MILLER v. COLVIN
Filing
15
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 02/03/2016. After a careful consideration of the evidence of record, the Court finds that the Commissioner's decision is suppor ted by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 8 ) be DENIED, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 11 ) be GRANTED, and that the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld.(Taylor, Abby)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
DONNA C. MILLER,
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
V
CAROLYN Tø. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Secutity,
1.:1,4CY948
)
)
)
Defendant.
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Donna C. Miller, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $$ a05(g) and
1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review
of a îtnal decision of Defendant, the Commissionet of
Social Secudty, denying her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits
the Social Security Act ("the
("DIB") undet Title II of
Act"). Plaintiff has filed a motion fot
summary judgment
(Docket Ent y 8) and Defendant has filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket
Entry 11). The Court has before it the cetified administtative tecotd. For reasons discussed
below,
it is recommended that the Commissioner's
decision be affìrmed, that Plaintiffs
motion for summary fudgment be denied, and that Defendant's motion fot judgment on the
pleadings be granted.
1,
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff applied for DIB on or about February
of
Jantary 31,
reconsideration.
2008. Gt 1,34-35.)1 Her
(Ir.
1.,201.1.,
alleging a disability onset date
application was denied initially and upon
87, 1,02-06.) Thereaftet, Plaintrff tequested aheaÃng de novo before
an Administative LawJudge
and a vocational expert
("N-|). Qr.35-72.)
("VE")
Plaintifl het attotney, a medical expert
appeared at the heating on Match 1,2, 201.3.
(It. 35.) A
decision was issued on July 22, 2013, upholding the denial of PlaintifPs application fot DIB.
Qt.21,-34.) O" December 9,2009, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request fot review
of the decision, thereby making the ALJ's detetmination the Defendant's final decision fot
purposes of ¡udicial
teview. (Ir.
1-3.)
II. STANDARD OF RE\rIEW
The Commissioner held that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
Under 42U.5.C. $ 405(9), the scope of judicial teview of the Commissionet's fìnal decision is
specifìc and
narow.
Srnitlt u. Scltweiker, T95 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986). This Coutt's
teview of that decision is limited to determining whethet thete is substantial evidence in the
recotd to suppott the Commissioner's decision. 42U.5.C, $ a05(g); Hanter
F.2d 31,, 34 (4th Cir. 1,992) þer curiam),
404.1,517
søþerseded
u. Salliuan,993
in nonreleuarct part þt 20 C.F.R.
S
(d)Q); Hay u. Sulliuan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1,456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
conclusion." Hønter, 993 F.2d at 34 (cäng
a
Nchardson u. Perales,402 U.S. 389, 401. (1971).
1 Transcrþt citations refer to the administtative tecotd.
2
"[t]
consists of more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a ptepondetaflce."
Id. (qli.ottng l-aws
u. Celebreçe, 368
F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966))-
The Commissioner must make findings
HoJt,907 F.2d
^t
of
1,456 (citing King u. Califuno, 599
fact and resolve conflicts in the evidence.
F.2d 597 , 599 (4th Cit. 1,979)). The Coutt
does not conduct a de novo review of the evidence ot the Commissioner's
findings.
Schweiker,
795F.2d at345. In reviewing for substantial evidence, the Court does not undetake to reweigh conflicting evidence, to make credibility determinations, ot to substitute its iudgment
for that of the Commissioner. Craig u. Chater, 7 6 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir.
907 F.2d
^t
1,996) (citing Ha1s,
1,456). "Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to diffet as to
whethet a claknantis disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the fCommissioner]
(ot the [Commissioner's] designate, the
AIJ)."
Craigl6F.3d at 589 (quoting lYalkeru.
