SUPERIOR PERFORMERS, INC. v. MEAIKE et al
Filing
190
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE JAMES A. BEATY, JR on 7/29/2014. ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Contempt [Doc. # 79 ] is DENIED, Defendants' Motion for Protective Order [Doc. # 128 ] is DENIED, and Defendants'Motion to Strike [Doc. # 101 ] is DENIED AS MOOT. The Preliminary Injunction [Doc. # 88 ] remains in effect. (Butler, Carol)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SUPERIOR PERFORMERS, INC. d/b/a
NATIONAL AGENTS ALLIANCE,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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SHAWN L. MEAIKE, MARC J. MEADE,
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BRYANT STONE, FRANK EUFEMIA,
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JAIME EUFEMIA, and MICHAEL SIZER,
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Defendants.
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______________________________________ )
1:13CV1149
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
BEATY, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Contempt and for Order to Show Cause
for Criminal Contempt (“Motion for Contempt”) [Doc. #79], a Supplement to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Contempt [Doc. #98] (“First Supplement”), a Second Supplement to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Contempt [Doc. #132], a Third Supplement to Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt
[Doc. #155], and an “Amendment” to Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt [Doc. #174],1 all filed
by Plaintiff Superior Performers, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “NAA”). Related filings before the Court
are a Motion to Strike [Doc. #101] and a Response to Plaintiff’s Multiple Supplements [Doc.
#178] filed by Defendants Shawn L. Meaike, Marc J. Meade, Bryant Stone, Frank Eufemia,
Jaime Eufemia, and Michael Sizer (“Defendants”) and non-parties Paul McClain and Family
1
Plaintiff more appropriately refers to this in its accompanying brief [Doc. #175] as a
“motion to add” these individuals to the Motion for Contempt. The Court denied this “motion
to add” these individuals at the Motion for Contempt hearing on July 23, 2014.
First Life, LLC. Defendants have also filed a Motion for Protective Order [Doc. #128]. These
motions are ripe for review.2
For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt,
deny Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order, and deny Defendants’ Motion to Strike as moot.
I.
BACKGROUND
This case is one of several related cases brought by Plaintiff in an attempt to enforce
restrictive covenants entered into by current and former NAA agents. This Court previously
granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [Doc. #36], and allowed the terms
of that injunctive relief to remain in effect from the March 5, 2014 preliminary injunction
hearing until April 11, 2014, when its Memorandum Opinion and Order [Doc. #88] granting
in part Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. #13] was filed.
Plaintiff now brings a Motion for Contempt alleging violations of this Court’s previously
issued Orders by Defendant Meaike and non-parties Paul McClain and Family First Life (“FFL”)
(collectively “Contempt Respondents”). In this Motion, Plaintiff seeks a variety of extensive
remedies from the Court, including an order of civil contempt, an order to show cause why
Contempt Respondents should be held in criminal contempt (and referral of this matter to the
U.S. Attorney’s Office for investigation), an order requiring immediate disassociation from all
2
Furthermore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #31], Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend
the Complaint a Second Time [Doc. #62], and Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate [Doc. #136],
are also pending before this Court. The Court will address these Motions in a separate Order.
In addition, Defendants have filed a Motion for Sanctions [Doc. #181], which is not yet ripe
for review.
2
former NAA agents who resigned from NAA since the March 5 hearing, damages in excess of
$1 million, and payment of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this Motion for
Contempt.3 (Mot. for Contempt [Doc. #79], at 3-4.) Contempt Respondents opposed this
Motion for Contempt and filed a Motion to Strike [Doc. #101] portions of the evidence
submitted by Plaintiff in support of its Motion for Contempt, on the basis that parts of the
evidence are inadmissible, and therefore, cannot be considered by the Court in evaluating a
Motion for Contempt.
