CARTER v. ARCHDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

Filing 57

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE THOMAS D. SCHROEDER on 2/25/2014; that the motions to dismiss filed by Garland Yates and the Randolph County District Attorney's Office (Docs. 12 , 33 ) are GRANTED and Carter's claims against those Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 54 ) is DENIED AS MOOT. FURTHER that all pending motions for sanctions are DENIED. (Docs. 40 , 43 , 46 , 49 .) FURTHER that Carter's motion to compel a Rule 26(f) conference (Doc. 38 ) is referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge and that Carter's motion to expedite (Doc. 56 ) is DENIED AS MOOT. (Sheets, Jamie)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

JAMES J. CARTER,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
ARCHDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT,
DAVID JONES, CITY OF ARCHDALE,
GARLAND YATES, and RANDOLPH
COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE,
Defendants.

1:13cv613

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.
This is a putative civil rights action brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
alleges

that

Plaintiff James J. Carter, who appears pro se,

Defendants

Archdale

Police

Department,

policeman

David Jones, the City of Archdale, prosecutor Garland Yates, and
the

Randolph

civil

rights

Randolph

County
when

County

District
they

Superior

Attorney’s

investigated
Court

in

Office

and

North

violated

prosecuted

his
in

(Doc.

Carolina.

him

30

(“Compl.”) at 2, 18, 30, 34.)

Before the court are several

motions.

Defendants

the

Attorney’s

Office

Yates

(“RCDAO,”

and

Randolph

collectively

with

County

District

Yates,

“the

DA

Defendants”) have filed two motions to dismiss (Docs. 12, 33), a
motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 54), and a motion for
sanctions

against

Carter

(Doc.

43).

Carter

has

filed

two

motions for sanctions against the DA Defendants (Docs. 40, 46),
a motion for a contempt citation against Yates (Doc. 49), a
motion to compel a Rule 26(f) conference (Doc. 38), and a motion
to expedite the determination of pending motions (Doc. 56).
For the reasons set forth below, the motions to dismiss
will be granted; the motion for judgment on the pleadings will
be denied as moot; all four sanctions-related motions will be
denied;

and

the

motion

to

expedite

will

be

denied

as

moot.

Because Carter’s Rule 26(f) motion involves a scheduling matter,
this court declines to rule on it to allow the Magistrate Judge
to set the schedule for this case.
I.

BACKGROUND
All of the pending motions concern disputes between Carter

and the DA Defendants.

The court, therefore, will only briefly

describe the alleged incidents relating to Jones, the Archdale
Police Department, and the City of Archdale in order to provide
context for the allegations relating to the DA Defendants.

The

complaint, read in the light most favorable to Carter, alleges
the following:
In May 2012, the Archdale Police Department investigated
Carter

for

Ornamental

allegedly
Mouldings,

stealing
LLC.

$2,400

(Compl.

at

from
5-10.)

investigating officers was Defendant Jones.
Jones have had a long-standing feud.
2

his

employer,

One

of

the

(Id.)

Carter and

(Id. at 3.)

On May 16,

2012, Jones obtained an arrest warrant for Carter.

(Id. at 11.)

Carter claims that between May 17 and May 22, Jones and the
Archdale Police Department subjected him and his family to a
“campaign

of

harassment”

in

warrant.

(Id. at 12-16.)

attempts

to

execute

the

arrest

Carter was out of the state during

that time and, upon his return home on May 22, turned himself in
to the Randolph County Sheriff’s Office rather than the Archdale
Police Department, because he feared for his safety.
16.)

Carter

Employee.”
The
Carter.

was

arrested

that

same

day

for

(Id. at

“Larceny

by

(Id. at 16-17.)

DA

Defendants

(Id. at 18.)

initiated

criminal

proceedings

against

While they claimed to be prosecuting

Carter from July 9, 2012, to August 5, 2013, he says that no
indictment was ever produced for him despite repeated requests.
(Id. at 18-26.)
conspired
indictment.

to

Carter alleges that Jones and the DA Defendants
prosecute

him

(Id. at 19-20.)

under

a

false

or

non-existent

Between July 9, 2012, and August

5, 2013, the DA Defendants held multiple hearings as part of
Carter’s prosecution; those hearings were before a judge who
Carter

charges

is

biased

against

accused the judge of corruption.

him

because

(Id. at 24-25.)

he

previously

According to

Carter, the DA Defendants and his own public defender attempted
to pressure him into pleading guilty to the charge.
25.)

