SAFFORD v. BARNES et al
Filing
11
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE THOMAS D. SCHROEDER on 11/10/2014; that the motion to dismiss (Doc. 6 ) is GRANTED and that the following claims are DISMISSED: the Fourteenth Amendment claims against Sheriff Barnes and Deputy Stewart (first and second causes of action); the failure-to-train claim against Sheriff Barnes in his official capacity (second cause of action); the claim for supervisory liability against Sheriff Barnes in his individual capacity (second cause of actio n); the State-law claims against Sheriff Barnes in his individual capacity (third and fourth causes of action); the vicarious liability claims under § 1983 against Sheriff Barnes (fifth cause of action); and the claim against Deputy Stewart brought under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-311 and 1-410 (sixth cause of action). (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WILLIAM JOSEPH SAFFORD,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
B.J. BARNES, Individually and
in his official capacity as
the duly elected Sheriff of
Guilford County, North
Carolina; and M.B. STEWART,
Individually and in his
official capacity as Deputy
Sheriff of Guilford County,
North Carolina,
Defendants.
1:14cv267
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.
Plaintiff William Safford brings suit against
Defendants
B.J. Barnes, Sheriff of Guilford County, and M.B. Stewart, a
Deputy Sheriff of Guilford County, for alleged violations of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
as well as violations of North Carolina law.
Before the court
is Defendants’ motion to dismiss several of Plaintiff’s claims
pursuant
12(b)(6).
to
Federal
(Doc. 6.)
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure
12(b)(1)
and
For the reasons set forth below, the
motion will be granted in full.
I.
BACKGROUND
The allegations of the complaint, viewed in the light most
favorable to Safford, are as follows:
On March 30, 2011, Safford was in district courtroom number
GB1C
of
the
Carolina.
Guilford
County
Courthouse
(Compl. ¶ 11, Doc. 1.)
in
Greensboro,
North
Safford is a middle-aged male
with severe physical ailments, including back problems requiring
the use of a cane or other assistance.
(Id. ¶ 9.)
He faces
difficulties sitting or standing for extended periods of time
without experiencing considerable discomfort.
(Id.)
After sitting in the courtroom for a protracted period of
time to have a prior criminal charge against him dismissed,
Safford’s back “seized up,” causing him immediate, severe pain.
(Id.
¶ 11.)
courtroom.
County
To
ease
(Id.)
Sheriff’s
the
pain,
Safford
stood
up
in
the
Stewart – a Deputy Sheriff of the Guilford
Department
and
the
bailiff
on
duty
in
the
courtroom at the time – approached Safford and ordered him to
return to his seat.
(Id. ¶¶ 6, 10–11.)
After informing Deputy
Stewart of his back ailment and current physical pain, Safford
requested that Deputy Stewart allow him to remain standing until
the
pain
subsided
in
his
back.
(Id.
¶ 11.)
According
to
Safford, the pain in his back and down his legs would not allow
him to sit down or leave the courtroom at that time.
(Id.)
Deputy Stewart, however, took Safford “by his arms and dragged
and forced him out of the courtroom, pushing him through double
doors and into [a] hallway where [Deputy Stewart] slammed him
2
forcefully into a wall and forced [Safford’s] arm up and behind
his back,” placing Safford in handcuffs.
(Id.)
That same day,
Safford was placed under arrest for resisting a public officer,
per either a magistrate’s order or warrant obtained by Deputy
Stewart.
this
(Id. ¶ 13.)
case
–
is
the
Stewart’s superior.
Deputy
physical
Sheriff Barnes – the other defendant in
Sheriff
of
Guilford
County
and
Deputy
(Id. ¶ 7.)
Stewart’s
ailments.
actions
(Id.
“greatly
¶ 12.)
aggravated”
Safford
Safford’s
underwent
medical
treatment, resulting in medical bills, and experienced pain and
suffering.
(Id.)
