GILLIS v. COLVIN
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 08/04/2015; that the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 15 ) be DENIED, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 18 ) be GRANTED and the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld. (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STEVEN F. GILLIS,
Plaintiff,
v
CAROLYN SIi. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
l:14CY426
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Steven F. Gillis, btought this action pursuant to Sections 205(9) and
1,631,(c)(3)
of the
Social Secudty
1383(c)(3), to obtain review
denying his claims
,\ct (the ",{.cC'),
as amended (42 U.S.C. $$ a05(g) and
of a final decision of the
Commissioner
of
Social Security
for a Period of Disability ("POD"), Disability Insutance
Benefits
("DIB"), and Supplemental Secutity Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Act.
The Coutt has befote it the certified administative record and cross-motions for judgment.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff fìled applications fot DIB, a POD, and SSI in January of 20'11 alleging
disability onset date
1
of
January
1, 2006.
(t
a
224-238.¡r The applications were denied
Ttanscript citations refer to the administrative record. Additionally, Plaintiff was'tncarcerated, and,
thus, ineligible fot benefits, from the alleged onset date untlJanuary 201,1,.
$$ aOz(x) (r) (Ð (Ð, 1 382(e) (r) (A).
Qt266,514.)
42 U.S.C.
initially and upon teconsideration. (d. at
1,49-1,56, 1,62-'179.)
Plaintiff requested a hearing
befote an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Id. at 180-82.) Present at the September
201.2heanng were Plaintiff, his attorney, and a vocational expett
(1/E').
5,
(Id. at 35-88.) The
ALJ determined in his November 23,201,2 decision that Plaintiff was rìot disabled under the
Âct.
(Id. at7-26.) On March 28,201,4, the Äppeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for
review, making the AIJ's determination the Commissioner's final decision fot review. (d. at
1-4.)
II. STANDARD FOR REVIEW
The scope of judicial teview of the Commissionet's final decision is specifìc and
narrow. Snith u. Schweiker,795 F.2d 343,345 (4th
detetmining
if
thete is substantial evidence
C:r..
1986). Review is limited to
in the record to support the Commissioner's
decision. 42 U.S.C. $ a05(g); Hanter u. Sulliuan, 993 tr.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir.
Sulliuan,907 tr.2d 1,453, L456 (4th Cir. 1990).
1.992);
Hay
In teviewing fot substantial evidence,
u.
the
Cout does not re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute
its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Craig u. Chater,76 tr.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1,996).
The issue befote the Coutt, thetefore, is not whether Plaintiff is disabled but whether the
Commissioner's fìnding that he is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was
reached based upon
^
correct application of the relevant laut. Id.
III. THE ALJ'S DISCUSSION
The
AIJ
followed the well-established five-step sequential analysis
whethet the claimant is disabled, which is set fotth in 20 C.F.R.
See
SS
to
ascettain
404.1520 and 41,6.920.
Albrigltt u. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 tr.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). Here,
2
although the AI-J found that Plaintiff had performed some work dudng the alleged period
of
disability, working as a secudty guard and making and selling fish sandwiches, the ALJ
detetmined that Plaintiff had not engagedin sub¡tantial gainful activity since his alleged onset
date
of January 1,2006.
Qr
12.) 'l'he ,AIJ next found in step two that PlarntitT had the
following severe impairments: mild degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical
spine; mild osteoatthritis
of the right hand; mild post traumatic
stress disorder ("PTSD");
depression; and a substance addiction disorder. (Id. at 13.) At step three, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff did not have an impaitment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically
equal to, one listed in .{ppendix
Priot to step four, the
1. (Id.
,\IJ
^t
1.4.)
determined PlaintifPs
RFC. (Id. at 16-24.) The ,\IJ
detetmined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform medium work with certain additional
limitations. (Id. at 16.) Specifically, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was limited to
undetstanding, remembeting,
and carrying out simple instuctions; in a low
stress
envitonment, which meant that he could not work in a fast-paced production environment,
but could only work in an environment where he made simple work-related decisions and in
which thete were few ot no changes in the work setting. (d. at 16.) The ALJ found too that
Plaintiff could work
in
proximity to, but not
in
coordination with, coworkers and
supervisots, and that he should not have contact with the public. (1/.)