(Id. at

Carter charges that the DA Defendants have used their
3

power

to

block

a

superior

court

repeated motions for discovery.

judge
(Id.)

from

ruling

on

his

They also claimed to

have set a trial date for July 29, 2013, but no trial was held
then and Carter was never informed it was canceled.

(Id. at

26.)
On July 26, 2013, Carter filed a complaint in the present
case and amended it on August 6.

(Docs. 1, 2.)

On August 12,

2013, his public defender informed him that the DA Defendants
claimed to have a second indictment against him and that the
first

indictment

dismissed.

(charging

(Compl.

at

“Larceny

26-27.)

by

Employee”)

Carter

then

had

filed

been

another

amended complaint, which is the current complaint, on September
4.

(Id. at 1.)

That complaint contains multiple paragraphs,

sometimes with dozens of subparagraphs, which are not organized
into

identifiable

causes

of

action.

Read

liberally,

Carter

alleges that Jones and the Archdale Police Department framed him
for a crime he did not commit, coerced statements from his wife,
harassed

him

and

his

family

in

executing

an

arrest

warrant,

wrongfully entered his home, and publicly humiliated him.
at 2-18.)
Archdale

(Id.

He further alleges that the City of Archdale and the
Police

Department

negligently

supervised

the

officers, including Jones, who violated his civil rights.
at 34-38.)

police
(Id.

As to the DA Defendants, he alleges they wrongfully

and maliciously prosecuted him, fraudulently claimed to possess
4

a

criminal

indictment

against

him,

conspired

to

violate

his

constitutional rights, used State resources and the authority of
their State offices to persecute him, and negligently supervised
RCDAO employees who then violated his civil rights.

(Id. at 1-

39.)
Carter

has

lodged

numerous

complaints

against

Defendants with various governmental organizations.
28.)

the

DA

(Id. at 27-

He claims that the DA Defendants’ actions have caused him

great emotional harm, ruined his reputation and employability,
and caused him to incur expenses to defend himself.
29.)

(Id. at 28-

He alleges that the DA Defendants have violated his civil

rights, both through their own actions and through their failure
to

supervise

the

employees

of

the

RCDAO.

(Id.

at

30-33.)

Carter seeks $100,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages
from each Defendant, an injunction preventing any employee of
the RCDAO or Archdale Police Department from having contact with
him or his family, an order requiring training and reforms for
the City of Archdale and the Archdale Police Department, and an
order requiring that his criminal records relating to this case
be expunged.
II.

(Id. at 38-39.)

ANALYSIS
A.

Motions to Dismiss

The

DA

Carter’s

Defendants

claims

pursuant

have

filed

to

Federal
5

two
Rule

motions
of

to

Civil

dismiss
Procedure

12(b)(1), (2), (5), (6), and (7).

(Docs. 12, 33.)

Among other

things, they argue that the Eleventh Amendment and common law
sovereign

immunity

deprive

this

court

of

subject

matter

jurisdiction over Carter’s claims and that Carter fails to state
a

claim

upon

which

relief

prosecutorial immunity.

can

be

granted

because

Carter opposes those motions.

of

(Docs.

31, 37.)
In addressing this case, the court is mindful that it must
construe pro se litigants’ complaints liberally, thus permitting
a potentially meritorious case to develop if one is present.
Hill

v.

Braxton,

277

F.3d

701,

707

(4th

Cir.

2002)

(citing

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).

However, this does

not

advocate

require

that

the

unrepresented party.
387,

391

(4th

Cir.

court

become

an

for

Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d
1990).

“Only

those

questions

which

squarely presented to a court may properly be addressed.”
1.
A

the

are

Id.

Sovereign Immunity

plaintiff

bears

the

subject matter jurisdiction.

burden

of

proving

this

court’s

Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac

R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991).
The

existence

of

subject

matter

jurisdiction

determination to be made by the court.