Plaintiff has since filed three Supplements, plus two days before the hearing, additional
declarations, all in support of its Motion for Contempt. (Supplements [Docs. #98, #132, #155]
and Declarations [Docs. #183, #184, #185].) In preparation for this hearing, the Court granted
limited expedited discovery to both parties, based on the expedited discovery requested by
Contempt Respondents as to the Wilson and Haggerty voicemail evidence introduced in
Plaintiff’s First Supplement [Doc. # 98]. This Court then held the hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion
for Contempt on July 23, 2014.
In a somewhat related matter, Defendants have filed a Motion for Protective Order
[Doc. #128]. Because Plaintiff is allegedly pursuing discovery in state court, which Defendants
contend was sought in order to circumvent this Court’s discovery procedures, Defendants ask
the Court to issue a protective order “instruct[ing] that, until discovery is permitted by this
3
Although Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt requests this relief, Plaintiff’s counsel did
state at the July 23, 2014 hearing that these remedies requested in its Motion for Contempt are
now premature, and instead, Plaintiff seeks additional expedited discovery in order to determine
an adequate remedy.
3
Court, Plaintiff shall cease pursuing discovery in state court matters related to named defendants
in this case or other cases Plaintiff has filed with this Court.” (Mot. for Protective Order
[Doc. #128], at 1.) The Motion for Protective Order also asks that this Court decline to allow
any such materials to be used in this Court prior to discovery. (Id.) Plaintiff opposes this
Motion. (Resp. to Mot. for Protective Order [Doc. #140].) The Court will address Plaintiff’s
Motion for Contempt, Defendants’ Motion to Strike, and Defendants’ Motion for Protective
Order in turn.
II.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CONTEMPT
Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt includes a Motion for an Order to Show Cause, in which
Plaintiff seeks to have Contempt Respondents appear before this Court to demonstrate why
they should not be held in contempt. (Mot. for Contempt [Doc. #79], at 1.) “In dealing with
a motion for an order to show cause, the first thing the Court must determine is whether the
plaintiff seeks to hold the defendant in civil or criminal contempt.” Ri Ra Holdings LLC v. Ri
Ra, Madra Mor, Inc., No. 1:99cv374, 2002 WL 1009730, at *5 (M.D.N.C. May 16, 2002) (citing
Major v. Orthopedic Equip. Co., 496 F. Supp. 604, 611 (E.D. Va. 1980)). A party’s or a court’s
description of a contempt sanction as either civil or criminal is not determinative and will be
independently scrutinized by the Court. Cromer v. Kraft Foods North Am., 390 F.3d 812, 821
(4th Cir. 2004) (citing Buffington v. Baltimore Cty, 913 F.2d 113, 133 (4th Cir. 1990)).
Generally, if the purpose of the contempt proceeding is to coerce compliance with a court’s
mandate or to compensate the complainant for losses sustained, then the contempt sought is
civil. Ri Ra Holdings, 2002 WL 1009730, at *5. However, if the purpose is to punish the
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offending party for past disobedience, then the contempt sought is criminal. Id. The Supreme
Court has explained that the “critical features” for determining whether a contempt remedy is
civil or criminal are “the substance of the proceeding and the character of the relief that the
proceeding will afford.” Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631, 108 S. Ct. 1423, 1426,
99 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1988). Thus, putatively civil contempt sanctions will be held to be criminal
sanctions in cases where imposed sanctions are “not conditioned on compliance with a court
order,” or “not tailored to compensate the complaining party,” but instead are “initiated to
vindicate the authority of the court and to punish the actions of the alleged contemnor.”
Cromer, 390 F.3d at 822 (quoting Bradley v. Am. Household, Inc., 378 F.3d 373, 378 (4th Cir.
2004); Buffington, 913 F.2d at 133-35) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the purpose of Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt appears to be aimed both at
punishing Contempt Respondents for allegedly violating the terms of the Court’s Order, as well
as coercing Contempt Respondents’ compliance with this Court’s Order in the future. Plaintiff’s
request that the Court require Defendant Meaike to immediately disassociate with the recently
resigned NAA agents and that the Court order Paul McClain to pay NAA “all commissions he
has earned from sales made by Resigned Agents” are not conditioned on compliance with a
court order or tailored to compensate Plaintiff. Rather, they are initiated to punish Contempt
Respondents. However, the request for damages in the amount of “all payments generated by
the Resigned Agents for Meaike and/or FFL” appears designed to compensate Plaintiff for
alleged losses. Therefore, Plaintiff does properly classify the proceeding as one seeking both
civil contempt and criminal contempt.
