BUFFKIN et al v. MARUCHAN, INC.

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN JR. on 2/27/2015; that Maruchan's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11 ) is DENIED in that Plaintiffs' Voluntary Withdrawal of Punitive Damages Claim (Doc. 18 ) renders Mar uchan's motion moot. In accordance with Plaintiffs' Notice (Doc. 18 ) and Maruchan's consent to said notice (Doc. 20 ), this court dismisses Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages without prejudice. FURTHER that Maruchan's Motion to Add Necessary Party (Doc. 13 ) is DENIED. FINALLY that Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand (Doc. 14 ) is DENIED. (Sheets, Jamie)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

KIMBERLY BUFFKIN and
ERIC RICHARDSON, in his
capacity as Guardian ad
Litem for OP,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MARUCHAN, INC., and TOYO
SUISAN KAISHA, LTD.,
Defendants.

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1:14CV3

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
Plaintiffs Kimberly Buffkin1 (“Buffkin”) and Eric Richardson
in his capacity as guardian ad litem for OP (“OP”) (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) commenced this action by filing a Complaint in the
General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, Forsyth
County, North Carolina, against Defendants Maruchan, Inc.
(“Maruchan”) and Toyo Suisan Kaisha, Ltd. (“Toyo”) (collectively
“Defendants”). (Complaint (“Compl.”) (Doc. 7).) Defendant

1

Kimberly Buffkin is the mother of OP.

Maruchan removed the action to federal court on January 6, 20142
based on diversity jurisdiction.3 (Notice of Removal (Doc. 1).)
In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Maruchan is a
subsidiary of Toyo. (Compl. (Doc. 7) at 1.) In the Notice of
Removal, Maruchan states that:
It is believed that Defendant Toyo Suisan Kaisha,
Ltd. is a Japanese corporation, with its principal
place of business also being in Japan. For the
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, Defendant Toyo
Suisan Kaisha, Ltd. is therefore believed to be a
foreign corporation and a citizen of Japan for the
purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Though it is
unclear at the present time as to whether Defendant
Toyo Suisan Kaisha, Ltd. has been properly joined and
served in this matter, counsel for Maruchan has also
been retained to represent Defendant Toyo Suisan
Kaisha, Ltd. and represents to the Court that it will
not object to the removal of this matter.
2

Maruchan’s Notice of Removal was placed under seal by an
assistant clerk of court when it was filed on January 6, 2014.
(Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Remand (Doc. 19) at 2.) The clerk sealed
the removal petition, because Maruchan failed to redact OP’s
name as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2, which requires the name
of a minor to be redacted. According to Maruchan, the clerk
telephoned Maruchan to alert them of their oversight and
informed Maruchan that the document would be sealed until
Maruchan could file a redacted version. Maruchan filed the
redacted notice of removal (Doc. 5) on January 7, 2014. (Id.)
3

The parties in the present action are completely diverse.
Plaintiffs are North Carolina residents. Maruchan, a
corporation, is a citizen of California, with its principal
place of business there. The amount in controversy exceeds the
statutory minimum for diversity. It is believed that Toyo is a
Japanese corporation with its principal places of business in
Japan. (Notice of Removal (Doc. 5).) Plaintiffs concede that
there is complete diversity between all parties. (Pls.’ Mem. in
Supp. of Mot. to Remand (Doc. 15) at 1.)
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(Notice of Removal (Doc. 5) at 4 (internal citations omitted).)
Also on January 6, 2014, Attorneys Leslie P. Lasher and
J. Matthew Little filed Notices of Appearances (Docs. 2, 4) on
behalf of both Maruchan and Toyo. Other than consenting to
removal, Toyo has not made any other filings in this matter.
Therefore, this court refers only to Maruchan and not
“Defendants” in this Order.
Presently before this court are three motions: (1)
Maruchan’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11), (2) Maruchan’s Motion to
Add Necessary Party (Doc. 13), and (3) Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Remand (Doc. 14). This court has carefully considered the
motions and all supporting briefs filed by both parties.

For

the reasons stated fully below, this court will deny all three
motions.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed the present action to recover damages

resulting from OP allegedly being burned by a spill of instant
soup produced by Maruchan. In May 2011, Buffkin purchased a
carton of Maruchan Instant Lunch (“Instant Lunch”).

(Compl.

(Doc. 7) ¶ 24.) That same month, OP’s father allegedly prepared
the Instant Lunch as directed by adding boiling water to the
Styrofoam cup that holds the instant lunch. (Id. ¶ 32.)
Plaintiffs allege that, because of a design defect in the
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Styrofoam packaging, OP’s infant nephew tipped the Instant Lunch
which then spilled on OP and severely burned her. (Id. ¶¶ 31,
33-34.) Plaintiffs contend that Maruchan knew or should have
known that the design of their Instant Lunch packaging was
dangerous and defective and are, therefore, responsible for OP’s
injuries and subsequent medical expenses. (Id. ¶ 37.) Plaintiffs
initiated the present action against Maruchan and Toyo to
recover medical and other related costs stemming from
Defendants’ alleged design defect and negligence. (Id. ¶ 45.)
II.