Àt the foutth
step
of the sequence, the AIJ
determined that Plaintiff could not
perform his past televant wotk as a caddy, cleaner, golf attendant, grill man, security guard,
stocket, or assemblet. (Id. at 24.) ,{.t the fifth step of the sequence, the ALJ concluded that
considedng the claimant's age (50 on the alleged onset date), education (at least a high school
a
J
education), and RFC (descdbed above), there were jobs
in the national
economy that
Plaintiff could perform. Qd. at 24.) Specifically, based on VE testimony, the ALJ concluded
that Plaintiff could pedorm wotk as alaundry checker and office cleanet. (Id. at25.)
IV. ANAIYSIS
Plaintiff makes two arguments. Fi-tst, he asserts that the ÂLJ failed to propetly weigh
the Department of Veteran Affair's ('1/4") opinion on disability. pocket E.rtty
1,6
at 1,.)
Second, he contends that the .A.LJ failed to propedy weigh the "acceptable medical source"
opinion of examining psychiatrist Scott T. Schell, M.D. (Id.)
I
The ALJ's Assessment of the VA's Determination Is Supported by
Substantial Evidence.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in evaluating a prior disability determination by
the
V-4. (Docket E.rtty 16 at 7-1.4.) More specifically, the VA
DisabiJity Rating Decision, dated January 26,201.2, and effective as
gtanted him a 50%o service connected rating for PTSD.
issued Plaintiff a VÂ
of
lt4ay 4,2011,, which
(r.252-256.) The ,{LJ attributed
the VÂ determination "little weight." Qd. at 23.) Evalt:ating the strength of Plaintiffs
argument tequires an undetstanding of Bird u. Commi¡sioner,699 F.3d 337,343 (4th C1r.201,2)
and SSR 06-03p.
l¡. Bird
v. Commissioner
In Bird, the Fourth Citcuit considered two issues. First, it
addtessed when an ALJ
must give retrospective consideration to medical evidence genetated after the date last
insuted
("DLI"). The claimant in Bird argued that the .À{
etted
in failing to
retrospectively evidence in the form of a VA ralng decision created after the
considet
DLI. Bird,699
F.3d at 338-39,340. The Fourth Ckcuit held that the Â.LJ was tequfued to give retrospective
4
consideration
to the VA's determination, even though it post-dated the claimant's DLI,
because the evidence placed the claimant's "symptoms in the context of his work and social
histories, dtawing a l-ink benveen his curent condition and his condition predating his
DLI."
Id. at 342.
Second, and mote importantly for this case, in Bird the
Fouth Circuit addressed "the
ptecise weight that the SSÅ must afford to a VA disability ra:J;ng." Id. at343. In addressing
this question, the Fourth Circuit noted that, "the VÀ and Social Secutity progtams serve the
same govetnmental purpose
of ptoviding benefits to persons unable to work
serious disability." Id. at 343.
because
of
a
It reasoned furthet that "þ]oth programs evaluate a claimant's
abiìity to petform full-time wotk in the national economy on a sustained and continuing
basis; both focus on analyztng a claimant's functional limitations; and both require claimants
to present extensive medical documentation in support of their claims." Id.
(citations,
intetnal quotations omitted).
From this, the Fourth Circuit concluded that "þ]ecause the purpose and evaluation
methodology oF both ptograms are closely related, a disability r^tuîg by one
agencies is highly televant
of the
nvo
to the disability determination of the other agency." Id. Thus,"in
making a disability determination, the SSA [Social Security Administration] must give
substantial weight to a V-4. disabiJity
raing." Id. "Flowever,
because the SSA employs its
own standatds for evaluating a claimant's alleged disability, and because the effective date of
covetage for a claknant's disability under the two programs likely will vary, an ALJ may give
less weight
to a V-d disability rating when the record before the ÀLJ cleady demonsttates
that such a deviation is appropriate."
Id. Consequently,
5
the Fourth Circuit held in Bird that
the .AIJ erred in finding Bird's V,{. disability tating irrelevant based solely on the Fact that the
VA decision became effective aftet Bird's DLI.
See
ìd.
^t
346 ("[B]ecause the ALJ made two
errors of law in conducting his analysis of the evidence concerning the issue whether Bird
was disabled before his
DLI, we vacate the disttict court's judgment and temand the case to
the district court for further remand to the ALJ fot ptoceedings consistent with
the
pdnciples of law exptessed in this opinion.")
B.
SSÃ 06-03p
The Social Security Rulings also speak to whether and when an N,J is obligated to
consider disability determinations from other agencies. Accotding to SSR 06-03p:
Out
tegulations
make cleat that the fìnal tesponsibility for
deciding certain issues, such as whether you are disabled, is reserved
to the Commissioner . . . . However, we are required to evaluate all
the evidence in the case tecord that may have z beadng ori our
detetmination or decision of disability, including decisions by other
Thetefore,
governmental and nongovernmental agencies
evidence of a disability decision by another governmental or
nongovernmental ageîcy cannot be ignoted and must be
consideted.
