STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, et al

Filing 56

REPLY, filed by Intervenor Defendants LUIS ACOSTA, CHRISTOPHER JACKSON, RAMONIA JONES, ANGIE MILLS, KEVIN MILLS, JULIA NIEVES, LAURA ORNELAS, CECILIA POLANCE, TAMIKA WILLIAMS, STAR WINGATE-BEY, to Response to 39 MOTION to Intervene filed by LUIS ACOSTA, CHRISTOPHER JACKSON, RAMONIA JONES, ANGIE MILLS, KEVIN MILLS, JULIA NIEVES, LAURA ORNELAS, CECILIA POLANCE, TAMIKA WILLIAMS, STAR WINGATE-BEY. (COLFAX, REED)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS,
INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-954-LCB-JLW

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH
CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, et al.,
Defendants.
CONSOLIDATED REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE
Proposed Intervenors hereby submit this consolidated1 reply brief in further
support of their Motion to Intervene.
A.

Proposed Intervenors Seek Limited Intervention

A significant portion of the submissions made by Plaintiff Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “SFA”) and Defendants University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, et al. (“Defendants” or “UNC-Chapel Hill”) is devoted to their suggestion
that permitting intervention will interfere with the orderly resolution of this matter. This
is not accurate. Proposed Intervenors’ participation will not have a significant impact on
the time or resources it will take to litigate this case.
Proposed Intervenors do not seek to participate as full parties in this litigation,
primarily because they do not seek to engage in the majority of the discovery that the

1

Pursuant to the Court’s August 3, 2015 Order (ECF No. 54), this brief addresses the
responses of both Plaintiff and Defendants.

parties plan to conduct. Proposed Intervenors only seek to gather and present evidence on
two issues: (1) evidence regarding the history of segregation and discrimination at UNCChapel Hill and in North Carolina and (2) evidence regarding the effect of UNC-Chapel
Hill’s existing, and Plaintiff’s proposed, admissions processes on the critical mass of
diverse students at UNC-Chapel Hill. Fact and expert evidence on these topics is
important to establish the validity of UNC-Chapel Hill’s admissions policy, but the
University’s institutional incentives weigh against its presenting such evidence.
Proposed Intervenors will not participate in discovery on other issues that the
parties have identified, such as the application process at UNC-Chapel Hill, applications
to UNC-Chapel Hill, the operation of the admissions office, or Plaintiff’s status as a
“bona fide” organization. Rather than seeking a role identical to the existing parties,
Proposed Intervenors seek limited participation to protect specific evidentiary interests.
Proposed Intervenors’ participation in other contexts of the litigation, such as
participating in briefing and the submission of fact and expert declarations, will have an
even smaller impact on the case. In fact, the parties do not object to Proposed
Intervenors’ participation in these aspects of the litigation. See Defs.’ Resp. to Mot. to
Intervene (“Defs.’ Resp.”) at 10 (ECF No. 51); see also Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. to
Intervene (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 15 (ECF No. 50).
B.

The Harvard Decision Does Not Provide Helpful Guidance

Both parties rely heavily on the decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v.
President & Fellows of Harvard College, No. 14-14176, 2015 WL 3683230 (D. Mass.

2

June 15, 2015) (“Harvard”) denying potential and current Harvard students’ motion to
intervene. The Harvard decision is distinguishable for several reasons.2
First, Proposed Intervenors are making a much more limited request for
intervention. Unlike the Harvard intervenors’ request to participate in every aspect of the
case as full parties, Proposed Intervenors here only seek to be able to submit evidence,
participate in motions practice, and conduct targeted discovery. While the Harvard court
denied full-party status, it allowed most of what the Proposed Intervenors request in this
case. Harvard, 2015 WL 3683230, at *11 (allowing students to submit declarations, file
substantive briefs, and participate in arguments). The additional request to participate in
targeted, specific discovery on a narrow set of issues is critical to Proposed Intervenors
being able to protect their interests and will not significantly alter the course of the
litigation as compared to the effect of the types of participation allowed in Harvard.
Second, Proposed Intervenors have clearer and more specifically defined interests
in seeking intervention. In contrast to the Harvard intervenors, Proposed Intervenors
have identified that their own Title VI rights may be violated if the Court does not have
the benefit of the evidence Proposed Intervenors seek to adduce and present. Harvard has
not had UNC’s history of Title VI violations, which makes it more likely that future
applicants’ Title VI rights will be implicated by the resolution of this litigation than in the
Harvard litigation. The Harvard intervenors defined their interest generally because they

