BLUE v. COLVIN
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 12/21/2015; that the Commissioner's decisionfinding no disability be AFFIRMED, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 14 ) be DENIED, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 16 ) be GRANTED, and that this action be DISMISSED with prejudice. (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
BRENDA LEE BLUE,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
V
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
S ecudty Adminis tration,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 1,:1,4CY946
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Btenda Lee Blue, btought this action pursuant to Sections 205(9) and
1,631
(c)(3) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), codified as amended (42 U.S.C. $$ a05@)and
1383(c)(3)),
to obtain judicial review of a ftr'al decision of the Commissioner of
Secutity denying her claims
for disability
Security Income ("SSD under Titles
II
and
insurance benefits
Social
("DIB") and Supplemental
XVI of the Act.1 The Cout
has before
it
the
cenified administtative tecotd and cross-motions for judgment. For the reasons set forth
below, the Coutt recofiunends that Defendant's motion (Docket Ent"y 16) be granted and
Plaintiffs motion pocket E.rtty 14) be denied.
t
"The Social Security Act comprises two disability benefits programs. The Soci¿l
Security
Disability Insurance Ptogram . . . provides benefits to disabled persons who have contributed to the
program while employed. The Supplemental Security Income Program . . . provides benefits to
indigent disabled persons. The statutory definitions and the regulations for determining
disability governing these two programs are, in all aspects relevant here, substantively identical."
Craigu. Chater,76F.3d 585, 589 n. 1 (4th C1r.1996) (internal citations omitted).
I.
P
PROCEDURA,L HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
kintif s Preuio a s App li ca tio n for B en ef ts
s
On Match
"1.9,
2009, Plaintiff filed applications
for DIB and SSI alleging disability
beginning September 30, 2008. Qr.93.)2 Plaintiffs claims were denied initially onJuly 26,
2009, and upon teconsidetation on Novembet 20,2009. (Id.)
Administrative LawJudge
A hearing was held befote
1"4{") on December 1,4,201,0. Plaintiff
as did a vocational expett
an
testified at the hearing,
("VE"). (Id.) On January 28, 201,1, ALJ
Daniel S. Pang
determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacíty ßFC) to perform light work
that tequired no more than occasional operation of foot conttols; occasional climbing of
ladders, ropes, scaffolds, ramp and stairs; occasional stooping, kneeling, ctouching and
ctawling; avoided concentrated exposure to extreme cold, heat, wetness, and humidity; only
occasional work with
ot assembling of objects smaller than a qùaLttet; and allowed for ar at-
will stand option. Gt. 96.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not perform her past
relevant work,
but that, based on the testimony of the VE, she could perform
representative jobs
of ticket seller, gate attendant, and conveyor line bakery worker,
thetefore the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the
Act. (Ir. 99.)
the
and
This
decision became the final administtative decision after. the Appeals Council declined teview.
Qr. 25,49.) Plaintiff did not appeal ALJ Pang's decision to fedetal court, thereby tendering
that decision to be final as of Januaty 28,2071,.
2
(ft.
49.)
Ttanscript citations refet to the administtative tecotd which was filed with Defendant's Answet
(Docket Entry 9.)
2
P laintff s C are n t App li catio n s
þr
B
enef ts
Plaintiff agun fìled applications for DIB and SSDI on September
26,20'1,1,, alleging
that she became disabled on September 30, 2008. Qr. 225;235.) The applications were
denied initially and agasn upon reconsideration. (Id. at 1,02;
'1,72:' 1,24; 1,37
.) A headng was
held befote ALJ Mason Hogan on Match 20,201,3. Plaintiff and het attorney were present
at the hearing, a¡d a VE testified by telephone.
Çr
20;
25.) At the hearing Plaintiff
amended the alleged onset date in her current application for benefits to January 29,201,7,
one day after AI-J Pang's decision.
Gt. 50.) In a decision dated June 5, 201-,3, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the
Act. (d. at 25-38.)
