TURNER v. TURNER et al
Filing
37
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE, L. Patrick Auld, signed on 06/01/2015. It is RECOMMENDED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 31 be GRANTED. Objections to R&R due by 6/18/2015)(Coyne, Michelle)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
TERRANCE TICO TURNER,
Plaintiff,
v.
SGT. TURNER, et al.,
Defendants.
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)
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1:14CV379
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a
recommended ruling on Defendants Clevenger, Killough, and Turner’s
Motion to Dismiss.
(Docket Entry 31).
For the reasons that
follow, the Court should grant the instant Motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a North Carolina state prisoner, initiated this
action by filing a pro se form Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Docket Entry 2), alleging deprivation of his rights in connection
with injuries sustained when an inmate in the adjacent cell started
a fire (id. at 3).
It states that Defendants failed to promptly
remove Plaintiff from his cell, and that his resulting exposure to
smoke led to his hospitalization and ongoing health issues.
(Id.
at
that
3.)
In
that
regard,
Plaintiff’s
Complaint
asserts
Defendants’ alleged inaction amounted to an infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
(See id.)
In
support of the foregoing, the Complaint offers the following
factual material:
1) “[o]n January 14, 2012[,] at approximately 7 p.m.[,] while
[Plaintiff] rest[ed] inside [his] cell on the segregation unit of
Orange Correctional Center, [Plaintiff] was suddenly aw[o]ken from
coughing and chok[]ing from thick black smoke filling the air [and]
also an inmate next door to [Plaintiff] yelling and kicking on his
door” (id.);
2) “[t]his particular inmate had allegedly set a fire in his
cell which resulted in [Plaintiff’s] cell and basically the entire
block being consumed in black smoke” (id.);
3)
“being
unable
to
breathe
and
barely
able
to
see[,]
[Plaintiff] immediately got off [his] bunk[,] went to [his] cell
door[,] and got the officer[’]s attention that was next door
dealing with the inmate who set the fire” (id.);
4) “[Plaintiff] requested [that] [Defendants Killough and
Clevenger,
as
well
as
former-Defendant
Bunn]
please
remove
[Plaintiff] from [his] cell due to smoke inh[a]lation[,] plus
[Plaintiff] was f[ee]ling very dizzy headed” (id.);
5) “[Defendant] Killough then told [Plaintiff] to go sit down
[and] that [Plaintiff] would be all right” (id.);
6) “[Defendants Killough and Clevenger, as well as formerDefendant Bunn] then walked away from [Plaintiff’s] cell door [and]
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totally ignored [Plaintiff’s] request to move [him] to safety so
[he] could breathe” (id.);
7) “[s]hortly thereafter [Defendant] Turner entered the block
[to] assist[] the other officers with the situation after [formerDefendant]
Bun[n]
and
[Defendant]
Clevenger
radioed
in
and
announced a code blue on the segregation unit” (id.);
8) “[Plaintiff] then got [Defendant] Turner’s attention and he
came to [Plaintiff’s] cell door and [Plaintiff] requested to him to
please
help
[Plaintiff]
and
remove
[him]
from
[his]
cell
. . . because [he] felt [him]self about to black out” (id.);
9)
“[Plaintiff]
also
decla[]red
to
[Defendant
Turner]
a
medical emergency and then he told [Plaintiff] to shut up and go
sit
or
lay
down
on
[the]
bunk
because
he
wasn’t
remov[]ing
[Plaintiff] from his cell . . . [and] he then walked away” (id.);
10) “[the] [l]ast thing [Plaintiff] could remember was trying
to
walk
back
to
[his]
bunk
[and]
[Plaintiff]
then
lost
consciousness falling hitting [his] back on the steel toilet and
sink plus banging [his] head on the cement floor” (id.);
11) “[w]hen [Plaintiff] regained consciousness [he] was at
U.N.C. Health Care Unit with IVs in [his] arms and the doctor
t[old] [him] [he] had [been] rushed from Orange Correctional Center
to his Health Care Unit from being passed out on the floor of [his]
cell for smoke inh[a]lation” (id.);
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12) “[Plaintiff] also had to take cat scans for the knot that
was on [his] forehead” (id.);
13) Plaintiff continues to “suffer with head aches daily, back
pains constantly and depression so [he] consulted with a doctor and
there are problems with [his] head and back so [the] doctor put
[Plaintiff] on medication for [his] head and back pains and also
[his] depression” (id.); and
14) “[Plaintiff’s] doctor also stated [that] [Plaintiff] would
be on medication for these problems for the rest of [his] life”
(id.).
Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff seeks $40,000 in
compensatory damages against each Defendant, $15,000 in punitive
damages against each Defendant, as well as recovery of his costs
incurred in bringing this action.
(Id. at 4.)
Defendant Bunn
subsequently moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Docket
Entry 11) and the Court (per United States District Judge Loretta
C. Biggs) granted that Motion (see Docket Entry 27 (adopting Docket
Entry 19)).
The remaining Defendants now move to dismiss, asserting: (1)
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights; (2) qualified immunity bars Plaintiff’s claim
against
Defendants
in
their
individual
capacities;
and
(3)
Plaintiff has not adequately pled allegations to support relief in
the form of punitive damages.
(Docket Entry 31 at 1-2.)
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Despite
notice of his right to respond (Docket Entries 35, 36), Plaintiff
has not responded (see Docket Entries dated Mar. 30, 2015, to
present).
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, under this Court’s Local Rules, failure
to respond to a motion generally warrants granting the relief
requested.
See M.D.N.C. R. 7.3(k) (“If a respondent fails to file
a response within the time required by this rule, the motion will
be considered and decided as an uncontested motion, and ordinarily
will be granted without further notice.”). “While this uncontested
motion [to dismiss] could be granted without further notice, in the
interest of justice, the merits of the motion will be addressed
below.”
527
Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.C., 226 F.R.D. 526,
(M.D.N.C.
2004)
(Tilley,
C.J.);
see
also
Stackhouse
v.
Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The fact is that if
a motion to dismiss is granted solely because it has not been
opposed, the
case
is
simply
not being
dismissed
because
the
complaint has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
Rather, it is dismissed as a sanction for failure to
comply with the local court rule.”); cf. Robinson v. Wix Filtration
Corp. LLC, 599 F.3d 403, 409 n.8 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[I]n considering
a motion for summary judgment, the district court must review the
motion, even if unopposed, and determine from what it has before it
whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a
-5-
matter of law.”).
Defendants first contend that “Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim pursuant to Fed[eral] R[ule] [of] Civ[il]
P[rocedure] 12(b)(6) for a violation of his Eighth Amendment Rights
due to any action or inaction by Defendants.”
1.)
(Docket Entry 31 at
Under said Rule, a complaint falls short if it does not
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal,
556
U.S.
662,
678
(2009)
(emphasis
Ashcroft v.
added)
(internal
citations omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
This standard “demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Id.
In other
words, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id.
“[D]etermining whether a complaint states on its face a
plausible
claim for
relief
and
therefore
can
survive
a
Rule
12(b)(6) motion . . . requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.”
F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
Francis v. Giacomelli, 588
Moreover, although the Supreme
Court has reiterated the importance of affording pro se litigants
the benefit of liberal construction, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
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Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine Twombly’s requirement
that
a
pleading
contain
more
than
labels
and
conclusions,”
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (applying Twombly in dismissing
pro se complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Office
of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se
complaint . . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than
formal
pleadings
drafted
by
lawyers.’
But
even
a
pro
se
complainant must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to
infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (quoting
Erickson,
551
U.S.
at
94,
and
Iqbal,
556
U.S.
at
679,
respectively)).
“It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in
prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.”
U.S. 25, 31 (1993).
Helling v. McKinney, 509
“To make a valid claim under the Eighth
Amendment, a prisoner must satisfy two elements.
First, ‘the
deprivation alleged must be sufficiently serious.’” Brown v. North
Carolina Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Odom v. South Carolina Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir.
2003)).
“Second, a prisoner must demonstrate that the prison
official had
a
‘sufficiently
culpable
state of mind.’”
(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
regard, “the
requisite
“state
of
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mind is
one
of
Id.
In that
‘deliberate
indifference’ to inmate health or safety.”
Odom, 349 F.3d at 770
(quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).
“In other words, ‘the test is whether the guards know the
plaintiff inmate faces a serious danger to his safety and they
could avert the danger easily yet they fail to do so.’”
Brown, 612
F.3d at 723 (quoting Case v. Ahitow, 301 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.
2002)).
