ABLE v. COLVIN

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN, JR on 03/28/2016 as set out herein. Plaintiff has not established an error warranting remand. ORDERED that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability is AFFIRMED, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Reversing the Commissioner (Doc. 10 ) is DENIED, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 12 ) is GRANTED, and that this action is dismissed with prejudice. A Judgment dismissing this action will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.(Taylor, Abby)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CRYSTAL WARREN ABLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

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1:14CV1078

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
Plaintiff Crystal Warren Able brought this action pursuant
to Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act
(the “Act”), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying
Plaintiff’s claim for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).
(Doc. 1.) The court has before it the certified administrative
record,1 as well as the parties’ cross-motions for judgment
(Docs. 10, 12).

For the reasons that follow, the court will

enter judgment for Defendant.

Transcript citations refer to the Administrative
Transcript of Record filed manually with the Commissioner’s
Answer. (Doc. 8.)
1

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff applied for SSI, alleging a disability onset date

of July 1, 2007.

(Tr. at 256-65.)

Upon denial of that

application initially (Tr. at 112-27, 151-55) and on
reconsideration (Tr. at 128-45, 159-68), Plaintiff requested a
hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) (Tr.
at 169-71).

Plaintiff, her attorney, and a vocational expert

(“VE”) attended the hearing (Tr. at 36-98), at which time
Plaintiff amended her onset date of disability to February 1,
2012 (see Tr. at 39, 281).
not disabled under the Act.

The ALJ subsequently ruled Plaintiff
(Tr. at 11-35.)

The Appeals

Council thereafter denied Plaintiff’s request for review (Tr. at
1-5), making the ALJ’s ruling the Commissioner’s final decision
for purposes of judicial review.
In rendering that disability determination, the ALJ made
the following findings later adopted by the Commissioner:
1.
[Plaintiff] has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since February 1, 2012, the amended
alleged onset date.
2.
[Plaintiff] has the following severe impairments:
obesity; asthma; and a mood disorder, variously
diagnosed as bipolar disorder and depressive disorder.
. . . .
3.
[Plaintiff] does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically
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equals the severity of one of the listed impairments
in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
. . . .
4.
[Plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity
to perform light work . . . , except that she can
frequently climb, stoop, and ladder climb; and she
should avoid concentrated exposure to irritants and
hazardous conditions. She retains the mental residual
functional capacity to perform simple, routine tasks;
follow simple, short instructions; make simple, workrelated decisions; and adapt to a few workplace
changes. She can have frequent interaction with the
general public, coworkers, and supervisors. She needs
an assistive device to ambulate.
. . . .
5.
[Plaintiff] is unable to perform any past
relevant work.
. . . .
9.
Considering [Plaintiff’s] age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there
are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that [she] can perform.
. . . .
10. [Plaintiff] has not been under a disability, as
defined in the [] Act, since February 1, 2012, the
amended alleged onset date.
(Tr. at 16-29 (bold font and internal parenthetical citations
omitted).)
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In cases such as this one, where the matter was previously

adjudicated by an ALJ, review of the ALJ’s ruling is limited to
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the following two issues: (1) whether substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision; and (2) whether the ALJ applied the
correct legal standards.

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hays v.

Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).

The question is

not whether Plaintiff is disabled, but whether the ALJ’s finding
that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial
evidence and based upon a correct application of the relevant
law.

See Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996);

Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987).

If a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate the evidence in support
of the ALJ’s decision, the court should not reweigh the evidence
or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.

Hays, 907 F.2d

at 1456.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that the court should overturn the ALJ’s
finding of no disability on these grounds:
Substantial evidence fails to support:
(1) “[t]he ALJ’s finding that [Plaintiff] can frequently
interact with the general public, coworkers and supervisors”
(Pl.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for J. (“Pl.’s Br.”) (Doc. 11) at
5);
(2) “[t]he ALJ’s RFC assessment failed to reflect
[Plaintiff’s] moderate difficulties in concentration,
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persistence or pace” (id. at 10) and contained “a flawed
credibility assessment” (id. at 11); and
3) “[t]he ALJ improperly discounted lay evidence from
[Plaintiff’s] family” (id. at 13).
Defendant contends otherwise and seeks affirmance of the
ALJ’s decision.

(Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for J. on the

Pleadings (“Def.’s Mem.”) (Doc. 13) at 5-20.)
A.