834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987)). The denial
Bowen,
of benefits will be teversed only if
reasonable mind could accept the tecotd as adequate to suppott the detetmination.
no
See Pera/es,
402 U.S. at 401,. The issue befote the Court, therefote, is not whethet Plaintiff is disabled,
but whethet the Commissionet's fìnding that Plaintiff is not disabled is suppotted by
substantial evidence and was reached based upon
See
^
corcect application
of the televant
law.
id.; Cofman u. Bowen,829 tr.2d 5L4,5L7 (4th Cit. 1987).
III. THE ALJ'S DISCUSSION
The Social Security Regulations defìne "disability" fot the purpose of obtaining
disability benefits as the "inabthty
to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of
J
any
medically determinable physical or mental impaitment2 which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or c
12
months." 20 C.F.R.
rL
be expected to last fot a continuous pedod of not less than
S 404.1505 (a); see also
42 U.S.C.
SS
423(dX1)(A), 1'382c(a)(3)(A). To
meet this definition, a claimant must have a sevete impairment which makes it impossible to
do previous work or aîy othet substantial gainful activity3 that exists in the national economy.
20 C.F'.R
S 404.1505 (a); see also
A.
42 U.S.C.
SS
423(dX2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)@).
The Five-Step Sequential Analysis
The Commissionet follows a five-step sequential analysis to ascertain whethet the
claimant is disabled, which is set fotth
Comrn'r of Soa
Sec.
in 20 C.F.R.
SS
404.1520, 41,6.920.
See
Albri¿ht
u.
Admiru.,174F.3d 473,475 n.2 (4th Cit. 1,999). The ALJ must determine in
sequence:
(1)
\iflhethet the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity
claimant is
Q)
wotking). If
inquþ
whether the
not disabled and the inquiry ends.
\Jflhethet the claimant has a sevete impairment.
disabled and the
(3)
so, the claimant is
Q.a.,
If not, then the claimant
is not
ends.
\)Øhether the impaitment meets
ot
equals to medical ctitetia
of 20 C.F.R., Pan
404, Subpatt P, Appendix 1, which sets fotth a list of impafuments thatwanant a
2
A "physical or mental impairmenC' is an impairment resulting ftom "aîatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which ate demonsftable by medically acceptable clinical and labotatory
diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. $S 423(dX3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).
3 "substantial gainfuI a;ctrvjtty" is work that (1) involves performing signifrcant ot ptoductive physical
ormentaldud.es, andQ) is done (orintended) fot¡aV orprofit. 20 C.tr.R. SS 404.1510,41,6.91,0.
finding of disabiìity without consideting vocational criterta.
If
so, the claknant is
disabled and the inquiry is halted.
ìØhethet the impairment prevents the claimant ftom performing past televant
(4)
wotk. If not, the claimant
is not disabled and the inquity is halted.
!Øhether the claimant is able to perfotm any othet wotk considering both her
(s)
residual functionai capacitya and her vocational abilities.
If
so, the claimant is
not disabled.
20 c.F.R.
SS
404.1520,416.920
In rendering his disability determination, the ALJ made the following findings latet
adopted by the Defendant:
1,. The claimant meets the insuted
Act through December
status tequirements of the Social Secutity
31.,201,3.
2.
The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January
31.,2008, the alleged onset date Q0 CFR 404.1571. et :eq.).
3.
The claimant has the following severe impaitments: major deptessive
disorder, chtonic, modetate to severe; dissociative disotder with
dep ets o nahzatton
and deteali zaion
p
a
henomena;
p
s
eudo s eizure; dep endent
"Residual functional capacity" ("RFC") is the most a claima¡t can do in a work setting despite the
physical and mental limitations of her impairment and any telated symptom (e.9., pan). See 20 C.F.R.
RFC
SS 404.1545(")(1), a1,6.9a5@)(1); see also Hines u Barnltart,453 F.3d 559,562 (4th Cir. 2006). The
to do
includes both a "physical exertional or sttength limitation" tlrat assesses the claimant's "ability
sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work," as well as "nonexertional limitations (mental,
sensoly or skin impairments)." Ha// a. Harris,658 tr.2d 260,265 (4th Cir. 1981).
