ARMSTONG v. COLVIN
Filing
13
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 11/04/2015; that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability be affirmed, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 8 ) be denied, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 11 ) be granted, and that this action be dismissed with prejudice. (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ERNEST ARMSTRONG,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.
1:14CV346
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Ernest Armstrong, brought this action pursuant to
the Social Security Act (the “Act”) to obtain judicial review of a
final decision of Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security,
denying
Plaintiff’s
(“DIB”).
claim
for
(See Docket Entry 1.)
Disability
Insurance
Benefits
The Court has before it the
certified administrative record (cited herein as “Tr. __”), as well
as the parties’ cross-motions for judgment (Docket Entries 8, 11).
For the reasons that follow, the Court should enter judgment for
Defendant.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff applied for DIB, alleging a disability onset date of
January 1, 2005.
(Tr. 141-47.)
Upon denial of that application
initially (Tr. 58-68, 87-90) and on reconsideration (Tr. 69-85, 95102),
Plaintiff
requested
a
hearing
de
novo
before
an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) (Tr. 103-04).
Plaintiff, his
attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”) attended the hearing
(Tr. 24-57), at which Plaintiff amended his alleged onset date to
September 5, 2009, his 50th birthday (see Tr. 28, 162).
The ALJ
determined that Plaintiff did not qualify as disabled under the
Act.
(Tr.
7-19.)
The
Appeals
Council
thereafter
denied
Plaintiff’s request for review, thus making the ALJ’s determination
the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial review.
(Tr. 1-4.)
In rendering that disability determination, the ALJ made the
following findings later adopted by the Commissioner:
1.
[Plaintiff] last met the insured status requirements
of the . . . Act on June 30, 2010.
2.
[Plaintiff] did not engage in substantial gainful
activity during the period from his alleged onset date of
September 5, 2009 through his date last insured of June
30, 2010.
3.
Through the date last insured, [Plaintiff] had the
following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease
of the cervical spine, carpal tunnel syndrome, right
meniscus tear, diabetes mellitus, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder.
. . .
4.
Through the date last insured, [Plaintiff] did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met
or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
. . .
5.
. . . [T]hrough the date last insured, [Plaintiff]
had the residual functional capacity to perform light
work . . . except only occasional climbing stairs or
2
ramps; occasional bending, balancing, stooping, crawling,
kneeling, or crouching; never climbing ropes, ladders or
scaffolds; avoid hazardous machinery and vibrations;
occasional overhead reaching bilaterally; frequent but
not
constant,
fingering,
grasping
or
handling
bilaterally; requires a sit/stand/adjust option as
necessary for comfort without a loss of production;
simple, routine, repetitive tasks; and occasional contact
with co-workers and the general public.
. . .
6.
Through the date last insured, [Plaintiff]
unable to perform any past relevant work.
was
. . .
10. Through
the
date
last
insured,
considering
[Plaintiff’s] age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there were jobs that
existed in significant numbers in the national economy
that [Plaintiff] could have performed.
. . .
11. [Plaintiff] was not under a disability, as defined
in the . . . Act, at any time from September 5, 2009, the
alleged onset date, through June 30, 2010, the date last
insured.
(Tr. 12-19 (internal parenthetical citations omitted).)
DISCUSSION
Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits.”
Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006).
Hines v.
However, “the scope
of . . . review of [such a] decision . . . is extremely limited.”
Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981).
In this case,
Plaintiff has not shown entitlement to relief under the extremely
limited review standard.
3
A.
Standard of Review
“[C]ourts are not to try [a Social Security] case de novo.”
Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974).
reviewing
court must
uphold
the
factual
findings
Instead, “a
of
the
ALJ
[underlying the denial of benefits] if they are supported by
substantial evidence and were reached through application of the
correct legal standard.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 561 (internal brackets
and quotation marks omitted).
“Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)).
“It consists of
more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less
than a preponderance.”
Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th
Cir. 2001) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).
“If
there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the
case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence.”
Hunter,
993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the [C]ourt should not
undertake
to
re-weigh
conflicting
evidence,
make
credibility
determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ, as
adopted by the Social Security Commissioner].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at
176 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).