,{IJ's determination
the
for purposes of review. (Id. at 7-9.) The Plaintiff
has
Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review, making the
Commissionet's final decision
exhausted all available administtative temedies, and this case is now
to 42 U.S.C.
S
On July 3,201,4, the
tþe for teview pursuant
405@.
il.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Commissioner held that Plaintiff was not undet a disability within the meaning
of the Act. Under 42U.S.C. $ a05(g), the scope of judicial teview of the Commissioner's
final decision is specific and natrow. Snith u. Scltweiker,795F.2d343,345 (4th Cir. 1986).
This Court's teview of that decision is limited to determining whether there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. 42U.5.C. $ a05(g); Hanter
Salliuan,993 F.2d
3'1,,
a.
34 (4th Cit. 1,992) þer rurian), superseded in non¡elevant part by 20
C.F.R. S 404.1517(dXZ); Hals u. Salliuan,907 F.2d7453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial
evidence
is "such televant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
a
J
support a conclusion." Hanter,993 tr.2d at 34 (crnngNchardson
(1,971)).
u. Perales,402
U.S. 389, 401
"It consists of mote than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat
less
than a ptepondet^îce." Id. (qtottng L^aws u. Celebreq7e, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)).
The denial of benefits will be tevetsed only if no reasonable mind could accept the tecotd
adequate
as
to support the determination. Nchardson,402U.S. at 401,. The issue before the
Court, therefore, is not whethet Plaintiff is disabled, but whethet the Commissionet's
finding that Plaintiff is not disabled is suppotted by substantial evidence and was reached
based upon a coffect application of the relevant
law.
See
id.; Cofnan u. Bowen, 829 tr.2d
51,4,
517 (4th Cir. 1987).
Thus, 'fa] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving a disability,"
Hall
a.
Han'is,658 F.2d 260,264 (4th Cir. 1981), and in this context, "disabiJity" means the
"'inability
to
engage
detetminable physical
in
^îy
substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically
ot mental impairment which can be expected to tesult in death ot
which has lasted or c n be expected to last for a continuous pedod of not less than
months,"' id. (quottne 42 U.S.C.
S
12
423(dX1XÐ). "To tegulaÅze rhe adjudicative ptocess, the
Social Security Administration has .
. . promulgated . . . detailed regulations incorporating
longstanding medical-vocational evaluation policies that take into account a claimant's age,
education, and wotk experience in addition to [the claimant's] medical condition." Hall,658
tr.2d at 364. "These regulations establish a 'sequential evahatton process' to determine
whether a claknart is disabled." Id. (internal citations omitted).
This sequential evaluation process ("SEP') has up to five steps: "The claimant
(1)
must not be engaged in 'substantial gainful tcluvity,' i.e., cttently wotking; and Q) must have
4
a 'severe'impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the 'listings'
otherwise incapacitattng
of specified impairments, ot
to the extent that the claimant does not
is
possess the residual
functional capacíty to (4) perform fthe claimant's] past work or (5) any other work." Albright
a. Comm'r of Soe
Sec.
Adnin., 174 tr.3d 473, 475 n. 2 (4th Ctt. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R.
S
404.1,520). The law concerning these five steps is well-established. Jaø, e.g., Mastro,270 F.3d
^t
177 -1,80; Ha//, 658 F.2d at 264-65; Hine¡ u. Baruhart, 453 F .3d 559 , 567 (4th
III.
Cir. 2006).
THE ALJ's DECISION
In hisJune 5,2013 decision, ALJ Hogan found thatPlaintiff was not disabled under
Sections 216(i) and 223(d)
detetmination, the
Social Secwity
Acl
CIt. 38.) In making this disability
AIJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in "substanial gainful actvity"
since het alleged onset
,{t
of the
date. Qr.
27
.) Plaintiff
thus met her burden at step one of the SEP.
step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffeted from the following
impairments thtough her date last
degenetative disc disease
inswed:
degenerative
joint
disease
severe
of the knees;
of the lumbat spine; diabetes mellitus; diabetic neuropathy and
mild obesity. Qd.) The ALJ found at step three that these impairments did not meet or
medically equal a disability listing. (d. at29.)
