CABRERA MEJIA v. WAL-MART

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE THOMAS D. SCHROEDER on 11/03/2014; that Wal-Marts motion to dismiss (Doc. 14 ) is GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED. (Garland, Leah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
LUIS D. CABRERA MEJIA,
Plaintiff,
v.
WAL-MART,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1:14CV237

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.
This is an employment discrimination action.

Plaintiff

Luis D. Cabrera Mejia, proceeding pro se, alleges that Wal-Mart
failed to provide him with a reasonable accommodation, subjected
him to acts of disability discrimination, and terminated him
because of his disability, in violation of the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101

et seq.

Wal-Mart argues that Mejia’s complaint fails to state a claim
and

moves

to

dismiss

Procedure 12(b)(6).1

it

pursuant

(Doc. 14.)

to

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Mr. Mejia’s personal situation

appears difficult and sad, but, for the reasons set forth below,
it fails to rise to the level of an ADA claim.

Accordingly,

Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss will be granted, and the case will
be dismissed.

1

Wal-Mart asserts that the correct corporate title for the Defendant
is “Wal-Mart Stores East, LP.”

I.

BACKGROUND
On a motion to dismiss, the court views the facts in the

light most favorable to Mejia.

See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.

Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009).
From

2011

until

June

21,

2013,

Mejia,

a

naturalized

Dominican-American, worked at an unspecified Wal-Mart store as a
customer service manager.

(Compl. at 3, 10.)

While at work on

May 1, 2013, Mejia became worried about being fired (apparently
because of a criminal assault charge against him filed by his
wife, with whom he was having marital problems) and asked for
time to talk to shift manager Dave Rhyne and other employees.
(Id. at 10, 29.)

On May 1st, 2013, Rhyne – along with several

other employees and managers – met with Mejia in the store’s
“cash office.”
course

of

that

(Id. at 21, 29.)
conversation

he

According to Mejia, during the
asked

Rhyne

whether

he

was

racist, to which Rhyne replied “he ‘might be right about that.’”2
(Id. at 20, 29.)
Later that day, Mejia had a second conversation with Rhyne.
(Id. at 20–21, 30.)

That conversation concerned a “personal

discussion” Mejia had had with a Wal-Mart cashier.
being

informed

of

that

discussion,

2

Rhyne

turned

(Id.)
to

After
another

Mejia repeatedly characterizes this statement as a “racial slur.”
(Compl. at 2.)

2

employee and, referring to Mejia, said “this man is going to
make me kill him.”

(Id.)

Following these two incidents, Mejia

developed an anxiety disorder and depression.3
9, 18–19.)

(Compl. at 2, 6–

The two conversations with Rhyne further agitated

Mejia’s prior intestinal problem.
approximately

twenty

(Id. at 2–4.)

to

thirty

(Id. at 2.)
pounds

and

Mejia also lost

attempted

suicide.

A few weeks after the incidents, in June 2013,

Mejia stopped coming to work for a week and a half without prior
notice.

(Id.

at

2–3.)

Mejia

alleges

that

medically-related issues caused this absence.

a

variety

of

(See id. at 2–3

(citing a lack of sleep, “passing gas,” and uncontrollable bowel
movements)).
Mejia eventually reported both conversations with Rhyne to
Wal-Mart’s

home

office

but

was

told

to

speak

to

the

store

manager, Daniel Barsdin, because the conversations had occurred
more than three weeks prior.
after

his

Barsdin.

week-and-a-half
(Id. at 2–4.)

(Id. at 2.)

absence

from

On June 21, 2013,

work,

Mejia

met

with

He told Barsdin that he had developed

an anxiety disorder and depression because of the conversations
with Rhyne and that he had stopped coming to work as a result.
(Id. at 2.)

According to Mejia, he had previously discussed his

medical conditions with Barsdin in March and May of 2013.
3

(Id.

Mejia’s attached medical records, however, indicate that, before the
May 1 incident, Mejia already felt depressed, had “a history of
anxiety,” and had previously been diagnosed with an anxiety disorder.
(Compl. at 10, 14–17.)

3

at

4.)

Mejia

also

told

Barsdin

problem,” he would return to work.

that,

if

he

“fix[ed]

(Id. at 4, 23, 31.)

the

At the

meeting, Mejia attempted to give Barsdin a police report and one
of his medical evaluations at the meeting.