Id.

is

a

legal

When assessing a

challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the court may look
beyond the face of the complaint and consider other evidence
6

outside the pleadings without converting the motion into one for
summary judgment.
1982).

A

Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir.

court

should

dismiss

for

lack

of

federal

subject

matter jurisdiction “only if the material jurisdictional facts
are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail
as a matter of law.”
The

DA

Richmond, 945 F.2d at 768.

Defendants

assert

they

under the Eleventh Amendment.
Circuit

has

not

enjoy

sovereign

(Doc. 13 at 3-4.)

conclusively

established

whether

immunity

The Fourth
a

dismissal

based on Eleventh Amendment immunity is a dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) or for failure
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

See Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524-25 n.2

(4th Cir. 2000).

Courts generally consider motions alleging

Eleventh Amendment immunity under Rule 12(b)(1), however.
Blackburn

v.

Trs.

of

Guilford

Technical

Cmty.

Coll.,

See

822 F.

Supp. 2d 539, 542 n.2 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (collecting cases).
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or

Subjects

of

any

Foreign

State.”

U.S.

Const.

amend.

XI.

Although by its terms the Eleventh Amendment applies to suits
brought against a State by “Citizens of another State,” it is
7

well

established

that

“an

unconsenting

State

is

immune

from

suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as
by citizens of another State.”
663

(1974).

Amendment

It
bars

is

also

suits

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,

well

understood

against

that

States

the

and

Eleventh

any

State

instrumentality properly characterized as an “arm of the State.”
Regents

of

(1997).

the

Univ.

Eleventh

of

Cal.

v.

Amendment

Doe,

519

immunity

U.S.

has

425,

only

429-30
limited

exceptions: (1) a State may waive its immunity; (2) Congress may
abrogate a State’s immunity; and (3) a plaintiff may sue for
prospective injunctive relief against State officials acting in
violation of federal law pursuant to the doctrine of Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

See Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins,

540 U.S. 431, 436-37 (2004) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at
123);

Coll.

Sav.

Bank

v.

Fla.

Prepaid

Postsecondary

Educ.

Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999).
The RCDAO, if it is indeed an entity capable of being sued,
would be a State agency, and Yates is a State official when
acting in his official capacity as District Attorney.
Town

of

Waynesville,

No.

1:09cv296,

2009

WL

Mathis v.

6067335,

at

*8

(W.D.N.C. Dec. 4, 2009) (unpublished) (finding that the North
Carolina Constitution provides for the office of the District
Attorney and prosecutorial districts, N.C. Const. art. IV, § 18;
that State statutory law divides the State into prosecutorial
8

districts, N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-60; and that District Attorneys
are therefore State officials), recommendation adopted, 2010 WL
1052331 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 19, 2010) (unpublished). 1

There is no

evidence that the RCDAO, the State of North Carolina, or Yates
has waived immunity in this case.

Carter also does not point to

any federal statute abrogating immunity for prosecutors in the
performance of their duties, and the court is aware of none.

On

the contrary, “[i]t is now well settled that a state [including
a state agency or official] cannot be sued under [42 U.S.C.]
§ 1983.”

Kelly v. Maryland, 267 F. App’x 209, 210 (4th Cir.

2008) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71

(1989)).

Carter’s

claims

for

damages

against

the

DA

Defendants (Compl. at 38) therefore fail as a matter of law,
because damages suits are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Carter’s claim for injunctive relief against the RCDAO (id.)
also fails as a matter of law, because suits for injunctive

1

The RCDAO argues that it is not a legal entity capable of being sued,
but provides no authority. “The capacity of a governmental body to be
sued in the federal courts is governed by the law of the state in
which the district court is held.” Avery v. Cnty. of Burke, 660 F.2d
111, 113-14 (4th Cir. 1981). North Carolina law does not answer this
question, but the court need not decide the issue because Carter’s
claims fail on other grounds. Generally, district attorneys’ offices
are not legal entities under § 1983.
See, e.g., Revene v. Charles
Cnty. Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 874 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Hancock v.
Washtenaw Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, 548 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Mich.
1982)); Thompson v. Police Dep’t of Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 10-6083,
2011 WL 4835831, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2011) (noting Third Circuit
view that district attorneys’ offices are not legal entities capable
of being sued under § 1983).