5
histtionic traits; botdetline versus low avetage intellectual functioning;
hypertension; and degenetative changes at C5-C6 (20 CFR a0al,520(c)).
4.
The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impaitments
that meets ot medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR
Patt404, SubpartP, ,\ppendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and
404.1,526).
5.
Aftet careful considetation of the entire record, the undersigned finds that
the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work
as defined in20 CFR 404.1567(c) except fot lift no mote than 50 pounds
occasionally,lift and carry 25 pounds ftequendy, and occasional climbing of
laddets, ropes, and scaffolds. Mentally, she requires L ot 2-step tasks in a
low stress iob with only occasional decision making required, only
occasional changes in the wotk place setting, no ptoduction, r.ate or pace
wotk, only occasional intetaction with the pubìic, occasional intetaction with
co-workets with no tandem tasks, and wotk is to be isolated with only
occasional supervision.
Qr23-26.)
In light of the above findings regatding Plaintiffs RFC, the AIJ determined that
Plaintiff was unable to perform het past relevant
work. Çr.32.)
The
AIJ
also found that
Plaintif( who was 51 years old at the time of the decision, met the definition of "advanced
age;' Id. (cittng2O C.F.R. S 404.1563). Finally,
was not an issue
communicate
the
AIJ noted that tansferability of job skills
in the case, and added that Plaintiff has a limited
education and can
in English. (It. 33.) Based on these factors, PlaintifPs RFC, and the VE's
testimony, the
AIJ concluded that "there are jobs that exist in significant
national economy that the claimant can
petfotm." Id. (cäng 20 C.F.R.
6
numbets in the
SS
404.1569 and
40a.1,569(a).) Accordingly, the
AIJ decided
that Plaintiff was not under a "disabilitI,"
defined in the Act, from her alleged onset date thtough the date of the decision.
as
Çr 34.)
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff contends that the Commissionet ered in determining that she was not
disabled for pwposes of the
Act. pocket Entry 9). In conclusory fashion,
Plaintiff taises
the following five arguments: (1) the ALJ etted in tejecting the medical opinions of Plaintiffs
pflmzlry physician; (2) the ALJ ered in evaluating PlaintifPs subjective complaints of fatigue,
anxiety, extreme memory loss, and inability to concenttate; (3) the ALJ failed het buden
of
establishing that there was other work in the economy that Plaintiff can perfotm; (a) the ALJ
ered in faiìing to request input from
a
psychiattist as the ALJ observed was necessa{y; and (5)
the AIJ's conclusion is not supponed by substantial evidence. As explained below, the
undersigned concludes that the ALJ ptopedy evaluated the objective and subjective evidence,
and her decision is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a cotect
application of the relevant law.
A. Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff states, without further argument, that the ALJ ptovided "no explanation
whatsoever for her tejection of the opinions and assessments of fPlaintiffs] primary tteating
physician Dr. Hassan at Uwharrie Medical Center and
Dr. Satet at Cornerstone
Medical
Center." (Docket E.rt y 9 at 2) If a treating soutce's medical opinion is "well-suppotted
and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record,
controlling weight[.]" SSR 96-2p,1996 WL 3741'88 fluly 2,7996);
7
it must be given
see also
20 C.F.R'
S
404.1527 (d)(2)
þroviding that the treating soutce's opinion will be given conttolling weight
if
well-suppoted by medically-acceptable clinical andlaboratory diagnostic techniques and not
in the tecord);
inconsistent with othet substantial evidence
Craig 7 6 F3d at
590.
The
Commissioner typically affords greater weight to the opinion of a clatmant's tteating medical
sources because such sources are best able to provide "a detailed longitudinal picture"
claimant's alleged disability.
See
of
a
20 C.F.R. S 404.1,527 GX2). However, a tteattng physician's
opinion is not due controlling weight when "it is not supponed by clinical evidence ot if it is
inconsistent with other substantial evidence." Cmig 7 6 F.3d at
weigh medical opinions pursuant to the following nonexclusive
590. "Coutts
list:
evaluate and
(1) whether the physician
has examined the applicant, (2) the treatment telationship between the physician and the
applicant, (3) the suppotability of the physician's opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion
with the tecord, and (5) whethet the physician is a specialist."
