FAUSTINA PATTERSON v. DUKE UNIVERSITY et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE N. C. TILLEY, JR on 09/23/2015; that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count Two of Plaintiff's Complaint and All Claims under the North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act (Doc. # 15 ) is GRANTED. (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
FAUSTINA PATTERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
DUKE UNIVERSITY, DUKE
UNIVERSITY HEALTH SYSTEM,
INC., DUKE UNIVERSITY
DISABILITY PROGRAM, and
LIBERTY MUTUAL GROUP, INC.,
Defendants.
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14CV1062
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Faustina Patterson filed suit against Duke University, Duke
University Health System, Inc., Duke University Disability Program, and
Liberty Mutual Group, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”) alleging violations of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended
(“ERISA”). This matter is before the Court on Defendants’1 unopposed
motion to dismiss Ms. Patterson’s second claim for relief and all claims
under the North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act for failure to state a
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Defendants assert that Ms. Patterson incorrectly identified Liberty Mutual
Group, Inc. as a defendant, when its correct name is Liberty Life Assurance
Company of Boston. (Doc. #16 at 1.) Therefore, all references to
Defendants in this Memorandum Opinion and Order includes Liberty Life
Assurance Company of Boston, rather than Liberty Mutual Group, Inc. Ms.
Patterson, though, has not moved to amend the Complaint to reflect the
alleged proper identification of this defendant.
claim. (Doc. #15.) After the time passed for Ms. Patterson to respond to
Defendants’ motion, the Clerk notified her counsel that the motion would be
referred to the Court for consideration of the unopposed motion unless she
intended to oppose the motion and could show excusable neglect for failing
to respond timely. (Doc. #17.) Two days later, Ms. Patterson’s counsel
telephonically notified the Court that Ms. Patterson would not be filing a
response to Defendants’ motion.
When a non-moving party fails to file a timely response to a motion,
“the motion will be considered and decided as an uncontested motion, and
ordinarily will be granted without further notice.” L. Civ. R. 7.3(k). See
Alexander v. Carolina Fire Control, Inc., No. 1:14CV74, 2014 WL 3729546,
*6 (M.D.N.C. July 25, 2014) (listing cases granting unopposed motions to
dismiss). Therefore, because Ms. Patterson not only failed to file a timely
response in opposition to Defendants’ motion, but also affirmatively
informed the Court that she would not be doing so, the second claim for
relief and all claims under the North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act may
be dismissed for these reasons.
Even if the Court were to consider whether Ms. Patterson sufficiently
stated a claim for relief, Defendants’ motion would be granted. A complaint
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
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relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id., 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.
Ct. at 1965); see also McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., State
Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that a
complaint must “contain[] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face in the sense that the
complaint’s factual allegations must allow a court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”).
In her Complaint, Ms. Patterson asserts two claims for relief. In the
first, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (§ 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA), she
seeks recovery of benefits she alleges are due to her under the terms of the
Duke University Disability Program (“the Program”). (Doc. #8 ¶¶ 16-19.)
She specifically seeks “at least the sum of $13,200.00 to date, plus
interest, costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.” (Id. ¶ 19.) In the second
claim for relief, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (§ 502(a)(3) of ERISA),
Ms. Patterson seeks equitable relief. (Id. ¶¶ 20-23.) Although she does not
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allege a separate claim for relief under the North Carolina Declaratory
Judgment Act, Ms. Patterson alleges that she is bringing the suit not only
under ERISA, but also pursuant to the North Carolina Declaratory Judgment
Act. (Id. opening ¶.)
A participant in or beneficiary of a plan covered by ERISA may bring a
civil action to recover benefits due to her, to enforce her rights, or to clarify
her rights. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). A plan participant or beneficiary may
also bring a civil action to enjoin an action or practice that violates
subchapter I of ERISA or the plan’s terms or to obtain other “appropriate
equitable relief.” Id. § 1132(a)(3).
Section 1132(a)(3) is a “catchall” provision that provides “appropriate
equitable relief” as a “safety net” when no other provision in § 1132(a)
provides an “adequately remedy.” Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489,
512, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1078 (1996) (finding relief under § 1132(a)(3)
appropriate where plaintiffs “must rely on the third subsection or they have
no remedy at all”). “[W]here Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief
for a beneficiary’s injury, there will likely be no need for further equitable
relief, in which case such relief normally would not be ‘appropriate.’” Id. at
515, 116 S. Ct. at 1079.