The
AfJ
next assessed Plaintiffs RFC3 and determined that Plaintiff could perform
sedentary work as defined
in 20 CFR SS 404.1.567(a) and 41,6.967(a) except never climb
'
"RFC is a measurement of the most â claimant can do despite [the claimant's] limitations." Hines,
453 F.3d at 562 (citation omitted). The RFC includes both a "physical exertional or strength
limitation" that assesses the claimant's "ability to do sedentary,hght, medium, heavy orvery heavy
work," as well as "nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or skin impairments)." Ha/1,658 F.2d
at 265. "RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only aftet [the ALJ] considets all relevant evidence of
a claimant's impairments and any telated symptoms (e.g., patn)J' Hines,453 F.3d at 562-63.
5
laddets, scaffolds, or ropes; occasionally climb ramps and staits; occasionally balance, stoop,
kneel, and ctouch, but never crawl; avoid concentrated exposute
to
hazards such
as
unprotected heights and dangerous machinery. Furthet, the ALJ found that Plaintiff would
requite the flexibility to use a handheld assistive device such as
^
cane
while standing and
walking. (It.30.)
In light of his RFC findings, the ,\LJ determined at step four that Plaintiff could
petform het past televant work ("PRW") as a receptionist (citing 20 C.F.R.
SS
404.1565 and
.,{,ccotdingly, the ALJ decided that Plaintiff was not under a "disability,"
41,6.965).
Qr.37.)
as defined
in the Act, at any time fromJanu^ry 29,2011 through the date of his decision,
June 5, 201,3 (cittng 20 C.F.R.
SS
404.1520(f) and 41,6.920(Ð).
IV.
(Ir.
38.).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs sole argument in this appeal is that the ALJ erred at step fout of the SEP
by failing "to fulfill his duty, under Social Security Ruling (SSR) 82-62, to fully question
fPlaintiffl and develop the tecord tegatding the physical and mental demands of het past
relevant
the
work."
AIJ
(Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of J. at 6, Docket Entry
15.) Plaintiff contends
mischatactenzed het testimony tegatding het duties, and failed
that
to give proper
weight to a thitd-party statement from her former employet.4
Prior to proceeding to step four, the AIJ
Plaintiff had the ability to perform a limited
4
assessed
rz,nge
of
Plaintiffs RFC and found that
sedentary
wotk. CIt. 30.) At
the
This Court notes that Plaintiff has made only a cursory legal argument, unsupported by any
relevant legal authority. The Local Rules of this district require that legal arguments made in bdefs
"shall tefer to all statutes, rules and ¿uthorities relied upon." M.D.N.C. L.R.7.2(a)@. The failute of
counsel to include legal analysis that is supported by citations to relevant legal authority is troubling
to this Cout. This Court is aware of at least ofle court that has imposed monetary sancdons against
attomeys fot filing frivolous and unsuppoted legal briefs in social secudty cases. See Stines u. Coluin,
No. 1:12cv121 (W.D.N.C. Oct. '1,,201,3) (Howell, M"g.J).
6
headng, the ALJ questioned Plaintiff about het past wotk, and Plaintiff testifìed that she had
worked as a receptionist for a tax service.
(It. 55.) Plaintiff also testified that she "did a
little filing" "some of the figuring," answeted phones and gteeted customers.
(Ir.
55-57.)
Plaintiff testified that she did not do any cleaning, lifting or carrying in this position. (Tt.
56.) Plaintiff testified that
she worked
in a small office, and that she would be seated for
thtee to fout houts during the day. (Id.) In response to the ALJ's question, Plaintiff stated
that she could no longer do the iob "because going up and down those stairs[,] it took a toll
on my knees." Cfr. 58.) After receiving this testimony, the
A{
asked Janette Clifford, a
VE, whether, in light of Plaintiffs RFC and her testimony, she could petfotm het past
televant work as a receptionist.
job of receptionist
as
(Ir. 87.)