However, “even subjective knowledge of [a prisoner’s]
medical needs is not enough; the officers must have actually known
that their response was inadequate to address those needs.” Iko v.
Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 242 (4th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original).
“This subjective assessment ‘sets a particularly high bar to
recovery.’”
Parker v. Maryland, 413 F. App’x 634, 638 (4th Cir.
2011) (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 241).
“‘In addition, prison
officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health
or safety may be found free from liability if they responded
reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not
averted. A prison official’s duty under the Eighth Amendment is to
ensure reasonable safety.’”
Odom, 349 F.3d at 770 (quoting Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994)).
Even assuming that Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong by
alleging serious and ongoing injuries from his exposure to smoke,
Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants fails under the second prong
because Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts to support an inference
that Defendants possessed a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,”
-8-
Brown, 612 F.3d at 723.
In that regard, the Complaint states that
Plaintiff twice asked one or more Defendants to let him out of his
cell to escape the smoke from a fire started by a nearby inmate.
(See Docket Entry 2 at 3.)
Plaintiff first made that request of
Defendants Killough and Clevenger (as well as former-Defendant
Bunn) because he felt dizzy from the smoke, in response to which
Defendant Killough advised Plaintiff to sit down.
(Id.)
The
officers then left, according to Plaintiff, to announce a “code
blue” on the segregation unit.
(Id.)
Subsequently, Plaintiff
requested that Defendant Turner let him out of his cell, which
request Defendant Turner refused.
(Id.)
Defendant Turner further
told Plaintiff to “shut up and go sit or lay down on [the] bunk
. . . .”
(Id.)
Such allegations do not suffice to support an
inference that any Defendants acted with deliberate indifference
for several reasons.
First,
none
of
the
above-cited
allegations
concerning
Defendants’ conduct appear to have any reasonable bearing on any
Defendant’s state of mind as to Plaintiff’s safety.
(See id.)
In
other words, the Complaint provides no support for the proposition
that Defendants “actually kn[ew] their response was inadequate to
address [Plaintiff’s] needs,” Iko, 535 F.3d at 242 (emphasis in
original).
Second, the face of the Complaint indicates that
Defendants could not immediately address Plaintiff’s medical needs
because they were actively engaged in responding to the fire - an
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emergency caused by another prisoner that threatened the safety of
the entire segregation unit.
(See Docket Entry 2 at 5.)
That such
a circumstance evidently required prison staff to act quickly and
consider the safety of numerous prisoners and guards alike weighs
strongly against a finding of deliberate indifference.
For instance, in a case involving a prisoner deliberately shot
by a guard without warning in the course of a prison riot, the
Supreme Court stated that, “in making and carrying out decisions
involving the use of force to restore order in the face of a prison
disturbance, prison officials undoubtedly must take into account
the very real threats the unrest presents to inmates and prison
officials alike, in addition to the possible harms to inmates
against whom force might be used.”
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 320 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy,
559 U.S. 34 (2010).
The Supreme Court then concluded that no
violation of the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights had occurred
and reinstated the district court’s entry of a directed verdict for
the prison officials.
Given
that
Id. at 326-28.
context
-
and
without
regard
to
Defendants’
knowledge of Plaintiff’s medical needs - Defendants’ conduct in
attending to the fire first before attending to Plaintiff’s medical
needs does not support a finding that Defendants unreasonably
responded to existing risks under the circumstances. See Odom, 349
F.3d at 770.
Finally, although Defendants were not able to avert
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Plaintiff’s injuries, they did provide Plaintiff with appropriate
medical care to address those injuries by transporting him to the
hospital.
(Docket Entry 2 at 5.)
In sum, Plaintiff’s Complaint
fails to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.
Next, Defendants assert that “Plaintiff’s claims against []
Defendants in their individual capacities should be dismissed
pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity.”
at 1.)1
(Docket Entry 31
The Court should dismiss this case on this alternative
grounds as well.
“Qualified immunity from § 1983 claims ‘protects
government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’”
Doe ex rel. Johnson v. South Carolina Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 169 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (some internal quotation marks
omitted).
Put simply, qualified immunity “ensures that officials
are not unfairly strung up for money damages as a result of bad
1
Plaintiff, in responding to Defendnt Bunn’s Motion to
Dismiss, contended that “[e]ach Defendant is sued indiv[i]dually
and in his official capacity.” (Docket Entry 18 at 2.) However,
state sovereign immunity bars a claim for damages against state
officers in their official capacities, see Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (“The Court has held that, absent waiver by
the State or valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment
bars a damages action against a State in federal court. This bar
remains in effect when State officials are sued for damages in
their official capacity.” (internal citation omitted)), and
Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to seek only money damages (see
Docket Entry 2 at 4).
