BROOKS v. INDIAN TRUST SETTLEMENT et al

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 11/21/2013; that Plaintiff's Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Affidavit/Declaration in Support (Docket Entry 1 ) is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL. RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2)(B)(ii). (Garland, Leah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

WILMA LYNN BUIE BROOKS,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
INDIAN TRUST SETTLEMENT and
)
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
)
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, )
)
Defendants.
)

1:13CV929

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Application
for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1), filed in
conjunction with Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (Docket Entry 2).
The Court will grant Plaintiff’s request to proceed as a pauper for
the limited purpose of recommending dismissal of this action, under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for failure to state a claim.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee
that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts ‘solely
because his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure
the costs.’”

Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953

(4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948)).

“Dispensing with filing fees,

however, [is] not without its problems.

Parties proceeding under

the statute

d[o]

not face

ordinary litigants.

the

same

financial

constraints

as

In particular, litigants suing in forma

pauperis d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully
obtaining relief against the administrative costs of bringing
suit.”

Nagy v. Federal Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th

Cir. 2004).
To

address

this

concern,

the

in

forma

pauperis

statute

provides, in relevant part, that “the court shall dismiss the case
at any time if the court determines that – . . . (B) the action or
appeal – . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted . . . .”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

A complaint falls short

when it does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added)
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

This standard “demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. In
other words, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.

Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id.1

The Court may also anticipate affirmative defenses that

1

Although the Supreme Court has reiterated that “[a] document
filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint,
(continued...)
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clearly appear on the face of the complaint.

Nasim, 64 F.3d at

955.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s Complaint names the Indian Trust Settlement and
the United States District Court for the District of Southern Ohio
as Defendants.

(Docket Entry 2 at 1.)

The Complaint arises from

Plaintiff’s efforts to recover from a recent settlement in a class
action brought by Native Americans against the Secretary of the
Interior (id. at 2), which alleged that the Secretary breached
fiduciary duties in managing the Individual Indian Money (“IIM”)
trust account on behalf of class members, see Cobell v. Salazar,
679 F.3d 909, 912 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

The Complaint alleges that

Plaintiff filed claims with the Claims Administrator, who then
improperly sought further documentation of Plaintiff’s eligibility
to recover from the Settlement.

1

(See Docket Entry 2 at 5-6).

(...continued)
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine Twombly’s requirement
that a pleading contain more than labels and conclusions,”
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (applying Twombly in dismissing
pro se complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Office
of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se
complaint . . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’
But even a pro se
complainant must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to
infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (quoting
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679,
respectively)).
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Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks transfer of her claim to the Middle
District

of

North

Carolina

so

that

she

may

demonstrate

her

eligibility to participate in the Cobell Settlement. (See id.) In
support of her claim, the Complaint offers the following factual
allegations:
1) “Plaintiff[] hereby has declared her race as American
Indian (indigenous to the state of North Carolina) by birth record,
by physical recognition, by North Carolina state issued documents,
and by historical context” (id. at 5);
2)

“Plaintiff

is

an

eligible

candidate

for

settlement

proceeds” (id. at 5-6);
3) “Plaintiff[] me[t] the deadline to place a claim and was
issued two claim numbers (366310 and 355-739)” (id. at 5);
4) “Defendant requested further proof of eligibility from
Plaintiff although documents were submitted offering proof of
eligibility” (id.);
5) “Southern District of Ohio: U.S. District Court offered no
written decision as to why the documents did not meet the burden of
proof” (id.); and
6) “it is an undue hardship[] for Plaintiff to travel to the
state of Ohio to defend the claim and stop further trust filings
without Plaintiff’s knowledge” (id. at 6).
Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff’s Complaint
“requests that the Middle District of North Carolina court review

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all such relevant documents proving eligible property status, and
extend time frame for a further investigation regarding a North
Carolina state issued IIM number, or IIM number issued by any other
organization, or by legal filings, or any person or organization
who may have gained possession of such information.”

(Id. at 5.)2

As an initial matter, a federal district court and a class
action settlement fund do not represent proper Defendants to an
action in federal court. See, e.g., Noziska v. United States Dist.
Court, No. CV13-69-M-DWM-JCL, 2013 WL 2338229, at *3 (D. Mont. May
28, 2013) (unpublished) (“[Plaintiff] has failed to name a proper

2

To the extent that Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts additional
claims, such claims also fail as a matter of law. Specifically,
the Complaint alleges 1) that “Plaintiff is seeking validation for
the purpose of entitlements under Public Law 93-638 Indian SelfDetermination Act” (Docket Entry 2 at 6), 2) that “despite
extensive education and training, Plaintiff and descendants have
been a victim of retaliation for claiming heritage and blood-line
with respect to employment, contracting, and education” (id.), and
3) that “Plaintiff requests [the] [C]ourt to order the release of
the Supreme Court Coble [sic] Settlement decision in its entirety
under the Freedom of Information Act” (id. at 5). With respect to
the Indian Self-Determination Act, that law “authorizes the
Government and Indian tribes to enter into contracts in which the
tribes promise to supply federally funded services, for example
tribal health services, that a Government agency would otherwise
provide,” Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 634
(2005); see also 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a), but it does not authorize
payments to individuals, see generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 450 et seq.
Further, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts a claim for
discrimination “with respect to employment, contracting, and
education” (Docket Entry 2 at 6), her Complaint contains no factual
allegations to support any inference of discrimination in those
contexts (see id. at 1-6). Finally, with respect to Plaintiff’s
request under the Freedom of Information Act, the Claims
Administrator has made all documents relating to the Cobell case
publicly available on the Indian Trust Settlement website, see
www.indiantrust.com/documents (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
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defendant.