ANALYSIS
Maruchan moves this court to both (1) dismiss Plaintiffs’

claims for punitive damages (Doc. 11) and (2) add OP’s father,
Jason A. Powell (“Powell”), as a necessary party (Doc. 13).
Plaintiffs move this court to remand the action back to state
court based on Plaintiffs’ allegations that Maruchan’s Petition
for Removal was not timely. (Doc. 14.)
A.

Motion to Dismiss Claim for Punitive Damages

Maruchan filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) and Memorandum
in Support of the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) on January 17,
2014. Maruchan argues that Plaintiffs did not properly assert a
claim for punitive damages in their complaint, but simply asked
for punitive damages in their prayer for relief. (Def.’s Mem. in
Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Punitive Damage Claim (“Def.’s
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Mem.”) (Doc. 12) at 3.) On February 10, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a
Notice of Voluntary Withdrawal of Punitive Damages Claim.
(Notice of Withdrawal (Doc. 18).) With this Notice, Plaintiffs
seek to withdraw their claims for punitive damages while
reserving the right to replead the claims should discovery
reveal facts supporting such a claim.4 (Id. at 2.) Maruchan
consents to Plaintiffs’ voluntary withdrawal without prejudice
to their punitive damages claim. (Def.’s Notice of Consent to
Voluntary Dismissal (Doc. 20).) In light of Plaintiffs’
withdrawal of the punitive damages claim with consent from
Maruchan, this court will deny Maruchan’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 11) as it is rendered moot and will allow dismissal of
Plaintiffs’ punitive damage claim without prejudice.
B.

Motion to Add Necessary Party

On January 23, 2014, Maruchan filed a Motion to Add
Necessary Party pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, or in the
alterative, Fed. R. Civ. P. 20.

(Doc. 13.) Maruchan requests

this court order or allow the addition of James A. Powell as a
necessary party in the present action. Upon information and
4

Plaintiffs cite Stricklin v. Fortuna Energy, Inc., Civil
Action No. 5:12CV8, 2013 WL 869717 (N.D.W. Va. Mar. 7, 2013) for
the proposition of allowing them to voluntarily withdraw their
punitive damage claims without prejudice in order to preserve
their right to replead such claims should discovery reveal facts
supporting such a claim. (Notice of Withdrawal (Doc. 18) at 2
n.2.)
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belief, Powell is OP’s father. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiffs did not
file any response to this motion.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 sets out the parameters for required
joinder of parties. Specifically, the rule states:
(a)

Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible.
(1)

Required Party. A person who is subject
to service of process and whose joinder will
not deprive the court of subject-matter
jurisdiction must be joined as a party if:
(A)

in that person's absence, the court
cannot accord complete relief among
existing parties; or

(B)

that person claims an interest relating
to the subject of the action and is so
situated that disposing of the action
in the person's absence may:
(i)

as a practical matter impair or
impede the person's ability to
protect the interest; or

(ii) leave an existing party subject to
a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations because
of the interest.
“Rule 19 creates a two-step inquiry: first, whether a party
is necessary to a proceeding because of its relationship to the
matter under consideration; and second, if a necessary party is
unavailable, whether the proceeding can continue in that party's
absence. If it cannot, the party is indispensable and the action
should be dismissed.” Teamsters Local Union No. 171 v. Keal
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Driveaway Co., 173 F.3d 915, 917-18 (4th Cir. 1999) (footnotes
and internal citations omitted).
In the alterative, Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 allows for permissive
joinder of parties. The relevant portion reads:
(a)

Persons Who May Join or Be Joined.
(1)

Plaintiffs. Persons may join in one action
as plaintiffs if:
(A)

they assert any right to relief
jointly, severally, or in the
alternative with respect to or arising
out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences; and

(B)

any question of law or fact common to
all plaintiffs will arise in the
action.

Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts that it was OP’s father5 who
prepared the Instant Lunch and was monitoring the children when
the alleged accident occurred. (Compl. (Doc. 7) ¶¶ 32-33.)
Maruchan alleges that Powell, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5013.4, as parent of OP, is legally responsible for OP’s medical
bills until OP reaches the age of majority. (Mot. to Add
Necessary Party (Doc. 13) at 1.) Maruchan asserts that Powell’s
alleged responsibility for OP’s medical bills make him a
necessary party to the present action. (Id. at 2.) However, this
5

Plaintiffs do not name OP’s father in the Complaint or any
subsequent filings.
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court does not find that Maruchan’s request to add Powell meets
the criteria for either Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 or 20.
This court is not persuaded by Maruchan’s assertion that
joinder is required pursuant to Rule 19, because Maruchan could
be subject to multiple or inconsistent obligations if both of
OP’s parents are not parties to the present suit. (Id.) The
Eastern District of Virginia analyzed the “inconsistent
obligations” prong of Rule 19.

