FLETCHER v. JOYNER
Filing
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RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOI ELIZABETH PEAKE on 08/08/2014, that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 4 be granted, that the Petition [Doc. # 1 be denied, and that this action be dismissed.(Taylor, Abby)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
MARK A. FLETCHER,
Petitioner,
v.
CARLTON B. JOYNER,
Respondent.
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1:13CV538
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Mark A. Fletcher, a prisoner of the State of North Carolina, brings a
Petition [Doc. #1] seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On
February 9, 2010, in the Superior Court of Moore County, Petitioner was convicted at trial of
second-degree sexual offense, attempted rape, and assault on a female, and was sentenced to
a total of over 252 to 321 months of imprisonment. (Petition, §§ 1-6.) The convictions
were affirmed by the North Carolina Court of Appeals on direct review. State v. Fletcher,
No. COA10-1418, 2011 WL 2473607 (N.C. App. June 21, 2011) (unpublished). Petitioner
did not pursue his direct appeal further, but did later file a Motion for Appropriate Relief
(MAR) and Amended MAR in the trial court, which the trial court summarily denied.
(Additional Attach. to Respondent’s Supporting Brief [Doc. #9], Exs. 12, 14.) However,
Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari from the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which
allowed the writ in part and entered an order reversing the trial court’s imposition of lifetime
sex offender registration and satellite-based monitoring. The petition for a writ of certiorari
was otherwise denied. (Additional Attach. to Respondent’s Supporting Brief [Doc. #10],
Ex. 19.) After a failed attempt at reconsideration in the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
Petitioner filed his Petition in this Court. Respondent opposes the Petition with a Motion
for Summary Judgment [Doc. #4].
Petitioner’s Claims
Petitioner raises five claims for relief in his Petition. The first is that the trial court
erred by allowing “non-corroborative hearsay as substantive evidence” of sexual assault after
the victim “never stated that she was sexually assaulted, neither did she state that she had
been raped” during her trial testimony. (Petition, § 12, Ground One.) Next, he claims that
the trial court erred by informing the jury, when it requested to see “Exhibit #1 of the police
report,” that the report had not been admitted into evidence. (Id., Ground Two.) In his
third and fourth claims for relief, he contends that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial (Id., Ground Three) and on appeal (Id., Ground Four). Finally, he asserts
that the trial court erred by refusing to redact certain statements from letters written by
Petitioner to the victim. He believes that the jury would have reached a different verdict
absent the admission of those statements. (Id., Ground Five.)
Facts
The basic facts of Petitioner’s case, as set out by the North Carolina Court of Appeals
on direct review are as follows:
F.G. met Mark Fletcher (defendant) in May of 2008 and a romantic
relationship developed. During the summer of 2008, they began living
together.
In August 2008, defendant was arrested and incarcerated.
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Defendant was released from jail on 15 September 2008. On 17 September
2008, defendant, while intoxicated, struck F.G. for the first time.
Although defendant continued to have problems with alcohol abuse and to
exhibit violent behavior toward F.G., she continued to live with him. In late
January of 2009, F.G. got a tax refund and together with defendant moved
into a motel. After a few days at the motel, defendant and F.G. were involved
in a domestic violence incident to which police responded. F.G. was arrested
based upon an unrelated outstanding warrant.
On 31 January 2009, F.G. was released on bond and returned to the motel.
Defendant was sitting in a parking lot across the street from the motel when
F.G. returned. Defendant spoke with F.G., and followed her to the motel
room. Defendant appeared to be intoxicated and told F.G. that he had used
ecstasy the previous night. Defendant accused F.G. of sleeping with the bail
bondsman. An argument ensued. When F.G. threatened to call the police,
defendant left.
Defendant later returned and knocked on the door. F.G. opened the door,
and defendant forced his way into the room. Defendant made more
allegations of F.G.’s infidelity and struck her in the head and shoulders.
Defendant pulled down F.G.’s pants and underwear. Defendant forced F.G.
to engage in sexual acts and vaginal intercourse. F.G. repeatedly begged
defendant to stop.
When defendant went to the bathroom, F.G. fled from the motel room and
sought help by knocking on the doors of other guest rooms. Another motel
guest, Juanita Hadwin (Hadwin), opened her door for F.G. Hadwin observed
that F.G. was “very frightened” and “bruised on the side of her face[.]” F.G.
told Hadwin that her boyfriend had beaten her and forced her to have sex.
F.G. was wearing a t-shirt, with no shoes or underwear. Hadwin called 911,
and F.G. stayed in her room until the police responded.
