SAFFORD v. BARNES et al
Filing
58
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE THOMAS D. SCHROEDER on 06/28/2016. For the reasons stated, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied. This conclusion reflects no judgment on any party (indeed Deputy Stewart denies many of the facts central to Safford's narrative) but reflects a record with materially conflicting versions of events that cannot be reconciled by objective evidence4 or without weighing credibility, which this court is precluded from doing at this stage. Accordingly, it will be for the jury to determine whose version of the facts to credit. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 28 ) is DENIED to the extent that it was not previously granted in this court's prior order (Doc. 46 ), with the caveat that the viability of any federal official capacity claim will be addressed after Plaintiff responds to Defendants' motion to strike (Doc. 48 ).(Taylor, Abby)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WILLIAM JOSEPH SAFFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
B.J. BARNES, Individually and
in his official capacity as
duly elected Sheriff of
Guilford County, North
Carolina; and M.B. STEWART,
Individually and in his
official capacity as a Deputy
Sheriff of Guilford County,
N.C.,
Defendants.
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1:14cv267
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.
Plaintiff
William
Joseph
Safford
brings
suit
against
Defendants B.J. Barnes, Sheriff of Guilford County, and M.B.
Stewart,
a
Deputy
Sheriff
of
Guilford
County,
who
allegedly
violated Safford’s constitutional rights when removing him from a
courtroom gallery during proceedings in State court.
court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Before the
(Doc. 28.)
In
a June 2, 2016 order, this court granted Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment in part and reserved ruling on certain issues. 1
1
The court granted summary judgment on the State-law claims against
Sheriff Barnes and Deputy Stewart in their official capacities. (Doc.
46 at 7.) The court also gave Safford ten days to show why any federal
official capacity claim “survives on the current record.” (Id.) Safford
filed a timely response (Doc. 47), and Defendants subsequently moved to
strike Safford’s response (Doc. 48). Safford’s response to the motion
(Doc. 46.)
The court will now address Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on the federal and State-law claims against Deputy
Stewart in his individual capacity.
Because the court finds that
genuine disputes as to material facts exist, Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment as to these claims will be denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
On March 30, 2011, Safford was in courtroom 1-C of the
Guilford County Courthouse in Greensboro, North Carolina, awaiting
the calling of a criminal case against him in District Court.
(Doc. 28-1 at 4.)
As viewed from the rear of the courtroom, he
was seated with his wife on the front left bench near the center
aisle.
(Id. at 6; Doc. 29 at 2.)
At some point during court
proceedings in another case, Safford, who is disabled, stood up to
ease a spasm in his back.
(Doc. 28-1 at 7.)
Using his cane for
support, he wiggled his leg in an attempt to relieve the spasm.
(Id.)
Deputy Stewart, who was acting as courtroom bailiff for the
sheriff’s office, saw Safford standing and approached him after a
few minutes.
(Doc. 29 at 2.)
An incident ensued that culminated
in Safford’s removal and arrest.
The parties have presented
contrasting evidence of how this came to pass.
Safford claims that Deputy Stewart walked up to him and asked
to strike is not due until July 8, 2016, the same day as the scheduled
settlement conference (Doc. 45). Accordingly, the motion to strike and
the fate of any federal official capacity claim will not be resolved
until after that time.
2
what was wrong.
(Doc. 28-1 at 7.)
Safford told the deputy that
he was having a back spasm and that he is disabled.
(Id.)
Deputy
Stewart directed Safford to either sit down or go into the hallway
to stand.
fall.
(Id.)
his cane.
(Id. at 8.)
Safford replied that if moved he would
At this point, Safford’s face was pointed down toward
(Id.)
Deputy Stewart then, in a “buff” voice, told
Safford “you’re going to sit down or either you’re going out here
in this hallway.”
(Id.)
Safford looked at Deputy Stewart and
said, “I’m going to sit down.”
(Id.)
As Safford proceeded to do
so with the assistance of his wife, the deputy grabbed him by his
shoulder and said, “F that, no, you’re going out now.”
(Id. at 8-
9.) Deputy Stewart then forced Safford’s left arm behind his back,
to his neck, and proceeded to drag Safford down the aisle of the
courtroom toward the exit, all while Safford dragged his cane and
yelled that he is disabled.
