MASON v. COLVIN
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATIONOF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE, signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 7/21/2015. RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability be affirmed, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Reversing the Commissioner (Docket Entry 13 ) be denied, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 15 ) be granted, and that this action be dismissed with prejudice. (Butler, Carol)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CLARA LEE MASON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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)
1:13CV1150
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Clara Lee Mason, brought this action pursuant to
the Social Security Act (the “Act”) to obtain judicial review of a
final decision of Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security,
denying Plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”)
under Title II of the Act.
(Docket Entry 1.)
The Court has before
it the certified administrative record (cited herein as “Tr. __”),
as well as the parties’ cross-motions for judgment (Docket Entries
13, 15).
For the reasons that follow, the Court should enter
judgment for Defendant.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB on July
19, 2010, alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2008.
(Tr. 157-58.)
She subsequently amended the alleged onset date to
July 1, 2010.
(Tr. 181.)
Upon denial of Plaintiff’s applications
initially (Tr. 74) and on reconsideration (Tr. 90), she requested
a hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
Plaintiff, her attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”) attended
the hearing.
(Tr. 33-54.)
By decision dated September 13, 2012,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act.
(Tr. 20-32.)
On October 20, 2013, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review (Tr. 3-5), making the ALJ’s ruling
the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial review.
In rendering that disability determination, the ALJ made the
following findings later adopted by the Commissioner:
1.
[Plaintiff] last met the insured status requirements
of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2011.
. . . .
2.
[Plaintiff] did not engage in substantial gainful
activity during the period from her alleged onset date of
July 1, 2010 through her date last insured of December
31, 2011.
. . . .
3.
Through her last date insured, [Plaintiff] had the
following severe impairments: osteoarthritis bilateral
knees and left shoulder; dequervain’s tenosynovitis of
the left wrist and left thumb; bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome with remote history of release surgery;
hypertension; obesity; depression; and anxiety.
. . . .
4.
Through the date last insured, [Plaintiff] did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met
or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
. . . .
5.
. . . [T]hrough the date last insured, [Plaintiff]
had the residual functional capacity to perform light
2
work . . . except she was limited to frequent, not
constant, use of the bilateral upper extremities. She
could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She must
have avoided concentrated exposure to extremes of cold
and concentrated exposure to hazards such as unprotected
heights and machinery.
She was limited to performing
only simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, in that she
can apply common sense understanding to carry out oral,
written and diagrammatic instructions, and she could have
no more than frequent contact with the public and
coworkers.
(Tr. 22-25 (internal parenthetical citations omitted).)
In
light
of
the
foregoing
findings
regarding
residual
functional capacity, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was capable
of performing past relevant work.
(Tr. 31.)
Accordingly, the ALJ
ruled that Plaintiff did not have a disability, as defined in the
Act, at any time from the alleged onset date through the date last
insured.
(Id.)
II.
DISCUSSION
Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits.”
Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006).
Hines v.
However, “the scope
of [the Court’s] review of [such a] decision . . . is extremely
limited.”
Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981).
A.
Standard of Review
“[C]ourts are not to try [a Social Security] case de novo.”
Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974).
Instead,
the Court “must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ [underlying
the denial of benefits] if they are supported by substantial
3
evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal
standard.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 561 (internal brackets and quotation
marks
omitted).
“Substantial
evidence
means
‘such
relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.’”
Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir.
1992) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)).
“It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be
somewhat less than a preponderance.”
Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d
171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
“If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a
verdict were the case before a jury, then there is substantial
evidence.”
Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the [C]ourt should not
undertake
to
re-weigh
conflicting
evidence,
make
credibility
determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ, as
adopted by the Social Security Commissioner].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at
176 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).
“Where
conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to
whether
a
claimant
is
disabled,
the
responsibility
for
that
decision falls on the [Social Security Commissioner] (or the ALJ).”
Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The issue before
[the reviewing court], therefore, is not whether [the claimant] is
disabled, but whether the ALJ’s finding that [the claimant] is not
4
disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based
upon a correct application of the relevant law.”
Craig v. Chater,
76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).
When confronting that issue, the Court must take note that
“[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving
a disability,” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981),
and that, in this context, “disability” means the “‘inability to
engage in
any
substantial
gainful
activity
by
reason
of
any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months,’” id.
(quoting
42
U.S.C.