“Where
conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to
4
whether
a
claimant
is
disabled,
the
responsibility
for
that
decision falls on the [Social Security Commissioner] (or the ALJ).”
Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The issue before
[the Court], therefore, is not whether [the claimant] is disabled,
but whether the ALJ’s finding that [the claimant] is not disabled
is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a
correct application of the relevant law.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d
585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).
When confronting that issue, the Court must take note that
“[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving
a disability,” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981),
and that, in this context, “disability” means the “‘inability to
engage in
any
substantial
gainful
activity
by
reason
of
any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months,’” id.
(quoting
42
U.S.C.
§
423(d)(1)(A)).1
“To
regularize
the
adjudicative process, the Social Security Administration has . . .
promulgated . . . detailed regulations incorporating longstanding
medical-vocational evaluation policies that take into account a
1
The Act “comprises two disability benefits programs.
[DIB] . . .
provides benefits to disabled persons who have contributed to the program while
employed.
Supplemental Security Income . . . provides benefits to indigent
disabled persons.
The statutory definitions and the regulations . . . for
determining disability governing these two programs are, in all aspects relevant
here, substantively identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1 (internal citations
omitted).
5
claimant’s age, education, and work experience in addition to [the
claimant’s] medical condition.”
Id.
“These regulations establish
a ‘sequential evaluation process’ to determine whether a claimant
is disabled.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
This sequential evaluation process (“SEP”) has up to five
steps:
“The claimant (1) must not be engaged in ‘substantial
gainful activity,’ i.e., currently working; and (2) must have a
‘severe’ impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the ‘listings’ of
specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent
that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capacity
to (4) perform [the claimant’s] past work or (5) any other work.”
Albright v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 475 n.2
(4th Cir. 1999).2
A finding adverse to the claimant at any of
several points in the SEP forecloses an award and ends the inquiry.
For example, “[t]he first step determines whether the claimant is
engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’ If the claimant is
working, benefits are denied.
The second step determines if the
claimant is ‘severely’ disabled.
If not, benefits are denied.”
Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at
each of the first three steps, “the claimant is disabled.” Mastro,
270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and
2
“Through the fourth step, the burden of production and proof is on the
claimant.
If the claimant reaches step five, the burden shifts to the
[government] . . . .” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal citations omitted).
6
two, but falters at step three, i.e., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment
is not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment,
the ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(‘RFC’).”
Id. at 179.3
Step four then requires the ALJ to assess
whether, based on that RFC, the claimant can “perform past relevant
work”; if so, the claimant does not qualify as disabled.
179-80.
Id. at
However, if the claimant establishes an inability to
return to prior work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step,
whereupon the ALJ must decide “whether the claimant is able to
perform other work considering both [the RFC] and [the claimant’s]
vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work experience)
to adjust to a new job.”
Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65.
If, at this
step, the government cannot carry its “evidentiary burden of
proving that
[the
claimant]
remains
able
to
work
other
jobs
available in the community,” the claimant qualifies as disabled.
Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.4
3
“RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the
claimant’s] limitations.”
Hines, 453 F.3d at 562 (noting that administrative
regulations require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained workrelated physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and
continuing basis . . . [which] means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an
equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted)). The
RFC includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses
the claimant’s “ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy
work,” as well as “nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or skin
impairments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only
after [the ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments and
any related symptoms (e.g., pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63.
4
A claimant thus can qualify as disabled via two paths through the SEP.
The first path requires resolution of the questions at steps one, two, and three
in the claimant’s favor, whereas, on the second path, the claimant must prevail
7
B.
Assignment of Error
In Plaintiff’s sole assignment of error, he contends that
“[t]he ALJ improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s knee impairments and
the medical necessity of his assistive devices when assessing the
RFC.”
(Docket Entry 9 at 4.)
In particular, Plaintiff faults the
ALJ for failing to “engage[] in [a] function by function analysis
or an actual assessment of [Plaintiff’s] credibility regarding his
knee
impairments”
statement
that
(id.),
and
[Plaintiff’s]
for
making
knee
only
impairments
performance of light work” (id. at 5).
a
“conclusory
allow
for
the
According to Plaintiff,
“[t]he only activity which the ALJ pointed to in arguing that
[Plaintiff] was not credible regarding this physical limitations
was
his
driving
uncomfortable.”
a
car
6
to
20
miles
(Id. at 8 (citing Tr. 17).)
before
he
became
Plaintiff maintains
that driving a car for that type of distance “is ‘so undemanding
that [it] cannot be said to bear a meaningful relationship to the
activities of the workplace’” (id. (citing Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d
627,
639
(9th
Cir.