2

Notably, the decision is currently on appeal to the First Circuit. Notice of Appeal,
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, No. 1:14cv-14176-ADB (D. Mass. July 13, 2015), ECF No. 60.
3

were attempting to justify broad participation in every aspect of the litigation, whereas
the Proposed Intervenors have identified how their specific interests will diverge from
UNC-Chapel Hill’s interests, and have limited their request for participation accordingly.
Third, Proposed Intervenors’ interests in being admitted to UNC-Chapel Hill are
different from the interests of applicants to Harvard. As the state’s publicly-funded,
flagship institution, UNC-Chapel Hill is unique for North Carolina residents,
guaranteeing a top-tier education for a fraction of the price of a private institution such as
Harvard. Moreover, UNC-Chapel Hill’s alumni network within North Carolina is
unparalleled and an important path to economic and political success in the state.3 In
contrast, the Harvard court was persuaded that the movants in that case were
indistinguishable from “any other minority student in America, or indeed, the world.”4
Harvard, 2015 WL 3683230, at *6.
The Harvard decision does not provide useful guidance in answering the question
of whether intervention is proper in this case. Despite the surface similarities – current
and future students seeking to intervene in a case challenging a university’s raceconscious admissions policy – the differences in the basis for and the extent of the
proposed intervention as well as the unique circumstances presented by a public

3

UNC General Alumni Assn, About the GAA, www.alumni.unc.edu/about-the-gaa/
Similarly, Proposed Intervenors are being represented by the North Carolina Justice
Center (NCJC), which has a specific interest in the availability of a UNC-Chapel Hill
education to all qualified applicants. NCJC is a nonprofit, legal advocacy organization
whose mission is to secure social justice for disadvantaged families and communities,
including the expansion of educational access for low-income North Carolinians.
4

4

university located in a state with a long history of discrimination against minorities make
this motion quite different. Thus, the Court must engage in an analysis that is specific to
the circumstances presented here.
C.

UNC-Chapel Hill Does Not Adequately Represent Proposed
Intervenors’ Interests Because it Will Not Introduce Relevant Evidence
Justifying UNC-Chapel Hill’s Consideration of Race

The parties argue that UNC-Chapel Hill will adequately represent the Proposed
Intervenors’ interests, but it is clear that UNC-Chapel Hill will not introduce all of the
relevant, persuasive evidence to support its admissions policy. Despite the fact that
Proposed Intervenors and UNC-Chapel Hill will both argue that Plaintiff’s arguments
lack merit, there are certain areas where they will present very different defenses of and
reasons for race-conscious admissions policies.
As a preliminary matter, Proposed Intervenors note that the “government
adequacy” and “same objective” presumptions should not be applied in this case for the
reasons set forth in their Motion. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Proposed Def.-Intervenors’
Mot. to Intervene (“Mem. in Supp.”) at 14-19 (ECF No. 40). However, if either
presumption is applied, it can be overcome by a showing of “adversity of interest” or a
“strong showing of inadequacy.” Stuart v. Huff, 706 F.3d 345, 352 (4th Cir. 2013). The
parties argue that Proposed Intervenors cannot make these showings because UNCChapel Hill’s unwillingness to present important, relevant evidence is merely a “litigation
strategy.” See Pl.’s Opp’n at 9-10; Defs.’ Resp. at 5-6. This assertion betrays a
fundamental misunderstanding of Proposed Intervenors’ contentions.