Safford filed his complaint on March 28, 2014, asserting
six causes of action: Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations
under
§ 1983
Amendment
against
violations
Deputy
under
Stewart;
§ 1983
Fourth
against
and
Sheriff
Fourteenth
Barnes;
a
North Carolina State law claim of false arrest and imprisonment
against Sheriff Barnes and Deputy Stewart; a State law claim of
battery
against
Deputy
Stewart;
vicarious
liability
claim
against Sheriff Barnes incorporating all § 1983 and State-law
claims; and a claim of “judgment against the person” under State
law against Deputy Stewart.1
(Doc. 1.)
Sheriff Barnes and
Deputy Stewart were named in both their official and individual
1
The complaint’s numbering of the causes of action omits numbers five
and six, skipping from the fourth cause of action to the seventh.
3
capacities.
In
response
to
Safford’s
claims,
Defendants
concurrently answered and moved to dismiss part of Safford’s
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
(Docs. 6, 8.)
not reply.
II.
Plaintiff responded (Doc. 10), and Defendants did
The motion is now ready for consideration.
ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a
complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
12(b)(6),
“a
Under Federal
complaint
must
contain
sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)).
A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference
that
alleged.”
Id.
the
defendant
(citing
is
Twombly,
liable
550
for
U.S.
at
the
misconduct
556).
A
Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “challenges the legal sufficiency of
a
complaint
considered
alleged are true.”
with
the
assumption
that
the
facts
Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192
(4th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted).
B.
Fourteenth Amendment Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
4
In his first and second causes of action, Safford brings
claims against Defendants under § 1983 for violations of the
Fourth
and
Fourteenth
Amendments,
alleging
force and arrest without probable cause.
use
of
excessive
Defendants argue that
the facts alleged in the complaint plausibly state a claim only
under
the
Safford
Fourth
appears
Amendment,
to
concede
not
the
this
Fourteenth
point.
Amendment.
(Doc.
10
at
6
(“Plaintiff asserts that this is a Fourth Amendment case.”).)
Nevertheless, he later contends that the alleged facts regarding
the use of excessive force state a claim under both the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
“In
§ 1983,
(Id. at 7.)
addressing
an
analysis
begins
constitutional
right
excessive
allegedly
application of force.”
(1989).
Claims
of
by
force
claim
brought
identifying
infringed
by
the
the
under
specific
challenged
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394
excessive
force
brought
under
§ 1983
implicate either Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights.
See
Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 445–46 (4th Cir. 2008), abrogated
on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38–39 (2010).
“The
point
at
which
Fourth
Amendment
protections
end
Fourteenth Amendment protections begin is often murky.”
523
F.3d
excessive
at
446.
force
The
“in
Fourth
the
Amendment
course
making
Orem,
claims
of
an
arrest,
investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of [a] person.”
Graham,
5
of
governs
and
490 U.S. at 388; see also Orem, 523 F.3d at 446.
By contrast,
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
the excessive force claims of a pretrial detainee or arrestee.
See Orem, 523 F.3d at 446.
In his complaint, Safford alleges that Deputy Stewart used
excessive force in removing him from the courtroom.
¶ 11.)
Because
the
alleged
excessive
force
occurred
(Compl.
before
Safford was in custody (i.e., before and during his arrest), the
Fourth Amendment – not the Fourteenth Amendment – applies to
Safford’s claim of excessive force.
See Graham, 490 U.S. at 388
(observing that the Fourth Amendment governs claims of excessive
force during “the course of an arrest”); Russell v. Wright, 916
F. Supp. 2d 629, 636 (W.D. Va. 2013) (“Claims of excessive force
occurring during an arrest are to be evaluated under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”); cf. Orem, 523
F.3d at 446 (concluding that Fourteenth Amendment applied after
arrest).
Safford’s
Fourteenth
Amendment
claims
against
both
Sheriff Barnes and Deputy Stewart will therefore be dismissed.
C.
Fourth Amendment Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against
Sheriff Barnes
Safford’s
second
cause
of
action
alleges
that
Sheriff
Barnes – in his official and individual capacities – is liable
for a failure to properly “hire, train, educate, and supervise
deputies,” resulting in violations of Safford’s constitutional
6
rights.
(Compl. ¶¶ 22–24.)