2007)),
and
“does
not
demonstrate
that
[Plaintiff] is capable of the standing and walking requirements of
light work” due to its performance while sitting (id.).
Moreover,
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly analyzed the medical
at steps one, two, four, and five. Some short-hand judicial characterizations
of the SEP appear to gloss over the fact that an adverse finding against a
claimant on step three does not terminate the analysis. See, e.g., Hunter, 993
F.2d at 35 (“If the ALJ finds that a claimant has not satisfied any step of the
process, review does not proceed to the next step.”).
8
necessity of Plaintiff’s cane and motorized scooter under Social
Security Ruling 96-9p, Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and
XVI: Determining Capability to Do Other Work – Implications of a
Residual
Functional
Capacity
for
Less
Than
a
Full
Range
of
Sedentary Work, 1996 WL 374185, at *7 (July 2, 1996) (“SSR 96-9P”)
(Docket Entry 9 at 5, 6-7), and that light work “requir[ing]
standing and walking for 6 hours out of an 8 hour workday . . . is
clearly unrealistic for an individual who uses a cane to ambulate
and was prescribed a motorized scooter by his doctor” (id. at 7).
Finally, Plaintiff “note[s] that the ALJ gave no consideration to
[Plaintiff’s]
left
knee
pathologies”
in
determining
the
RFC,
including an August 2012 MRI which reflected a meniscal tear in his
left knee.
(Id. (citing Bird v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that ALJ should consider
medical
evaluations
post-dating
claimant’s
date
last
insured
because such evaluations can “reflect[] . . . possible earlier and
progressive degeneration”).)
Plaintiff’s contentions warrant no
relief.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of the
medical evidence regarding Plaintiff’s knee impairments.
The ALJ
initially observed that “[t]he evidence of record for the period in
question from the amended onset date of September 5, 2009 through
the date last insured of June 30, 2010 is limited.”
Indeed, the
record
reflects
just
9
(Tr. 15.)
three office visits
to
the
Veterans Administration Medical Center (“VAMC”) between September
5, 2009, and June 30, 2010, none of which involved complaints of or
treatment
presented
for knee
with
pain:
complaints
(1)
on
of
October
23,
epigastric
2009,
burning
Plaintiff
and
left
costovertebral angle (“CVA”) pain (Tr. 600-06);5 (2) on November
24, 2009, Plaintiff complained of head and back pain, along with
anger, mood swings, and depression (see Tr. 587-90); and (3) on
December
11,
2009,
Plaintiff
reported
sinus
congestion
and
pressure, joint pain, dizziness, and a problem sleeping on his left
side (Tr. 569-77).
Given the absence of evidence relating to Plaintiff’s knee
impairments during the relevant period, the ALJ gave Plaintiff the
benefit of the doubt and considered records reflecting Plaintiff’s
right knee arthroscopy in January of 2004, over five years prior to
the amended onset date, and an MRI of Plaintiff’s right knee in
June of 2011, nearly one year after the date last insured:
The available record shows that [Plaintiff] has a history
of a right meniscus tear for which he had surgery on
January 9, 2004. However, the record shows that since
that surgery [Plaintiff] has [been] treated with
conservative methods including pain medications. An MRI
of [Plaintiff’s] right knee taken after the date last
insured in June 2011 did show a complex tear in the
medial meniscus.
Therefore, the undersigned limited
[Plaintiff] to the light exertional level with a
sit/stand/adjust option.
5
The costovertebral angle consists of “the angle formed on either side of
the vertebral column, between the last rib and the lumbar vertebrae.”
See
Elsevier Saunders, Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 88 (3d ed. 2012).
10
(Tr. 15 (internal record citations omitted).) The ALJ did not fail
to discuss any material evidence relating to Plaintiff’s knee
impairment and amply accommodated any limitation arising from
Plaintiff’s knee pain by limiting him to light work and including
the sit/stand/adjust option.