SSR 06-03p, Considering Opinions and Other Euidence From Soarce¡ Who
Are Not 'Acceptable
Medical Sources" in Di:ability Claims; Considering De¿isions on Disabilifl b1 Other Couemmental and
Nongouernmental Agencie¡,
41,6.91,2þ)(v);
see
2006
WL
2329939,
at *6 Q006); 20 C.F.R.
SS 404.1512þX"),
øl¡o 20 C.tr.R. SS 404.1504,416.904.
C. The AIJ Cleady Demonstrated That His Decision to Give "Little Weight"
to the VA Determination Was Supported by Substantial Evidence.
As noted, the V,\ issued Plaintiff a VA Disability Rating Decision, dated January 26,
201,2 and effective as
of May 4,2011,, which granted him a 5070 service connected rating fot
PTSD. Çr.252-256.) In according "little weight" to this determination, the AIJ
6
stated:
The undersigned is awaLte that the claimant has a
Veteran's Administration sèrvice connected tating of 50 percent
for PTSD (Ex. 8D). Furthet evidence ftom the Vetetan's
Àdministration (r/A) reveals that the claknant has a 20 petcent
impairment rating for lumbosacral or cervical strain @,x. 19F).
While the undersigned is not bound by disability decisions made
by othet govetnmental agencies, the undersigned must,
pursuant to SSR 06-3p, nonetheless considet these disability
decisions. Per SSR 06-03p, decisions ftom other agencies
ptovide insight into the claimants impairments only to the
extent they reveal the evidence used to reach the decision of
disability. The Ruling instrLrcts the undersigned to evaluate the
opinion evidence ftom medical sources, as well as "non-medical
sources" who have had contact with the individual in their
professional capacity, used by othet agencies that arc in our case
recotd, in accotdance with Agency policy. While the decision at
issue has been submitted and made pat of the record @,x. 8D),
the services connection evaluation perfotmed on October 28,
201,1,1 by QTC Medical Services for the claimant's PTSD have
not been submitted. Therefore, the undersigned cannot tell
what medical or vocational evidence was used to reach the
conclusion of disability or whether said evidence was similat to
or diffetent from the evidence of record before the
undersigned. As such, the decision of the VA as to the
claimant's disability tating ptovides no insight into the
claimant's impairments and the undersigned accords it little
weight. More importantly, the undetsigned finds that a V,\
t^trng of 50 percent for PTSD is not consistent with the
longitudinal medical evidence before the undetsþed, which
teveals that the claimant has had a good response to teatment,
that upon examination, his mental status is largely normal, and
that his conditions have resulted in minimal symptoms. To the
extent that the VA's tating decision was based upon the same
medical evidence before the undetsigned, it has been considered
as outlined herein.
(Id. at23.)
The undersigned agrees with Defendant that this is not a case where the
explain the consideration given to the VA rating. (Docket E.rtty 20 at
undetsigned agrees
futher with Defendant that the ,{fJ
7
8.)
ÂIJ
failed to
Moreover, the
considered Plaintiffs VA
detetmination in light of the entite tecord and gave proper reasons to afford it less weight.
,{.s an initial matter, the ALJ gave the
V,\ tating
less weight because "decisions
from
othet agencies ptovide insight into the claimant's impairments only to the extent they reveal
the evidence used to reach the decision of disability." Çr. 23 (citing SSR 06-03p)). lØhile
Plaintiff submitted the V-d decision into the tecord, he did not submit the evaluation
performed by QTC Medical Services on October 28,201'1, upon which the tating appears to
be pdmadly based. Qr.23 referencingTr.253-54.)
It is also important to note that the ALJ
acttally held the recotd open hete aftet Plaintiffs administrative headng specifically
so
Plaintiff could submit the evaluation to the Commissioner. (Id. at 45.) Defendant corecdy
points out that the burden is on a claknant to present evidence of his disability. 42 U.S.C.
S
423(dX5XÐ; 20 C.F.R. S$ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a); Blalock u. Nchard¡on, 483 tr.2d 773,775
(4th Cit. 1,972). This includes fumishing medical evidence suppoting his claim. 20 C.F.R.
SS 404.1512(a),'1,516;416.91,2(a).
