RATLIFF v. WAKE FOREST BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 01/14/2014; that Plaintiff's Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Affidavit/Declaration in Support (Docke t Entry 1 ) is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL. RECOMMENDED that any federal claim be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and any state-law claim be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). (Garland, Leah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

LEON RATLIFF,
Plaintiff,
v.
WAKE FOREST BAPTIST
MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant.

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1:13CV991

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application
for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1), filed in
conjunction with Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (Docket Entry 2).
The Court will grant Plaintiff’s request to proceed as a pauper for
the limited purpose of recommending dismissal of this action, under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for failure to state a claim.1
LEGAL BACKGROUND
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee
that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts ‘solely
because his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure

1

Plaintiff’s Application does not fully address question 3,
by referencing his receipt of “[r]ent payments, interest, or
dividends” and “AFDC, WIC or Food Stamps” without indicating the
specific nature or amount of funds received from these sources.
(See Docket Entry 1 at 2.) However, in light of the recommendation
of dismissal, no need exists to consider this matter further.

the costs.’”

Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953

(4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948)).

“Dispensing with filing fees,

however, [is] not without its problems.
the statute

d[o]

not face

ordinary litigants.

the

same

Parties proceeding under
financial

constraints

as

In particular, litigants suing in forma

pauperis d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully
obtaining relief against the administrative costs of bringing
suit.”

Nagy v. Federal Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th

Cir. 2004).
To

address

this

concern,

the

in

forma

pauperis

statute

provides, in relevant part, that “the court shall dismiss the case
at any time if the court determines that – . . . (B) the action or
appeal – . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted . . . .”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

A complaint falls short

when it does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added)
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

This standard “demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. In
other words, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.

Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

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action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id.2
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s Complaint names Wake Forest Baptist Medical Center
as the sole Defendant.

(Docket Entry 2 at 1.)

It alleges racial

discrimination, neglect, and mistreatment by staff members while
Plaintiff underwent surgery at Defendant’s hospital.

(Id. at 2,

4.) In support of Plaintiff’s claims in this regard, the Complaint
offers the following factual allegations:
1) on “July 17th, [2013, Plaintiff] was undergoing a[] 6hr
surgery were [sic] [Plaintiff] was mistreated in the worst level of
[h]atred” (id.);
2) during “2 nights of ‘Hospital’ stay, [Plaintiff] [o]nly
[received] one pain pill” (id.);

2

Although the Supreme Court has reiterated that “[a] document
filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine Twombly’s requirement
that a pleading contain more than labels and conclusions,”
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (applying Twombly in dismissing
pro se complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Office
of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se
complaint . . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’
But even a pro se
complainant must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to
infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (quoting
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679,
respectively)).
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3) Plaintiff received “[n]o wheel chair [a]ssistance [and]
waited for allmost [sic] 2 hrs.” (id.);
4) “[Plaintiff] never met the staff members that gave the
‘Surgery’” (id. at 3);
5) “[t]here were no precautions of medical advice” (id.);
6) “[Plaintiff] almost suffered a Heart Attack! after 6 weeks
of [n]ausea and sickness due to no instructions and lack of medical
advice” (id.);
7) “[Plaintiff] was treated just like an Outkast [sic], as if
[Plaintiff] wasn’t even counted as a[] human” (id.);
8) “[Plaintiff] had to be readmitted only to suffer more of
the same treatment on August 23rd” (id.);
9) at the “E.R. department . . . they stole[] [Plaintiff’s]
shirt out of [his] bags [and he went] 5 days without [his]
belongings” (id.); and
10) Plaintiff received “[n]o ‘Bath[,]’ [n]o Pain Pills, [and]
[n]o wheel [c]hair upon [f]alling” (id.)
Based

on

the

foregoing

allegations,

Plaintiff

seeks

compensation in the amount of $250,000 for “Pain & Suffering and
Neglect by Racial Discrimination.”

(Id. at 4.)

Plaintiff’s

Complaint does not explicitly identify a federal cause of action.
(See id. at 1-4.)