S. Co. Energy Mktg., L.P. v.

Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 190 F.R.D. 182, 186 (E.D. Va. 1999).
Looking at various circuit court decisions, that court found
that “[t]he term ‘inconsistent obligations’ does not mean ‘any
inconsistency’. . . . Inconsistent obligations [requiring
joinder] arise only when a party to the case risks facing
conflicting judgments, so that compliance with one would
conflict with the other.” Id. In contrast, the court found Rule
19 joinder inapplicable when the alleged inconsistent
obligations arose from possible “inconsistent adjudications.”
Id. “Inconsistent adjudications . . . are those in which a party
might prevail on one theory of liability in one case, and then
fail on that same theory, and even on the same or similar facts,
in another case against another party; while inconsistent as a

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matter of logic, these judgments would not necessarily subject
the party to inconsistent legal obligations.”6 Id.
Maruchan has not persuaded this court that Powell is a
necessary party pursuant to Rule 19. Plaintiffs’ claims in the
present action can be fully resolved without the addition of
Powell. In addition, Maruchan has not persuaded this court that
resolution of the present matter without Powell will subject
Maruchan to the possibility of conflicting, inconsistent
judgments. The financial obligations between OP’s parents with
regard to OP are not a matter for this court presently, nor are
they a matter for Maruchan. Another factor dissuading this court
from joining Powell is that Powell has not thus far claimed any
interest in the present action.7 This court also finds that Rule
20 joinder is not implicated, because there is nothing in the
record to indicate that Powell has asserted any right to relief

6

See Delgado v. Plaza Las Americas, Inc., 139 F.3d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 1998)(“[T]he mere possibility of inconsistent results
in separate actions does not make the plaintiff in each action a
necessary party to the other.”); RPR & Assocs. v. O’Brien/Atkins
Assocs., P.A., 921 F. Supp. 1457, 1464 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (“Rule 19
is not triggered by the possibility of a subsequent adjudication
that may result in a judgment that is inconsistent as a matter
of logic.”). S. Co. Energy Mktg., 190 F.R.D. at 186 n.5.
7

Joinder was not required under Rule 19(a)(2) where the
district court found that [party to be joined] had not claimed
an interest in the federal action. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins.
Co. v. Wood, 429 F.3d 83, 93 (4th Cir. 2005).
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at all. Therefore, this court will deny Maruchan’s Motion to Add
Necessary Party (Doc. 13) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 or 20.
C.

Motion to Remand

Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand (Doc. 14) and
Supporting Memorandum (Doc. 15) on February 3, 2014. On
February 18, 2014, Maruchan filed a response in opposition to
Plaintiffs’ motion to remand (Doc. 19) and, on March 7, 2014,
Plaintiffs filed a reply (Doc. 21). Plaintiffs assert that
Maruchan’s Notice of Removal was not timely filed, because the
Notice was filed on January 6, 2014, the 30th and final day it
could be filed, but the Notice was not redacted to protect minor
child OP’s identity.8 As explained earlier, the clerk’s office
alerted Maruchan of this oversight, filed the Notice of Removal
under seal on January 6, 2014, and Maruchan filed a redacted
version the next day.
Plaintiffs do not contest that the January 6, 2014 Notice
of Removal was procedurally correct in that it properly asserted
diversity jurisdiction in this action. (Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 21) at
4.)

Plaintiffs’ timeliness claim stems from Plaintiffs’

assertion that Maruchan’s Notice of Removal was actually filed
8

Both parties agree that 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) requires
that a Notice of Removal be filed within 30 days of a
defendant’s receipt of the initial pleading. In the present
action, the 30th day was January 6, 2014.
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on January 7, 2014, when the redacted version was filed. This is
simply not the case. Maruchan filed the Notice of Removal with
this court on January 6, 2014, and then amended that Notice on
January 7, 2014, pursuant to instructions from this court. The
Notice was docketed on January 6, 2014. (Doc. 1.) The Notice of
Removal was timely filed within the thirty-day time period
required by statute. Therefore, this court will deny Plaintiffs’
Motion to Remand (Doc. 14).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Maruchan’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) is DENIED in that
Plaintiffs’ Voluntary Withdrawal of Punitive Damages Claim (Doc.
18) renders Maruchan’s motion moot. In accordance with
Plaintiffs’ Notice (Doc. 18) and Maruchan’s consent to said
notice (Doc. 20), this court dismisses Plaintiffs’ claim for
punitive damages without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maruchan’s Motion to Add
Necessary Party (Doc. 13) is DENIED.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand
(Doc. 14) is DENIED.

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This the 27th day of February, 2015.

_______________________________________
United States District Judge

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