completed by Dt. Lucas during the time
he
provided services to Plaintiff and is consistent with other substantial evidence in the tecord,
including Plaintifls own testimony of his ability
cats, and get around on a scooter with no
to care fot his personal
difficulty.
(See
Tr
needs, care
fot his
43-44,21,9-220,223-24.) The
ALJ also concluded the following tegarding Dt. Pool's tteatment of Plaintiff:
Little weight is given to the opinion of Dt. Pool, who completed a Medical
Statement on Februaty 25,201.1,. Dr. Pool indicated that the claimant suffered
from moderate chronic low back pain, but that he was unable to perform any
wotk acttvity. Little weight is afforded [to] this assessment as Dr. Pool did not
indicate the claimant's ability to lift, c^rrry, sit, stand, or walk. Additionally, his
repott was incomplete (Exhibit B-6F).
Qr. 25-26.) In making this conclusion, the ALJ
6
specifically refetenced an incomplete
checklist opinion in which Dr. Pool summarily concludes that Plaintiff "is unable to wotk in
any capacity."
Çr. 230-36.)
In his ârgumenq Plaintiff attempts to
measure the
AIJ's
assessment
of Dr.
Pool's
opinion against the ALJ's assessment of Dt. Lucas' opinion. However, this compatison is to
no avail. Dr. Pool's conclusion that Plaintiff cannot wotk concerns an issue teserved for the
Commissioner. SSR 96-5P, 1,996 WL 374183, at *2 ("fl]teating source opinions on issues
that ate reserved to the Commissionet
significance.");
see
also
Elli¡
u.
^te
never entitled to conttolling weight
ot
special
Bamhart,392F.3d 988, 994 (8th Cir. 2005) (",{. medical soutce
opinion that an appìicant is 'disabled' or 'unable to work,' . . . , involves an issue reserved for
the Commissioner and therefore is not the type
Commissioner gives controlling
WL
364741.1.,
'medical opinion'
to which
the
weight."). Additionally, checklist opinions, even fully
completed, ate often entitled to telatively little weight.
148-RJ, 201,2
of
See
McGlothlen
u.
A¡traa, No. 7:1.1.-CY-
at x6 (E,.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 201.2) ("fotm reports . . . ate arguably
entitled to little weight due to the lack of explanation"); Halloran
u, Barnhørt,
362 F.3d 28,
31,-
32 e. n.2 Qd Clr. 2004) (standardized form opinions are "only marginally useful" and not
particulatly "infotmative"); Berrios lupt<
u. Sec'1 of Heahh dv
(1st Cir. 1,991) (checklist opinions disfavoted); FrrJ
u.
Haman Seras., 951, F.2d 427 , 431
Bowen,816 F'. 2d 508, 515 (10th Cir. 1987)
(checklist fotms, "unaccompanied by thorough wdtten reports or persuasive testimoîy, aîe
not substantial evidenc e");
see
also
20 C.F.R. $ 1527(c)(3) ("The more a medicai source presents
relevant evidence to support an opinion . . . the more weight we will give that
opinion. The
bettet an explanation a source provides for an opinion, the more weight we will give that
7
opinion."). Because the ALJ's consideration of Plaintiffs treating physicians is supported by
substantial evidence, Plaintiff s atgument fails.
B. Evidence Post-DLI
Next Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to considet evidence cteated aftet Plaintiffls
DLL3 pocket Entty
Corun'r of Soa
Sec.
11 at 6-7.)
In suppott of his argument, Plaintiff telies upon Bird u.
Admìn, which held that "[m]edical evaluations made after a claimant's
insured stâtus has expired are not automatscally barred from considetation andmay be relevant
to prove a disability atising befote the claimant's
(citation omitted). The
Cout futher
DLI."
699 F.3d 337,340 (4th Cir. 201,2)
stated that "evidence created aftet a claima¡t's DLI,
which permits an infetence of linkage between the claimant's post-DLI state of health and
her
pte-DLI condition, could be the most cogent proof of a claknant's pte-DLI disability."