5

First, the evidence Proposed Intervenors seek to develop and present in the case
will remain undiscovered by UNC-Chapel Hill not for strategic reasons, but because of
considerations that are unrelated to the litigation and unrelated to the interests of current
and potential students. Evidence regarding the long history of segregation and
discrimination in North Carolina and at the University, as well as evidence that a critical
mass of diverse students has not yet been created on campus, is central to demonstrating
the particularized need for the University to consider race as part of its admissions
process. There is no litigation-based reason to exclude such evidence from the record, but
UNC-Chapel Hill faces strong incentives not to adduce and present the evidence because
it could create Title VI liability in the future and backlash and criticism in the present.
See Mem. in Supp. at 14-16.
Notably, UNC Chapel-Hill does not state in its response that it will gather the
evidence that Proposed Intervenors have identified as important to its defense, nor does it
describe any reason such evidence is not relevant. Indeed, UNC-Chapel Hill entirely
avoids any mention of evidence of historical and current discrimination on campus, as
well as the potential disparate impact on minorities and corresponding Title VI liability
that might occur should the admissions process be changed. Its understandable reluctance
to broach these subjects supports Proposed Intervenors’ contention that UNC-Chapel Hill
will not raise them in this litigation. Should this Court, at Plaintiff’s behest, eliminate or
limit UNC-Chapel Hill’s consideration of race while permitting it to keep other aspects of

6

its admissions process, UNC-Chapel Hill may be subject to Title VI liability.5 This
divergence of interests overcomes any presumption of adequacy of representation.
Second, the parties erroneously suggest that Proposed Intervenors must establish
that their interests are entirely adverse to UNC-Chapel Hill’s interests. To the contrary,
an intervenor need only show that its interests “diverge sufficiently that the existing party
cannot devote proper attention to the applicant’s interests[.]” United States v. Terr. of
Virgin Islands, 748 F.3d 514, 519-20 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Crossroads Grassroots
Policy Strategies v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 788 F.3d 312, 314 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(“Recognizing that doubtful friends may provide dubious representation, we have often
concluded that governmental entities do not adequately represent the interests of aspiring
intervenors.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Proposed Intervenors are
interested in ensuring that all relevant evidence is in the record – even evidence that is
disagreeable to Defendants.
The scope of this divergence of interests defines the scope of Proposed
Intervenors’ proposed participation. It is only where Defendants and Proposed
Intervenors’ interests diverge that Proposed Intervenors seek to participate. Proposed
Intervenors will fill the gaps left because of UNC-Chapel Hill’s different, and
institutionally constrained, bases for defending its admissions policy.

5

The potential follow-on litigation that may result from these proceedings is another
reason that justifies granting, at a minimum, permissive intervention in order to “prevent
piecemeal litigation.” Cappachione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 179 F.R.D.
505, 509 (W.D.N.C. 1998).
7

Rather than addressing Proposed Intervenors’ specific arguments, UNC-Chapel
Hill generally asserts that it will vigorously defend its admissions policy. This bare
assertion is insufficient given UNC-Chapel Hill’s failure to rebut the argument that the
vigor of its defense will be tempered by institutional conflicts. Of course, UNC-Chapel
Hill’s statements of its current intentions do not alleviate uncertainty about what positions
it will take throughout the lengthy litigation. See Virgin Islands, 748 F.3d at 521 (“[I]t is
not realistic to assume that the [government’s] programs will remain static or unaffected
by unanticipated policy shifts.”).
D.

Proposed Intervenors Have a Significant Protectable Interest

While UNC-Chapel Hill appears to concede that Proposed Intervenors have a
“significant protectable interest” sufficient to justify intervention, Plaintiff continues to
argue that they do not. Plaintiff’s explanations for its position are legally and factually
flawed.
Plaintiff first bases its argument on the assertion that Proposed Intervenors “would
lack any legal interest in objecting even if UNC-Chapel Hill voluntarily decided to
discontinue racial preferences.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 6. Even assuming Plaintiff is correct, the
point is irrelevant. The intervention rule makes clear that the “interest” requirement
should be evaluated practically, not legally. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 Advisory Committee’s
note (“[i]f an absentee would be substantially affected in a practical sense by the
determination made in an action, he should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene.”);
see also Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 578 F.2d