(Id. at 8-10.)
he never struggled or resisted.
Safford claims that
(Id. at 12.)
When the deputy got
Safford out the door, he slammed Safford against a brick wall
outside of the courtroom.
(Id. at 16.)
Safford observed another
officer, Deputy Steve Phillips, assisting Deputy Stewart.
(Id.)
Safford was ordered to put his hands behind his back, but he told
the deputies that he had already done so.
(Id. at 18.)
was eventually forced to the ground and arrested.
Safford
(Id. at 17-19.)
Deputy Stewart offers a very different version.
He claims
that when he initially asked Safford why he was standing, Safford
3
replied that he needed to speak with one of the Assistant District
Attorneys.
(Doc. 29 at 2.)
Deputy Stewart politely told Safford
that he would need to sit down and wait to be called, to which
Safford hostilely replied, “I ain’t sitting down; my back hurts.”
(Id.)
Deputy Stewart then told Stewart that “he needed to sit
down but, if his back hurt and he wished to stand, that he could
move to the rear of the courtroom where he could remain standing.”
(Id.)
He repeated these instructions several times, but Safford
refused to follow them.
(Id. at 2-3.)
After several requests,
Safford responded by cursing in an angry voice, “F**K you.”
at 3.)
(Id.
Safford then pushed Deputy Stewart “in the chest with both
of his hands and sat down abruptly on the bench.”
(Id.)
The force
was sufficient to cause Deputy Stewart to move one step backwards.
(Id.)
Deputy Stewart then informed Safford that he “had to stand
up and leave the Courtroom immediately because” he was going to be
arrested for “resisting, delaying and/or obstructing an Officer.”
(Id.)
Safford refused to comply and said, “F**K you.
going anywhere!”
(Id.)
I’m not
Believing it was not safe to leave Safford
in the courtroom, Deputy Stewart then grabbed Safford by his arm
and attempted to pull him off the bench.
physically resisted this effort.
(Id.)
(Id. at 4.)
Safford
Deputy Stewart eventually
removed Safford from the bench, got him to his feet, and moved him
into the center of the aisle.
(Id.)
(Id.)
Safford continued to resist.
While Deputy Stewart was escorting Safford toward the door
4
at the rear of the courtroom, Deputy Phillips came to assist him.
(Id.)
The deputies then moved Safford toward the door.
(Id.)
Throughout this process, Safford resisted by “jerking his upper
body back and forth . . . planting his feet and locking his legs.”
(Id.)
Safford
was
very
“extremely difficult.”
strong,
making
the
deputies’
task
(Id.)
Once Safford was outside the courtroom, the deputies “steered
[him] up against a wall” and repeatedly instructed him to stop
resisting and place his hands behind his back. (Id. at 5.) Safford
refused to comply and instead “pushed his arms and hands down
toward his sides and the front of his body to prevent [the
deputies] from gaining control.”
(Id.)
“At no time was the
Plaintiff ever slammed into a wall.” (Id.) Believing that Safford
could not be handcuffed without taking him to the ground, Deputy
Stewart then told Deputy Phillips to help him take Safford to the
floor.
(Id.)
Safford responded by using his “upper and lower
body strength to remain on his feet,” but the deputies eventually
got him to the floor.
(Id.)
Safford continued to resist on the
ground but eventually complied and allowed himself to be handcuffed
once Deputy Phillips removed his Taser from its holster.
(Id.)
Deputy Stewart claims that he never “grabbed [Safford] by his
handcuffs and pulled his wrists up toward his neck.”
(Id.)
Both Safford and Deputy Stewart have witnesses who support
their version of events.
Deputy Phillips has testified to Deputy
5
Stewart’s sequence of events, with the caveat that he does not say
that Safford pushed Deputy Stewart.
(Doc. 31 at 2.)
Instead, he
says Safford grabbed Deputy Stewart’s arm in an aggressive manner.
(Id.)
Then Assistant District Attorney David L. Gore, III, who
was standing approximately twenty feet away, testified that he saw
Safford “lightly push Deputy Stewart.”
(Doc. 32 at 2.)