Fletcher, 2011 WL 2473607, at *1.
Procedural Bar
Respondent has addressed Petitioner’s claims on the merits, and also contends that all
of Petitioner’s claims, with the exception of his fourth claim for relief for ineffective
assistance of counsel on appeal, are subject to a procedural bar. In this regard, Respondent
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notes that the state MAR court concluded that Petitioner could have raised these issues in his
direct appeal but failed to do so. Respondent therefore contends that because this state
court determination rests on a ground that is independent of federal law, this Court may not
consider those claims. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). In response,
Petitioner contends the state MAR court did not explicitly rely on procedural bar and argues
that he adequately raised his claims.
Having considered these contentions, the Court notes that to the extent the state
MAR court concluded that Petitioner’s claims were procedurally barred under state law,
those claims would be subject to dismissal in this Court. However, the Court further notes
that no procedural bar issue has been raised as to Petitioner’s fourth claim alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel on appeal, and in considering that claim, the Court must address the
merits of most of Petitioner’s remaining claims, as set out below. Having done so, the
Court concludes that Petitioner’s claims are meritless on their face in any event. The
analysis of these claims is therefore set out below.
Standards of Review
This Court must apply a highly deferential standard of review in connection with
habeas claims “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
More specifically, the Court may not grant relief unless a state court decision on the merits
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or . . . was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
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proceeding.” Id. “Clearly established Federal law” includes only “‘holdings, as opposed to
the dicta,’” of the United States Supreme Court. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702
(2014) (quoting Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1187 (2012)). A state court decision is
“contrary to” United States Supreme Court precedent if the state court decision either
“arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme] Court on a
question of law” or “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a
decision of [the United States Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different”
from the Supreme Court precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000). A state
court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court case law “if the
state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but
unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407; see
also id. at 409–11 (explaining that “unreasonable” does not mean merely “incorrect” or
“erroneous”). “[E]ven clear error will not suffice.” White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702 (citing
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75–76 (2003)). “Rather, ‘as a condition for obtaining
habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling
on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an
error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.’” Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct.
770, 786–787 (2011)). Finally, this Court must presume state court findings of fact correct
unless clear and convincing evidence rebuts them. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
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In this case, Petitioner contends that all of the claims were properly raised and
adjudicated on the merits, which means that the standards of § 2254(d) would apply. The
Court therefore considers Petitioner’s claims under that standard.
Claims One, Two, and Five
Petitioner’s first, second, and fifth claim for relief all challenge the trial court’s
admission or treatment of certain pieces of evidence.
As to all of these claims, the
admission of evidence is a matter of state law. Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.3d 758, 762 (4th Cir.
1993).
State law errors do not give rise to federal habeas claims absent a specific
constitutional violation or fundamental unfairness. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68
(1991); Grundler v. North Carolina, 283 F.2d 798, 802 (4th Cir.1960). Here, Petitioner’s
first claim is that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from a police officer and from
Juanita Hadwin that the victim told them on the night of the crimes that Petitioner beat and
sexually assaulted her. He contends that these statements constituted “non-corroborative
hearsay.”
This claim is patently frivolous.
As Respondent points out, the victim’s
statements to Hadwin and the officer were made soon after the assault and were given at a
time when the victim was still scared, crying, and, in the case of the statement to Hadwin,
half-naked after having just fled the room where Petitioner assaulted her.
Therefore, the
statements were excited utterances, rather than inadmissible hearsay, under North Carolina
law.
See, e.g., State v. Guice, 141 N.C. App. 177, 201, 541 S.E.2d 474, 489 (2008)
(discussing the “excited utterance” hearsay exception in North Carolina and holding that
statements given by a still-crying victim to a responding officer minutes after an assault
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constituted excited utterances). Further, the statements corroborated the victim’s testimony
at trial. Petitioner states in the Petition that the victim did not claim that she was “sexually
assaulted” or “raped” at trial. Although she did not use those terms, his characterization of
her testimony is simply false. The victim testified at length, and in sometimes brutal detail,
that Petitioner forced his way into her motel room, beat her in the head and upper body,
forced her onto a bed, grabbed her hair and forced her to perform oral sex on him, forcibly
pulled off her pants and underwear, and then engaged in intercourse with her while she asked
him to stop. (Additional Attach. to Respondent’s Supporting Brief [Doc. #7], Trial Tr., Vol
III. at 196-210.) When he got up to go to the bathroom, she fled the room, began knocking
on random doors at the motel, and was able to get Hadwin to open the door and let her in.