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

prohibits discrimination “on the ground of race, color, or national
origin . . . under any program or activity receiving Federal

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financial assistance.”

42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

A hospital receiving

federal funds, including Medicare and Medicaid payments, qualifies
as a “program or activity” under Title VI.

See United States v.

Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 736 F. 2d 1039, 1044-46 (5th Cir. 1984);
Dorer v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 898, 899-900 (D.
Md. 1998).3

As a result, Title VI affords a cause of action to

a patient who alleges racial discrimination in the care given by a
medical facility that accepts any federal funds.

See Ferguson v.

City of Charleston, S.C., 186 F.3d 469, 479-480 (4th Cir. 1999),
rev’d on other grounds, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); see also Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279 (2001) (affirming that Title VI affords
private right of action to enforce its provisions, at least with
respect to intentional discrimination).

“Courts commonly use the

Title VII discrimination proof scheme to evaluate claims for
intentional discrimination under Title VI,” Escobar v. Montgomery
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. Civ. A. AW-99-1964, 2001 WL 98600, at *5
(D. Md. Feb. 1, 2001) (unpublished), which allows plaintiffs to
proceed by establishing a prima facie case of discrimination or by
offering direct evidence of discrimination, see id. at *5-6; Love

3

Similarly, any university which accepts federal funds
subjects itself to suit under Title VI. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d4a(2)(A); Radcliff v. Landau, 883 F.2d 1481, 1483 (9th Cir. 1989)
(“Receipt of federal financial assistance by any student or portion
of a school thus subjects the entire school to Title VI
coverage.”).
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v. Duke Univ., 776 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073 (M.D.N.C. 1991), aff’d,
959 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1992).
Under Title VI, “[f]or Plaintiff[] to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination, [he] must show that [he is a] member[] of
a protected class, that [he] suffered an adverse action, and
similarly situated individuals did not suffer the same adverse
actions in the same or similar situations.”
98600, at *6.

Escobar, 2001 WL

Following this framework, Plaintiff’s Complaint

fails to state a claim for racial discrimination.

The Complaint

neither identifies Plaintiff’s race nor describes medical treatment
received by similarly situated individuals of another race.

(See

Docket Entry 2 at 1-4.)
Simply invoking the term “racial discrimination” does not
suffice to state a claim.
(“[T]he

tenet

that

a

court

See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
must

accept

as

true

all

of

the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.”). In fact, the Complaint’s only factual reference to
race concerns the allegation that Plaintiff suffered “misconduct by
Black and White staff members.”

(Docket Entry 2 at 2.)

Simply

put, the Complaint lacks any factual allegations consistent with
either direct evidence of racial discrimination or any inference of
racial discrimination.
Beyond its wholly conclusory claim of racial discrimination,
Plaintiff’s

Complaint

appears

to

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allege

a

state-law

medical

malpractice claim with no basis for federal jurisdiction, such as
diversity of citizenship. In this regard, the Complaint identifies
Plaintiff

as

a

resident

of

High

Point,

North

Carolina,

and

Defendant as having its principal place of business in WinstonSalem, North Carolina.

(Docket Entry 2 at 1.)

Such circumstances

cannot satisfy the diversity jurisdiction statute.
§ 1332(a).

See 28 U.S.C.

In light of the recommended dismissal of the federal

claim at the pleading stage and the absence of grounds for the
exercise of diversity jurisdiction, the Court should decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims and,
instead, should dismiss those claims without prejudice.

See 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 726 (1966).4
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a federal claim and this
Court should decline to entertain any state-law claims.

4

To the extent statute of limitations concerns may apply to
Plaintiff’s refiling of any remaining claims in state court, 28
U.S.C. § 1367(d) provides: “The period of limitations for any claim
asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same
action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after
the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled
while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is
dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for Leave
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Affidavit/Declaration in Support
(Docket Entry 1) is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE
COURT TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that any federal claim be dismissed pursuant
to

28

U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

and any

state-law

claim be

dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
January 14, 2014

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