Frequent Interaction with Others

In Plaintiff’s first issue on review, she asserts that the
ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiff could perform work involving
frequent interaction with the general public, coworkers, and
supervisors. (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 5-10.) Plaintiff maintains
that the record supports a limitation to only occasional
interaction with others (id. at 5), and provides two bases for
her argument: (1) the ALJ gave “significant weight” to the
opinions of two state agency consultants who opined that
Plaintiff “would require limited interaction with others” (id.
at 6 (citing Tr. at 26, 125, 143)), and to a psychological
consultative examiner who assessed Plaintiff’s ability to relate
to coworkers as “moderately impaired” (id. at 7 (citing Tr. at
26, 500); and (2) “[l]ay evidence [from Plaintiff’s mother and
daughter] also supports a limitation to occasional interaction
with others” (id. at 8 (citing Tr. at 317, 318, 347)).
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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s error prejudiced her, because
the VE testified that no jobs existed for a person with a
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) identical to the ALJ’s RFC
but limited to occasional rather than frequent interaction with
others.

(Id. at 9 (citing 80, 81).)

Plaintiff’s contentions do

not warrant relief.
Here, as a general matter, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s
testimony, the objective medical evidence, and the medical and
lay opinion evidence relating to Plaintiff’s mental impairment
in a fair degree of detail.

(See Tr. at 18-19, 22, 26-27.)

At

step two of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff’s mood disorder constituted a severe
impairment (see Tr. at 16), and at step three, the ALJ found
that, although Plaintiff’s mood disorder did not meet or equal a
listed impairment, it resulted in moderate limitation in
Plaintiff’s social functioning. (See Tr. at 22.)

In that

regard, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “goes to the grocery store
once per month for thirty to forty minutes,” “leaves the house
to visit her grandmother and her daughter at their houses,
spends time with her grandchildren, [] talks with her
neighbors,” “takes public transportation,” “went to school on
Wednesdays,” and “went on vacation to New Orleans.” (Tr. at 22.)

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The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff’s credibility in
conjunction with the RFC determination (see Tr. at 23-25), and
found that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms [we]re not
entirely credible.” (Tr. at 24.) The ALJ again detailed
Plaintiff’s activities of daily living and concluded that those
“activities demonstrate that [Plaintiff] can lift, balance,
stand, walk, sit, perform simple and routine tasks, sustain
attention and concentration, and be around other people.” (Tr.
at 25 (emphasis added).)
The ALJ also evaluated the opinion evidence of record as it
pertained to Plaintiff’s mental impairments (see Tr. at 25-27),
and gave “significant weight” to the opinions of state agency
psychological consultants Keith Noles, Ph.D., and Daniel Nelson,
Psy.D., that Plaintiff “would require limited interaction with
others” (Tr. at 26 (emphasis added) (citing Tr. at 125, 143)),
and to the opinion of consultative psychological examiner Samuel
Gray, Psy.D., rating Plaintiff as “moderately impaired in her
ability to relate to others.” (Id. (emphasis added) (citing Tr.
at 500).)

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decision to accord

“significant weight” to these opinions compelled the ALJ to
limit Plaintiff to occasional as opposed to frequent interaction
with others; however, Plaintiff does not point the court to any
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authority supporting the view that limited interaction and
moderate impairment in social functioning must translate to less
than frequent interaction with others.
at 5-10.)

(See Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11)

Although the ALJ’s adoption of those opinions

logically must result in some limitation in social functioning,
see Kniffen v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Civil Action No. 14-CV-10106,
2015 WL 687323, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2015) (unpublished)
(noting that “[a] ‘moderate’ limitation [in social functioning]
(representing the mid-point on a five-point scale of none, mild,
moderate, marked, and extreme) implies the presence of at least
some degree of limitation” (emphasis added)), the ALJ here did
limit Plaintiff to frequent interaction with others (defined as
occurring from one-third up to two-thirds of an eight-hour
workday, see Social Security Ruling 83-10, Titles II and XVI:
Determining Capability to Do Other Work – The Medical-Vocational
Rules of Appendix 2, 1983 WL 31251, at *6 (1983) (“SSR 83-10”)),
as opposed to constant interaction (defined as existing twothirds or more of an eight-hour workday, see Social Security
Administration, Program Operations Manual System,
§ DI 25001.001, ¶ B.35).
Plaintiff’s reliance on the statements of her mother and
daughter as support for a limitation to occasional interaction
similarly fails.

(See Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 8 (citing Tr. at
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317, 318, 347).)

As discussed in more detail below in the

context of Plaintiff’s third assignment of error, the ALJ gave
“little weight” to the opinions of Plaintiff’s mother and
daughter (Tr. at 27), and substantial evidence supports that
determination.
Lastly, even assuming, arguendo, that the ALJ erred by
failing to limit Plaintiff to occasional interaction with
others, any such error remains harmless under the circumstances
of this case.