650, 654 (4th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. S 404.1527(d).
Johnson u. Bamhart, 434 F.3d
",\n AIJ's
decision not
to
afford
controlling weight to a tteattne physician's opinion must be supported by substantial evidence
in the record." Dyda
u. Coluin,47
F. Srrpp. 3d 318, 324 M.D.N.C. 2014) (citing ll/inþrd
u.
Chater,9IT F. Srrpp. 398, 401) (E.D.Va. 1996)).
Hete, there is limited documentation of Dt. Sami Hassan's tteatment of
Plaintiff. Gt
326, 371,-73.) These documents reflect treatment notes fuom 4 office visits from May
1.2,
2010 through Decembet 2,201,1,. Qr.326,371-73.) The Coutt does not ascertain, not has
Plaintiff made aware, any explicit language in the notes which tendets a "medical opinion."
See
20 C.F.R. S 41,6.927 ("Medical opinions are stâtements ftom physicians and psychologists
8
or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and sevetity of
[the claimant's] impairment(s), including [the claimant's] symptoms . . . what fthe claimant's]
can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant's] physical ot mental testrictions."). In
reviewing those notes, the
deptession. Qr.
Sater
27
AIJ
noted in her decision that Plaintiff teceived medication for
.) At the tequest of Dr. Flassan, Plaintiff was teferred to Dr. Richatd
fot a neurological consultation on or about June 20,201,2. Çl375-77.) Dr.
Sater
perfotmed an examination and concluded that Plaintiff had some neck and back tenderness,
but good tange of motion. Qr. 377.) He concluded that Plaintiff was alert with fluent
speech, that het extraoculat muscles were intact, her limbs, muscle bulk, tone and strength
were notmal, deep tendon teflexes were normal, and plantar. responses were
summaty,
Dt. Satet indicated that Plaintiff
deals
flexor. Qd.) In
with "fatigue, subjective cognitive decline,
joint and muscle aches, and insomnia;" however, he "feel[s] the chance that fPlainldlff] may
have multiple sclerosis is less than 1,0o/o."
(Id.) He furthet stated that PlaintifPs
"pain,
combined with insomtia and subjective memory concerns are consistent with a diagnosis for
fibtomyaþia"
assessment
^nd
mild deptession. (Id.) The AIJ tefetenced Dr. Sater's evaluation in het
of Plaintiffs
RFC. Qt.29-30.) In considedng acttal medical
source statements
by non-treating physicians (which wete given gteat weight), the ALJ repeatedly indicated that
the evaluations ftom the non-tteating physicians were consistent with medical evidence and
notes from Plaintiffs treating physicians.
Qr.
31,-32.) Fot example,
Dr.
Carlo Yuson,
a
consultative examinet, felt that Plaintiff did not have multiple sclerosis, but "more likely is
suffedng ftom an underþing deptession with some somatfzatTon."
9
(Ir. 340.)
Although
Plaintiff received medication for deptession, she had not sought mental health treatment'
Thus, a consultative examination was done in June
concluded that Plainti
ff
201.1.,
which Dr. Gtegory A. Villatosa
may have "some difficulty with wotk-related activities," she has gotten
along with othets in work settings in the past, has the ability to follow directions, has the ability
to maintain focus with tasks at a somewhat slowet pace, and that she may have difficuities
with ptessures of day-to-day work activities.
Qr 35a.) Anothet
consultative examinet's
opinion was given great weight by the AIJ, and likewise consistent with PlaintifFs ffeating
physicians.
Qr
31.-32; 41,2-1.3.) Fout state agency opinions wete also given significant
weight which wete also supported by the medical evidence in the
tecotd. Qr.