9

relief are only permitted against State officials, not State
agencies.

See, e.g., Frew, 540 U.S. at 437.

Carter’s

only

remaining

claim

–

for

injunctive

relief

against Yates – seeks an order restraining RCDAO employees from
having any contact with Carter, his family, or his property.
Even

assuming

all

the

facts

in

the

complaint

to

be

true,

however, the only contact the DA Defendants have had with Carter
has been in State court hearings and through Carter’s public
defender; that is, all alleged contact is within the context of
the ongoing criminal case.

(Compl. at 21, 24-25, 29.)

Carter

does not allege that Yates or any employee of the RCDAO harassed
him

in

any

other

way.

His

request

for

injunctive

relief

therefore is not proper, as the conduct he seeks to restrain
directly involves his ongoing state criminal proceedings.

Under

principles of comity and federalism, a federal court should not
interfere

with

ongoing

state

extraordinary circumstances.
37,

45

(1971).

It

is

clear

criminal

proceedings

absent

See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
that

Carter

believes

that

the

pending state criminal charges against him lack merit, but he
must challenge

the

legitimacy

of

the

charges

against

him

in

state criminal court and then, if necessary, pursue appropriate
relief.

See Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 845-46 (4th Cir.

2003).

10

2.

Prosecutorial Immunity

Carter does not specify whether he is suing Yates in his
official

capacity

capacity.

as

District

Attorney

or

in

his

individual

Reading Carter’s complaint liberally, the court will

assume he intends both.

As previously stated, Carter’s claims

against Yates in his official capacity are barred by sovereign
immunity

and

Younger

abstention.

The

court

now

turns

to

Carter’s claims against Yates in his individual capacity.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “challenges
the

legal

sufficiency

assumption

that

Giacomelli,

588

the

facts

F.3d

citations omitted).

of

186,

a

complaint

alleged
192

considered

are

(4th

with

true.”
Cir.

the

Francis

2009)

v.

(internal

A complaint fails if it does not “contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556

Atlantic

U.S.

662,

678

(2009)

(quoting

Bell

Corp.

v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 2
“[A]

prosecutor

enjoys

absolute

immunity

from

suit

for

conduct ‘in initiating and in presenting the State’s case.’”
Springmen

v.

Williams,

122

F.3d

Cir.

1997)

(quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)).

That

2

211,

213

(4th

The “no set of facts” standard cited by the DA Defendants (Doc. 13 at
5) is no longer applicable.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
Additionally, the North Carolina pleading rules (Doc. 13 at 5 (citing
Dixon v. Stuart, 85 N.C. App. 338 (1987))) are not applicable in
federal court.

11

immunity

extends

prosecute,

to

[and]

decisions

whether

dismiss

“whether
an

and

when

to

indictment

against

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33.

particular defendants.”

to

about

Yates’s

decisions, therefore, to prosecute Carter, to dismiss the first
indictment and issue a superseding indictment, to hold hearings,
to

set

a

trial

date,

and

all

his

other

actions

“intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” are
entitled to absolute immunity.

Id. at 430.

As to Carter’s claim that the two indictments against him
do not exist, the court notes that the DA Defendants have filed
copies of both – one dated July 9, 2012, and a superseding
indictment dated July 8, 2013.
Circuit

routinely

takes

including indictments.

(Doc. 33-1 at 3-6.)

judicial

notice

of

The Fourth

court

records,

See, e.g., United States v. Kane, 434 F.

App’x 175, 176 (4th Cir. 2011) (taking judicial notice of the
indictment charging the defendant with burglaries); Lolavar v.
de Santibanes, 430 F.3d 221, 224 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005) (taking
judicial notice of court records); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v.
Coil,

887

F.2d

1236,

1239

(4th

Cir.

1989)

(taking

judicial

notice in a subsequent civil case of defendants’ guilty pleas in
the related criminal prosecution for arson).

In this case, the

court has conducted an independent investigation by obtaining
from the Clerk of Superior Court in Randolph County signed and
certified copies of the first pages of both the original and
12

superseding indictment against Carter.