Id. at 341, (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, "tetrospective considetation of
evidence is appropriâte when the record is not so persuasive as to
ûnal condition
of the
citations omitted);
out any linkage of the
claimant with his eatliet symptoms." Id. (internal quotations and
¡ee al¡o Power¡ u. Coluin,
Jan. 1,4,2015) (unpublished) (examining
Here, Plaintiffs
de
No. 1:14CV272,2015 !ØL
post-DLI
analysis
2131.89, at x4 (44.D.N.C.
in Bird).
DLI was Decembet 31,201.0. Çl 21.) The ALJ
discussed evidence after that date, including the evaluations of Dr. Pool
the infotmation tegatding Plaintiffs sutgeties
in
3 "To qualify for DIB,
2011, and 201,2
in
considered and
201.1,
(r.
25-26),
Çr. 25), and othet treatment
fPlaintiffl must prove that þe] became disabled pdot to the expiration of
h[is] insured status." Johnson u. Bamhart,434F.3d 650, 655-56 (4th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
8
records fuom 201,1 Ql
25). The ALJ
also tefetenced
Plaintiffs
absence
of medical attention
following his surgery ín 201,2 Çr.26¡.+ Because the ALJ propedy considered evidence post-
DLI, Plaintiffs claim is without merit.
See
Joe u. Coluin,
No. 8:14-CV-01,221,-JDA, 2015 lfI,
4878886, ú.x1.4 Q).S C. Aug. L4, 2015) (unpublished) ("[C]ontraLry to Plainuffs assertions, the
ALJ expressly consideted the evidence dated after Plaintiffs DLI . .
. [hus]
Plaintiffs
atgument . . . is without medt.").
C. Listing t.02^
Lasdy, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to explain why Plaintiff did not meet Listing
1,.021'.s (Docket Entty
9.)
Step three
of the sequential analysis
requires the
AtJ
to
+ At the time of the hearing,
the post-2012 sutgery notes were not available. Upon review by the
Appeals Council, medical evidence regarding post-2072 surgely evaluations were provided by
Piaintiffls counsel and became patt of the record. Gt. 10, 283,285.) The ptogtess notes showed
improvement in b¿ck and lower extremity pâin.
¡
In this argument, Plaintiff also inco¡porates a challenge to the ALJ's findings at step two. (Docket
Etttty 1'1 at B.) Referencing the ALJ's firdirg of "low back pain" âs a severe impairment (see Tt. 23),
Plâintiff assetts that pain is a symptom and not an impairment. (Docket Entty 11 at 8) "A severe
impairment is one that 'signifitu"tty limits [a claimanCs] physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities."' Garoþlo u. Coluin, No. 1:14CV761,,201,6 WL 1,092650, at *2 Q{.D.N.C. Mar 21,2076)
(citing 20 C.F.R. $ a16.920(c). Low back pain is fiequently noted as a severe impairment. See IWorleyt
u. Coluin, No. 2:14CV00020, 2016WL 1248976, at x1 $X/.D.Ya.}rlat.29,201,6) (unpublished) ("The
ALJ found that the medical evidence established that fclatmant] suffered from severe impairments,
namely chronic low back pain with lowet extremity weakness . . . l'); Brewer u. Coluin, No. 5:13-CV705-BO, 2015 ìØL 450901., at*2 @^D.N.C. Feb. 3,2015) (unpublished) ('Plaintiffs obesity . , . low
back pain were consideted severe impairments . . . ."); McMwrry u. Cobin,No. CIV.A.8:12-01792,201.3
ìfL 5288076, atxl. P.S.C. Sept. 17, 2013) (unpublished) ("[Ilh. ALJ found fhat fclaimant] suffered
from sevetal severe impairments-hypopituitary syndrome, fatigue . , . low back pain . . .
well as
-âs
a numbet of non-severe impairments."); þnes u. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,No. 4:1OCV1,46,201,1,WL 6981,194,
at x3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 72,2011), report and reconmendation adoþred, No. 4:1OCV746,201,2 ìØL 78398 (E,.D.
Ya. Jan. 1'0, 2072) , aÍid, 47 4 F. App'x 17 4 (4th C:r.. 201,2) ("At step two, the ALJ found that [claimant]
had the following severe impairments: osteopathy of the left glenohumeral (shoulder) joint, low back
pain, and migraine headaches."); Hornick u. Bamhar4 No. CIV.A. 505CV00053, 2006 VlL 759666, at
*2 CIY.D. Ya.
