SIMMONS et al v. CORIZON HEALTH, LLC et al
Filing
52
MEMORANDUM OPINION signed by JUDGE THOMAS D. SCHROEDER on 10/6/2015, that for the reasons stated, Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege a § 1983 claim against Sheriff Barnes in his official capacity. ORDERED that Defendants' motion for reconsideration (Doc. 36 ) is GRANTED and Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim against Sheriff Barnes in his official capacity (Doc. 15 ) is GRANTED. (Butler, Carol)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
GLENDA S. SIMMONS, as Guardian
and Conservator of Bryan
O'Neil Simmons, CALVIN C.
SIMMONS, as Guardian and
Conservator of Bryan O'Neil
Simmons, BRYAN O'NEIL SIMMONS,
and TIFFANY SIMMONS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CORIZON HEALTH, INC., CORIZON,
LLC, B.J. BARNES, in his
official capacity as Sheriff
of Guilford County, North
Carolina, GUILFORD COUNTY, and
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXCESS
LIABILITY FUND, INC.,
Defendants.
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1:14cv730
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiffs Glenda, Calvin, Bryan, and Tiffany Simmons bring
suit
against
Defendants
Corizon
Health,
Inc.,
Corizon,
LLC
(collectively “Corizon”); B.J. Barnes, Sheriff of Guilford County,
Guilford County, and the Local Government Excess Liability Fund,
Inc. (collectively “Guilford Defendants”), for alleged violations
of Bryan Simmons’ constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, as well as for violations of North Carolina law.
20.)
(Doc.
Before the court is Sheriff Barnes’ motion, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, for reconsideration of this
court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order entered August 4, 2015. (Doc.
36.)
For
the
reasons
set
forth
below,
the
motion
for
reconsideration and motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim
against Sheriff Barnes, in his official capacity as Sheriff of
Guilford County, North Carolina, will be granted.
I.
BACKGROUND
This suit arises from injuries Bryan Simmons sustained while
incarcerated in the Guilford County jail.
(Doc. 20 ¶ 1—22.)
A
complete version of the factual allegations are set forth in this
court’s August 4, 2015 Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. 35) and
need not be repeated here.
Following
Plaintiffs’
filed a motion to dismiss.
complaint,
(Doc. 15.)
the
Guilford
Defendants
In considering the Guilford
Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to Sheriff Barnes, this court
observed that the “Guilford Defendants ma[d]e no argument that
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint fails to allege facts of an official
policy causing the claimed Eighth Amendment violation.”
at 23.)
(Doc. 35
On that basis, the motion to dismiss was denied as to
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against Sherriff Barnes.
(Id.)
However,
Sheriff Barnes’ motion for reconsideration contends that this
argument was in fact made, albeit summarily.
(Doc. 29 at 15.)
Specifically, in connection with a broader argument as to Sheriff
Barnes’ respondeat superior liability, the Guilford Defendants’
brief in support of their motion to dismiss argued that there are
no “substantive allegations that . . . Sheriff [Barnes] initiated
2
a specific policy or tacitly endorsed a specific custom or practice
which proximately caused [the injury alleged].” 1
omitted).)
(Id. (emphasis
Sheriff Barnes now urges the court to consider this
argument.
II.
ANALYSIS
Sheriff Barnes labels his motion for relief from judgment as
a Rule 60 motion, but because Sheriff Barnes’ motion for relief
from judgment was filed within 28 days of the entry of judgment,
it is proper for this court to treat it as a motion to alter or
amend judgment under Rule 59(e).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e);
Knowles v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 788 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir.
1986); Maxus Energy Corp. and Subsidiaries v. United States, 31
F.3d 1135, 1139-41 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“The universal rule is that,
regardless of its label, any motion made within [28] days of entry
of judgment which seeks a substantive change in the judgment will
be considered a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion.”).
A court may amend
a judgment under Rule 59(e) where it is necessary to “prevent
manifest injustice.”
(4th Cir. 1993).
Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081
Because Sheriff Barnes’ argument was initially
1
Litigants are cautioned that they are obliged to state their arguments
clearly and to support them with legal authority, or else they will be
deemed insufficient.
See M.D.N.C. Local Rule 7.2(a).
Here, Sheriff
Barnes’ argument was a single sentence buried in a larger discussion of
respondeat superior liability.
The court addresses the motion now
because Sheriff Barnes is clearly entitled to relief at this early stage
and thus should avoid the unnecessary expense of defending the claim
until it can be dismissed at summary judgment.
3
overlooked, justice requires this court to now consider whether
Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that a policy or custom of
Sheriff Barnes proximately caused Simmons’ injury.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Plaintiffs have sued Sheriff Barnes only in his official
capacity. (Doc. 20.) In addition, unlike as to Defendant Guilford
County, Plaintiffs do not allege that the Sherriff’s office had a
contractual relationship with Corizon. (See id. ¶¶ 13, 14, 29, 32,
44, 46, 68, 100, 104 (alleging that the relevant contract was
between Guilford County and Corizon)).
cannot
state
a
claim
against
Sheriff
Accordingly, Plaintiffs
Barnes
in
his
official
capacity without alleging that Simmons’ injuries were proximately
caused by “an official policy or custom of the Sheriff’s office.”