The VE testified that Plaintiff could perfotm the
it was actually and genetally performed.
(Id.)
At the foutth step of the SEP, the regulations ptovide that a claknant's
møst preuent [herJ
frorz
doing
"impairvtent
past releaant work . . . v/e will compare our IRtrC] assessment
.
with the physical and mental demands of your past relevant work . . . . If you can srill do this
kind of wotk, we will find that you are not disabled." 20 C.F.R.
(emphasis
SS
404.1520(Ð, 41,6.920(Ð
in original). A plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the -Act if she can
retutn to her past televant wotk as it is customarily petformed in the economy ot as the
clamant acrnlly perfotmed the
bears the burden
wotk.
.1¿¿
SSR 82-62, 1,982
WL
31.386, at
x3. The claimant
of establishing her inability to work within the meaning of the -¿{ct. 42
U.S.C. S 423(dX5). She must make a þrima faùe showtng
unable to return to het past televant
wotk.
of disability by showing
she is
Grant u. Schwieþ.er,699 F.2d 1.89,191 (4th Cir.
1e83).
7
After
assessing
mental demands
the claimant's RFC, the
AIJ must compare it with the physical
and
of the claimant's PRIø and then determine if the claimant's impairments
ptevent her performance of PR\X/.
Sæ
20 C.F.R.
S
404.1520(f). .,{.ccotding to SSR 82-62:
The claimant is the primary soutce fot vocational documentation
[d]etermination of the claimant's abiJity to do PRìØ tequires a carcful appraisal
of (1) the individual's statements as to which past work tequirements can no
longer be met and the reason(s) for his or her inability to meet those
requirements; Q) medical evidence establishing how the impairment limits
ability to meet the physical and mental tequirements of the wotk; and (3) in
some cases, supplementany or corroborative information ftom othet sources,
such as employets, the Dictionary of Occupattonal Titles, etc., on the
requirements of the work as generally peformed in the economy.
SSR
82-62. In making this determination, the ,{LJ must make the following specific findings
of îact:
L. ,{. finding of fact
as
to the individual's RFC.
2. A finding of fact as to the physical and mental demands of the past
job/occupation.
3.
,{. fìnding of factthat the individual's RFC would permit a returrl to his ot
het past job or occupation.
rd.
Plaintiff contends that because het testimony showed that she customadly sat fot
three to fout hours and stood fot fout houts during an eight hout shift, the ALJ erred by
finding that Plaintiff could perfotm her PRW as she actually performed
it in light of het
limitations. The Dictionary of Occupatonal Titles (DOÐ chanctenzes the iob of
"receptionist" as sedentary wotk that involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a trne;
catrying lightweight items; tequites only "occasional" standing or walking; does not involve
climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, ctouching ot ctawlingi and does not tequire neat
8
ac,ity, fat actity, ot
^ny
038, 1991 WT, 672192.
level of depth perception. Dictionary of Occupational Titles,
In this case, the hypothetical
assume that the individual could sit
presented
237 .367 -
to the VE asked het to
for six hours out of an eight-hout day and could stand
and ot walk fot two houts out of an eight-hour day.
(It.
87.) This description is consistent
with the characterization of the job of teceptionist in the DOT.
See
DOT
^t
237.367-038.
Plaintiff seems to be arguing that because she also performed other duties such as filing and
talþing customer's paytolls het job was riot that of metely a teceptionist. However, het
description
of her job in the tax pteparation office
cettainly encompasses the job of
"teceptionist" as it is generally perfotmed, and, more impotandy, as Plaintiff petformed it.
Plaintiff has not established that she could not meet the demands of het past iob
as
teceptionist. Substantial evidence supports the AIJ's step fout detetmination that Plaintiff
could petform her past relevant work as it was genetally petformed, as thete was evidence
that she could perform the functional demands and job duties of a receptionist as the job is
performed in the national economy.
