OTUONYE v. KING
Filing
16
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN JR. on 1/21/2015, that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4 ) is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED. A Judgment dismissing this action will beentered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion and Order. FURTHER that Plaintiff's Motion to Stay (Doc. 14 ) is DENIED AS MOOT. (Daniel, J)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
KENNETH E. OTUONYE,
Plaintiff,
v.
PHYLLIS LILE KING,
Defendant.
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1:14CV585
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
Plaintiff Kenneth E. Otuonye (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro
se, commenced this action by filing a Complaint (Doc. 2) on
July 14, 2014, against Defendant Phyllis Lile King
(“Defendant”). Presently before this court is Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. 4). This court has carefully considered
Defendant’s Motion, Defendant’s Supporting Brief (Doc. 6) and
Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 7). For the reasons stated fully
below, this court will dismiss the present action for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges “fraud” against Defendant stemming from
both (1) an alleged payment agreement between Plaintiff and
Defendant regarding payment for representation in Case Number
1:13CV76 and (2) a settlement agreement entered into in
1:13CV76.1 Defendant was Plaintiff’s attorney for a portion of
the settled action. (Complaint (“Compl.”) (Doc. 2) at 3.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “gave me some papers containing
$22,500 and ask[ed] me to sign . . . [A]fter signed, [she] told
me not to tell anybody because it is a secret deal.” (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff asks this court to “help me get the money she
defrauded from me.” (Id. at 5.)
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 16, 2014 (Doc.
4) and a Supporting Brief (Doc. 6) on July 25, 2014. Defendant
moves this court to dismiss the present action asserting that
federal jurisdiction is inappropriate, because there is neither
a federal question at issue nor diversity jurisdiction. (Def.’s
Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 4) at 1.) Plaintiff filed his Response
(Doc. 7) on August 4, 2014. Defendant’s Motion is thus ripe for
adjudication.
1
Case Number 1:13CV76 was an employment discrimination and
wrongful discharge action filed pro se by Plaintiff Otuonye in
the Middle District of North Carolina on January 30, 2013.
(1:13CV76 (Doc. 2).) A Notice of Appearance by attorney was
filed in that action by current Defendant King on April 30,
2013. (1:13CV76 (Doc. 17).) Case Number 1:13CV76 was reported as
settled on June 12, 2013, and a Stipulation of Dismissal was
entered on June 21, 2013 (1:13CV76 (Doc. 20)). The present
action stems from Plaintiff’s claims regarding (1) a payment
agreement and (2) the signing of the settlement agreement in
Case Number 1:13CV76.
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II.
LEGAL STANDARD
When a defendant makes a facial challenge to subject
matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff, in effect, is
afforded the same procedural protection as he would
receive under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration. In that
situation, the facts alleged in the complaint are
taken as true, and the motion must be denied if the
complaint alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject
matter jurisdiction.
Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Rule 12(b)(6)
protects against meritless litigation by requiring sufficient
factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level” so as to “nudge[ ] the[ ] claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially
plausible provided the plaintiff provides enough factual content
to enable the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.
Id.
The pleading setting
forth the claim must be “liberally construed” in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, and allegations made therein
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are taken as true.
(1969).
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421
However, the “requirement of liberal construction does
not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the
pleadings to allege any facts [that] set forth a claim.”
Estate
of Williams-Moore v. Alliance One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335
F. Supp. 2d 636, 646 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
When a party is proceeding pro se, that party’s filings are
“to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). It is important to note that, in the case of a pro se
plaintiff, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine Twombly's
requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and
conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing pro se
complaint).
III. ANALYSIS
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994). Generally, federal court jurisdiction stems from either
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(1) a federal question or (2) diversity of the parties. “Article
III of the Constitution gives the federal courts power to hear
cases ‘arising under’ federal statutes.” Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc.
v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986). This is federal question
jurisdiction. “The general-diversity statute, § 1332(a),
authorizes federal court jurisdiction over cases in which the
citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of
each defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 62
(1996). In addition, for federal diversity jurisdiction, the
amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
In the present action, Plaintiff’s pleadings fail to
support this court’s jurisdiction on either federal question or
diversity grounds. First, Plaintiff does not assert a cause of
action arising under any federal question or law. Plaintiff
specifically asserts:
I the plaintiff alleged a fraud under Paragraph
1, because of the agreement we had, stating that if
she goes to the Court and win[s] the amount I was
demanding from my former employer I will pay her by
percentage, but if only to settle out of the Court, I
will [pay] her [a] couple of hundreds of dollar for
finishing what I have already started. [A]lso alleged
fraud because I was harassed to sign a paper against
my will.
(Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Resp.”) (Doc. 7)
at 1-2.) Construing the complaint liberally and assuming
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Plaintiff’s allegations are true, this court finds that
Plaintiff’s claims are, most likely, contract claims.
Plaintiff
includes in his first claim, “because of the agreement we had,”
and bases his cause of action on that agreement. A breach of
contract claim that implicates no federal issues is a state law
claim. See Heath v. City of Fairfax, 542 F.2d 1236, 1238 (4th
Cir. 1976) (finding no federal constitutional issues posed by a
simple breach of contract and, therefore, no federal question
jurisdiction). The allegation of being forced to sign a paper
against his will is also not, in itself, a federal claim.2
Plaintiff may be able to assert this action as a contract claim
of being forced to sign the agreement under duress or force, but
such a claim would be a contract claim that belongs in state
2
The agreement that Plaintiff asserts he was “harassed to
sign” (Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 7) at 2) is most likely the settlement
agreement from 1:13CV76. In North Carolina, a settlement
agreement is a contract. “Whether denominated accord and
satisfaction or compromise and settlement, the executed
agreement terminating or purporting to terminate a controversy
is a contract, to be interpreted and tested by established rules
relating to contracts.” Simontacchi v. Invensys, Inc., Civil No.
3:05cv283, 2009 WL 426466, at *8 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 19, 2009)
(quoting Carter v. Foster, 103 N.C. App. 110, 404 S.E.2d 484
(N.C. App. 1991)). Regardless of whether it was the settlement
agreement or some other agreement, Plaintiff does not allege any
facts suggesting jurisdiction lies with this court, and an
allegation of harassment does not establish federal jurisdiction
in and of itself.
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court. Because Plaintiff does not assert a cause of action
“arising under” federal law, this court does not have federal
question jurisdiction over the pending matter.
In addition, there is no diversity jurisdiction in the
present action. There is neither evidence nor allegations that
both parties are residents of different states. To the contrary,
all documentation indicates that both parties are North Carolina
residents. (Compl. (Doc. 2); Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 4);
Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 7).) In addition, Plaintiff alleges an amount
in controversy of $6,000, well below the statutory amount in
controversy requirement of $75,000. (Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 7) at 3.)
In light of these facts, this court finds no basis to support
diversity jurisdiction in the present action.
Plaintiff specifically asserts that jurisdiction is proper
in this court because, “it is the same court that handle[d] this
matter last year.” (Id.) The Supreme Court has addressed the
issue of federal jurisdiction over state law claims when the
state law claims stemmed from allegations against an attorney in
a previous action in federal court. In Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S.
____, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013), a plaintiff sued an attorney who
represented the plaintiff in a federal patent infringement suit
for legal malpractice stemming from the patent infringement
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action. In Gunn, the Supreme Court held that, despite the
underlying claim being in federal patent law, Texas state court
had subject matter jurisdiction over the legal malpractice
action. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1068; see also Custer v. Sweeney, 89
F.3d 1156 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that district court had
discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
legal malpractice claim after dismissing ERISA claim because
legal malpractice claim is not completely preempted by ERISA and
does not incorporate federal law issues substantial enough to
create federal-question jurisdiction).
Though the present action is not a legal malpractice claim,
the cases addressing whether or not a federal court has
jurisdiction over a legal malpractice claim when the underlying
action was a federal question are informative. This court finds
that, despite federal jurisdiction in Plaintiff’s previous
action (1:13CV76), and Plaintiff’s current claims arising out of
alleged actions by Defendant when Defendant was Plaintiff’s
attorney in that previous action, federal jurisdiction in the
present action is inappropriate. Plaintiff’s claims do not
implicate any federal question making federal jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 improper and there is no diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) is GRANTED and that this
action is DISMISSED.
A Judgment dismissing this action will be
entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion and
Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay (Doc.
14) is DENIED AS MOOT.
This the 21st day of January, 2015.
_______________________________________
United States District Judge
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