§
423(d)(1)(A)).1
“To
regularize
the
adjudicative process, the Social Security Administration has . . .
detailed regulations incorporating longstanding medical-vocational
evaluation policies that take into account a claimant’s age,
education, and work experience in addition to [the claimant’s]
medical
condition.”
Id.
“These
regulations
establish
a
‘sequential evaluation process’ to determine whether a claimant is
disabled.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
1
The Act “comprises two disability benefits programs. [DIB] . . . provides
benefits to disabled persons who have contributed to the program while employed.
[Supplemental Security Income] . . . provides benefits to indigent disabled
persons. The statutory definitions and the regulations . . . for determining
disability governing these two programs are, in all aspects relevant here,
substantively identical.”
Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1 (internal citations
omitted).
5
This sequential evaluation process (“SEP”) has up to five
steps:
“The claimant (1) must not be engaged in ‘substantial
gainful activity,’ i.e., currently working; and (2) must have a
‘severe’ impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the ‘listings’ of
specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent
that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capacity
to (4) perform [the claimant’s] past work or (5) any other work.”
Albright v. Commissioner of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 475
n.2 (4th Cir. 1999).2
A finding adverse to the claimant at any of
several points in the SEP forecloses an award and ends the inquiry.
For example, “[t]he first step determines whether the claimant is
engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’ If the claimant is
working, benefits are denied.
The second step determines if the
claimant is ‘severely’ disabled.
If not, benefits are denied.”
Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at
each of the first three steps, the “claimant is disabled.” Mastro,
270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and
two, but falters at step three, i.e., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment
is not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment,
the ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity
2
“Through the fourth step, the burden of production and proof is on the
claimant.
If the claimant reaches step five, the burden shifts to the
[Commissioner] . . . .” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal citations omitted).
6
(‘RFC’).”
Id. at 179.3
Step four then requires the ALJ to assess
whether, based on that RFC, the claimant can perform past relevant
work; if so, the claimant does not qualify as disabled.
179-80.
Id. at
However, if the claimant establishes an inability to
return to prior work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step,
whereupon the ALJ must decide “whether the claimant is able to
perform other work considering both [the claimant’s RFC] and [the
claimant’s] vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work
experience) to adjust to a new job.”
Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65.
If, at this step, the Commissioner cannot carry its “evidentiary
burden of proving that [the claimant] remains able to work other
jobs
available
disabled.
in
the
community,”
the
claimant
qualifies
as
Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.4
3
“RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the claimant’s]
limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562 (noting that administrative regulations
require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-related physical
and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis . . .
[which] means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule”
(internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted)).
The RFC includes both a
“physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses the claimant’s
“ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work,” as well as
“nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or skin impairments).” Hall, 658
F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only after [the ALJ] considers
all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments and any related symptoms (e.g.,
pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63.
4
A claimant thus can establish disability via two paths through the SEP. The
first path requires resolution of the questions at steps one, two, and three in
the claimant’s favor, whereas, on the second path, the claimant must prevail at
steps one, two, four, and five. Some short-hand judicial characterizations of
the SEP appear to gloss over the fact that an adverse finding against a claimant
on step three does not terminate the analysis. See, e.g., Hunter, 993 F.2d at
35 (“If the ALJ finds that a claimant has not satisfied any step of the process,
review does not proceed to the next step.”).
7
B.
Assignments of Error
Plaintiff contends that the Court should overturn the ALJ’s
finding of no disability because the ALJ failed to properly assess
Plaintiff’s credibility, resulting in an inaccurate RFC.
Entry
14
at
4-9.)
Defendant
affirmance of the ALJ’s decision.
In
attacking
the
contends
otherwise
(Docket
and
seeks
(Docket Entry 16 at 5-8.)
ALJ’s credibility
assessment,
Plaintiff
asserts that, “when an ALJ discredits subjective testimony, he must
articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so.”
(Docket
Entry 14 at 9).
Plaintiff further contends that the “ALJ [] did
not
adequate
articulate
reasons
for
rejecting
[Plaintiff’s]
testimony,” and the Court should remand the case on that basis.
(Id.)