Evans v. Guilford Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 1:13CV499, 2014 WL 4641150,
at *3 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2014) (emphasis added); Lytle v. Doyle,
326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003).
4
There are four ways for an
unconstitutional policy or custom to arise:
(1) through an express policy, such as a written
ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a
person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an
omission, such as a failure to properly train officers,
that “manifest[s] deliberate indifference to the rights
of citizens”; or (4) through a practice that is so
“persistent and widespread” as to constitute a “custom
or usage with the force of law.”
Lytle,
326
F.3d
at
471
(alteration
in
original
and
internal
citations omitted).
Plaintiffs
do
Sheriff’s office.
not
allege
any
affirmative
(See Doc. 20 ¶¶ 111-27.)
policy
by
the
Instead, they allege
that Sherriff Barnes and his employees have a policy or custom of
deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners.
id.)
(See
In support of this argument, Plaintiffs allege an incident
from a year prior to Simmons’ injury.
(Id. ¶ 123.)
There, an
inmate died from a blood clot after being strapped to a restraining
chair for 24-36 hours.
(Id.)
This is the only prior incident
that Plaintiffs allege.
This single, isolated incident is not sufficient to establish
a policy or custom of medical neglect.
See, e.g., Slakan v.
Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 1984) (“Ordinarily, [the
plaintiff] cannot satisfy his burden of proof by pointing to a
single incident or isolated incidents.”); Layman v. Alexander, 294
F. Supp. 2d 784, 794 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (“Deliberate indifference on
the part of a supervisor may not be established ‘by pointing to a
5
single incident or isolated incidents, . . . for a supervisor
cannot be expected to promulgate rules and procedures covering
every
conceivable
occurrence
within
the
area
of
his
responsibilities.’” (quoting Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373)); Russell v.
Town
of
Chesapeake,
817
F.
Supp.
38,
42
(S.D.
W.Va.
1993)
(“Evidence of one prior incident of excessive force . . . by itself
would not establish the pattern of ‘persistent and widespread’
constitutional violations necessary to demonstrate a ‘custom.’”
(citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978))); see also Jones v. Muskegon Cnty., 625 F.3d 935,
946-47
(6th
Cir.
2010)
(finding
that
five
incidents
did
not
establish a “custom that was ‘so widespread, permanent, and well
settled as to have the force of law.’”) (citations omitted)).
In addition to being isolated, the prior incident is of
limited relevance to Simmons’ injury.
Plaintiffs do not allege
that Simmons was placed in a restraint chair. Instead, they allege
he was denied access to adequate healthcare when he was obviously
sick.
Further, it was not the Sheriff’s policy that caused injury
in the prior incident; Plaintiffs allege the actual policy in place
when the prior incident occurred prohibited chair restraint for
more than two hours.
(Doc. 20 ¶ 123.)
For these reasons, the
prior incident alleged by Plaintiffs, even assuming it to be true,
is far too isolated and unrelated to establish a policy or custom
of deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners.
6
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against Sheriff Barnes also fails if
their policy or custom argument is construed as a failure to train
claim.
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that “[t]he Sheriff Deputies
who were engaged to oversee Simmons during his incarceration were
either improperly trained to ascertain and handle foreseeable
medical emergencies . . . or were indifferent to his plight.”
(Doc. 20 ¶ 117.)
Inadequate training “may serve as the basis for
§ 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to
deliberate indifference.”
U.S. 378, 390 (1989).
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489
Deliberate indifference only exists where
a municipal policy, or lack of a policy, “make[s] the specific
violation [alleged] almost bound to happened, sooner or later,
rather than merely likely to happen in the long run.”
Carter v.
Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiffs appear to allege that Simmons’ injury would have
been avoided if the jail guards had been trained to “ascertain and
handle foreseeable medical emergencies.”
(Doc. 20 ¶ 117.)
But
for additional training to have had any effect in this case, the
guards would need to have been trained to (1) recognize medical
emergencies and (2) override the advice of medical staff where
they believe a medical emergency is being ignored.
The
absence
indifference.
of
this
policy
does
not
rise
to
deliberate
First, as noted above, Plaintiffs have not alleged
any prior incident that would have put Sheriff Barnes on notice
7
that training his guards to override the advice of medical staff
was necessary.
See Harris, 489 U.S. at 399 (collecting cases).
Second, “jail officials are ordinarily entitled to defer to the
judgment of medical professionals.”
Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 676 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Russell
v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975).
Accordingly, given
the
the
dearth
of
alleged
prior
incidents
and
common
sense
presumption that medical staff have more expertise in medicine
than jail guards, Plaintiffs have failed to plausible allege that
Sheriff Barnes’ failure to train his guards to override the advice
of medical staff made Simmons’ injury “bound to happen, sooner or
later.” Carter, 164 F.3d at 218.
Because
Simmons’
Sheriff’s
Plaintiffs
injuries
office,
were
have
failed
caused
Sheriff
by
Barnes’
to
a
plausibly
policy
motion
to
or
allege
custom
dismiss
that
of
the
will
be
granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly
allege a § 1983 claim against Sheriff Barnes in his official
capacity.
IT
IS
THEREFORE
ORDERED
that
Defendants’
motion
for
reconsideration (Doc. 36) is GRANTED and Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against Sheriff Barnes in his
official capacity (Doc. 15) is GRANTED.
8
/s/
Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
October 6, 2015
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