See generally Fisher v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 1055,

1057 (7th Cir. 1989) (“No principle of administrative law or
common sense requires us to remand a [Social Security] case in
quest of a perfect opinion unless there is reason to believe
that the remand might lead to a different result.”).

Based on

the VE’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that, considering
Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, she
remained able to perform the jobs of cashier, parking lot
attendant, ticket taker, and laundry sorter.
29.)

(See Tr. at 28-

The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) listing for

the laundry sorter job rates the requirements of “Taking
Instructions-Helping” as “Not Significant” and “Talking” as “Not
Present.”

G.P.O., DOT, § 361.687-014, 1991 WL 672991.

Moreover, the DOT code for the laundry sorter job contains a
fifth digit of “8,” reflecting the lowest possible level of
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human interaction that exists in the labor force.

See DOT,

App'x B, 1991 WL 688701; see also Cobb v. Colvin, No. 2:13CV115
TCM, 2014 WL 6845850, at *19 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 3, 2014)
(unpublished) (“As defined in the DOT, the level of interaction
designated for the[se] job[s] . . . is ‘not significant’ and is
rated at a Level 8. . . . This designated level of interaction
is compatible with an RFC limiting a claimant to only occasional
contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the public.” (internal
citations omitted)).

The VE testified that 4,000 laundry sorter

jobs existed in the national economy (see Tr. at 92), and
Plaintiff has not challenged the VE’s testimony in that regard.
In sum, Plaintiff’s first issue on review fails to entitle
her to relief.
B.

RFC Assessment

In Plaintiff’s second assignment of error, she alleges that
“[t]he ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by substantial
evidence” in two respects.

(Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 10.)

First,

Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ failed to account for
Plaintiff’s moderate limitation in concentration, persistence,
or pace in the RFC.

(See id. at 10-11.)

Specifically,

Plaintiff contends that the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in
Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015), holds that a
limitation to simple, routine tasks does not account for
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moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace,
because “the ability to perform simple tasks differs from the
ability to stay on task,” and that “[o]nly the latter limitation
would account for a claimant’s limitation in concentration,
persistence[,] or pace.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 10-11 (citing
Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638).)

Second, Plaintiff asserts that the

ALJ’s credibility assessment is “flawed” because “[t]he ALJ
never explained how [Plaintiff’s] activities of daily living
were inconsistent with her testimony regarding her lifting,
sitting, and standing ability.” (Id. at 12-13 (citing Mascio,
780 F.3d at 640).)

Plaintiff’s contentions do not warrant

relief.
After the ALJ’s decision in this case, the Fourth Circuit
decided Mascio, which directly addressed the relationship
between a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or
pace and the inclusion of simple, routine, and repetitive tasks
and/or unskilled work in the RFC and hypothetical question.
at 638.

Specifically, the Fourth Circuit held as follows:

[W]e agree with other circuits that an ALJ does not
account “for a claimant’s limitations in
concentration, persistence, and pace by restricting
the hypothetical question to simple, routine tasks or
unskilled work.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631
F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011) (joining the Third,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits). As Mascio points out,
the ability to perform simple tasks differs from the
ability to stay on task. Only the latter limitation
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Id.

would account for a claimant’s limitation in
concentration, persistence, or pace.
Perhaps the ALJ can explain why Mascio’s moderate
limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace at
step three does not translate into a limitation in
Mascio’s [RFC]. For example, the ALJ may find that
the concentration, persistence, or pace limitation
does not affect Mascio’s ability to work, in which
case it would have been appropriate to exclude it from
the hypothetical tendered to the [VE]. See id. at
1181. But because the ALJ here gave no explanation, a
remand is in order.
Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638.

However, the Mascio court also allowed

for the possibility that an ALJ could adequately explain why
moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace would
not result in any limitation in the RFC.

Id.

The Western

District of Virginia recently had occasion to discuss this very
point:
Mascio does not broadly dictate that a claimant’s
moderate impairment in concentration, persistence, or
pace always translates into a limitation in the RFC.
Rather, Mascio underscores the ALJ’s duty to
adequately review the evidence and explain the
decision . . . .
. . . .
An ALJ may account for a claimant’s limitation with
concentration, persistence, or pace by restricting the
claimant to simple, routine, unskilled work where the
record supports this conclusion, either through
physician testimony, medical source statements,
consultative examinations, or other evidence that is
sufficiently evident to the reviewing court.