Specifically,
Plaintiff
takes
issue
with
the
ALJ’s
assessment of her testimony concerning her hand and wrist pain (see
id.
at
4-8)
Plaintiff’s
and
several
credibility
inferences
from
various
drawn
by
the
ALJ
inconsistencies
statements in the record (see id. at 8-9).
as
in
to
her
In support, Plaintiff
cites to Hines, 453 F.3d 559, for the proposition that, “‘[h]aving
met [her] threshold obligation of showing by objective medical
evidence a condition reasonably likely to cause the pain claimed,’
[Plaintiff] ‘[wa]s entitled to rely exclusively on subjective
evidence to prove the second part of the test, i.e. that [her] pain
is so continuous and/or severe as to prevent [her] from working a
8
full eight hour day.’” (Docket Entry 14 at 7 (quoting Hines, 453
F.3d at 565).)
As
an
initial
matter,
Plaintiff
“bears
the
burden
of
establishing [her] impairments and the resulting limitations on
[her] ability to perform work.”
Donnell v. Astrue, No. 1:09CV308,
2010 WL 3911425, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 5, 2010) (unpublished)
(Dixon, M.J.), recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Nov. 5,
2010) (Schroeder, J.).
In order to successfully challenge the
ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, Plaintiff must
show how a proper credibility analysis would have resulted in
additional functional limitations in the RFC and how that RFC would
impact the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s ability
to perform the jobs cited by the VE.
F.
App’x.
515,
518
(10th
Cir.
See McAnally v. Astrue, 241
2007)
(“[W]e
agree
with
the
magistrate that, ‘[w]ith regard to [her] hypertension, loss of
vision or skin problems, the claimant has shown no error by the ALJ
because she does not identify any functional limitations that
should have been included in the RFC [assessment] or discuss any
evidence that would support the inclusion of any limitation.’”);
Miles v. Astrue, No. 8:07-3164-RBH, 2009 WL 890651, at *14 (D.S.C.
Mar. 30, 2009) (unpublished) (“[T]he plaintiff details various
pieces of evidence which she contends the ALJ misconstrued . . . .
The plaintiff, however, has not explained how such evidence, if
fully
considered,
would
have
proven
9
additional
limitations
sufficient to eliminate the possibility that [the] plaintiff could
perform the sedentary work required of her past relevant work.
Accordingly, error, if any, in either failing to consider such
evidence or in misconstruing it, would be harmless.”).
Here,
although Plaintiff has made the conclusory statement that “this
case must be remanded for proper assessment of her credibility, the
medical record and her RFC,” (Docket Entry 14 at 9), she has made
no effort to show how a proper credibility analysis would have
impacted the RFC and the jobs she could perform as a result of that
RFC (see Docket Entry 14 at 4-9).
Nor
does
Plaintiff’s
generalized
credibility analysis withstand scrutiny.
attack
on
the
ALJ’s
Social Security Ruling
96-7p, Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Evaluation
of Symptoms in Disability Claims: Assessing the Credibility of an
Individual’s Statements (“SSR 96-7p”), as applied by the Fourth
Circuit in Craig, 76 F.3d at 594-95, provides a two-part test for
evaluating a claimant’s statement about symptoms.
“First, there
must be objective medical evidence showing ‘the existence of a
medical impairment(s) which results from anatomical, physiological,
or
psychological
abnormalities
and
which
could
reasonably
expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’”
be
Id. at
594 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b)).
If a claimant meets that threshold obligation, the fact finder
must proceed to part two and evaluate the intensity and persistence
10
of the claimant’s symptoms, as well as the extent to which they
affect
her
ability
to
work.
Id.
at
595.
In
making
this
evaluation, the fact finder:
must take into account not only the claimant’s statements
about her pain, but also all the available evidence,
including the claimant’s medical history, medical signs,
and laboratory findings, any objective medical evidence
of pain (such as evidence of reduced joint motion, muscle
spasms, deteriorating tissues, redness, etc.), and any
other evidence relevant to the severity of the
impairment, such as evidence of the claimant’s daily
activities, specific descriptions of the pain, and any
medical treatment taken to alleviate it.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
At the outset, Plaintiff overstates the reach of Hines.
That
case holds only that, at part two of the credibility assessment,
“subjective evidence of the pain, its intensity or degree can, by
itself, support a finding of disability.”