Defendants contend that Safford’s
allegations against Sheriff Barnes – in both capacities – are
factually insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
1.
Failure-to-train § 1983 Claim
Barnes in His Official Capacity
Safford
capacity
claims
failed
–
that
to
supervise deputies.
Sheriff
properly
Barnes
hire,
–
Against
in
Sheriff
his
train,
official
educate,
and
Specifically, he alleges that “a reasonably
well-trained officer in Defendant Stewart’s position would have
recognized that Mr. Safford was willing to comply with his order
but was not physically able to do so because of his injury” and
that
such
an
appropriately
officer
“would
address
his
have
allowed
physical
ailments
escorting him” out of the courtroom.
contend
that
requirements
these
of
allegations
Twombly
and
Mr.
Safford
before
(Id. ¶ 16.)
fail
Iqbal.
to
meet
This
gently
Defendants
the
court
to
pleading
agrees
with
Defendants.
As
a
preliminary
matter,
Safford
articulates
no
factual
allegations regarding Sheriff Barnes’ failure to properly hire
or supervise.
He appears to acknowledge this conclusion by only
arguing that his complaint has stated a claim for failure to
train.
(See
Doc.
10
at
7–11.)
In
any
event,
Safford’s
complaint lacks any facts alleging why Deputy Stewart should not
7
have
been
supervision.
hired
or
how
Safford’s
Deputy
claims
Stewart
based
lacked
on
allegations will therefore be dismissed.
those
adequate
conclusory
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).
Safford
does
allege
a
failure
to
train
Sheriff Barnes in his official capacity.
on
the
part
of
To impose liability
under § 1983 on a municipality for failure to train, the failure
to train must reflect the municipality’s deliberate indifference
to the rights of its citizens.
See City of Canton, Ohio v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (“[T]he inadequacy of police
training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where
the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the
rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”); Doe
v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 456 (4th Cir. 2000).
Deliberate
indifference is “a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof
that
a
municipal
actor
consequence of his action.”
disregarded
a
known
or
obvious
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct.
1350, 1360 (2011) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty.,
Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)); see also Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835–36 (1994) (holding that deliberate
indifference lies “somewhere between the poles of negligence at
one
end
and
purpose
or
knowledge
equates to recklessness).
8
at
the
other”
and
roughly
“A
pattern
untrained
deliberate
of
employees
similar
is
constitutional
‘ordinarily
indifference
for
necessary’
purposes
of
violations
to
failure
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360 (citation omitted).
by
demonstrate
to
train.”
However, “in a
narrow range of circumstances, a pattern of similar violations
might not be necessary to show deliberate indifference.”
Id. at
1361 (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
With allegations of only a single violation of
federal
a
rights,
plaintiff
may
still
establish
deliberate
indifference by showing that “the need for more or different
training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result
in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers
of
the
[municipality]
can
reasonably
deliberately indifferent to the need.”
be
said
to
have
been
Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.
Safford identifies no pattern of constitutional violations.
See
Connick,
131
S.
Ct.
at
1360.
Instead,
relying
on
the
exception recognized in Canton, Safford argues that “[t]he need
to train bailiffs on the use of reasonable force is so obvious
that Sheriff Barnes’
indifference.”
failure to do so amounts to deliberate
(Doc. 10 at 10.)
While this argument relies on
an exception viable in only a limited set of circumstances, the
Supreme Court has sanctioned application of this exception where
a
municipality
arms
officers
without
training
them
constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force.”
9
“in
the
Canton,
489
U.S.
at
380
n.10.
In
that
circumstance,
deliberate
indifference to an obvious risk on the part of the municipality
can establish a claim under § 1983.
See id.; Connick, 131 S. Ct
at 1361.
Safford’s allegations, even assumed to be true, fall short
of
sufficiently
pleading
incident liability.
even
the
most
deficiencies
in
Canton’s
narrow
range
of
single-
Safford provides no “supporting facts of
general
nature
training”
in
to
the
suggest
use
of
any
specific
reasonable
force.
Revene v. Charles Cnty. Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 875 (4th Cir.