The court therefore is

satisfied that the indictments filed against Carter in Randolph
County Superior Court actually exist and takes judicial notice
of them.
Accordingly,
Defendants

(Docs.

the
12,

motions
33)

to

will

dismiss
be

filed

granted,

and

by

the

all

DA

claims

against those Defendants will be dismissed with prejudice.

The

court therefore need not reach the other arguments put forth by
the DA Defendants 3 or their motion for judgment on the pleadings
(Doc. 54).
B.

Motions for Sanctions

Before

the

court

(Docs. 40, 43, 46, 49.)

are

four

sanctions-related

motions.

The court will address Carter’s three

motions first.

3

The DA Defendants’ defense of insufficient service of process appears
to have merit. They assert that Carter did not serve the appropriate
person under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(4), as
incorporated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(2)(B). (Doc. 13
at 11.) Carter attempted to serve Yates and the RCDAO by having his
wife deliver the complaint and summons to the RCDAO office in Asheboro
and mail the complaint and summons to both parties. (Doc. 16.) Those
forms of service do not comply with Rule 4. Giving Carter a chance to
perfect service of process, however, would be futile, as his claims
fail on the merits for the reasons noted. In addition, to the extent
Carter attempts to have his references to malicious prosecution
construed as a claim here, it is “clear that there is no such thing as
a ‘§ 1983 malicious prosecution’ claim.”
Lambert v. Williams, 223
F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 2000). Finally, to the extent he asserts that
persons within the RCDAO failed to properly supervise anyone, it is
equally clear that there is no respondeat superior liability under
§ 1983 absent evidence of an official policy or custom.
Monell v.
Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

13

On

October

9,

2013,

Carter

moved

for

sanctions

under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(3), alleging that David
Adinolfi, Special Deputy Attorney General for North Carolina and
counsel for the DA Defendants, “lied” in his filings to this
court and filed forged and fraudulent documents.
Rule

11(b)(3)

provides

that

“[b]y

presenting

to

(Doc. 40.)
the

court

a

pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an attorney . . .
certifies

that

information,
under

the

to

and

the

best

belief,

circumstances

formed
.

.

his

represents

claims,
are

Carter

search

the

after

.

evidentiary support . . . .”
support

of

the

person’s
an

knowledge,

inquiry

factual

reasonable

contentions

have

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).
attaches

results

print-outs

from

the

of

North

what

To
he

Carolina

Administrative Office of the Courts website for the criminal
court calendars in Randolph County: one from October 4, 2013,
showing

his

name,

birthday,

and

case

number

(2013CRS053047)

listed (Doc. 41-1), and one from September 16, 2013, showing a
list of “Carters” and their birthdays and case numbers, but no
entry for himself (Doc. 41-2).

Carter alleges that the search

results prove that the indictments are “forged and fraudulent”
and that his criminal case was only entered into the computer
database after he filed his response to Adinolfi’s second motion
to

dismiss

records.

(Doc.

37),

challenging

(Doc. 41 at 2-3.)
14

the

authenticity

of

the

In response, Adinolfi denies that any of his filings or
statements has been false.
the

Randolph

Carter’s
October
Adinolfi

County

case
6,

(Doc. 42.)

Superior

(2013CRS053047)

2013

email

contends,

Carter

Court
(Doc.

from

He attaches a copy of

42-1),

Carter

alludes

Calendar,

to
to

and

which
a

copy

Adinolfi,
the

lists

in

ongoing

of

an

which,
criminal

proceedings against him (Doc. 42-2) and is evidence that the
criminal case against Carter exists and that he is aware of it.
Regardless
acknowledgment
against
judicial

him,

of
by

the

notice

whether
Carter

the

of

indictments
establish

email

the

may

be

construed

pendency

of

a

of

that

which
a

this

criminal

as

criminal

court
case

has

does

an

case
taken

exist.

While Carter has supplied some evidence of his inability to find
his name and case listed on the website for the North Carolina
Administrative Office of the Courts, he has not demonstrated
that there can be no reasonable explanation for why that is so.
Indeed, the website acknowledges that a user may not be able to
find his name or case in the database and directs such users to
consult the local county for further information. See Frequently
Asked Questions, THE NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE

OF THE

http://www.nccourts.org/Support/FAQs/FAQs.asp?Type=22#309
visited Feb. 24, 2014).