Plaintiff also contends that the ÂIJ failed to give proper weight to the statement of
Plaintiffs former employet about Plaintiffs job duties and limitations. In this statement,
Barban McMillan stated that Plaintiff wotked fot her tax service firm ftom Jantary
February 2008 as a receptionist and that Plaintiff also performed office
McMillan werit ori to
2001,
filirg. (Ir. 337.) Ms.
say:
I
frequendy observed that fPlaintiff] was having ptoblems with het knees
because I observed het limping when she tried to walk. I also observed that
het knees would become stiff after sitting and it was diffìcult fot her to stand
and move atound the office due to pain she obviously was experiencing with
her knees. The pain and stiffness in het knees progressed such that her
9
to
limping became more frequent and on some days she had to leave wotk earþ
as a tesult.
fPlaintiffl also expedenced problems with het eye sight. She ftequently
complained that her eyes were giving het ptoblems, and I observed het
rubbing her eyes and staining as she attempted to read documents and enter
information into client files. As a result, I had to redo work she was
pedorming because of the errors that she made because of het inabiJity to see
numbets and wotds cortecdy.
(rd.)
In his decision, the AIJ noted that he had consideted Ms. McMillan's statement but
that he gave it little weight for several reasons. The
acceptable medical source
Moteover, according
,{IJ noted that
Ms. McMillan was riot an
not did she have any type of treating relationship with Plaintiff.
to the ALJ, Ms. McMillan's
diagnostic in nature and adds litde value to the
statement
decision ."
"is neithet functional nor
^tad
is less ptobative because
Ms. McMillan had not observed Plaintiffs daily activities since 2008, only addressing
Plaintiffs knee ptoblems prior to her knee replacement surgelT. (Ir.
35.)
An ALJ may consider testimony from non-medical sources such
as employets,
family
membets and friends to determine the severity of a claimant's impairments and his ot het
residual abiJity to
2006
wotk.
See
20 C.F.R.
$S 404.1513(dX4)
ard 41,6.91,3(d)(a);
SSR 06-03p.
WL 2329939 (SSA) ("the adjudicatot genetally should explain the weight given to
opinions ftom these 'othet sources,' or otherwise ensure that the discussion of the evidence
in the determination or
decision allows
a claimant ot
subsequent reviewer
to follow
the
of
the
adjudicators' reasoning when such opinions may have an effect on the outcome
case." SSR 06-03p, 2006 WT, 2329939. It is clear ftom his decision that the ALJ consideted
the testimony of Ms. McMillan and that he followed the tegulations in determining what
10
weight to give the statement. The
statement was entided
AIJ
explained
in detail why he detetmined that the
to little weight, including as mentioned above, the soutce of
the
statement, the fact that Ms. McMillan was not a medical providet and had not observed
Plaintiff since 2008, befote Plaintiff had knee teplacement surgery, and that het observations
were inconsistent with the medical evidence
in the tecord
concerning PlaintifPs vision.
ìØhile the ALJ noted Ms. McMillan's telationship with Plaintiff and that het testimony would
"natualTy tend to be colored by affection," he also provided evidence-based reasons fot
assigning little weight
to the statement.
See
Marsball u. Coluin,
No.
'1.:"1,4cv542, 201,5
WL
5970435 atxS OI.D.N.C. Oct.1.4,201,5) (unpublished) (citing Dodrillu. Shalala,12F.2d9l,5,
919 (9th Ck., 1993)
('If
the -,{IJ wishes to discount the testimony of the lay witnesses, he
must give reasons that are germane to each witness) and Cooper
u.
Aslrae, No. 2:08-CV-18-
FL,2009 \Xl,928548, at *5-6 (E.D.N.C. Âpt. 3, 2009 (unpublished)
('If
the
AIJ
decides to
reject lay testimony concerning a [c]laimant's pain or other symptoms, the ALJ must do so
explicitly and with sufficient specificity to enable the coutt
to
decide whethet there ate
legitimate reasons for the ALJ's disbelief and whether the ALJ's detetmination is supported
by substantial evidence." (citing Hatcher u. Sec)t Dtp't
(4th Cir
1989). Plaintiffs
of Health dv Haman Seras.,898
tr.2d
2L
conclusory argument that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to
the evidence about Plaintiffs job duties as supplied by het formet employet is without medt.
