DURHAM v. ACCELERATED FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS, LLC
Filing
4
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 01/28/2015; that Plaintiff's Application to Proceed IFP (Docket Entry 2 ) is granted. RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim. (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SONDRA DURHAM,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
ACCELERATED FINANCIAL
SOLUTIONS, LLC
Defendant.
1:15CV66
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed IFP (Docket Entry 2) in conjunction with her pro se
Complaint (Docket Entry 3).
The Court will grant Plaintiff’s
instant
limited
Application
for
the
purpose
of
recommending
dismissal of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for
failure to state a claim.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee
that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because
his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the
costs.”
Cir.
Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th
1995)
(en
banc)
(internal
“Dispensing
with
filing
fees,
quotation
however,
[is]
marks
not
omitted).
without
its
problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis
d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining
relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.
FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004).
To address this
concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that “the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines . . .
the action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted . . . .”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
A plaintiff “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), when the complaint does
not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’
a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Id.
This standard “demands more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Id.
In other words, “the tenet that a court must accept as true
all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions.”
Id.1
1
Although the Supreme Court has reiterated that “[a] document
filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations and quotation
2
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s Complaint stems from allegations that Defendant
improperly acquired Plaintiff’s credit report.
2.)
(See Docket Entry
The Complaint states two claims against Defendants under 15
U.S.C. § 1681n for willfully violating the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (“FCRA”) by obtaining Plaintiff’s credit reports without a
permissible purpose.
(Docket Entry 2 at 2-3.)
Because the
Complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations of willfulness, the
Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s case.
The Complaint contains only bald assertions that Defendant
willfully
obtained
Plaintiff’s
credit
report.
“‘[M]ere
assertions[s] of willful noncompliance with the FCRA will not, on
its own, satisfy Rule 8(a).’”
Vecchione v. Bay Area Credit Serv.,
No. 1:13CV586, 2014 WL 6972407, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 9, 2014)
(unpublished) (quoting Singleton v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, No. DKC
11-1823,
2012
(unpublished)).
WL
245965,
at
*4
(D.
Md.
Jan.
25,
2012)
This Court has repeatedly dismissed similar cases
wherein plaintiffs failed to put forth sufficient allegations of
willfulness. See e.g., Nowlin v. Capital One, No. 1:13CV1108, 2014
WL 795771 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2014) (unpublished), recommendation
adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 2014); Golden v. NCO Fin.
marks omitted), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine Twombly’s requirement
that a pleading contain more than labels and conclusions,”
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing pro se complaint).
3
Sys., No. 1:12CV1097, 2013 WL 4519774 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2013)
(unpublished), recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Sept. 13,
2013); James v. Paragon Revenue Group, No. 1:12CV1371, 2013 WL
3243553 (M.D.N.C. June 26, 2013) (unpublished), recommendation
adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. July 23, 2013). The same result should
occur here.
Therefore, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s
claims.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff
demonstrate
fails
that
to
allege
Defendant
sufficient
willfully
factual
violated
matter
to
FCRA
by
Application
to
the
impermissibly obtaining Plaintiff’s credit report.
IT
IS
THEREFORE
ORDERED
that
Plaintiff’s
Proceed IFP (Docket Entry 2) is granted.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
January 28, 2015
4
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