COURTS,
(last

In light of the actual indictments

filed in Randolph County, which constitute the best evidence of
their existence, Carter’s evidence falls short of demonstrating
15

that

Adinolfi

has

made

any

misrepresentation

to

the

court.

Accordingly, Carter’s motion for sanctions will be denied.
On

October

17,

against Adinolfi.
him

an

2013,

Carter

(Doc. 46.)

“intimidating,

moved

again

for

sanctions

Carter alleges that Adinolfi sent

threatening,

letter” on September 23, 2013.

and

harassing

(Doc. 47 at 3.)

blackmail

He quotes from

the letter in his motion (id. at 6-8) and attached it to his
prior motion for sanctions as an exhibit (Doc. 41-3).

Adinolfi

opposes Carter’s second motion on the same grounds as the first.
(Doc. 48.)
Although

Carter

claims

that

the

letter

“violates

the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” the pertinent sanctions rule
–

Rule

11

–

counsel, or

does

not

between

govern

opposing

communications
counsel

and

Rule 11 governs filings with the court.

a

between
pro

se

opposing
litigant.

See Fed. R. Civ. P.

11(b); see also On Time Aviation, Inc. v. Bombardier Capital
Inc.,

570

F.

Supp.

2d

328,

335

(D.

Conn.

2008)

(“Rule

11

sanctions are restricted to representations to the Court (and
not

letters

Higgins,

between

No.

99

counsel).”);

CIV.

5820

Okoampa-Ahoofe

(AGS),

2000

WL

v.

Johnson

1471552,

at

&
*5

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000) (“Communications between attorneys on
the merits of the claims is part of the litigation process, and
such communications . . . affect the sanctions analysis only
insofar

as

they

relate

to

alleged
16

misrepresentations

to

the

Court.”).

Carter cannot demand sanctions based on Adinolfi’s

letter under Rule 11 because the letter was not “present[ed] to
the court”; it was a communication to Carter.
11(b). 4

Fed. R. Civ. P.

No sanctions are warranted on the basis of this letter,

and Carter’s motion will therefore be denied.
On October 18, 2013, Carter moved for a contempt citation
and sanctions against Yates.

(Doc. 49.)

He alleges that Yates

has scheduled “sham” hearings in Carter’s State court criminal
matter

in

retaliation

(Doc. 50 at 1-2.)
Superior

Court

for

Carter’s

filings

in

this

action.

He also alleges that Yates “had a Deputy

Clerk

prepare

and

mail

a

fraudulent

bond

forfeiture notice claiming that [Carter] had failed to appear
for

a

2013.”

hearing

on

(Id. at 2.)

the

non-existent

indictment

on

Yates opposes Carter’s motion.

October

7,

(Doc. 51.)

For the same reasons as previously stated, this court will
not review the proceedings of an ongoing state criminal matter
absent extraordinary circumstances, which are not present here.
The court also notes, for the reasons previously stated, that

4

Even if the court could issue sanctions under Rule 11 for a letter
from opposing counsel to a pro se litigant, it would not do so here.
There is nothing objectionable or unreasonable in the letter.
Contrary to Carter’s assertions (Doc. 47 at 1-2), communications
between opposing parties need not be filed with the court and, indeed,
should not be filed with the court unless for some proper purpose.
Adinolfi’s failure to do so, therefore, is not proof of any nefarious
purpose. As to the content of the letter, it merely informs Carter of
Adinolfi’s belief that Carter’s claims are baseless and requests that
Carter drop the lawsuit voluntarily. (Doc. 41-3.)

17

Yates enjoys absolute immunity in prosecuting Carter and may
schedule

hearings

as

needed;

prosecutorial

immunity

shields

Yates from any inquiry into his motives, regardless of their
propriety.
Carter’s

On the issue of the bond forfeiture notice based on

absence

from

a

hearing,

Carter

must

challenge

the

notice through proper procedures in the Randolph County Clerk’s
Office if indeed he was present or was instructed to leave, as
he alleges.
forum

to

(Doc. 50 at 3-5.)

determine

the

October 7, 2013 hearing.

facts

This court is not the proper
of

what

happened

at

Carter’s

Carter’s motion on these bases will be

denied.
Lastly,

the

DA

Defendants

Carter on October 14, 2013.

moved

for

(Doc. 43.)

sanctions

against

The motion and its

accompanying exhibit note that Adinolfi warned Carter of the
legal insufficiency of his claims and informed him of Yates’s
“two kinds of immunity.”
that,

despite

warning,

The DA Defendants allege
heaped

threats,

accusations of fraud, and frivolous filings on them.