1989); see also Tobey v. Napolitano, 808 F. Supp. 2d 830, 844
(E.D. Va. 2011) (observing that plaintiff had “not articulated
any
particular
training
deficiency
that
should
have
been
evident”), aff’d sub nom. Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379 (4th Cir.
2013).
Moreover,
the
complaint’s
allegations
offer
no
suggestion “that the incident here alleged was anything but an
aberrational act by an individual officer, however motivated.”
Revene, 882 F.2d at 875.
“A single act of the type here alleged
cannot suffice, standing alone, to establish the existence of
. . . a policy” of inadequate training.
131
S.
Ct
at
1359
(“A
Id.; see also Connick,
municipality’s
culpability
for
a
deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns
on a failure to train.”).
Thus, because Safford has failed to
10
plausibly allege deliberate indifference to support his failureto-train claim, that claim will be dismissed.
2.
Safford
Supervisory
Liability
§ 1983
Claim
Sheriff Barnes in His Individual Capacity
also
asserts
that
Sheriff
Barnes
Against
–
in
his
individual capacity – failed to properly hire, train, educate,
and supervise deputies under § 1983.
In essence, Safford seeks
to impose supervisory liability on Sheriff Barnes.
Howard
Cnty.,
(“Although
§ 1983,
Md.,
there
is
supervisory
constitutional
423
F.
no
Supp.
2d
respondeat
officials
violations
may
of
502,
511
superior
be
held
their
See Ensko v.
(D.
Md.
2006)
liability
under
liable
employees
for
if
the
their
indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct
caused
injury.”).
To
establish
supervisory
liability
under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must show:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive
knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct
that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of
constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff;
(2) that the supervisor’s response to that knowledge
was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference
to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive
practices,”; and (3) that there was an “affirmative
causal link” between the supervisor’s inaction and the
particular constitutional injury suffered by the
plaintiff.
Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations
omitted).
Safford’s
complaint
lacks
sufficient
factual
allegations to impose supervisory liability on Sheriff Barnes.
11
First,
Barnes’
Safford
actual
fails
or
to
allege
constructive
facts
showing
knowledge.
To
Sheriff
demonstrate
knowledge under Shaw, a plaintiff must show:
(1) the supervisor’s knowledge of (2) conduct engaged
in by a subordinate (3) where the conduct poses a
pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional
injury to the plaintiff.
Establishing a “pervasive”
and “unreasonable” risk of harm requires evidence that
the conduct is widespread, or at least has been used
on several different occasions and that the conduct
engaged in by the subordinate poses an unreasonable
risk of harm of constitutional injury.
Id.
(citation
sufficiently
omitted).
alleges
Safford
Sheriff
argues
Barnes’
that
his
complaint
by
asserting
knowledge
that, as sheriff, Sheriff Barnes knew Deputy Stewart would be
required to use force.
establishing
that
Even if true, Safford must allege facts
Sheriff
Barnes
knew
Stewart involving excessive force.
of
conduct
by
Deputy
Cf. id. at 799–800 (holding
that plaintiff established knowledge requirement under Shaw by
showing that officer in three incidents “used excessive force
which
posed
an
unreasonable
risk
of
harm
to
arrestees”).
Safford, however, makes no allegation that Sheriff Barnes had
knowledge of any incidents involving Deputy Stewart’s use of
force,
let
Montgomery,
alone
751
excessive
F.3d
214,
force.
227
(4th
Cf.
Cir.
id.;
2014);
Wilkins
v.
Willis
v.
Blevins, 966 F. Supp. 2d 646, 662 (E.D. Va. 2013) (dismissing
supervisory liability claim under § 1983 where supervisor was
alleged to have had actual or constructive knowledge of “only
12
one prior act” by subordinate).
Accordingly, Safford fails to
establish Sheriff Barnes’ knowledge under Shaw.
Second, Safford’s allegations fall far short of those facts
establishing a finding of deliberate indifference under Shaw.