Jan. 26,2006) (unpublished) ("The ALJ's step-two findings were . . . low back pain,
hepatitis-C, and 'questionable' autoimmune hepatitis . . . ."). Plaintiff does not argue that any other
9
determine whether aclaimant's impairment(s) meets ot equals the medical ctiteria of 20 C.F.R.,
Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, which sets forth a list of impairments that w^tta;nt a finding of
disability without considedng vocational critena. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520(d); rce also Radford
Coluin,734 F.3d 288, 291. (4th Cir. 201,3) (intemal quotations and citations omitted)
claimant is entitled to a conclusive presumption that he is impaired
if
u.
("'\
he can show that his
condition meets or equals the listed impairments."). The claimant has the butden of
demonsttating that all of the cdteria of a Listing are
1,1.52
met.
Kellzagb u. Heckler,785
F.2d
1,1,47 ,
(4th Cir. 1986).
Here, Plaintiff specifically finds fault with the ALJ's "lack
of
consideration, analysis, and explanation" of Listing1.02A.6 Q)ocket Etttry 11
any mention,
at9.)
Listing
1,.021' provides that:
Major dysfunction of a joint(s) (due to any cause): Charactenzed by gross
anatomical deformity (e.g., subluxation, contracture, bony or fibtous ankylosis,
instability) and chronic joint pain and stiffness with signs of limitation of motion
ot other abnormal motion of the affected joint(s), and findings on appropriate
medically acceptable imaging of joint space nanowing, bony desttuction, ot
ankylosis of the affected joint(s).
found at step two. In any event, any purported step two effor
harmless given the presence of other identified severe impairments. Young u. A$rue, No.
1:09CV1008,201,3 WL 474787, at xl0 (X4.D.N.C. Feb. 7, 2013) (unpublished) ("\üØhere an ALJ has
alteady determined that a plaintiff suffers fiom at least one severe impafument, any fatlure to categorize
an additional impairment as severe generally cânnot constitute tevetsible ettor, because, upon
detetmining that a claimant has one severe impairment, tlre Secretary must continue with the
temaining steps in his disability evaluation.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); ¡ee also
Garoþ/0, 201.6 WL 7092650, at x4 ('[A]ny step two error as to consideration of these impairments is
harmless given that the ALJ identified other severe impairments at step two and ptoperþ considered
all impafuments, both sevete and non-severe, in formulating Plaintiffs RFC assessment.") (citations
omitted).
severe impafument should have been
is
a The ALJ did discuss
another Listing in his decision, Listing
10
1.04. Çr.23.)
A. Involvement of one maior peripheral weight-bearing joint (i.e., hip, knee, ot
ankle), resulting in inability to ambulate effectively, as defined in 1.0082b[.]
20 C.F.R. $ Pt.404, Subpt. P, App. 1, S 1.02. Listing 1,.02A also requires a findingof an
"inability to ambulate effectively".T
Id. 't
duty of an ALJ includes identifting "relevant listed
impairments," and "fcompadng] each of the listed cÅteria to the evidence
of
[a claimant's]
symptoms." Cook u. Hec,ë./er, 183 tr.2d 1,168, 1,1,73 (4th Cfu. 1986). The duty to identi$'
relevant listed impafuments is tiggered when there is "'ample evidence in the tecotd to support
a
determination' that the claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the listed impafuments
Ketcheru.
73); rce,
e.g.,
Apfel,68 F.Supp.2d629,645
Md. 1999) (quoting C00k,783F.2dat1,1,72-
MarÍin u. Coluin, No. 1:11CV408, 2014WL 4114207, at *4 (À4.D.N.C. Aug. 20,
201,4); Drøne u. Coluin,
also Morgan u.
z
P.