The ALJ did not err in assigning little weight to the statement of Plaintiffs former employet.
Plaintiff also atgues that the AIJ ered in his assessment of ALJ Pang's Jantary
201,1,
decision on PlaintifPs prior claim for benefits in which ALJ Pang characterized Plaintiffs
past relevant work as "office helpet" and that her RFC
1,1,
fot light work with
additional
exertional resttictions ptecluded all past relevant
makes only a conclusory argument, citing
work.
no
case
Agatn, the Coutt notes that Plaintiff
law or tegulations to support her
afgument.
Flere, the ,AIJ found at step fout that Plaintiff could perform her past televant work
and therefore was not disabled. However, as previously noted, in the pdot adjudication
the
20"1.1.
claim,
A{
of
Pang found at step fout that Plaintiff could not perform het past
relevant work, which he charactenzed as light work. The Fourth Circuit has established that
the Commissionet must consider prior disability benefits decisions for the same claimant in
determining
if that clurrrant is disabled.
Albright u. CommT of Social Secariry, 174 F.3d 473,
477-78 (4th Cir. 1999). In this Circuit, when adjudicating a subsequent disabiJity claim, an
ALJ should considet such factots as (1) whether the facts on which the prior findings were
based is subject to change with the passage of time, such as facts telating to the severity of a
claimant's medical condition; Q) the likelihood
of such change, considering the length of
time elapsed between the previously adjudicated period and the pedod being adjudicated in
the subsequent claim; and (3) the extent that the evidence not consideted in the final
decision in the pdot claim ptovides a basis fot making a different finding with tespect to the
period being adjudicated in the subsequent claims.
2000 WL 43774 (S.S.A. Jan.'1,2,2000). The
AfJ
Jee
Âcquiescence Ruling ("ÂR'') 00-1(4),
here followed the directions set out
00-1(4), noting that although ALJ Pang's decision was less than two years old,
in,\R
it was based
on medical evidence which is diffetent from the evidence in the present case, including
evidence of some impairments that wete not ptesent at the time of the prior decision. The
A{
ptopetly crafted a new RFC, considering all of Plaintiffs functional impairments at the
1,2
time of the headng and setting out his reasons fot adopting the RFC descdbed above. In
doing so, the ALJ complied with the requfuements of Albright and the govetning tegulations
of the SSA.
Finally, Plaintiff appears to argue that the ALJ erred by giving no weight to the State
Agency's characteÅzation of Plaintiffs past televant work as art Administative Cletk,
considered a light exertional
job.
(Pl.'s Bt. at 9, Docket Entry 15.) Again, Plaintiff has not
cited any case law or SSA regulation requiring an ALJ to
assessment
assþ
any weight to a State Agency
of an individual's ability to perform past relevant u¡ork. The ALJ noted in
his
decision that he was giving no weight to the State ,A.gency's vocational assessment because
he was teþing on the testimony of the VE, who had more than twenty years of experience in
the field and who teviewed the entire record and heard Plaintiffs testimony at the headng,
including her own characterization of her previous job as a receptionist. As such, substantial
evidence supports the
receptionist
as
A{'s
finding that Plaintiff could petform her past work as
a
it was generally pedormed.
V. CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the tecotd and the arguments of the parties, this Court concludes
that the A{'s determination is supported by substantial evidence. Having so concluded, the
Court recofiunends that the Commissioner's decision be affìrmed
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissionet's decision
finding no disability be AFFIRMED, that PlaintifPs Motion forJudgment on the Pleadings
1.3
pocket Entty 14) be DENIED, that Defendant's Motion fot Judgment on the
Pleadings
(Docket Ent y 16) be GRANTED, and that this action be DISMISSED with prejudice.
U
Dutham, North Carohna
December
,20L5
74
Joe L.'VØebster
States Magistrate Judge
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