Demonstrating deliberate indifference requires a showing of “a
supervisor’s
continued
widespread
abuses.”
assumes
heavy
a
indifference.”
a
Shaw,
burden
Id.
documented abuse.
that
inaction
of
13
in
the
F.3d
proof
at
in
face
documented
“The
799.
of
plaintiff
establishing
deliberate
Here, there are simply no allegations of
See Willis, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 663 (observing
complaint
containing
one
allegation
of
a
previous
“isolated incident” lacked “sufficient factual allegations” to
establish deliberate indifference); cf. Jones v. Murphy, 470 F.
Supp. 2d 537, 546 (D. Md. 2007)
(observing that
contained “documented” and “widespread” abuses).
fails
to
allege
factual
allegations
showing
allegations
Thus, Safford
Sheriff
Barnes’
deliberate indifference.
Finally, Safford fails to state any facts demonstrating “an
affirmative
causal
link”
between
Sheriff
inaction and Deputy Stewart’s conduct.
Barnes’
alleged
Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799
(holding that “an affirmative causal link” can be established
through a finding of direct or proximate causation).
Safford
articulates no facts suggesting that Sheriff Barnes instructed
or otherwise caused Deputy Stewart to take any alleged action
13
against Safford.
to
allege
that
misconduct
by
Moreover, as noted above, the complaint fails
Sheriff
Barnes
Stewart.
had
any
knowledge
of
prior
Therefore,
the
complaint
fails
to
support a reasonable inference that Sheriff Barnes caused or was
the proximate cause of the alleged violation by Stewart.
For all these reasons, Safford’s claim imposing supervisory
liability under § 1983 against Sheriff Barnes will be dismissed.
D.
State-Law Claims Against
Individual Capacity
Sheriff
Barnes
in
His
In his third cause of action, Safford attempts to hold
Sheriff
Barnes
imprisonment
individually
under
respondeat superior.
North
liable
Carolina
for
law
(See Compl. ¶ 31.)
false
under
arrest
a
theory
and
of
Sheriff Barnes argues
that public official immunity bars State law claims against him
in his individual capacity.
(See Doc. 7 at 13–14.)
Under North
Carolina law,
a public official, engaged in the performance of
governmental duties involving the exercise of judgment
and discretion, may not be held personally liable for
mere negligence in respect thereto. The rule in such
cases is that an official may not be held liable
unless it be alleged and proved that his act, or
failure to act, was corrupt or malicious, or that he
acted outside of and beyond the scope of his duties.
Meyer v. Walls, 489 S.E.2d 880, 888 (N.C. 1997) (quoting Smith
v. Hefner, 68 S.E.2d 783, 787 (N.C. 1952)); see also Smith v.
Garcia, 5:08-CV-577-D, 2010 WL 3361653, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 20,
2010) (applying the rule in Meyers).
14
Sherriff Barnes contends
that this immunity bars the false arrest and imprisonment claim
against him.
In
response,
Safford
concedes
public official immunity.2
that
Sheriff
Barnes
has
Safford therefore abandons his claim
for false arrest and imprisonment against Sheriff Barnes in his
individual capacity, and that claim will be dismissed.3
E.
Vicarious Liability Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In his fifth cause of action, Safford claims that Sheriff
Barnes,
“as
principal
and
employer
of”
Deputy
Stewart,
is
vicariously liable for Deputy Stewart’s actions.
(See Compl.
¶ 35.)
to
In
his
response
to
Defendants’
motion
dismiss,
however, Safford acknowledges that Sheriff Barnes may not be
held vicariously liable under § 1983 in his individual capacity.
(See Doc. 10 at 14.)
incident,
Sheriff
Unless involved directly in the courtroom
Barnes
is
not
liable
under
§ 1983
in
his
2
Specifically, Safford states: “Plaintiff recognizes that the Courts
have decided to alleviate individual liability of the elected Sheriff
for the constitutional injuries caused by the actions of his Deputies,
such as . . . [i]ndividual capacity claims under North Carolina state
law.” (See Doc. 10 at 14.) In noting Safford’s concession, the court
does not examine or adopt Safford’s reasoning. Cf. Mandsager v. Univ.
of N.C. at Greensboro, 269 F.Supp.2d 662, 681 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (noting
that under North Carolina law “[p]ublic official immunity is not a
defense to intentional torts”); see also Beck v. City of Durham, 573
S.E.2d 183, 190 (2002).