(Id. at 210-211.) Hadwin testified that the victim then told her that “her boyfriend had been
hitting on her and had her in the room and wouldn’t let her out and that he made her have
sex with him. And when he went to the bathroom, she ran out the door.” (Id. at 254.)
Hadwin called the front desk, which called the police. Sergeant Allen, a police officer who
responded to the call, testified that the victim told him that “she had been assaulted, sexually
assaulted and beaten by her boyfriend, the defendant, for several hours, and that she was just
able to break away out of the house - correction - out of the motel room when he had gone
to the bathroom.” (Additional Attach. to Respondent’s Supporting Brief [Doc. #8], Trial
Tr., Vol IV. at 283.)
Whatever the terminology used or not used by the victim, the
testimony of Hadwin and the officer concerning the victim’s statements to them is clearly
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corroborative of the substance of the victim’s testimony. Petitioner’s claim of error by the
trial court is based on a false premise and fails for that reason.1
Petitioner’s second claim for relief alleges that the trial court erred when the jury
asked to see “exhibit #1 of the police report” and the trial court refused the request, stating
that it had not been admitted into evidence. This is again an incorrect characterization of
the events at trial. The State’s exhibit #1 was a copy of the victim’s statement to police, not
the entire police report on the matter. (Petition, Attach., Evid. Log; Additional Attach. to
Respondent’s Supporting Brief [Doc. #8], Trial Tr., Vol IV. at 287.) Other reports were
discussed during Sergeant Allen’s testimony, but not marked or admitted into evidence. (Id.
at 295-96.) Therefore, when the jury requested the “police report,” the trial judge correctly,
not erroneously, told them that the report was not part of the evidence. Under North
Carolina law, he could not supply the non-evidentiary report to the jury, see State v. Combs,
182 N.C. App. 365, 373, 642 S.E.2d 491, 498 (2007), and Petitioner points to no established
federal case requiring that an item not in evidence be given to the jury. Petitioner’s second
claim for relief also fails.
Petitioner’s fifth claim for relief asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to redact
certain statements from letters written by Petitioner to the victim after the assault. He does
not list those statements in the Petition, but they were set out in a Motion to Redact filed by
his attorney at trial and currently contained in the record of his direct appeal. (Respondent’s
Supporting Brief [Doc. #5], Ex. 1 at 6-7.) Petitioner’s attorney sought the reaction of
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At times in his pleadings, Petitioner also contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury on
non-corroborative hearsay. Any such claim obviously fails for the reasons just listed.
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nineteen statements in the letters, and the trial judge agreed with most of the redactions, but
allowed three of the challenged statements to be entered into evidence. They are: (1) “My
most productive years of my life has been spent behind these walls”; (2) “I never wanted to
come to this place again” and (3) “Moore county will verify that I was incarcerated on the
date I was suppose to appear in Lee co so legally that can’t get me a FTA.” (Id.) Petitioner
claims that these statements were “irrelevant and highly prejudicial to the Petitioner’s
defense” and maintains that, absent their admission, “the jury would probably have reached a
different result.” (Petition, § 12, Ground Five.)
However, even if Petitioner could show that the challenged statements should not
have been admitted, he still cannot prevail because he cannot demonstrate, as he must where
alleging a trial error on habeas review, that the admission of the statements “had a
‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Bauberger v.
Haynes, 632 F.3d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623
(1993)). Here, the State mainly built its case on the strong and detailed testimony of the
victim, coupled with the corroborative testimony discussed above. Petitioner did not testify
and called no witnesses on his behalf. His defense instead relied upon the cards, letters, and
money that the victim sent to him in jail after the assault, as well as calling her credibility into
question based on certain inconsistent statements and her prior criminal convictions. In the
end, the case came down to whether or not the jury still believed her, and it did. Thus, it is
unlikely that the challenged statements in Petitioner’s letters played any significant part in the
case and it cannot be said that the statements had a “substantial and injurious effect or
influence” on the verdict. Accordingly, the claim should be denied.
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Claims Three and Four
Petitioner’s two remaining claims are that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
at trial and on appeal. As with his other claims, these claims easily fail. In order to prove
ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish, first, that his attorney’s
performance fell below a reasonable standard for defense attorneys and, second, that he was
prejudiced by this performance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). With
respect to the first prong, the petitioner bears the burden of affirmatively showing deficient
performance. See Spencer v. Murray, 18 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 1994). With respect to the
second prong, to establish prejudice, Petitioner must show that there is a reasonable
probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Petitioner’s claim that he received ineffective assistance on appeal is also judged using
the Strickland test.