The undetsigned can see no error in the ALJ propetly
noting that the tecotd did not contain the QTC Medical Services report.
Ând, even setting this issue aside, the ALJ's handling of the VA determination
is
supponed by substantial evidence. This is because the ,\LJ also gave the VA rating less
weight because it was inconsistent with the longitudinal medical evidence, which
demonsttated that Plaintiff had a good response to treatment, latgely normal mental status
examinations, and minimal symptoms.2 Qr.23.)
Hart u. Coltin, No. 3:14-CV-00169-FDW, 2015 WL 470448, *3-4 (ìø.D.N.C. Feb 04, 2015)
(affrrming ALJ's decision to afford litde weight to Medicaid disability determinarion where it was not
consistent with the tecotd as a whole); Bennett u. Coluin, No. 13-871, 2015 WL 354170, at *8
(E.D.N.C. Jan.1,7,2015) ('The court concludes that the ALJ's assessment of the VA's decision is
supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. The court accorditgly rejects
2
See, e.g.,
8
Mote specifìcally, an AIJ must evaluate alI of the medical opinions in the record in
light of: the examining relationship, the treatment relationship, the degree to which the
opinion relies on relevant evidence, the consistency of the opinion with the tecotd as a
whole, the specializatton of the source of the opinion, and othet factors brought to the ALJ's
attention. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1,527(c),4L6.927(c).
A
medical source's opinion must be both
well-supported by medical signs and laboratory findings as well as consistent with othet
substantial evidence in the case record.
Id. "Ef
u physician's opinion is not supported by
clinical evidence ot if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded
significantly less weight." Cmig76 F.3d at 590. In reviewing fot substantial evidence, the
Court does not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, to make
determinations, or
omitted);
accord
credibility
to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id.
(crtatton
Mastro r.,4pft/,270F.3d171,178 (4th Cir. 2001)
Hete, the ,{LJ accurately observed that objective medical evidence revealed that
during a June
201.1. evaluation
with Muty Fruit, Psy.D., Plaintiff was neatly dtessed with good
gtooming/hygiene; was polite and coopetative; had normal speech; had logical and goaldirected thoughts without evidence
of
disordet
ot
delusion; had no hallucinations; had
insight and judgment within normal limits; had good self-esteem; and no problems with
concenttation. Qr.20
referencircgTr.
511-15.) The -{LJ further cotrectly noted that Dt. Ftuit
indicated that PlaintifPs evaluation scotes did not support the ptesence of full critetia fot
diagnosis
of PTSD or major depressive disorder. Qr. 20
referenùng
a
Tr. 517). Dt. Fruit
plaintiffs challenge to it."); Johnson u. Coluin, No. 13-509,201,4\Xry,4636991, at *B-10 (E.D.N.C.
Sept.16, 201,\ (fndnq no error under Bird standard fot ALJ accotding VA decision less weight);
Mills a. Coluin, Case No. 5:1.3-cv-432-FL,201.4 \7L 4055818, at * 5 (E.D.N .C. Aug. 1,4,201,4) (same).
9
indicated further that Plaintiff was receiving treatment for deptessive disorder and the
absence
of
several major deptessive episode symptoms was arì indicator that his anti-
depressant medication was effectively treating his symptoms.
The ,{.LJ also accurately observed that in August of
fft.
201.1.,
20 refereeingTr. 517-18.)
Plaintiff teported his mood
swings were less, and psychiatnstMizanur Rahman, M.D., indicated that he had a genetally
untemarkable mental status examination-he made
fat eye contact, did not have abnormal
involuntary movemenq and his speech was riot ptessuted-apart from his mood being
"down" and his affect constricted. flr. 20 referencingTr.433-84.) Evidence from 2012 also
demonstrated that Plaintiff had only mild limitations, as indicated by his active participation
and insight gained in gtoup therapies.
201.2,
Tr
Qr
21 referencingTr. 579-84.) Additionally, by July
Plaintiff denied hearing voices and tepotted he was tecently marrted.3 Çr.
21, referendng
622-23.) And, as the .AIJ noted, Plaintiff testified that he was able to attend school in
that he completed one semestet of community college where he passed
all.
of his
classes
without special accommodations with the help of support and tutoting ftom Ptoject
Promise.a
Qt
23,46-51,.) Given this evidence, the ÂLJ properþ considered the V-d rating
also told Dr. Fruit that he was doing "odd jobs a little here and there" and had applied for
"social secutity disabiJity income, so þe] canriot work too much or it will impact his claim." (Tr.