31.-32;73-86;
8S-101.) The Court concludes the ALJ evaluated all of the medical opinions of the recotd,
giving appropriate weight to each. Thus, PlaintifPs argument is without medt.
B. PlaintifPs Credibility
Platnlff
ALJ failed to ptopetly evaluate Plaintiffs subjective complaints.
argues that the
(Docket Entry 9 at2.) The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted a nvo-step process
by which the ALJ must weigh the credibility of a claimant's personal statements in the disability
determination process. The
frst
step requires the ALJ
to detetmine if thete is "objective
medical evidence showing the existence of a medical impairment which could reasonably be
expected to produce the actual pain,
Craig 76 F.3d
^t
594. The
in the amount and
degree, alleged by the claknant."
second step tequites an evaluation
of subjective
evidence,
considering claimant's "statements about the intensity, petsistence, and limiting effects of
fclaimant's] symptoms." Id. at 595 (citing 20 C.F.R. SS 416.929(c)(4) and a0aJ'529(c)@.)
10
"The ALJ must consider the following: (1) a claimant's testimony and other statements
concerning pain or othet subjective complaints Q) clatmant's medical history and laboratory
findings; Q) u"y objective medical evidence of pain; and (4) any othet evidence televant to the
severity
of the impairment."
Grwbþt u. Astrae,
No. 1:09CY364,2010 WL 5553677, at*3
flX/.D.N.C. Nov. L8,201,0) (citing Craig76F.3dat595;20 C.F.R. $ a04.1529(c). "Othet
evidence" refers to factors such as claimant's daily activities, duration and ftequency of pain,
treâtment other than medication received for telief of symptoms, and any othet measures used
to telieve claimant's alleged pain. Id.
A review of the tecord
PlaintifPs credibility.
indicates that the ALJ did not error
!7ith tegards to Step 1, the ALJ concluded that "the
medically determinable impairments could teasonably be expected
symptoms."
in het evaluation of
to
cause
Çr 27.) At step two, the ALJ determined that "the claimant's
claimant's
the alleged
statements
concerning the intensity, petsistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely
credible fot the reasons explained in this decision."s
(Id.)
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiffs
medical impairments would likely produce some pain, "but not to the extent alleged."
30.) For example, Plaintiff testified that
she relied upon her husband
Gt
to help her get out of
bed and that she is constantly tired and weak so she is on the couch most of the day Qr. 4344), but she told Dr. Villarosa that, onatypicalday, she cates fot het dogs, makes the bed,
watches television, and sometimes water the
flowets. (Tr. 353.)
She also cooks twice a week,
The Coutt notes that the language used by the AIJ is diffetent ftom the objectionable boilelplate
language regarding credibility that is at issue tn Mascio u. Coluin,780 F.3d 632,639 (4th Cir. 201'5).
5
1.1
goes out to eat three times a month, and uses het
also indicated that she had
pool a couple times
a
week. (Id.) Plaintiff
to "hold everything trylng to get thtough the house," (Tt. 44),b,lt
during the psychiatric consultation, Plaintiff "exhibited notmal gaít, [with] "unusual
movements." Çr. a}a.) As fot PlaintifPs deptession, she tequested medication, but
sought any mental health treatment.
Çt. 55,372.)
has
not
"Because [she] had the oppottunity to
observe the demeanor and to detetmine the credibiJity of the clumant, the ALJ's observations
concerning these questions
^re
to be given gteat weight." Shiueþ
u.
Heck/er,739 F.2d987,989
(4th Cit. 1984) (citing þler u. Il/einberger,409 F. S,rpp. 776 F,.D. Ya. 1,976)). In making her
credibility detetminations, the ALJ in the ptesent case assessed all evidence and noted specific
inconsistencies with PlaintifPs complaints
of disabling symptoms and limitations, and
the
medical evidence presented that wauanted discrediting the PlaintifPs testimony. The ALJ's
credibility determination is sufficient based upon the evidence of tecotd. Thus, this atgument
is without metit.