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Jones v. Colvin, Civil Action No. 7:14CV00273, 2015 WL 5056784,
at *10-12 (W.D. Va. Aug. 20, 2015) (unpublished) (emphasis
added); see also Hutton v. Colvin, Civil Action No. 2:14-CV-63,
2015 WL 3757204, at *2-3 (N.D. W. Va. June 16, 2015)
(unpublished) (finding reliance on Mascio “misplaced” and that
ALJ “gave abundant explanation” for why unskilled work
adequately accounted for claimant’s moderate limitation in
concentration, persistence, or pace, where ALJ relied on the
claimant’s daily activities and treating physicians’ opinions of
claimant’s mental abilities).
Here, the ALJ adequately explained why the mental
restrictions in the RFC adequately accounted for Plaintiff’s
moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace.

At

step three, the ALJ gave “significant weight” to the opinion of
state agency consultant Dr. Daniel Nelson that Plaintiff
experienced moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration,
persistence, or pace.

(Tr. at 22 (citing Tr. at 129-44).)

Then, in determining Plaintiff’s mental RFC, the ALJ again gave
“significant weight” to Dr. Nelson’s opinion that, despite
moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace,
Plaintiff was “able to sustain attention and concentration for
simple tasks.” (Tr. at 26; see also Tr. at 142 (emphasis
added).) The ALJ thus explicitly considered Plaintiff’s ability
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to “stay on task” which the Mascio court distinguished from the
ability to perform simple tasks.

See Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638.

The ALJ further noted that Dr. Nelson’s opinions were
“consistent with [Plaintiff’s] ongoing treatment records from
Daymark Recovery Services, as well as [Plaintiff’s] reported
activities of daily living.” (Tr. at 26; see also Tr. at 18-19
(ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s treatment with Daymark); Tr. at
25 (ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s daily activities).)

The ALJ

has thus created a “logical bridge” between the record evidence
and her conclusion that Plaintiff can perform simple tasks,
notwithstanding moderate limitation in concentration,
persistence, or pace, see Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872
(7th Cir. 2000), and remand is not warranted under Mascio.

See

Del Vecchio v. Colvin, Civil Action No. 1:14CV116, 2015 WL
5023857, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 25, 2015) (unpublished) (“Here,
unlike in Mascio, the ALJ discussed substantial record evidence
in determining [the claimant’s] mental RFC, and his explicit
reliance on [the state agency consultant’s] opinion adequately
explains why [the claimant’s] limitations in concentration,
persistence, or pace did not translate into any additional
restrictions . . . . Therefore, the Court is not left to guess
at the ALJ’s decision-making process.”); compare Pulliam v.
Colvin, 1:13CV176, 2016 WL 843307, at *5-7 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 1,
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2016) (unpublished) (finding ALJ’s reliance on state agency
consultants’ opinions insufficient to satisfy Mascio where those
opinions were “potentially inconsistent, yet the ALJ grouped
them together and adopted both without distinguishing between
them” and the ALJ failed to “acknowledge the distinction between
performing simple tasks and the ability to stay on task, which
was so critical to the Mascio decision”).
Plaintiff’s allegation that the ALJ conducted a “flawed”
credibility analysis because she did not explain why she
discredited Plaintiff’s testimony about her abilities to lift,
sit, and stand similarly fails.
11.)

(See Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at

In evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting

effects of a claimant’s symptoms, an ALJ:
must take into account not only the claimant’s
statements about her pain, but also all the available
evidence, including the claimant’s medical history,
medical signs, and laboratory findings, any objective
medical evidence of pain (such as evidence of reduced
joint motion, muscle spasms, deteriorating tissues,
redness, etc.), and any other evidence relevant to the
severity of the impairment, such as evidence of the
claimant’s daily activities, specific descriptions of
the pain, and any medical treatment taken to alleviate
it.
Craig, 76 F.3d at 595 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).

The ALJ here fully complied with Craig.

The ALJ

first considered Plaintiff’s testimony, including her statements
“that she can walk from two to four minutes, stand five to
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twenty minutes, sit for twenty to thirty minutes, and lift
twelve to fourteen pounds.”

(Tr. at 24.)

The ALJ found those

statements “not entirely credible for the reasons explained in
this decision.”

(Id.)2

The ALJ then provided multiple reasons

for finding Plaintiff not entirely credible: (1) consultative
examiner Dr. Samuel Gray noted that Plaintiff exhibited possible
symptom exaggeration and provided a rule-out diagnosis of
malingering; 2) Plaintiff had prior convictions for writing
worthless checks and welfare fraud; 3) Plaintiff’s testimony
contained inconsistencies regarding whether she had earned any
money, traveled outside of Winston-Salem, or taken any classes
since 2007; 4) the objective medical evidence in the record did
not support Plaintiff’s allegations of disability; and 5)
Plaintiff’s activities of daily living did not support her
allegations of disability.