51,4.) He also reported to Dr. Rahman in June 2011, that he was doing some work part-time, and
Dt. Rahman noted that Plaintiffs mental status examination wâs generally normal apart from
deptessed mood and constricted affect. (Id. at 521,-23.)
' Plaintiff
o
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ þored his testimony describing special assistance in his entollment
in community college. (Docket Etrtty 16 at 13 referenùngTr. 49-50,72-75.) However, at the hearing,
Plaintiff stated that whjle he saw a psychologist once a week at the community college, he did not
receive diffetent treatment from other students in terms of test taking and homework. (Ir. a9-50.)
,\nd, given the considetable evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff was not
disabled, and given that the ALJ discussed Plaintiffs time at community college at some length, any
error here would be, at most, harmless. (Id. at 15,23.)
10
and, consistent with Bird and governing regulations, suffi.ciently articulated ptopet reasons
for giving it
II
less weight.s
The AIJ's Assessment of Dr. Schell's Opinion
Is
Supported by
Substantial Evidence.
Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ committed reversible etrot in his analysis of the
medical opinion of examining psychiatrist Scott T. Schell,
M.D.
(Docket E.rt y 16 at 1,
1.4-
20.) Âs explained below, the ALJ's assessment of Dr. Schell is well-supported.
'\s noted, an ALJ must
evaluate all of the medical opinions in the record in light of:
the examining relationship, the treatmerit relationship, the degree to which the opinion relies
on televant evidence, the consistency of the opinion with the tecord as a whole, the
specials,zaton of the source of the opinion, and othet factors brought to the ,\LJ's attention.
20 C.F.R. S 404.1,527(c),41,6.927(c). Here, upon considedng Dr.Schell's two reports, the
AIJ
accurately noted that each report is vague, conclusory, and not expressed in vocationally
televant
¡sm5-¡þat
is, neither report provides functional limitations arising ftom PlaintifPs
mental impairments.
Qr. 22
rqferenùng 457-460,
467-10.) Thus, although Dr.
concluded that PlaintifPs mental impairments "adversely influenced" his behaviot
469),
Schell
Çt
459,
Dr. Schell did not provide any specific functional limitation beyond those set forth in
the RFC that,if supported, could be incorporated into an RFC assessment.
404.1,527
See
20 C.F.R.
SS
(a)(2), 416.927 (a)(Z). Consequently, these reports were not entitled to any partcular
weight.6
s
Insofar as Plaintiff argues in Section I above that Dr. Schell's opinions support his VA rating, the
aïgument is not petsuasive fot the reasons set forth below in Section II.
o
The Cotrrt notes too that the "limitations" assessed by Dr. Schell do not indicate that Plarntiff was
l1
,\nd even setting that issue aside, the -{LJ propetly declined to give Dr.
opinions greater weight because
Dr.
Schell's
Schell's observations were
in conflict in and of
Qr 20,22.)
Specifically, Dr. Schell
themselves and in addition to other medical records.
noted that Plaintiff was able to do chores and go to church on a regular basis, was able to
form a working relationship and sustain concentration, and had a global assessment of
functioning ("Gr\F") score of 60 in Match201,1, a score on the bordetline between mild and
modetate symptoms.T Qd. at 20, 457-59).
Dr. Schell also indicated that Plaintiff was
coopetative and a reliable historian, was oriented, could sustain concenttation, and had
genetally normal mental status examination
in March
second examination, presented with what the
proportion with those present in the
201.1 presentation
In
then two months later, at the
noted were symptoms greatly out of
ftst examination.
ptesentation as "inconsistent"),458,467-68.)
Plaintiffs l/ray
AIJ
201,L;
a
(Id. at 23 (describing Plaintiffs
fact, the ALJ specifi.cally noted that
to Dr. Schell was at odds with his March 2011 presentation
to Dr. Schell and was also at odds with his ptesentation to the V-A (described in gteater detail
in Section I above) in the summer of 201J.
(r.
23 (descdbing ll{zy
201,1
visit with Dr.
Schell as "completely inconsistent with his presentation to treating sources at the
Vr\ dudng
completely precluded from performing all work.
t
The GAF is a scale nngþg from zero to one hundred used to ïate
individual's psychological,
^tr
social, and occupational functioning. See Am. Psychiatric Assoc, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders ('DSM-IV") 32-34 (4th Ed., Text Revision 2000). Scotes between 51-60
indicate modetate symptoms or moderate difficulties in social, occupational, or school functioning.