8

1341, 1345 (10th Cir. 1978) (noting that Rule 24 “refers to impairment as a practical
matter” and thus “the court is not limited to consequences of a strictly legal nature”).
Moreover, a person can have a protectable interest in the continuation of a policy,
regardless of whether that person has the right to sue over the policy. See, e.g.,
N.A.A.C.P., Inc. v. Duplin Cnty., N.C., No. 7:88-CV-00005-FL, 2012 WL 360018, at *3
(E.D.N.C. Feb. 2, 2012) (“[I]t is not necessary for an intervenor to have a right to bring
suit independently.”).
Plaintiff also suggests that Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,
Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN)
et al., 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014), demonstrates that Proposed Intervenors have no significant
interest. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5-6.6 Schuette did not address intervention at all, much less clarify
what “protectable interest” justifies intervention. Moreover, Justice Kennedy specifically
disavowed that the opinion in any way posited on “the constitutionality, or the merits, of
race-conscious admissions policies in higher education.” 134 S. Ct. at 1630 (Kennedy,
J.). Thus, there is nothing in Schuette that supports Plaintiff’s proposition that Schuette
“made clear” that Proposed Intervenors “have no protectable interest – let alone a
significantly protectable interest” in this litigation. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5.

6

Plaintiff additionally argues that a “significant protectable interest” must be a “direct”
interest. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5 (citing Harvard, 2015 WL 3683230, at *6). The Harvard
opinion cited no authority for that determination other than to note that the proposed
intervenors in that case acknowledged that their interests were “indirect.” Harvard, 2015
WL 3683230, at *6. Proposed Intervenors make no such concession here.
9

Plaintiff next argues that Proposed Intervenors “clearly lack Article III standing,”
which, according to Plaintiff, is a “powerful signal that intervention as of right should be
denied.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 7. As Plaintiff concedes, however, the Fourth Circuit has not held
that defendant-intervenors must demonstrate Article III standing to intervene as of right.
See Duplin Cnty., 2012 WL 360018, at *3 n.3 & *4 n.4 (“[T]here is no binding precedent
on this court that dictates an intervenor as of right must have standing to intervene.”).7
Nevertheless, Proposed Intervenors do have Article III standing; indeed, Proposed
Intervenors have precisely the same interest as Plaintiff in a policy that maximizes their
chances of admission to UNC-Chapel Hill. Should Plaintiff prevail, Proposed Intervenors
could suffer the same injury that Plaintiff claims to be suffering right now – being denied
admission to UNC-Chapel Hill. It is immaterial for Article III purposes whether Proposed
Intervenors share with Plaintiff the same statutory cause of action to enforce that interest.
Proposed Intervenors’ protectable interest and standing is illustrated by Brumfield
v. Dodd, 749 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2014), a case that was studiously left unaddressed by
both Plaintiff and Defendants. The student intervenors in Brumfield sought to defend the
validity of a state voucher program and the Fifth Circuit found that a “prospective
interference with educational opportunities” was sufficient to establish an interest for
purposes of intervention. Id. at 343. It also found the interest sufficient to establish

7

Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has explicitly recognized that “a party who lacks standing
can nonetheless take part in a case as a permissive intervenor.” Shaw v. Hunt, 154 F.3d
161, 165 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing S.E.C. v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310
U.S. 434, 459 (1940)).
10

standing (as required in the Fifth Circuit). Id. at 344 (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc.
v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 464-65 (5th Cir. 1984)). Similarly here,
Proposed Intervenors have an interest in the continuation of the consideration of race as
part of UNC-Chapel Hill’s admissions process, even if they would not have a cause of
action to require the University to adopt such an admissions policy.
E.