Judge
Susan E. Bray, who was presiding at the time, did not observe the
initial sequence of events but testified that Safford did “not go
willingly” when the deputies were taking him out of the courtroom.
(Doc. 28-2 at 7.)
Safford’s
events.
wife,
Kandi
(Doc. 39-9 at 2-3.)
Safford,
supports
his
version
of
She was seated next to Safford and
testified that he never pushed the deputy and that he was in the
process of sitting when he was grabbed.
(Id.)
Raymond Torain, a
bystander seated “to the right and rear of Mr. Safford across the
aisle . . . [and] three rows back,” testified that Safford never
cursed or pushed Deputy Stewart and seemed to be in the process of
sitting down when the deputy “grabbed him by the arm and chickenwinged it high up behind his back.”
(Doc. 39-3 at 3.)
Both sides have enlisted experts to evaluate whether the use
of
force
and
arrest
were
justified.
However,
both
experts
principally rely on their party’s version of events in forming
their opinions.
(See Doc. 39-5 at 34; Doc. 33-3 at 8.)
6
There is also surveillance video of the events that occurred
outside of the courtroom. There is not, however, any video footage
of the critical moments inside the courtroom.
In fact, despite
moving for summary judgment, Defendants acknowledge that Safford’s
testimony that he did not push Deputy Stewart “raises a genuine
issue of material fact on this issue alone.”
II.
(Doc. 34 at 22.)
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is proper where “there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
“[I]n ruling on a motion
for summary judgment, the nonmoving party’s evidence ‘is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that
party’s] favor.’”
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)
(alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
A dispute over a material fact is
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
248.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at
The court is not permitted to weigh the evidence, assess
credibility, or resolve issues of fact.
Id. at 255.
The law
preserves these core jury functions for trial because “it is only
when the witnesses are present and subject to cross-examination
that their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony
can be appraised.”
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co, 398 U.S. 144, 176
(1970).
7
A. Fourth Amendment Individual Capacity Claims
Safford claims that his arrest was not supported by probable
cause and that the force used to effectuate it was excessive.
Deputy Stewart defends on the basis of qualified immunity.
“Qualified immunity is ‘an entitlement not to stand trial or
face the other burdens of litigation.’”
Brown v. Gilmore, 278
F.3d 362, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). Officers are entitled to qualified immunity
“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
A violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional
right
will
exist
that
conclusion
not
[the
unless
officer]
circumstances ‘beyond debate.”
309 (2015).
“existing
acted
precedent
placed
unreasonably
in
the
the[]
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305,
Accordingly, officers are entitled to qualified
immunity unless this court can “say that only someone ‘plainly
incompetent’ or who ‘knowingly violate[s] the law’ would have
perceived a sufficient threat and acted as [the officer] did.”
Id. at 310 (some alterations in original).
1. Unlawful Arrest
Safford’s version of events, if believed by the jury, would
establish a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable seizures.
Arrests unsupported by probable cause
8
are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Miller v. Prince
George’s Cty., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007).
“For probable
cause to exist, there need only be enough evidence to warrant the
belief of a reasonable officer that an offense has been or is being
committed; evidence sufficient to convict is not required.” Brown,
278 F.3d at 367.
Two factors govern this court’s analysis of
probable cause: (1) “the suspect’s conduct as known to the officer”
and (2) “the contours of the offense thought to be committed by
that conduct.”
Id. at 368 (citations omitted).
Under Safford’s version of events, which a reasonable jury
could credit, a reasonable officer could not have believed that an
offense had been or was being committed.
The offense of arrest,
labeled “Resisting officers,” makes it a misdemeanor for any person
to “willfully and unlawfully resist, delay or obstruct a public
officer in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his
office.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223.
Safford responded to Deputy
Stewart’s first request by telling him that if he moved he would
fall.
(Doc. 28-1 at 8.)
Safford responded to Deputy Stewart’s
second request by telling him he was going to sit down.
(Id.)
Safford then began to sit down, and got “halfway” down before being
grabbed by Deputy Stewart.
(Id. at 8-9.)
In other words, under
Safford’s version of events, he was unable to comply with the first
order and Deputy Stewart seized him for arrest while he was visibly
9
complying with the second order.
A reasonable officer could not
believe that probable cause existed under these circumstances.