Plaintiff’s challenge to the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s
credibility, i.e., that the assessment hinged solely on Plaintiff’s
ability to drive for 6 to 20 miles, understates the scope of the
ALJ’s analysis. (See Docket Entry 9 at 8.)
Social Security Ruling
96–7p, Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI:
of Symptoms in Disability Claims:
Evaluation
Assessing the Credibility of an
Individual’s Statements, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 (July 2, 1996) (“SSR
96-7p”), as applied by the Fourth Circuit in Craig, 76 F.3d at 59495, provides a two-part test for evaluating a claimant’s statements
about symptoms.
“First, there must be objective medical evidence
showing ‘the existence of a medical impairment(s) which results
from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities and
which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other
symptoms alleged.’” Id. at 594 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b)).
Upon satisfaction
of
part
one
by
the
claimant,
the
analysis
proceeds to part two, which requires an assessment of the intensity
and persistence of the claimant’s symptoms, as well as the extent
11
to which they affect his or her ability to work.
Id. at 595.
In
making that determination, the ALJ:
must take into account not only the claimant’s statements
about her pain, but also all the available evidence,
including the claimant’s medical history, medical signs,
and laboratory findings, any objective medical evidence
of pain (such as evidence of reduced joint motion, muscle
spasms, deteriorating tissues, redness, etc.), and any
other evidence relevant to the severity of the
impairment, such as evidence of the claimant’s daily
activities, specific descriptions of the pain, and any
medical treatment taken to alleviate it.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the ALJ found for Plaintiff at part one of the
inquiry,
but
ruled,
in
connection
with
part
two,
that
his
statements about the degree of his symptoms lacked credibility in
so far as he claimed a level of impairment that would prevent him
from performing a range of light work.
(Tr. 15.)
After discussing
Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the location and intensity of his
pain,
the
objective
medical
evidence
regarding
his
alleged
impairments, and treatments Plaintiff had sought to relieve his
pain (see Tr. 15-16), the ALJ concluded as follows:
While [Plaintiff] alleges disabling limitations due to
his impairments, the objective medical evidence fails to
support such a finding in this case. The record shows
that [Plaintiff] received only conservative care with no
major exacerbations of pain or inpatient treatment
required during the period in question.
Further, the
record contains evidence that [Plaintiff’s] mental health
conditions are controlled with medication. In addition,
evidence regarding [Plaintiff’s] daily activities is not
limited to the extent one would expect, given the
complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.
[Plaintiff] alleges that he has to walk with the
assistance of a cane, but admits that it is not
12
prescribed. [Plaintiff] also alleges constant neck pain
but admits that he continues to be able to drive 6 to 20
miles comfortably. Consideration of these factors also
leads the undersigned to conclude that [Plaintiff’s]
allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations cannot
be accepted, and that the [RFC] finding in this case is
justified.
(Tr. 17 (internal record citations omitted) (emphasis added); see
also Tr. 13 (“In activities of daily living, [Plaintiff] had mild
restriction.”), 191 (acknowledging that he showers, stays home
alone, and drives downtown).) The ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s
credibility thus covered the full range of factors required by the
regulations, Craig, and SSR 96-7p.
argues
that
Plaintiff’s
the
ALJ
erred
credibility
by
Moreover, although Plaintiff
predicating
regarding
his
knee
his
evaluation
impairment
on
of
his
ability to drive 6 to 20 miles because driving does not reflect
Plaintiff’s ability to stand or walk (see Docket Entry 9 at 8), as
the underlined portion of the quoted excerpt above demonstrates,
the ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s driving ability to discount his
allegations of neck pain, not knee pain (see Tr. 17).
Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ improperly analyzed the
medical
necessity
similarly fails.
of
Plaintiff’s
cane
and
motorized
scooter
The ALJ explicitly considered Plaintiff’s use of
a cane both at the hearing (see Tr. 40, 46), and in the ALJ’s
decision (see Tr. 15 (acknowledging Plaintiff’s testimony he walks
with cane), 17 (noting Plaintiff’s admission cane not prescribed)).
However, no physician of record prescribed or opined as to the
13
medical necessity of the cane.
(See generally Tr. 285-1527.)