No. 1:10CV901, 201,4WL 408753, at x4 (IVI.D.N.C. Feb. 3, 2014);
Coluin,No. 7:13-CV-279-8O,201/WL6473525,atx2
@.D.N.C. Nov. 1,8,201,4)
Effective ambulation is defined in 20 C.F.R. $ Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, S 1.008(2)þ)
Inability to ambulate effectively means an extreme limitation of the ability to walk; i.e.,
an impairment(s) that interferes very seriously with the individual's ability to
independently initiate, sustain, ot complete activities. Ineffective ambulation is
defrned generally as having insufficient lowet exttemity functioning to permit
independent ambulation without the use of a hand-held assistive device(s) that limits
the functioning of both upper exttemities . . . .
To ambulate effectively, individuals must be capable of sustaining a reasonâble walking
pâce over a sufficient distance to be able to carry out activities of daiþ living. They
must have the abiJity to travel without companion assistance to and from a place of
employment ot school. Therefote, examples of ineffective ambulation include, but are
not limited to, the inability to walk without the use of a walket, two crutches or two
cânes, the inability to walk a block
a re soÍLlble pace on rough or uneven surfaces,
^t
the inability to use standard public transportation, the inability to c tty out toutine
ambulatory activities, such as shopping and banking, and the inability to climb a few
steps at a teasonable pace with the use of a single hand rail.
1.1
see
("The ALJ's failure to consider [the] Listing . . . in this instance, whete there is obviously
evidence that may support the listing, is clear
ertot."). "Neither the Social Security law not
logic commands an ALJ to discuss allor any of the listed impaitments without some significant
indication in the record that the clatrnant suffers ftom that impafument." Ketcher,63 F. Supp.
2d at 645.
Here, Plaintiffs brief fails to point to any medical findings demonsttating that his
impairments equal or meet all the criteria of Listing 1.I2A, not does the Coutt find ample
evidence sufficient enough to ttigger the ALJ's duty to discuss such
atgument
fails. Cknyt
a. Corzm'r of Soc. Jar.,
Listing.s Thus, PlainufPs
No. SAG-15-0106,201,5WL
61,52253, at
*2 (D.
Md. Oct. 16,2015) (unpublished) (finding several requitements of a Listing "not ptesent on
the record . . . thus no ample evidence exists to mandate an express discussion of the Listing').
Plaintiffs reliance pdmarily upon the holding inRødþrd is misplaced. 734F.3d at295.
In
Radford, the
Foutth Circuit held that the ALJ's surnmary conclusion that the claimant did
not meet a Listing was an "insufficient legal analysis" and "[a] full explanation by the r{LJ [was]
particularly important
amount
in fthat]
case because [the claimant's] medical record includefd]
a fau
of evidence supportive of his claim[.]" Id. (citatton omitted). Thus, "the AIJ's
failure to adequately explain his teasoning ptecludefd] th[at] Court and the disttict court ftom
undertaking a meaningful teview of the finding that [the claimant] did not satis$' [the] Listing
I For ex¿mple, no ample evidence
exists tegarding Plaintiffs "inability to ambulate effectively"
triggering the ALJ's duty to discuss Listing 1,.02A. See e.g., Tr. 219,221, 223,267 $lrrdrns Plaintiff
displayed normal or good gut); see also Tr. 201,-05,271.-1.8 (evaluations of state agency physicians
(which the ALJ gave greatweight) specificaþ indicating that Plaintiffs impairments did not equal or
meetlistingl,.02[).
n
...
."
Id. at296 (citations and quotations omitted). Hete, this case is distinguishable in that
Plaintiff has failed to bdng
all the requirements of
foth
any evidence supportive of this claim that he equaled or met
Listin91,.02A. Mills u. Coluin,No. 5:13-CV-432-FL,201'4WL 4055818,
at x5 (E.D.N.C. A.ug. 1,4,201,4) ("In this case . . . whete there is no such probative evidence
suggesting that plaintiff meets or equals Listing 1.02 or Listing 1.04, the
AlJ
was not required
to engage in a full explanation of such listings.") Thetefore, the ALJ's lack of discussion
tegarding Listing 1,.021' does not waffarft remand.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, this Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffls Motion fot
Judgment Revetsing the Commissionet pocket Entry 10) be
DENIED, that Defendant's
Motion forJudgment on the Pleadings Q)ocket Entry 14) be GRANTED, and that the final
decision of the Commissioner be upheld.
U
June 24,201.6
Durham,
Noth
Carcltna
73
oe L. Webster
States Magistrate Judge
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