1/. Scores between 61, and 70 indicate mrld symptoms or some difñculty in social, occupational, or
school functtoúng. Id. The Fifth Edition of the DSM discontjnued use of the GAF, in patt
because of "conceptual lack of clanry" and "quesd.onable psychometrics in routine practice."
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Nlental Disorders 16 (5th ed., Am. Psychiatric Äss'n 2013).
t2
this same period of time" and "further inconsistent with his presentation to same examinet
just two months prior").) And, as Defendant coffectly points out, Dr. Schell's reports
appeared based in large part on Plaintifls self-teporting, which the ,{LJ found were not fully
ctedible based on his repotted daily activities, including caring
school, working part-time, and getting engaged and then married.
fot his mother,
[r.23-24).
attending
See
CraigT6
F.3d at 590 n.2. For these reasons, the ALJ propedy gave these reports little weight.s
The state
^gency
physicians also reviewed the medical evidence and determined that,
glven his ability to engage in daily activities and tecords indicating genetally unrematkable
mental status examinations, Plaintiff could petform simple, toutine, repetitive work with
limited social intetaction.
41,6.927(e)Q)Q; Mitchell
u.
(Ir.
Astrwe,
94-98, 121-26.) See
20 C.F.R. SS 404.1.527(e)(2XÐ,
Civil Action No. 2:08cv632,2009 \XT- 4823862, at x7 (E.D.
Va. Dec. 11,2009). Ât the initial level of review, Dr. Schell's March 2011 report-his only
existing medical opinion on Plaintiff at the time-u/as given only "modetate" weight because
it relied heavily on Plaintiffs own subjective reports and the diagnoses of schizoaffective and
somattzatton disorders were not entirely consistent u/ith the othet medical evidence
tecotd. (Tr. 98.) .{t the reconsideration level, the state agency physician
gave
of
Dt. Schell's
subsequent May 2011 report only "little weight" because it was not consistent v/ith the other
record evidence, but gave Dr. Schell's eadier March 2011 opinon "great weight" because it
was consistent with other tecotd evidence. (Id. at 121.)
Plaintiff contends that it was inconsistent and theteforc mateital ertot to give "great
weight" to the opinions of the non-examining state agency medical consultants (one of
8
Insofar as Plaintiff argues in Section II above that his VA. rating supports Dr. Schell's opinions, the
argument is not persuasive for the reasons set forth above in Section I.
13
whom gave Dr. Schell's March 201L report"greatweight") while at the same time giving Dr.
Schell's nvo opinions "little
is not petsuasive and any
weight." pocket Enry
eror
1.6
at 19-20.) Yet Plaintiffs argurnent
here is at most harmless.
First, in giving the non-examining physicians "gteat weight," the ALJ appeared to be
refetencing no more than the non-examining physicians' opinions on Plaintif?s p@sical
limitations.
AIJ
(r. 23.) Second, even assuming the corrtrary-that
is, even assuming that the
intended to give "great weight" to the opinions oF the non-examining state agency
physicians as
to both Plaintiffs physical and mental limitations-¡þs decision of the AIJ
remains suppotted by substantial evidence. As explained, both the non-examining state
agency physicians and the
purported
AIJ
gave
to tecord a significant
Dt.
Schell's May 201.1.
deteriotation
opine¡-¡þs opinion that
in Plaintiffs mental health after
Match
201.1.-"httle weight," aÍrd, as explained above, this is amply supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Consequently, there is no ettot ot inconsistency hete in the manner
the ,ALJ addtessed Dr. Schell's May 2011 opinion. As For Dt. Schell's Match 20LL opinion,
not only did the ÄLJ cleady intend to give it "little weight," but despite this he also crafted
an RFC that essentially took account
vocationally relevant terms.
If
of that opinion insofat as it
thete is any error hete, it is harmless.
See
was expressed in
Morgan u. Bamltart,
142Fed. Åpp'* 71.6,722-23 (4th Cir.2005) ftolding that reversal not required upon error in
assessing treating physician's
opinion where errot cleatly has no bearing on the proceeding).
PlaintifÎs arguments to the contrary
are
not convincing.
V. CONCLUSION
Aftet a carcfuI consideration of the evidence of tecord, the Coutt finds that
I4
the
Commissioner's decision
is supported by
substantial evidence. Åccotdingly, this Coutt
RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs Motion fotJudgment on the Pleadings @ocket Entry
15)
be DENIED, Defendant's Motion fot Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 18) be
GRANTED and the final decision of the Commissionet be upheld.
August
Jo.
&otu
Uni
l5
eb
States Magisttate Judge
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