5
A.
Civil Contempt
In order for this Court to hold Contempt Respondents in civil contempt, Plaintiff must
show each of the following elements by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) the existence of a
valid decree of which the alleged contemnor had actual or constructive knowledge; (2) that the
decree was in the movant’s ‘favor’; (3) . . . that the alleged contemnor by its conduct violated the
terms of the decree, and had knowledge (at least constructive knowledge) of such violations; and
(4) . . . that [the] movant suffered harm as a result.” Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 288, 301
(4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Colonial Williamsburg Found. v. The Kittinger Co., 792 F. Supp. 1397,
1405-06 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff’d, 38 F.3d 133, 136 (4th Cir. 1994)). If Plaintiff fails to make the
necessary showing, Contempt Respondents cannot be held in contempt and there is no need to
require Contempt Respondents to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. Ri Ra
Holdings, 2002 WL 1009730, at *6.
However, “[i]f the moving party makes a prima facie showing of these elements, the
burden shifts to alleged contemnor to justify his non-compliance.” U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n v. Capitalstreet Fin., LLC, 3:09CV387-RJC-DCK, 2010 WL 2131852, at *2
(W.D.N.C. May 25, 2010) (citing United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983); Parker v.
Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 740 (11th Cir. 2006)). “Recognized defenses to civil
contempt include: (1) a good-faith attempt to comply with the [C]ourt’s order; (2) substantial
compliance; and (3) an inability to comply.” Id. (citing Consolidated Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers of Am., 683 F.2d 827, 832 (4th Cir. 1982)).
Contempt Respondents do not dispute that the first two elements are satisfied: the
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individuals at issue had knowledge of a valid decree by this Court and that decree was in
Plaintiff’s favor. Rather, Contempt Respondents dispute that Plaintiff has shown by clear and
convincing evidence that either of the last two elements are present: violation of the Court’s
Orders and that Plaintiff suffered harm as a result. Furthermore, Contempt Respondents
contend that even if the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown by clear and convincing evidence
that all four of the civil contempt elements are met, two recognized defenses save Contempt
Respondents from contempt: their good-faith attempt to comply with the Order and their
substantial compliance with the Order.
With regard to the first of the two disputed elements, whether there has been a violation
of this Court’s Orders, much evidence has been filed and reviewed by the Court, which this
Court will briefly summarize. In general, the evidence presented by Plaintiff can be categorized
into three categories:4 (1) circumstantial evidence of individuals leaving NAA, some of whom
joined FFL;5 (2) circumstantial evidence of communications occurring between Contempt
Respondents (and other FFL independent contractors) and individuals who were working for
4
Contempt Respondents filed a Motion to Strike [Doc. #101] certain evidence
submitted by Plaintiff, which Contempt Respondents contend is inadmissible as the evidence
is based on inadmissible hearsay, speculative, not based upon the declarants’ first-hand
knowledge, and/or irrelevant. (Mot. to Strike [Doc. #101].) Specifically, Contempt
Respondents move to strike the following three declarations: (1) the Declaration of Cleta
Stegner [Doc. #85], the Declaration of Jason Carey [Doc. #86], and portions of the Third
Affidavit of Marshall Pettigrew [Doc. #87]. However, because the Court can appropriately find
grounds to unfavorably consider Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt even with this evidence,
Contempt Respondents’ Motion to Strike is denied as moot.
5
This includes evidence of a larger than average resignation rate shortly after the
preliminary injunction hearing, and evidence logging when individuals who at least at one point
were NAA agents became active with FFL carrier, Royal Neighbors.