The only named defendant is the United States District

Court.”); cf. Skillman v. General Steel Settlement Fund, No. Civ.
10-11472-MLW, 2010 WL 4340624, at *1-2 (D. Mass. Nov. 2, 2010)
(unpublished) (dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
complaint

alleging

insufficient

recovery

from

class

action

settlement fund).
Moreover, a party seeking to transfer an action from one
United States District Court to another must do so via motion in
the court where the action pends.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); White

v. ABCO Eng’g Corp., 199 F.3d 140, 143-44 (3d Cir. 1999).

Thus, a

proposed transferee court - in this case, the Middle District of
North Carolina - has no subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a
transfer from another venue.
Furthermore, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio does not appear to have any involvement in the
approval or administration of the Cobell Settlement.
-

the

private

company

chosen

to

administer

the

Although GCG
Settlement

-

maintains an office within the Southern District of Ohio, see
Indian Trust Settlement, www.indiantrust.com (last visited Nov. 15,
2013), the

United

States

District

Court

for

the

District

of

Columbia approved the Settlement and retained jurisdiction over its
administration, see Cobell v. Salazar, No. 1:96CV01285(TFH), 2011
WL 10676927, at *7 (D.D.C. July 27, 2011) (unpublished) (“This
Court shall retain jurisdiction for the purpose of accomplishing

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the terms of the Settlement Agreement and its administration, and
resolving any disputes in connection therewith.”), aff’d, 679 F.3d
909 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Craven v. Cobell, 133 S.Ct. 543
(2012).
In approving the Settlement, that court outlined the procedure
for “[a]ll individuals who believe they are entitled to participate
in the [S]ettlement as a member of the Trust Administration Class.”
Id. at *5.3

Such procedure provides for an initial determination

and two levels of appeals, all handled by the Claims Administrator.
Id. at *5-6.

Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates that she timely

submitted her eligibility documents to the Claims Administrator,
which “requested further proof of eligibility from Plaintiff.”
(See Docket Entry 2 at 5.)

Apparently, rather than provide such

additional proof or pursue an appeal of the eligibility decision
through the Claims Administrator (see id. at 1-6) - assuming the
Claims Administrator reached a final decision with respect to her
claim - Plaintiff has filed the instant lawsuit.

3

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specify to which of the two
Cobell Settlement classes she alleges membership.
(See Docket
Entry 2 at 1-6.) Presumably, Plaintiff asserts membership in the
Trust Administration Class (certified pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3), with the right to opt out), because the Historical
Accounting Class (certified pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A)
and (b)(2), with no right to opt out) did not require class members
to affirmatively file a claim.
See Cobell, 679 F.3d at 914
(distinguishing two settlement classes); Cobell, 2011 WL 10676927,
at *3-6 (describing procedures for each settlement class).
-7-

A similar attempt by a plaintiff to recover in district court
for a claim already encompassed by the Cobell settlement failed.
See Villegas v. United States, __ F. Supp. 2d __, __, No. CV120001EFS, 2013 WL 3990809, at *7 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 4, 2013) (unpublished)
(“Plaintiff is precluded from pursuing this claim due to his
membership in the Cobell settlement class.”).
that

the

plaintiff,

seeking

recovery

through

That court found
his

own

action

independent of the Cobell case, “had ample opportunity to oppose
the Cobell court’s conclusion by appealing the decision to the D.C.
Circuit, but [the plaintiff] chose not to pursue such appeal.” Id.
at *11.

In the instant case, the Complaint does not appear to

challenge the substance of the Cobell Settlement or to deny that
its terms bind Plaintiff - that is, the Complaint does not indicate
that Plaintiff opted out or wishes to do so.
at 1-6.)

(See Docket Entry 2

Rather, the Complaint seeks independent review of the

procedure by which the Claims Administrator responded to her claim.
(See id. at 5-6.)
By design, class actions seek to avoid such collateral review
of

either

the

substance

of

a

settlement, or its implementation.

final

judgment,

including

a

See generally Juris v. Inamed

Corp., 685 F. 3d 1294, 1312-14 (11th Cir. 2012) (discussing limits
on collateral attacks to class action judgments). Generally, claim
preclusion or a release within the settlement agreement itself (or
both) will bar collateral review of a class action settlement. See

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Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373-80
(1996).

As a result, federal courts have restricted collateral

review of class action settlements to due process concerns related
to adequacy of representation, notice, or the inability to opt out.
See Juris, 685 F.3d at 1313.

In the instant case, Plaintiff’s

Complaint, even construed liberally, does not assert any defects
concerning the adequacy of
to opt out.

representation, notice, or her ability

(See Docket Entry 2 at 1-6.)

Thus, the face of the

Complaint indicates that both claim preclusion and the Settlement
Agreement itself would bar Plaintiff’s efforts to challenge the
Claims Administrator’s determination of eligibility.

In sum,

Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for Leave
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Affidavit/Declaration in Support
(Docket Entry 1) is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE
COURT TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
November 21, 2013

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