See Lawrence v. Branker, 517 F.3d 700, 708-09 (4th Cir. 2008).
However, appellate counsel need not raise on appeal every non-frivolous issue requested by a
defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983); see also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527
(1986); Evans v. Thompson, 881 F.2d 117, 124 (4th Cir. 1989) (declaring that counsel
pursued sound strategy when he “determined what he believed to be petitioner’s most viable
arguments and raised them on appeal”). Winnowing out weaker arguments to press forward
with more important points is part of effective appellate advocacy. Jones, 463 U.S. at
751-52. Prejudice can be shown by demonstrating that “‘counsel omitted significant and
obvious issues while pursuing issues that were clearly and significantly weaker.’” Bell v.
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Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 180 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 533 (2d
Cir. 1994)).
Petitioner sets out five allegations of ineffective assistance by his trial attorney, three
of which are based on counsel’s failure to object to the alleged errors associated with
Petitioner’s first, second, and fifth claims for relief.
However, as explained above,
Petitioner’s first, second, and fifth claims are without merit. The first and second claims do
not reflect any errors, and therefore his attorney had no reason to object and also could not
have prejudiced Petitioner by failing to object. As to the fifth claim, any alleged error did
not result in any prejudice to Petitioner.
Those three claims of ineffective assistance fail for
that reason.
Petitioner also claims that his attorney failed to object when the trial court incorrectly
imposed lifetime sex offender registration and satellite-based monitoring in the case. This
claim should be denied as moot because the North Carolina Court of Appeals already
corrected any error as part of Petitioner’s MAR proceeding.
Finally, Petitioner asserts that his attorney should have objected when the trial court
did not admit any physical evidence to support the sexual assault and rape charges. This
contention is unclear, and it may be that Petitioner is confused. No physical evidence is
required and, in any event, it would have been the State, not the trial court, which would
have supplied any physical evidence that it wished to bring. Petitioner may be asserting that
counsel should have made an insufficiency of the evidence argument based on the lack of
physical evidence. However, counsel did make a motion to dismiss the sexual assault
charges based on insufficiency of the evidence.
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(Additional Attach. to Respondent’s
Supporting Brief [Doc. #8], Trial Tr., Vol IV., at 337.) The motion was summarily denied,
which is not surprising given the victim’s clear testimony that the assaults occurred. Such
testimony is easily sufficient to allow the matter to go to the jury and to sustain a conviction.
See State v. Whitman, 179 N.C. App. 657, 670, 635 S.E.2d 906, 914 (2006) (stating that it is
“well-settled that the testimony of a single witness is adequate to withstand a motion to
dismiss when that witness has testified as to all the required elements of the crimes at issue”).
Petitioner does not explain what more his trial attorney could have done to argue or win the
motion. In the end, Petitioner cannot show either substandard performance or prejudice
based on his allegations regarding his trial attorney, and his third claim for relief should be
denied.
Petitioner’s fourth claim is similar.
He contends that his appellate attorney
incorrectly failed to argue on appeal that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance in
not challenging the admission of the statements in the letters that he sought to redact and by
failing to object to errors in the jury instructions and the refusal of the trial court to let the
jury review the police report. With respect to the statements in the letters, as discussed
above, the admission of the statements did not prejudice Petitioner’s case, and Petitioner
cannot establish that he was prejudiced by any alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. As
for the police report, it was not introduced into evidence, as discussed above, and there is no
reason that either his trial or appellate attorney would have raised this point. Finally,
Petitioner’s reference to a jury instruction error is not clear in the Petition, but he states in his
response that the error occurred when the trial court failed to give a jury instruction
regarding non-corroborative hearsay.
As set out previously, the statements alleged by
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Petitioner to be non-corroborative hearsay do not appear to have been hearsay at all and
were, in any event, highly corroborative of the victim’s testimony. Therefore, no error
occurred and there was no basis for his attorney to object or for appellate counsel to raise the
matter on appeal.
Next, Petitioner faults appellate counsel for failing to raise the sex
offender registration and satellite based monitoring claim on appeal. Again, this claim is
moot. Finally, Petitioner again refers to the trial court’s failure to admit physical or medical
evidence of the sexual assaults. This is an apparent reference to counsel failing to raise the
insufficiency argument on appeal, and the claim has no merit for the reasons discussed
previously. All of Petitioner’s claims of appellate ineffective assistance fail and should be
denied.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Respondent’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. #4] be granted, that the Petition [Doc. #1] be denied, and that this action be
dismissed.
This, the 8th day of August, 2014.
/s/ Joi Elizabeth Peake
United States Magistrate Judge
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