Proposed Intervenors’ Motion is Timely and Their Intervention Would
Not Prejudice the Existing Parties

Plaintiff argues that Proposed Intervenors’ motion is untimely, asserting that
Proposed Intervenors did not act with “reasonable dispatch” and that the existing parties
would be prejudiced should Proposed Intervenors be permitted to intervene. Pl.’s Opp’n
at 12-14 (citing R & G Mortg. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 584 F.3d 1, 9 (1st
Cir. 2009)). Plaintiff is wrong on both counts, having failed to consider the status of this
litigation and the limited nature of Proposed Intervenors’ request.
Proposed Intervenors’ motion to intervene is timely given the procedural history
of this case. See Brown v. Eckerd Drugs, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1440, 1444 (W.D.N.C. 1983)
(“The critical issue with respect to timeliness is whether the motion was made as soon as
it was clear that the interests of the [proposed intervenors] would not be served by the
[existing parties].”). It is immaterial that some courts have found shorter “delays”
untimely, since the analysis considers the progress of the case rather than the mere
amount of time that has elapsed since the complaint was filed. See Scardelletti v. Debarr,
265 F.3d 195, 202 (4th Cir. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536
U.S. 1 (2002) (“The purpose of the [time] requirement is to prevent a tardy intervenor
11

from derailing a lawsuit within sight of the [case’s] terminal.”) (quoting United States v.
South Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 710 F.2d 394, 396 (7th Cir. 1983)).
When considering the timeliness of Proposed Intervenors’ Motion in relation to
the procedural status of the case, it is important to recognize that the Motion was filed at
the time of Plaintiff’s deadline to add additional parties and weeks before Defendants’
(the side on which Proposed Intervenors seek to join) deadline to add additional parties.
In addition, discovery has just begun and is not set to close until Feb. 15, 2016. Order of
May 14, 2015 (ECF No. 34); see United States ex. rel. Frank M. Sheesley Co. v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 239 F.R.D. 404, 412 n.9 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (finding motion to
intervene timely when motion was made two months before deadline to add new parties,
“case [was] still in its initial stages, there [were] no filings beyond the initial pleadings
and the motions sub judice, and discovery [was] not scheduled to conclude” for three
more months).
Similarly, permitting the limited intervention sought by Proposed Intervenors
would cause no prejudice to the parties. As detailed above, Proposed Intervenors seek to
introduce evidence related to only two specific topics. They will not affect the discovery
process related to the other issues in this litigation. Accordingly, there is no basis for
Plaintiff’s assertion that Proposed Intervenors’ participation will add “at least several
months” to the current discovery schedule. Pl.’s Opp’n at 14. To the contrary, because the
majority of discovery is outside of Proposed Intervenors’ interests, there will be ample

12

time to complete all discovery within the current schedule and without increasing the
burden on the existing parties.8
F.

Alternatively, the Court Should Grant Permissive Intervention Instead
of Amici Curiae Status

To the extent that this Court finds that Proposed Intervenors are not entitled to
intervene as of right, it should grant permissive intervention. Courts have granted
permissive intervention in cases where there is a divergence of interest, but that
divergence does not rise to the level of adversity, see, e.g., Pa. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Perlberg, 268 F.R.D. 218, 226 (D. Md. 2010) (granting permissive intervention where
intervenors sought identical result but interests were not identical), and in cases where the
intervenors would ensure “a complete and full development and presentation of the facts
and issues in this case,” Alexander v. Hall, 64 F.R.D. 152, 158 (D.S.C. 1974).
The primary argument made by the parties against permissive intervention is that
they will be prejudiced by Proposed Intervenors’ participation in discovery. Pl.’s Opp’n
at 15; Defs.’ Resp. at 9. The limited additional discovery requested by Proposed
Intervenors will not prejudice the existing parties. See, e.g., United States v. Marsten

8

The fact that all Proposed Intervenors are represented by a single team of lawyers
supports a finding that their limited participation in discovery can be accommodated
within the existing schedule. To the extent that UNC-Chapel Hill suggests that additional
unnamed parties may seek to intervene at some point, Defs.’ Resp. at 2 n.1, this court
should not refuse intervention based on speculation regarding possible future intervenors.
See, e.g., Estate of Siemen v. Huron Med. Ctr., et al., No. 11-11249-BC, 2012 WL
909820, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2012) (“Because only Dr. Butki has sought
intervention, it would be imprudent to consider the effect intervention of a number of
unnamed parties with different interests and circumstances would have on the
litigation.”); see also Cappachione, 179 F.R.D. at 509-10 (rejecting Defendants’
“slippery slope” argument that there would be no logical reason to bar any other set of
parents from intervening).
13