(emphasis
added).
circumstances,
an
In
ALJ
other
may
words,
choose
to
Hines, 453 F.3d at 563
under
rely
the
appropriate
exclusively
on
a
claimant’s subjective complaints to find disabling pain at part two
of the credibility assessment. However, Hines does not compel ALJs
to consider only subjective evidence at part two of the credibility
assessment, as such a requirement conflicts with the regulations,
which plainly require ALJs to consider a variety of factors in
evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
pain.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) (directing ALJs to assess a
claimant’s medical history, medical signs and laboratory findings,
daily activities, testimony about the nature and location of pain,
11
medication and other treatment used to alleviate pain, along with
medical opinions from examining and non-examining sources).
As
to
her
hand
and
wrist
pain
specifically,
Plaintiff
principally takes issue with the ALJ’s characterization of her
conditions as having improved through treatment, thus rendering
those conditions less severe.
(Docket Entry 14 at 7-8.)
In that
regard, Plaintiff contends:
The question is not whether the claimant could obtain and
perform a job during a period of remission, but rather
whether the claimant could hold a job for any significant
length of time. The record demonstrates that whenever
[Plaintiff] experienced a period of improvement in
symptoms, it was always followed by a period of symptom
worsening with pain, finger locking and loss of
sensation.
Thus, [the ALJ’s] pointing to a temporary
period of improvement does not detract from [Plaintiff’s]
credibility regarding her chronic wrist and hand
problems.
(Id. at 8 (internal citations omitted).)
However, Plaintiff
appears to mischaracterize the ALJ’s interpretation of her hand and
wrist pain.
The ALJ concluded from the evidence in the record
that, “[d]ue to [Plaintiff’s] recurrent wrist pain and numbness,
she could frequently, not constantly use both arms . . . [and]
could not be exposed to cold temperatures . . . .”
(emphasis added).)
“recurrent,”
the
(Tr. 28
In other words, by describing the pain as
ALJ
acknowledged
that
Plaintiff
experienced
periods of improvement and periods of worsening, a description that
mirrors Plaintiff’s own characterization of her symptoms above.
12
Notably, nowhere does the ALJ deem Plaintiff’s testimony
regarding her hand and wrist lacks credibility because the severity
of her condition fluctuated over time.
(See Tr. 26-29.)
Instead,
the ALJ reasonably determined that a recurrent condition would have
a less severe impact on Plaintiff’s ability to work than a constant
condition or a condition that only worsened.
(See id.)
The
resulting RFC assigned to Plaintiff reflects that determination in
that the ALJ conditioned Plaintiff’s ability to perform light work
by limiting her “to frequent, not constant use of the bilateral
upper extremities.”
(Tr. 25.)
Moreover, the inclusion of that
limitation suggests that the ALJ did not consider only the effects
of Plaintiff’s hand and wrist symptoms during periods of remission,
as Plaintiff suggests (Docket Entry 14 at 8); rather, the ALJ
contemplated that Plaintiff would not at any time be able to do a
job that required the level of functioning of her hands and wrists
normally
associated
[Plaintiff’s]
with
recurrent
light
wrist
work
pain
(see
and
Tr.
28
numbness,
(“Due
she
to
could
frequently, not constantly use both arms.”)).
Here, the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints
of pain complies with the applicable regulations. The ALJ found at
part
one
of
the
credibility
assessment
that
Plaintiff
had
impairments that could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged
symptoms.
(Tr. 26.)5
Proceeding to part two of the credibility
5
Plaintiff has not alleged any error with respect to
credibility inquiry. (See Docket Entry 14 at 4-9.)
13
this part of the
assessment, the ALJ found, however, that “[Plaintiff’s] statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with
the . . . [RFC] assessment.”
(Id.)6
In making that part two finding, the ALJ discussed the medical
history and medical signs relevant to Plaintiff’s hand and wrist
pain.
(Tr. 26-28.)
Further, the ALJ reviewed observations from
Plaintiff’s treating providers as to the fluctuations in her hand
and wrist pain which tended to support the view that she responded
well to surgery and injections (see id.), including that, by
February
2012
(immediately
following
Plaintiff’s
last
date
insured), her provider reported that her tenosynovitis had resolved
and that “[Plaintiff] is doing well with her wrist.
Only having
occasional discomfort at times” (Tr. 478; see also Tr. 28).
The
ALJ next compared Plaintiff’s own statements in the medical record
and at the hearing concerning her daily activities, which tended to
6
The Fourth Circuit recently issued a published decision, Mascio v. Colvin, 780
F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015), which found that the ALJ erred by using, at part two
of the credibility assessment, “boilerplate” language that “the claimant’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his
pain] are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above
residual functional capacity assessment.” Id. at 639. The court joined the
Seventh Circuit in holding that this language “‘gets things backwards’ by
implying ‘that ability to work is determined first and is then used to determine
the claimant’s credibility.’” Id. (quoting Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645
(7th Cir. 2012)).