Under
Safford’s
version
of
events,
only
a
“plainly
incompetent” officer 2 who “knowingly violates the law” could have
believed that probable cause existed.
310.
Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at
Complying with an order is the antithesis of the offense of
resisting an officer’s commands created by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14223.
In fact, under North Carolina law, “merely speaking to,
remonstrating with, or even criticizing an officer during the
performance of his duties is not prohibited if done ‘in an orderly
and peaceable manner.’”
Brooks v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 984 F.
Supp. 940, 955 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (quoting State v. Leigh, 278 N.C.
243, 251, 179 S.E.2d 708, 713 (1971)); Roberts v. Swain, 126 N.C.
App. 712, 724, 487 S.E.2d 760, 768 (1997) (collecting cases).
If
such
or
conduct
does
not
constitute
resisting,
obstructing, then it is clear that complying cannot.
delaying,
See Veney v.
Ojeda, 321 F. Supp. 2d 733, 745-46 & n.22 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“[I]t
is clear that a reasonable officer would have understood that there
2
Stewart contends that he is entitled to more latitude because, unlike
patrol officers, a courtroom bailiff is tasked with maintaining rules
of order and decorum. (Doc. 34 at 20.) But even assuming this is true,
Safford contends that he had announced his intention to sit and that he
was in the process of doing so. (Doc. 28-1 at 7-9.) Stewart has not
pointed to any policy or duty of a courtroom bailiff that justifies the
arrest and removal of an individual who is visibly complying with the
bailiff’s orders. (See Doc. 34 at 20-21.) Therefore, any distinction
between patrol officers and bailiffs is not determinative under Safford’s
version of events, which is admittedly disputed.
10
would be no probable cause to arrest an individual for obstruction
of justice [in Virginia] if that individual, in the course of a
traffic stop, was cooperative and complied fully with the officer’s
instructions.
It is clearly established that an arrest in such
circumstances would violate the Fourth Amendment.” (collecting
cases, including Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 403-04 (4th Cir.
2003)
(construing
North
Carolina’s
and
Virginia’s
obstruction
statutes as “virtually identical”))).
2. Excessive Force
Safford’s version of events, if believed by the jury, would
also establish a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be
free from excessive force.
Excessive force claims against law
enforcement officers are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness standard.
(1989).
Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 395
The question under the totality of the circumstances is
“whether a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have
concluded that a threat existed justifying the particular use of
force.”
Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 2001).
In determining whether a reasonable officer on the scene would
have used force, courts are to consider the following factors
established by Graham: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers
or
others,
and
whether
he
is
actively
attempting to evade arrest by flight.”
11
resisting
arrest
490 U.S. at 396.
or
“The
‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”
“that
police
officers
are
often
Id.
forced
Courts must consider
to
make
split-second
judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving.”
Id. at 397.
Courts are also instructed to focus “on
the circumstances at the moment force was used and on the fact
that officers on the beat are not afforded the luxury of armchair
reflection.”
Elliot v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1996).
Here, under Safford’s version of events, the three Graham
factors point toward a Fourth Amendment violation.
First, the
severity of the crime at issue in this case is a misdemeanor and
not severe.
Moreover, for the reasons noted above, if Safford is
to be believed there was not even probable cause to conclude that
the
offense
had
been
committed.
Second,
although
Safford’s
standing during court proceedings clearly constituted a disruption
that
warranted
the
deputy’s
attention
and
intervention,
a
reasonable officer would not have viewed Safford as posing an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.
Under
Safford’s version of events, Deputy Stewart faced a disabled man
with a cane who had told him he was going to sit down and was in
the process of complying with the order to sit down.
at 7-9.)
(Id.)
(Doc. 28-1
Safford denies ever cursing or pushing Deputy Stewart.
Third, and for these same reasons, a reasonable officer
12
would not have viewed Safford as actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.
In light of these factors,
and assuming Safford’s version of events as this court must at
this stage, it takes no second guessing of Deputy Stewart to
conclude that jerking Safford up from his seat, forcing his arm
behind his back up to his neck, and dragging him out of the
courtroom constituted excessive force.
(Id.)
Finally, only a
“plainly incompetent” officer who “knowingly violates the law”
could
have
believed
that
the
Safford’s version of events.
force
used
was
justified
under
Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 310.