7
NAA at the time the communications were made;6 and (3) alleged direct evidence of
solicitation.7
First, evidence of larger than average numbers of resignations and evidence that a
significant portion of those resigned agents now work for FFL is too speculative to constitute
clear and convincing evidence of solicitation or encouragement to quit by Contempt
Respondents. (See Order [Doc. #123], at 6.) As the Court has previously explained, and as
Plaintiff has acknowledged, it is not a violation of this Court’s Orders for Contempt
Respondents or any individuals to communicate with current NAA agents, or even to discuss
the status of this case with them, as long as they are not soliciting them to work for FFL or
encouraging them to quit. Therefore, under the clear and convincing evidentiary standard
governing a motion for civil contempt, evidence that contact by way of phone or “text” took
place between Contempt Respondents and current NAA agents, or between any other FFL
agent and current NAA agent, is not enough for this Court to conclude that Respondents should
be held in civil contempt. Similarly, evidence that a much larger than average percentage of
NAA agents resigned shortly after the preliminary injunction hearing is also insufficient to rely
on in this proceeding.
Furthermore, the circumstantial and direct evidence that non-party individuals, other than
the Contempt Respondents, may have violated the Court’s Orders is not relevant to this
6
This includes evidence gleaned from phone records and depositions in parallel state
court proceedings.
7
This includes the Wilson voicemail, evidence of the Haggerty “robocall,” and limited
email and text messages obtained in parallel state court proceedings.
8
proceeding against Contempt Respondents. Although theoretically an individual who is not a
Contempt Respondent could have been acting at the direction of FFL or another Contempt
Respondent, Plaintiff offers almost no evidence as to why such actions should be imputed to
any Contempt Respondents.8
Plaintiff also points to evidence that some individuals have deleted texts and perhaps
even altered documents that were discovered in the state court discovery process. Contempt
Respondents did not have adequate notice to respond to the allegations that were raised for the
first time in the declarations filed by Plaintiff on July 21, 2014, but even if they had adequate
time and did not respond to the substance of these allegations, the Court still would likely not
place much weight on such evidence in this proceeding. Although Plaintiff contends that
perhaps this Court should draw an adverse inference from the alleged spoliation of some of this
8
Plaintiff does point to evidence of an email signature line of Sean Ruggiero (the Court
presumes this is the same individual who is a Defendant in Case No. 14cv232, although his last
name is spelled “Ruggerio” in that Complaint), describing himself as “managing agent” with an
office address matching that of Defendant Meaike. But without more, how this individual
describes himself in an email signature line is not enough to refute Contempt Respondents’
contention that he is merely an independent contractor for FFL without any express or implied
authority to act on behalf of FFL. Indeed, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence or authority
to suggest that Sam Ruggiero has any such authority to act on behalf of FFL or any of the other
Contempt Respondents.
To the extent that Plaintiff has taken the position in prior filings with this Court that its
own agents-that is, independent contractors who sell insurance on behalf of insurance carriers
and NAA-are not able to act on behalf of, or bind Plaintiff, the Court will not impose a
different understanding of the independent contractor relationship on FFL without evidence
suggesting that a different understanding is warranted. (See Pl.’s Request for Clarification
[Doc. #126], at 2 (explaining Plaintiff’s position as to why it lacks the legal authority to require
its independent contractors to search for or produce telephone records).)
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evidence in the state court discovery process, Plaintiff has not convinced the Court that it may
draw adverse inferences based on alleged discovery abuses that occurred in a different court’s
discovery proceedings. If such alleged discovery abuses occur in the discovery process in this
Court, that would, of course, present a different situation that the Court would feel compelled
to address.
Furthermore, Plaintiff does not appear to allege that any of purported discovery abuses
were committed by the Contempt Respondents. Therefore, these alleged discovery abuses are
not relevant to the contempt proceedings against the Contempt Respondents. To the extent
that Plaintiff contends that they warrant further expedited discovery as requested at the
contempt hearing, Plaintiff has not shown good cause as to why the Court should allow it to
further circumvent the standard discovery process. (See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1).) Therefore,
Plaintiff’s request at the hearing for additional expedited discovery for the stated purpose is
denied.