However, the court concluded that the ALJ’s use of such
language would constitute harmless error if the ALJ had “properly analyzed
credibility elsewhere.” Id. Although in Mascio, the court did not find that the
ALJ had elsewhere properly analyzed the claimant’s credibility, id. at 640, in
this case (for reasons discussed above), the ALJ did otherwise properly analyze
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain.
14
suggest that, “despite the claimant’s pain, the record shows no
more than mild limitations in her activities of daily living.”
(Tr. 29.)
In particular, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “remained
independent in her activities of daily living[,] . . . she cared
for [her ill father] until his death in 2011[,] . . . [and] she was
planting a garden . . . .”
(Tr. 24.)
In sum, the ALJ’s
credibility analysis as to her hand and wrist symptoms complies
with the regulations and Fourth Circuit law.
As a final matter, Plaintiff also asserts that “[t]he rest of
the ALJ’s reasons for finding [Plaintiff] non-credible are just
strange.”
(Docket Entry 14 at 8.)
In that regard, Plaintiff
objects to the ALJ’s consideration of various inconsistencies
between the record and Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing.
at 8-9.)
(Id.
For instance, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff told two
different versions of a story about injuring her wrist, one in
which she did so trying to catch a falling child and another in
which
she
was
trying
to
catch
an
older
woman.
(Tr.
29.)
Similarly, the ALJ observed that, “when asked about her garden at
the hearing, [Plaintiff] denied spending time in her garden, which
is inconsistent with her report to her own mental health provider
in May 2012 . . . .” (Id.)
In addition, the ALJ cited some
discrepancies between the work history Plaintiff reported to her
therapist and to the Social Security Administration.
15
(Id.)
According
to
Plaintiff,
the
ALJ
has
“dredg[ed]
up
inconsistencies that do not exist” (Docket Entry 14 at 8) and that,
for instance, referencing Plaintiff’s two versions of the story
about catching a child/elderly woman “was an improper reason for
finding
[Plaintiff]
impairments”
(id.).
lacked
credibility
regarding
her
wrist
However, the ALJ bears the duty to consider
how inconsistent statements reflect generally on the credibility of
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.
See Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d
1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Ultimately, it is the duty of the
[ALJ] reviewing a case, and not the responsibility of the courts,
to
make
findings
of
fact
and
to
resolve
conflicts
in
the
evidence.”); see also Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 657-59
(4th Cir. 2005) (affirming ALJ’s credibility determination based on
inconsistencies in the record and the claimaint’s unclear and
evasive answers to the ALJ’s questions).
In addition, “[b]ecause
[the ALJ] has the opportunity to observe the demeanor and to
determine the credibility of the claimant, the ALJ’s observations
concerning these questions are to be given great weight.”
v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1984).
Shively
Notwithstanding
Plaintiff’s explanations for some of these inconsistencies in her
statements
(see
Docket
Entry
14
at
8-9),
the
ALJ
reasonably
concluded that the presence of numerous inconsistent statements by
Plaintiff in the record tended to render her statements generally
less credible (Tr. 29-30).
16
Finally, as Defendant correctly observes, “even assuming the
ALJ incorrectly deemed each of these statements to be inconsistent,
such error would be harmless since [those were] not the only
factor[s]
the
evaluation.”
ALJ
considered
as
part
of
his
credibility
(Docket Entry 16 at 7 (citing Hosey v. Astrue, No.
2:11CV42, 2012 WL 667813, at *7 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2012), for
proposition that, where credibility finding reflects consideration
of entire record, mistake as to small piece of evidence constitutes
harmless error).)
Here, as discussed above, the ALJ considered a
wide range of medical and opinion evidence in determining that
Plaintiff’s
hand
and
wrist
pain
did
not
preclude
performing light work with the prescribed limitations.
reasons,
substantial
evidence
supports
the
ALJ’s
her
from
For these
credibility
analysis.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has established no grounds for relief.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision
finding no disability be affirmed, that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Judgment Reversing the Commissioner (Docket Entry 13) be denied,
that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry
15) be granted, and that this action be dismissed with prejudice.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
July 21, 2015
17
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