Under such circumstances, the ALJ did not err by discounting the
impact of Plaintiff’s cane on the RFC formulation.
See SSR 96-9p,
1996 WL 374185, at *7 (“To find that a hand-held assistive device
is
medically
required,
there
must
be
medical
documentation
establishing the need for a hand-held assistive device to aid in
walking or standing, and describing the circumstances for which it
is needed (i.e., whether all the time, periodically, or only in
certain situations; distance and terrain; and any other relevant
information).”).
Plaintiff
also faults
the
ALJ
for
failing to
take
into
consideration Plaintiff’s alleged need for a motorized scooter.
(Docket Entry 9 at 6-7.)
However, Plaintiff’s VAMC providers
authorized the provision of a motorized scooter for Plaintiff on
December 9, 2011, nearly a year and a half past Plaintiff’s date
last insured.
(See Tr. 1125.)
Further, the kinesiotherapist
encouraged Plaintiff “to continue activity as he can tolerate,” and
concluded that Plaintiff needed “power mobility . . . for extended
distances,” but did not indicate the necessity of the scooter for
shorter
distances.
(See
id.)
Given
the
timing
of
the
authorization and the limitation on the necessity of the scooter to
extended distances, the ALJ did not err by failing to discuss
Plaintiff’s claimed need for the motorized scooter.
14
Finally, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to take into
account Plaintiff’s left knee pathologies in formulating the RFC.
(See Docket Entry 9 at 7-8.)
In that regard, Plaintiff relies on
an August 3, 2012 MRI of his left knee which reflected a meniscal
tear.
(See
id.
at
7
(citing
Tr.
1371-73).)
According
to
Plaintiff, the ALJ should have considered this evidence despite its
occurrence over two years after Plaintiff’s date last insured
because such evidence could “be ‘reflective of a possible earlier
and progressive degeneration,’” citing Bird, 699 F.3d at 341.
(Docket Entry 9 at 7.)
pain
in
both
knees
However, although Plaintiff complained of
and
a
VAMC
orthopedist
diagnosed
mild
degenerative joint disease in both of Plaintiff’s knees on July 1,
2009,6 prior to his date last insured, the orthopedist noted full
range of motion in both knees and no effusion, and recommended no
surgery and only medication management for any resultant symptoms.
(Tr. 633.)
Moreover, the record lacks any evidence that Plaintiff
suffered from a meniscal tear in his left knee until the August
2012 MRI. Because nothing in the record links Plaintiff’s meniscal
tear in 2012 to a pre-date last insured left knee impairment, the
ALJ did not err in failing to discuss (or account in the RFC for)
Plaintiff’s left knee condition.
See Bird, 699 F.3d at 341 (“Our
more recent decision in Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650 (4th Cir.
6
Although an x-ray of Plaintiff’s right knee on April 16, 2009 showed mild
degenerative joint disease (see Tr. 407-08), the record does not reflect that
Plaintiff underwent any imaging studies of his left knee at that time (see Tr.
406-27).
15
2005), is further instructive of the principles we articulated in
Moore[v. Finch, 418 F.2d 1224 (4th Cir. 1969)].
the
SSA
treating
administrative
physician
hearing
submitted
had
a
In Johnson, after
concluded,
new
the
claimant’s
assessment
identifying
additional impairments that were not linked in any manner to the
claimant’s condition before her [date last insured].
n.8.
Id. at 656 &
Because there was no evidence that these impairments existed
before the
claimant’s
[date last
insured], we
held
that the
evidence was not relevant, and that the ALJ was not required to
give the new assessment retrospective consideration.
655–56.
Id. at
Thus, our holding in Johnson reinforces the principle
applied in Moore that post–[date last insured] medical evidence
generally is admissible in an SSA disability determination in such
instances in which that evidence permits an inference of linkage
with the claimant’s pre–[date last insured] condition.
See Moore,
418 F.2d at 1226.”).
In sum, Plaintiff’s assignment of error lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not established an error warranting remand.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision
finding no disability be affirmed, that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Judgment
on
the
Pleadings
(Docket
16
Entry
8)
be
denied,
that
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 11)
be granted, and that this action be dismissed with prejudice.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
November 4, 2015
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?