3
The complaint makes no allegation that Sheriff Barnes should be
individually liable for the fourth cause of action for battery under
North Carolina law.
To the extent the complaint does attempt to do
so, that claim is dismissed as well for the reasons provided in this
section.
15
individual capacity.
See Revene, 882 F.2d at 874 (“No other
basis of liability [than official capacity] exists for holding
the sheriff separately liable on the claim as pleaded because no
claim is made that he was directly involved in [the alleged
constitutional violation], and there is no vicarious liability
under § 1983.”).
Safford does not allege that Sheriff Barnes
was directly involved in the courtroom incident.
Sheriff
Barnes
against
him
is
in
not
his
liable
for
individual
the
§ 1983
capacity.
Therefore,
claims
See
brought
Strickler
v.
Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1387 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
sheriff could not “be held vicariously liable for any conduct of
his
subordinates”
in
his
individual
capacity
under
§ 1983);
McDonald v. Dunning, 760 F. Supp. 1156, 1169 (E.D. Va. 1991)
(“Because plaintiff has presented no evidence of the sheriff’s
personal involvement in the alleged violations, and the sheriff
has
averred
that
he
had
no
knowledge
of
plaintiff’s
incarceration, the suit may not proceed against the defendant
sheriff in his individual capacity.”).
F.
Allegations Under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-311 and 1-410
Finally,
Safford
contends
that
a
combination
of
North
Carolina statutory provisions entitle him to execute a future
judgment against Deputy Stewart.
According to Safford, under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-410, Deputy Stewart is subject to arrest
because of the conduct of a “Defendant Sydney Lemay,” which
16
allegedly caused injury to Safford.
(Compl. ¶ 37.)
Because
Deputy Stewart is subject to arrest under § 1-410, Safford then
argues that he is entitled to “judgment against the person” of
Deputy Stewart under § 1-311.
(Id.)
As an initial matter, it is unclear who Defendant Sydney
Lemay is or what involvement he or she has in this case.
Even
assuming that Safford’s complaint meant Deputy Stewart rather
than Sydney Lemay, the complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
Safford’s “claim” under North
Carolina law is a recitation of two North Carolina procedural
rules
allowing
defendants.
for
These
the
two
execution
of
procedural
judgments
rules
against
merely
allow
civil
the
execution of a judgment against an individual who may have been
arrested in a civil action.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-140; N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1-311; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 69.
a private right of action.
They do not create
See Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I.
Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 372 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure did not create
a cause of action); Shahin v. Darling, 606 F. Supp. 2d 525, 539
(D. Del. 2009), aff’d, 350 F. App’x 605 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding
that state procedural rule did not create a cause of action);
McShane v. Recordex Acquisition Corp., Civ. No. 01117 Feb. Term
2003, 070576, 2003 WL 22805233, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 14,
2003) (same); Douglas v. Anson Fin., Inc., Civ. No. 2–05–283–CV,
17
2006 WL 820402, at *5 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2006) (failure to
comply with Texas rules of civil procedure did not give rise to
a private cause of action); see also Digene Corp. v. Ventana
Med. Sys., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 (D. Del. 2007) (“[T]he
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create a private cause
of action.”).
This claim will therefore be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion to dismiss (Doc. 6)
is GRANTED and that the following claims
are DISMISSED:
the
Fourteenth Amendment claims against Sheriff Barnes and Deputy
Stewart (first and second causes of action); the failure-totrain
claim
against
Sheriff
Barnes
in
his
official
capacity
(second cause of action); the claim for supervisory liability
against Sheriff Barnes in his individual capacity (second cause
of action); the State-law claims against Sheriff Barnes in his
individual capacity (third and fourth causes of action); the
vicarious liability claims under § 1983 against Sheriff Barnes
(fifth cause of action); and the claim against Deputy Stewart
brought under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-311 and 1-410 (sixth cause of
action).
/s/
Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
November 10, 2014
18
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