(Doc. 43

at 2-3.)

this

(Doc. 43-1.)
Carter

has

They allege further that Carter “has engaged in a

pattern of groundless and vexatious litigation.”

(Id. at 3.)

They request that this court impose a prefiling injunction on
Carter, so that he may not file a document without certification
from a licensed attorney and the court.
motion.

(Doc. 52.)
18

Carter opposes the

Rule 11 applies to pro se plaintiffs as well as attorneys.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

Prefiling injunctions may be appropriate

when

a

a

plaintiff

frivolous

has

litigation.

history
The

bar

of
for

continuing
what

vexatious

constitutes

and

such

history is much higher than what is present here, however.

a

See,

e.g., McMahon v. F & M Bank-Winchester, 45 F.3d 426 (4th Cir.
1994)

(unpublished)

(approving

of

prefiling

injunction

after

nine years of litigation in state and federal court on the same
claims);

Potter

Mosteller,

199

prefiling

(imposing

v.

F.R.D.

injunction

after

181

(D.S.C.

more

than

six

2000)

years

of

frivolous lawsuits on the same claims); Williams v. Harkleroad,
838

F.

Supp.

2d

363

(M.D.N.C.

2011)

(imposing

prefiling

injunction after more than eight years of vexatious litigation).
Carter

commenced

this

action

five

months

ago

previously sued any Defendant on the same facts.

and

has

not

Although his

filings are numerous, a prefiling injunction is not warranted.
However,

Carter

is

warned

that

his

pro

se

status

does

not

entitle him to avoid the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Local Rules of this court, which will be enforced.

All

filings and matters before the court must be well grounded in
fact and law, as required by Rule 11.

The motion for sanctions

and request for prefiling injunction will therefore be denied at
this time.

19

C.
On

Motion to Expedite
November

22,

2013,

Carter

moved

to

expedite

determination of all pending motions in this case. 5

the

(Doc. 56.)

He believes that the delay in this court’s ruling on the pending
motions compared to the rapidity in its ruling against Carter on
his

motion

(motion),

18

for

an

emergency

(Magistrate

stay

Judge’s

and

injunction

recommendation),

(Docs.

32

6

(order))

indicate that this court finds merit in his claims but does not
want to rule in his favor (Doc. 56 at 2).
As to expediting a determination, Carter’s motion is moot
insofar as a determination has now been made.

To the extent

Carter seeks to expedite his motion for a Rule 26(f) conference,
that

motion

is

denied.

The

Magistrate

scheduling order in due course.

Judge

will

set

a

Otherwise, Carter’s speculation

as to the reasons why his motions were not decided earlier is
unwarranted and false.

All motions are decided in due course,

given the heavy workload of the court.
III. CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

stated,

the

court

finds

that

sovereign

immunity, Younger abstention, and prosecutorial immunity require

5

Carter’s request was in the form of a letter to the Chief Judge of
this District, which is not the appropriate way to file a motion to
expedite.
All motions must be filed with the Clerk of Court and
served on opposing counsel. See Local Rule 7.3.

20

the dismissal of Carter’s claims against the DA Defendants and
that no sanctions are warranted against either party.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motions to dismiss filed
by Garland Yates and the Randolph County District Attorney’s
Office (Docs. 12, 33) are GRANTED and Carter’s claims against
those Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The motion for

judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 54) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT

IS

FURTHER

sanctions are DENIED.

ORDERED

that

all

pending

motions

for

(Docs. 40, 43, 46, 49.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Carter’s motion to compel a Rule
26(f)

conference

(Doc.

38)

is

referred

to

the

assigned

Magistrate Judge and that Carter’s motion to expedite (Doc. 56)
is DENIED AS MOOT.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
February 25, 2014

21