(See Tr. at 24-25.)

This analysis

complies with Craig and allows the court to “trace the path” of

2

Plaintiff’s reliance on Mascio to support her credibility
argument is misplaced. The ALJ here did not use “the vague (and
circular) boilerplate statement” criticized in Mascio: “the
claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the
extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional
capacity assessment.” Mascio, 780 F.3d at 639 (emphasis added).
Moreover, unlike in Mascio, the ALJ here adequately assessed
Plaintiff’s credibility. See id. (“The ALJ’s error [in using
the forbidden boilerplate language] would be harmless if he
properly analyzed credibility elsewhere.”).
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the ALJ’s reasoning.

Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir.

1995).
In conclusion, Plaintiff’s second assignment of error fails
as a matter of law.
C.

Lay Evidence

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by “improperly
discount[ing] lay evidence from [Plaintiff’s] family.”
Br. (Doc. 11) at 13.)

(Pl.’s

In particular, Plaintiff claims that the

ALJ could not use “natural bias” as a reason to discount written
statements submitted by Plaintiff’s mother and daughter
supportive of her claim for disability.

(Id. at 13-14 (citing

Regennitter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1298
(9th Cir. 1999), and Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289 (9th
Cir. 1996)).)

Plaintiff’s argument provides no basis for

relief.
ALJs may consider evidence from non-medical sources, such
as statements from spouses, parents, caregivers, siblings, other
relatives, friends, neighbors, and clergy, to determine the
severity of a claimant’s impairments and his or her residual
ability to work.

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(d)(4).

See

also Social Security Ruling 06–03p, Titles II and XVI:
Considering Opinions and Other Evidence from Sources Who Are Not
“Acceptable Medical Sources” in Disability Claims; Considering
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Decisions on Disability by Other Governmental and
Nongovernmental Agencies, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2 (Aug. 9,
2006) (“SSR 06–03p”). “[I]nformation from [non-medical sources]
may be based on special knowledge of the individual and may
provide insight into the severity of the impairment(s) and how
it affects the individual’s ability to function”[;] however, in
considering evidence from these sources, “it would be
appropriate to consider such factors as the nature and extent of
the relationship, whether the evidence is consistent with other
evidence, and any other factors that tend to support or refute
the evidence.”

SSR 06–03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2, *6; see

Cooper v. Astrue, No. 2:08–CV–18–FL, 2009 WL 928548, at *5–6
(E.D.N.C. Apr. 3, 2009) (unpublished) (“If the ALJ decides to
reject lay testimony concerning a [c]laimant’s pain or other
symptoms, the ALJ must do so explicitly and with sufficient
specificity to enable the court to decide whether there are
legitimate reasons for the ALJ's disbelief and whether the ALJ's
determination is supported by substantial evidence.” (citing
Hatcher v. Sec’y, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 898 F.2d 21,
23-25 (4th Cir. 1989))).
Here, the ALJ summarized the written statements from
Plaintiff’s mother and daughter (see Tr. at 27), and then
evaluated them as follows:
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These opinions are given little weight as they are lay
opinions from family members with a natural bias for
[Plaintiff], and were based on casual observation
rather than objective medical evidence. These
opinions are not consistent with the objective medical
evidence of record or [Plaintiff’s] activities of
daily living . . . .
(Id. (emphasis added).)

Thus, the ALJ did not discount the lay

evidence solely on the basis of natural bias.

See Morgan v.

Barnhart, 142 F. App'x 716, 724 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Morgan argues
that the ALJ impermissibly discredited the questionnaire
responses submitted by her husband and daughter on the basis of
inherent familial bias.

While we agree with Morgan’s argument

in principle, we would not reach the issue here, because the ALJ
did not, in fact, discredit the observations of Morgan’s family
members solely because of inherent familial bias.”).

Further,

SSR 06–03p expressly permits an ALJ to consider “the nature and
extent of the relationship” between a claimant and a third-party
source, as well as “any other factors that tend to support or
refute the evidence.”

SSR 06–03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *6.

Thus, the ALJ did not commit error in relying on the abovequoted reasons for rejecting the lay evidence in this case.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not established an error warranting remand.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision

finding no disability is AFFIRMED, that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Judgment Reversing the Commissioner (Doc. 10) is DENIED, that
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 12) is
GRANTED, and that this action is dismissed with prejudice.
A Judgment dismissing this action will be entered
contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
This the 28th day of March, 2016.

______________________________________
United States District Judge

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