(Id. at 4.)

Barsdin

refused to accept those documents and instead asked that Mejia
write a statement.

(Id. at 3.)

Mejia refused Barsdin’s request

and said that he was going to contact a lawyer.

(Id. at 3–4.)

After this meeting with Barsdin, Mejia “never returned to work”
and has “since been separated.” (Id.)

Following the June 21

meeting, Mejia filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”)

charge

discrimination.

on

December

(Id. at 23.)

9,

2013,

claiming

disability

In his EEOC charge, Mejia stated

that, as of May 4, 2013, he “did not ask nor did [he] need
reasonable accommodation.”

(Id.)

Mejia filed this pro se complaint on March 20, 2014.
2.)

(Doc.

The complaint asserted claims of disability discrimination

based on Wal-Mart’s failure to accommodate Mejia’s disability,
Wal-Mart’s refusal to accept documentation of his disability,
and Mejia’s discharge.4

(Id. at 2–5.)

Attached to the complaint

are medical records, a police report, an EEOC charge and rightto-sue letter, and a number of documents typed and written by
Mejia.

(See Doc. 2.)

Subsequent to filing the complaint, Mejia

4

Although citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 as the jurisdictional basis for
his complaint, Mejia makes no factual allegation that Wal-Mart
retaliated against him for filing an EEOC charge. (See Compl. at 1.)

4

filed several additional documents as attachments and exhibits
to his complaint.5

(Docs. 5, 11, 13.)

On June 26, 2014, Wal-

Mart filed a motion to dismiss Mejia’s complaint for failure to
state a claim.

(Doc. 15.)

Mejia responded (Doc. 17), Wal-Mart

replied (Doc. 18), and Mejia filed a further response (Doc. 19).
Wal-Mart’s motion is now ripe for consideration.
II.

ANALYSIS
A.
A

Standard of Review
court

liberally,

thus

must

construe

permitting

develop if one is present.

a

pro

se

litigants’

potentially

complaints

meritorious

case

to

Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 707

(4th Cir. 2002) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972)).

However, this rule does not require that the court

become an advocate for the unrepresented party.

Weller v. Dep’t

of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).

“Only those

questions which are squarely presented to a court may properly
be addressed.”

Id.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a
complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim

5

Although labelled as attachments, these additional documents were not
filed with the complaint.
Because these filings provide no new
factual allegations but simply repeat allegations from the complaint
and its attachments, this court need not determine whether it should
consider those later-filed documents.
See Phillips v. LCI Int’l,
Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999) (requiring that, to be
considered on a motion to dismiss, a document not attached to the
complaint be both “integral to and explicitly relied on in the
complaint”).

5

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

12(b)(6),

“a

Under Federal

complaint

must

contain

sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)).

A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference

that

alleged.”

the

Id.

defendant

(citing

is

Twombly,

liable
550

for

U.S.

the

at

misconduct

556).

A

Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “challenges the legal sufficiency of
a

complaint

considered

alleged are true.”

with

the

assumption

that

the

facts

Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192

(4th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted).
B.

Failure to Accommodate

Mejia

first

asserts

that

accommodate his disability.

Wal-Mart

failed

(Compl. at 3.)

to

reasonably

Wal-Mart counters

that Mejia fails to state a claim for reasonable accommodation
under the ADA.

(Doc. 15 at 6–8.)

Wal-Mart is correct.

To state a claim for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff
must

allege

meaning

of

facts
the

that

ADA;

(1)

(2)

he
his

had

a

disability

employer

had

within

notice

of

the
his

disability; (3) he could perform the essential functions of his
job with reasonable accommodation; and (4) his employer refused
to make such accommodations.

See Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp.,
6

717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013).

Because Mejia’s complaint

fails to allege facts demonstrating that he could have performed
his

job’s

essential

functions

with

reasonable

accommodation,

dismissal of Mejia’s claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper.
Mejia claims that, at the June 21 meeting, he requested
that Barsdin “fix the problem.”6

(Compl. at 4, 31.)

Mejia’s

request was made after informing Barsdin of his anxiety and
depression stemming from the May 1 conversation.
31.)