In sum, Safford’s version of events, if believed, would
establish that the force used was not justified in violation of
Graham.
(See Doc. 28-1 at 7-9.)
It is clearly established and
common sense that using the force used by Deputy Stewart to achieve
the
compliance
of
an
already
individual is unjustified.
compliant
and
nonthreatening
See Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307,
314 (4th Cir. 1992); Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347, 356-57 (4th
Cir. 1995); Eberhardt v. O’Malley, 17 F.3d 1023, 1028 (7th Cir.
1994) (“The easiest cases don’t even arise.”); Bartram v. Wolfe,
152 F. Supp. 2d 898, 903-904 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (“Was it clearly
established as objectively unreasonable in August 1998 to punch or
otherwise
batter
cooperating
with
a
handcuffed
a
law
suspect
enforcement
who
was
officer’s
complying
and
instruction?
Although one has difficulty finding a case on point for that
13
proposition, this is one of those rare instances where the question
ineluctably leads to an affirmative answer.”); Gray v. Torres, No.
08cv1380, 2009 WL 2169044, at *4 (D. Md. July 17, 2009); see also
Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 508 (4th Cir. 2011).
Accordingly, in light of the material factual disputes that
remain in this case, Deputy Stewart is not entitled to qualified
immunity on Safford’s Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful arrest
and excessive force.
Swick v. Wilde, 529 F. App’x 353, 357-58
(4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (dismissing appeal for lack of
jurisdiction where denial of qualified immunity was based solely
on a dispute of material fact). 3
B. State-Law Individual Capacity Claims
Safford asserts State-law claims against Deputy Stewart in
his individual capacity for false arrest, false imprisonment, and
battery.
Deputy Stewart seeks summary judgment on these claims on
the basis of public official immunity.
does
not
protect
officials
from
Public official immunity
actions
that
were
“corrupt,
malicious or perpetrated outside and beyond the scope of official
duties.”
Beck v. City of Durham, 154 N.C. App. 221, 230, 573
S.E.2d 183, 190 (2002) (quoting Locus v. Fayetteville State Univ.,
3
Unpublished decisions of the Fourth Circuit are not ordinarily accorded
precedential value but “are entitled only to the weight they generate
by the persuasiveness of their reasoning.” Collins v. Pond Creek Mining
Co., 468 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted)).
14
102 N.C. App. 522, 526, 402 S.E.2d 862, 865 (1991)).
An action is
malicious where it is “(1) done wantonly, (2) contrary to the
actor’s duty, and (3) intended to be injurious to another.”
Brown
v. Town of Chapel Hill, 233 N.C. App. 257, 264, 756 S.E.2d 749,
755 (2014) (citations omitted).
If the jury were to believe
Safford’s version of events, a finding of malice could be justified
for Deputy Stewart’s arrest and use of force against a disabled
man who, after announcing his intent to comply, visibly attempted
to do so.
Accordingly, Deputy Stewart is not entitled to summary
judgment on the basis of public official immunity.
III. CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
judgment is denied.
stated,
Defendants’
motion
for
summary
This conclusion reflects no judgment on any
party (indeed Deputy Stewart denies many of the facts central to
Safford’s
conflicting
narrative)
versions
but
of
reflects
events
a
that
record
cannot
with
be
materially
reconciled
by
objective evidence 4 or without weighing credibility, which this
court is precluded from doing at this stage.
Accordingly, it will
be for the jury to determine whose version of the facts to credit.
4
The video surveillance of the events that occurred outside of the
courtroom is the only objective evidence in this case, and it does not
capture the moments critical to this opinion. The court has viewed the
video, but expresses no opinion as to whether it demonstrates that
Safford resisted arrest.
Defendants have not argued or provided
authority for the proposition that an arrest and use of force, even if
initially unjustified, can become justified once the suspect resists
arrest. As a result, the court does not reach the issue.
15
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 28) is DENIED to the extent that it was not
previously granted in this court’s prior order (Doc. 46), with the
caveat that the viability of any federal official capacity claim
will be addressed after Plaintiff responds to Defendants’ motion
to strike (Doc. 48).
/s/
Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
June 28, 2016
16
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