Apts. Inc., 175 F.R.D. 265, 268 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (“Although some additional discovery
may need to be taken, this alone is insufficient to establish prejudice.”); Diagnostic
Devices, Inc. v. Taidoc Tech. Corp., 257 F.R.D. 96, 100 (W.D.N.C. 2009) (permitting
intervention under Rule 24(b) when request was for limited participation). To the extent
that the parties suggest that they would be prejudiced by Proposed Intervenors’ access to
actual applications submitted to UNC-Chapel Hill, Defs.’ Resp. at 9, Proposed
Intervenors are not seeking such discovery and do not need to be served with it.9 Thus, no
party will be prejudiced by permitting Proposed Intervenors’ limited participation in
discovery (and no party objects to Proposed Intervenors’ participation in substantive
briefing and the submission of declarations).
Finally, the parties’ insistence that amicus curiae status is sufficient to protect
Proposed Intervenors’ interests is incorrect. Plaintiff once again misapprehends Proposed
Intervenors’ request when it asserts that they “are chiefly concerned with . . . shar[ing]
with the Court their views and perspectives.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 16. To the contrary, Proposed
Intervenors are concerned with presenting evidence, and amicus status does not generally
allow a party to submit evidence. As the Supreme Court has explained, “an amicus—with
the exception of the right to file a brief—might be unable adequately to present all the

9

Moreover, Proposed Intervenors have reviewed and would accept the terms of the
Confidentiality and Protective Order that currently governs this case, which would
prevent students and potential applicants from viewing highly personal and sensitive
information. See Agreed Confidentiality & Protective Order (ECF No. 49).
14

relevant data to the court.” Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement
Workers of Am. AFL-CIO, Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 216 (1965).
This Court has ample discretion to permit intervention, and then to ensure, either
at the outset or through the course of the litigation, that Proposed Intervenors’
participation in no way impedes the resolution of this case. See Linkous v. Am. Alt. Ins.
Corp., No. 7:11-CV-278, 2011 WL 4894233, at *3 (W.D. Va. Oct. 13, 2011) (“If the
Court later determines that State Farm’s presence in the instant litigation is hindering,
rather than helping, the efficient administration of justice, it reserves the right to limit the
extent of State Farm's intervention accordingly.”).
G.

Conclusion

For the above-stated reasons and the reasons set forth in Proposed Intervenors’
opening brief, the Court should grant the Motion to Intervene. To address any concerns
raised by the parties regarding any negative effect occasioned by the participation of
Proposed Intervenors, the Court may limit intervention to the scope outlined above,
allowing Proposed Intervenors to protect their interests while causing no prejudice to the
existing parties and permitting this case to proceed in a timely fashion.
Dated: August 7, 2015

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Reed N. Colfax
Reed N. Colfax*
Glenn Schlactus*
Sasha Samberg-Champion*
Laura Gaztambide-Arandes*
RELMAN, DANE & COLFAX PLLC
1225 19th Street NW, Suite 600
15

Washington, DC 20036
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
Tel: [phone]
/s/ Jack Holtzman
Jack Holtzman, N.C. Bar No. 13548
Christine Bischoff, N.C. Bar No. 41792
NORTH CAROLINA JUSTICE CENTER
224 South Dawson Street
Raleigh, NC 27601
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
Tel: [phone]
/s/ Jon M. Greenbaum
Jon M. Greenbaum*
LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS UNDER LAW
1401 New York Avenue NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20005
[e-mail]
Tel: [phone]
ATTORNEYS FOR PROPOSED
DEFENDANT-INTERVENORS
* Special Appearance

16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
In accordance with Local Rule 5.3(b)(2), I hereby certify that this document filed
through the CM-ECF system on August 7, 2015 will be sent electronically to the
registered participants as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing.
/s/ Reed N. Colfax
Reed N. Colfax

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