(Id. at 3,

He further states that he could have “come back to work”

if the problem was fixed, referring to the May 1 conversation
between Mejia and Rhyne.

(Id. at 4, 31.)

Mejia’s complaint, however, lacks the specificity required
to survive a motion to dismiss.

See Walters v. McMahen, 684

F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The mere recital of elements of
a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, is
not

sufficient

to

survive

a

motion

made

12(b)(6).”) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)).
complaint

(at

accommodation.

best)
Beyond

alleges

a

that

vague

request

pursuant

to

Rule

For one, Mejia’s
for

allegation,

some
the

unknown
complaint

offers no details as to whether the requested accommodation was
plausible or even what it was.

See Cooper v. Cmty. Haven for

6

Mejia’s EEOC complaint dated December 9, 2013, states that, as of May
4, 2013, Mejia “did not ask nor did [he] need reasonable
accommodation.”
(Compl. at 23.)
That statement does not conflict
with the complaint’s allegation that an accommodation request was made
to Barsdin on June 21, 2013.

7

Adults & Children With Disabilities, No. 8:12-CV-1041-T-33EAJ,
2013 WL 24240, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 2013) (concluding that a
request to “do it [d]ifferent” is insufficient to state a claim
for failure to accommodate); Shaywitz v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry &
Neurology, 675 F. Supp. 2d 376, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (requiring
that a plaintiff allege at least a “plausible accommodation” to
survive a motion to dismiss); Getso v. City Univ. of New York,
No. 08 CIV. 7469 (LAP), 2009 WL 4042848, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
18, 2009) (“The Amended Complaint fails to state that Plaintiff
requested and was denied a specific accommodation.
allegations
‘reasonable

suggest

only

accommodation.’

that

he

requested

Without

being

Plaintiff’s

some
more

abstract
specific,

Plaintiff cannot make out a claim under . . . the ADA.”).
Moreover,

Mejia

fails

to

provide

even

the

most

basic

details about his job, let alone that he could have performed
its essential functions.

See Rubino v. New Acton Mobile Indus.,

LLC, CIV.A. RDB-13-2651, 2014 WL 4267493, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 27,
2014) (“Without even a cursory description of what kind of work
the Plaintiff does, he has simply recited the elements of the
cause of action.”); Kelley v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 750 F. Supp.
2d 1132, 1139 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (dismissing complaint for giving
“no information at all as to what Plaintiff [could] do or what
the essential elements of Plaintiff’s job [were]”); Morgan v.
Rowe Materials, LLC, CIV.A. 3:08CV576, 2009 WL 1321514 (E.D. Va.
8

May

11,

part,

2009)

because

entailed”

and

functions

(dismissing
the

a

failure-to-accommodate

plaintiff

failed

perform

the

his

job,

with

or

short,

Mejia

fails

In

to

“what

he

accommodation”).

able

state

“whether

of

is

to

claim,

without
to

his

in
job

essential
reasonable

allege

with

any

specificity that he could have performed the essential functions
of his job with reasonable accommodation.
complaint

fails

accommodate,

to

and

state

Wal-Mart’s

an

ADA

motion

Therefore, Mejia’s

claim

to

for

dismiss

failure

this

to

claim

is

accordingly granted.
C.

Wrongful Discharge

Mejia next alleges that Wal-Mart fired him because of his
disability.
to

work”

According to Mejia’s complaint, he “never returned
after

the

June

separated” from Wal-Mart.

21

meeting

(Compl. at 4.)

and

“has

since

been

Wal-Mart again argues

that Mejia fails to state a claim of discriminatory discharge
under the ADA.

(Doc. 15 at 8–9.)

giving

to

rise

discrimination,

a

his

Because Mejia states no facts

reasonable
claim

fails

inference

of

to

a

state

unlawful
claim

of

discriminatory discharge for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6).
An ADA discriminatory discharge claim requires allegations
of

facts

showing

that

the

employee

(1)

“was

a

qualified

individual with a disability”; (2) “was discharged”; (3) “was
fulfilling his employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of
9

discharge”; and (4) “the circumstances of his discharge raise a
reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination.”

Reynolds v.

Am. Nat’l. Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 150 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 273 n.9 (4th
Cir. 2004)).