C. The ALJ's Step-Five Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to meet her burden of establishing that there were
othet jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could
petfotm. (Docket Etrtty 9 at2.) The
Commissioner contends that the hypothetical question presented to the vocational expert at
the hearing "accutately porrayed Plaintiffs limitations." (Docket E.ttry
'l.,2
at 1,3.) The
undetsigned agrees.
At step five, the Commissioner has the "butden of ptoviding evidence of a significant
numbet of jobs in the national economy that a claimant could
1,2
petfotm."
IN/al/: u. Barnhart,
296 F.3d 287,290 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Powers u. Apfel, 201 F.3d 431,, 436 (7th Cit.2000)).
Hete, the ALJ relied upon the VE testimony to detetmine whether there ate othet jobs in the
national economy which Plaintiff could
perform. "In otder for avocattonal expett's opinion
to be relevant or helpful, it must be based upon a consideration of all other evidence in the
record."
Wal/eer u. Boweru, 889 F.2d 47,
50 (4th Cir. 1939). The ALJ posed a hypothetical
question to the VE as to whethet an individual like Plaintiff of the same age, educational level,
wotk expedence, and RFC limitations could find employment in the national economy. (Tt
63-69.) The VE testified that jobs such
existed
as
a material handler, a kitchen helpet, and a cleanet
in the national economy which Plaintiff could petform. (Tt. 69.) The AIJ
determined that the VE's testimony was consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
and ultimately concluded that Plaintiff is "capable of making a successful adjustment to other
work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy."
(Ir. 33-34.) Having
considered the evidence of the record, the Coutt concludes that substantial evidence supports
the AIJ's conclusion at this
step. Plaintiffs conclusory statement that the,\LJ failed to meet
her burden at step five of the sequential evaluation process is without merit.
D. Psychiatrist Records
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ "etted in failing to request input from
as
a Psychiatrist
the [ALJ] observed was necessary." (Docket Entty 9 at2.) This atgument also lacks medt.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ stated that he would "geta psychiattist to teview
fPlaintiffs] record and offer an opinion." Qr.71,.) The AIJ left the record open and delayed
his decision until there was "futthet input frorr' a
13
psychiattist." (Id.) On Apdl
17
,201.3,Dt.
Richatd L. Spencet conducted a consultative psychiatric evaluation and submitted an opinion.
Qr
404-1,4.) The
AIJ explicitly noted this in het decision. Qr. 27-28.)
Therefote,
Plaintiffs argument lacks medt.
E. Substantial Evidence
Lastly,
to the extent Plaintiff
substantial evidence, this atgument
argues that the ALJ's decision
is not
fails. In het decision, the ALJ stated that
based upon
she consideted
the entire medical evidence of tecotd in teaching het conclusion as to PlaintifPs disabiJity
status.
Çt23.)
The ALJ concluded that PlaintifPs RFC "which limits fPlaintiffl to medium
wotk with mental limitations[,] mote than adequately accounts fot þet] impairments." Gt.
32.) The ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff could petfotm medium wotk subject to sevetal
physical and mental limitations is consistent with the medical evidence and is supported by
evidence which
Johnson, 434
"a
reasor'table mind
might accept as adequate to
supp
ort a conclusion."
F3d at 653 (quoting C*tg,76 F.3d at 589). The ALJ's decision that Plaintiff
could perfotm other jobs in the national economy is also suppoted by substantial evidence.
Thetefote, tevetsal is not wartanted on this basis.
V. CONCLUSION
Aftet a carcfvl considetation of the evidence of record, the Court fìnds that the
Commissionet's decision is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon
coffect application
of the televant
a
law. Accotdingly, this Coutt RECOMMENDS that
PlaintifPs Motion fot Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 8) be
14
DENIED, that Defendant's
Motion forJudgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 11) be GRANTED, and that the final
decision of the Commissionet be upheld.
February
Jo"
Uni
&rotu
Dwham, Notth Carobna
15
States Magisttate Judge
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