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For example, in Korotynska v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 474 F.3d 101 (4th
Cir. 2006), the plaintiff brought suit solely for equitable relief under §
1132(a)(3) when her long-term disability benefits were terminated, and the
defendant moved to dismiss. The court found that there was “no question”
that section 1132(a)(1)(B) “squarely addresse[d[ [the] plaintiff’s injury.” Id.
at 106. Affirming the district’s court’s dismissal of the § 1132(a)(3) claim,
the court held “that § 1132(a)(1)(B) afford[ed] the plaintiff adequate relief
for her benefits claim, and a cause of action under § 1132(a)(3) [was] thus
not appropriate.” Id. at 107. Cf. Varity, 516 U.S. at 515, 116 S. Ct. at
1079 (finding relief under § 1132(a)(3) appropriate because the plaintiffs
could not proceed under § 1132(a)(1)(B) because they were no longer
members of the plan and, therefore, had no benefits due to them). See also
Smith v. Sydnor, 184 F.3d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty under § 1132(a)(3) is actually a claim for
benefits due if the resolution of the claim requires an interpretation and
application of the ERISA-regulated plan rather than an interpretation and
application of ERISA); Jenkins v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural,
Ornamental & Reinforcing Ironworkers Local No. 79 Pension Fund, No.
2:14CV526, 2015 WL 1291883, *8 (E.D. Va. Mar. 20, 2015) (dismissing §
1132(a)(3) claim as a “’repackaged’ denial of benefits claim[]”).
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Here, the clear focus of Ms. Patterson’s suit is the denial of benefits
she alleges are due to her. She alleges that she “timely and properly made
an application for long term disability benefits,” which was approved. (Doc.
#8 ¶ 10.) She received disability benefits from October 23, 2009 through
October 23, 2011, while she was allegedly under the regular care of a
physician for her disabling conditions. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) On October 20,
2011, allegedly “without any basis in law or medical fact, and in willful
disregard of the clear language of the [Program],” Defendants terminated her
long-term disability benefits effective October 23, 2011. (Id. ¶ 12.) Ms.
Patterson claims that, in so doing, Defendants “purposely ignored the clear
language of the [Program].” (Id. ¶ 12.) Allegedly, soon after Defendants
terminated her benefits, she “timely and properly appealed the termination of
her long term disability benefits” twice, but both appeals were denied. (Id. ¶
13.) Ms. Patterson ultimately alleges that Defendants “denied and refused
to pay [her] her long term disability benefits in at least the amount of
$13,320.00 to date.” (Id. ¶ 15.)
As in Korotynska, § 1132(a)(1)(B) affords Ms. Patterson an adequate
remedy for her claimed denial of benefits. Furthermore, resolution of her
claims requires a review, interpretation, and application of the Program, an
ERISA-regulated plan, not simply a review, interpretation, and application of
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ERISA. Therefore, Ms. Patterson’s second claim for relief seeking equitable
relief under § 1132(a)(3) is dismissed.
In addition, ERISA preempts any claims that Ms. Patterson has made
under the North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act. With certain
exceptions not applicable here, ERISA supersedes a state law that “relate[s]
to any employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Therefore, a court
must determine if state law claims “that are said to implicate ERISA” are
preempted. Darcangelo v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 187 (4th
Cir. 2002). Relevant here, ERISA completely preempts state law claims that
fall within the civil enforcement scope of § 1132(a). Id. (citing Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S. Ct. 1542). See also
Baumgartner v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., No. CCB-03-1770, 2004 WL
964205, *3 (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2004) (finding removal jurisdiction under
ERISA despite the plaintiff’s characterizing his claim as one for declaratory
relief under state law). Therefore, ERISA preempts any claims Ms. Patterson
may have asserted under the North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act and
those claims are also dismissed.
For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Two of Plaintiff’s Complaint and All
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Claims under the North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act (Doc. #15) is
GRANTED.
This the 23rd day of September, 2015.
/s/ N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.
Senior United States District Judge
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