Assuming that the complaint’s factual allegations

are true, Mejia’s account of how he left his job still lacks
facts alleging that he was discharged and raises no reasonable
inference that Wal-Mart discriminated against him.

Mejia simply

alleges that, after the June 21 meeting with Barsdin, he “never
returned

to

work”

(Compl. at 3–4.)

and

that

he

has

“since

been

separated.”

Nothing in the complaint suggests that Wal-

Mart fired him because of disability.

The complaint is not even

clear as to whether Mejia was fired or if he instead quit.

(Id.

(stating that Mejia has “since been separated” from Wal-Mart.)
Mejia essentially alleges that he walked out of the June 21
meeting with Barsdin and that his failure to return to work was
of his own accord.

(Id. at 31.)

Without factual allegations,

Mejia’s claim fails to support a reasonable inference that he
was discriminatorily discharged.

Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss

as to this claim is therefore granted.7

7

Although Wal-Mart does not argue that Mejia was not meeting its
legitimate expectations, Mejia’s allegations make clear that he failed
to attend work for a week and half without prior notice and never
returned to work after the June 21 meeting with Barsdin. See Jones v.
HCA, No. 3:13CV714, 2014 WL 1603739, at *7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 21, 2014)
(dismissing claim for failing to allege facts supporting a reasonable

10

D.

Other Discriminatory Actions

Finally,

Mejia

cites

Barsdin’s

refusal

to

accept

his

medical evaluation and police report at the June 21 meeting as
discriminatory conduct under the ADA.
The

refusal

to

accept

those

(Compl. at 3, 23, 31.)

documents,

however,

is

not

an

adverse employment action.
The ADA bars an employer from discriminating against an
employee

“on

the

basis

of

disability

in

regard

to

job

application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions,

and

privileges

of

employment.”

42

U.S.C.

§ 12112(a).

To state an ADA discrimination claim, a plaintiff

must allege facts demonstrating that he (1) has a disability;
(2) is a “qualified individual;” and (3) suffered an adverse
employment action.

See EEOC v. Stowe-Pharr Mills, Inc., 216

F.3d 373, 377 (4th Cir. 2000).
Mejia alleges that Barsdin would not accept two documents –
a medical evaluation and a police report.

There is no factual

allegation that Barsdin had any responsibility to accept those
documents, that the refusal to accept those documents had any
effect on Mejia’s employment status, or, most importantly, that
the

refusal

to

inference that
expectations”).

accept

employee

them

was

was

even

meeting

11

his

because

of

disability

employer’s

“legitimate

discrimination.

See

Salami

v.

N.C.

Agr.

&

Technical

State

Univ., 394 F. Supp. 2d 696, 712 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (“An adverse
employment action is an action which results in a ‘significant
detrimental effect’ to the employee.”), aff’d, 191 F. App’x 193
(4th Cir. 2006).

Without more, the refusal to accept Mejia’s

papers simply does not amount to an “adverse employment action”
under the ADA.

Cf. Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 255 (4th Cir.

1999) (listing typical “adverse employment actions” under Title
VII as “discharge, demotion, decrease in pay or benefits, loss
of

job

title

or

supervisory

responsibility,

or

reduced

opportunities for promotion”); Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt.,
Inc.,

259

F.3d

261,

271

(4th

Cir.

2001)

(holding

that

co-

workers’ refusal to speak to fellow employee did not constitute
an

“adverse

employment

action”

under

Title

VII);

Koch

v.

Schapiro, 759 F. Supp. 2d 67, 76 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[A]n employer’s
request for medical documentation for the purpose of assessing
an

employee’s

credibility

or

determining

an

appropriate

accommodation is not an adverse employment action.”); Tayag v.
Lahey Clinic Hosp., Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 446, 453 (D. Mass.
2010) (“Being asked to produce additional paperwork, even if the
request

was

unreasonable,

does

not

constitute

‘adverse

employment action’ under the ADA.”), aff’d, 632 F.3d 788 (1st
Cir. 2011).
Because

Mejia’s

allegation
12

of

discrimination

falls

far

short of an “adverse employment action” for purposes of the ADA,
even when liberally construed, Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss is
granted as to this claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss
(Doc. 14) is GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED.

/s/
Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
November 3, 2014

13