Finally, given the attention this evidence has been given in the contempt proceedings,
the Court will briefly discuss the alleged Wilson voicemail and Haggerty robocall.9 Plaintiff’s
First Supplement to its Motion for Contempt [Doc. #98] was based on receipt of an alleged
solicitation voicemail by NAA agent, George Wilson, and a similar call allegedly received by
Todd Haggerty, both of whose cellular telephones purportedly indicated that the calls came from
9
The Court acknowledges that Defendants have filed a Motion for Sanctions
[Doc. #181] with regard to this evidence. However, that Motion is not yet ripe for review, so
the Court will not address the merits of that Motion at this time.
10
the main telephone number for FFL. Contempt Respondents vigorously dispute the reliability
and veracity of this evidence, and this Court granted both parties limited discovery on this issue.
(Orders [Docs. #131, #142, #158, #173].)
The parties agree that the voice on the voicemail recording has been altered and that the
telephone records produced through expedited discovery show that there was not a phone call
made from FFL’s main phone line to either the Wilson or Haggerty phone numbers that
allegedly received these calls. Both parties have retained experts on the matter, each tending to
implicate a different person as the caller on the recording. Beyond the concerning implication
that this evidence may have been fabricated by Plaintiff, Contempt Respondents’ forensic
examiner expert contends that any information regarding the Wilson voicemail has been erased
from the phone, which Plaintiff does not dispute. Indeed, Contempt Respondents’ expert
contends that this erasure appears by use of a factory reset, as well as use of an application called
“Clean Master,” designed to “remove personal and sensitive information.” (Ex. A - Resp. to
Pl.’s Multiple Supplements [Doc. #178], at 2-3.) Furthermore, it is noteworthy to the Court that
this alleged deletion occurred on May 22, 2014—that is, after both Plaintiff’s counsel and Mr.
Wilson himself confirmed that he was preserving the voicemail on his phone on May 9, 2014.
(See Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Emergency Mot. for Exp. Disc. [Doc. #118], at 5-6; Second Decl. of
George Wilson [Doc. #119] ¶ 7.) Although Plaintiff’s counsel contends that this was an
unfortunate accident, it certainly does not help the Court reach the conclusion that that Plaintiff
advocates for: that Mr. Jimino (who may be associated with Defendant Meaike) was the actual
caller.
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Similarly, it appears that neither Plaintiff nor Mr. Haggerty took any steps to preserve any
evidence of the phone call made to him. Indeed, Mr. Haggerty admitted during his deposition
that he does not know if the phone number set forth in his declaration is in fact the number that
was displayed on his phone, as the information relating to the phone number or caller ID for
the alleged robocall is now “gone.” (Ex. A - Mot. for Sanctions [Doc. #182-1], at 50). In
conclusion, the Wilson voicemail and Haggerty robocall evidence is at a minimum, inconclusive,
and certainly not clear and convincing.
After reviewing the evidence presented by both parties, the Court concludes that Plaintiff
has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the Contempt Respondents have
violated an order issued by this Court. As that is a required element for civil contempt,
Plaintiff’s Motion [Doc. #79] to hold Contempt Respondents in civil contempt is denied, and
the request for expedited discovery requested by Plaintiff at the hearing is denied. As previously
noted, because this Court can deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt without considering the
merits of Contempt Respondents’ Motion to Strike [Doc. #101], the Contempt Respondents’
Motion to Strike is denied as moot.
B.
Criminal Contempt
18 U.S.C. § 401 gives the Court, at its discretion, “power to punish by fine or
imprisonment, or both,” for conduct, including “[d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ,
process, order, rule, decree, or command.” 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012). “To support a conviction
of criminal contempt for violation of a court order, it must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, that a person willfully, contumaciously, intentionally, with a wrongful state of mind,
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violated a decree which was definite, clear, specific, and left no doubt or uncertainty in the minds
of those to whom it was addressed.” United States v. McMahon, 104 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir.