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guesses in gray areas [and] [i]t encourages capable citizens to
join the ranks of public servants by removing the threat of
constant litigation.”
Braun v. Maynard, 652 F.3d 557, 560 (4th
Cir.
citation
2011)
(internal
and
quotation
marks
omitted).
Accordingly, “[q]ualified immunity is ‘an immunity from suit rather
than a mere defense to liability.’”
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236
(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
For that
reason, the United States Supreme Court “‘repeatedly has stressed
the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest
possible stage in litigation.’” Id. (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502
U.S. 224, 227 (1991)).
“Determining whether qualified immunity applies involves a
two-prong inquiry: ‘whether the facts make out a violation of a
constitutional right’ and ‘whether the right at issue was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.’” West
v. Murphy, 771 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Pearson, 555
U.S. at 232 (internal ellipsis omitted)).
“However, it is within
[the Court’s] discretion to decide ‘which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of
the circumstances in the particular case at hand.’”
Doe ex rel.
Johnson, 597 F.3d at 169 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236).
The
Supreme Court has observed that, “[w]hen qualified immunity is
asserted at the pleading stage, the precise factual basis for the
plaintiff’s claim or claims may be hard to identify.” Pearson, 555
-12-
U.S. at 239-40.
Under such circumstances, a court may properly
proceed to the second prong to avoid “an uncomfortable exercise
where the answer to whether there was a violation may depend on a
kaleidoscope of facts not yet fully developed . . . .”
Id. at 240
(internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipsis omitted).
Accordingly, in this case, the Court need not first consider
whether a violation of a constitutional right has actually occurred
under the first prong to conclude that no violation of a clearly
established
right
has
occurred
under
the
second
prong.
“A
Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law
when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘the contours of a
right are sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would
have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (quoting Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
The Supreme Court has
“not require[d] a case directly on point, but existing precedent
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.”
Id.
Moreover, “[t]he universe of existing precedent is
not unlimited [and] [c]ourts “‘ordinarily need not look beyond the
decisions of the Supreme Court, [the relevant] court of appeals,
and the highest court of the state in which the case arose.’”
West, 771 F.3d at 213 (quoting Lefemine v. Wideman, 672 F.3d 292,
298 (4th Cir. 2012)).
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As discussed above, the fact that Defendants had to respond to
an emergency which posed a threat to many prisoners and guards
alike weighs against finding a clearly established violation.
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.
See
In responding to an unexpected fire
started by another inmate, prison staff had little time to consider
their response.
See West, 771 F.3d at 213 (“Qualified immunity
takes cognizance of human imperfections. Implicit in the idea that
officials have some immunity for their acts, is a recognition that
they may err and that it is better to risk some error and possible
injury from such error than not to decide or act at all.” (internal
quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)).
Put simply, Plaintiff’s
Complaint does not identify any adequate basis to support a finding
that
Defendants
committed
a
clearly
established
violation
of
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Therefore, qualified immunity
protects Defendants and the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s case.
Defendants finally assert that “Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants for punitive damages should be dismissed for failure to
adequately plead allegations rising to the level of punitive
relief.”
assess
(Docket Entry 31 at 2.)
punitive
damages
in
an
“‘[A] jury may be permitted to
action
under
§
1983
when
the
defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or
intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the
federally protected rights of others.’”
Smith v. Pepersack, Nos.
98-1842, 98-1843, 194 F.3d 1305 (table), 1999 WL 760218, at *5 (4th
-14-
Cir. 1999) (unpublished) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56
(1983)). Moreover, “the callous indifference required for punitive
damages is essentially the same as the deliberate indifference
required for a finding of liability on the § 1983 claim.”
v.
Dyke,
814
F.2d
941,
948
(4th
Cir.
1987).
Cooper
Given
that
equivalence, because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts to
support the contention that Defendants demonstrated deliberate
indifference, as discussed above, the Complaint also fails to state
a claim for punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
Defendants have established grounds for relief pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
for Failure to State a Claim (Docket Entry 31) be granted.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
June 1, 2015
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