1997) (quoting Richmond Black Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Richmond, 548 F.2d 123, 129
(4th Cir. 1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[T]the contempt power’s sole function is to punish an ‘act derogatory to the power and
authority of the [C]ourt.’” Brandt v. Gooding, 636 F.3d 124, 135 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 155 U.S. 3, 5, 15 S. Ct. 19, 39 L. Ed. 49 (1894)).
Criminal contempt proceedings are initiated at the sole discretion of the court and are “‘not
dependent on the [success] or even the continuation of the’ underlying suit.” Id. (quoting Bray
v. United States, 423 U.S. 73, 76, 96 S. Ct. 307, 46 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1975)). “Indeed, the very
‘purpose of a criminal court is not to provide a forum for the ascertainment of private rights’
but ‘to vindicate the public interest in the enforcement of the criminal law.’” Id. (quoting
Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25, 100 S. Ct. 1999, 64 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1980)).
As criminal contempt proceedings would require a violation of this Court’s Orders,
criminal contempt proceedings are unwarranted in view of what has, or more specifically, what
has not been presented to the Court. For these reasons, this Court has already concluded that
Plaintiff has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that Contempt Respondents violated
an Order issued by this Court. Therefore, the Court will not refer this matter to the U.S.
Attorney’s Office, as Plaintiff requested. As such, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for
Contempt [Doc. #79] in its entirety, including Plaintiff’s request to initiate criminal contempt
proceedings against the Contempt Respondents.
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III.
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order [Doc. #128] requests that the Court issue a
protective order “instruct[ing] that, until discovery is permitted by this Court, Plaintiff shall cease
pursuing discovery in state court matters related to named defendants in this case or other cases
Plaintiff has filed with this Court,” and that this Court decline to allow any such materials to be
used in this Court prior to discovery. (Mot. for Protective Order [Doc. #128], at 1.) Plaintiff
opposes this request, contending that Defendants’ Motion fails because it does not satisfy the
standards of a protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, and because
well-settled principles of federalism and comity foreclose this Court form enjoining pending
state court actions in the manner sought by Defendants. (Resp. to Mot. for Protective Order
[Doc. #140].)
Pursuant to Rule 26(c), a protective order can be issued only with “good cause” “in the
court where the action is pending.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). First, Defendants do not offer
authority to this Court to support the contention that, under Rule 26(c), this Court has the
authority to dictate how discovery should proceed in state court, as that is not the court where
this action is pending. Second, although this Court does have authority over how to conduct
the discovery proceedings in this Court, Defendants would still need to show good cause for this
Court to deny Plaintiff the use of lawfully obtained evidence in proceedings in this Court. See
Brittain v. Stroh Brewery Co., 136 F.R.D. 408, 412 (M.D.N.C. 1991) (“The burden of showing
good cause rests with the party requesting the protective order.”) In this regard, Defendants
must “make a particular request and a specific demonstration of facts in support of the request
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as opposed to conclusory or speculative statements about the need for a protective order and
the harm which would be suffered without one.” Id. (citing Gulf Oil v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89,
102 n.16, 101 S. Ct. 2193, 68 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1981); Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 133 F.R.D. 46,
48 (D. Kan. 1990)). Defendants have not made such a specific demonstration of facts about the
harm that would be suffered without a protective order. As such, Defendants have not shown
good cause as to why, if Plaintiff lawfully obtains admissible evidence, it should not be allowed
to use that evidence in this Court, even if it did not procure such evidence through this Court’s
discovery process. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order [Doc. #128] is denied.
IV.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt [Doc. #79] is
DENIED, Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order [Doc. #128] is DENIED, and Defendants’
Motion to Strike [Doc. #101] is DENIED AS MOOT. The Preliminary Injunction [Doc. # 88]
remains in effect.
This the 29th day of July, 2014.
United States District Judge
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