HENSON SCALES v. WEBB et al

Filing 77

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN, JR on 06/05/2017, that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Lawsuit with Prejudice, and for Summary Judgment (Doc. 61 ) is GRANTED. FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees & Costs Associated with Hearing Held Jan. 24, 2017 (Doc. 64 ) is GRANTED. Plaintiff is HEREBY ORDERED to pay Defendants a total of $3,248.60 in fees and costs. FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion and Supplem ental Motion for Use of Skype or Telephone for Scales v. Webb and Man Bites Dog Theater and Summary Judgment (Docs. 68 , 72 ) are DENIED as moot. A judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order will be entered contemporaneously herewith. (Garland, Leah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
MEG HENSON SCALES,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHAUNESTI WEBB and
MANBITES DOG THEATER COMPANY,
Defendants.

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1:15CV192

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
Presently before this court is a Motions to Dismiss Lawsuit
with Prejudice, [or alternatively] for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants Chaunesti Webb (“Webb”) and Manbites Dog Theater
Company (“Manbites Dog”). (Doc. 61.) Pro se Plaintiff Meg Henson
Scales (“Plaintiff”) has filed a response (Doc. 67), and
Defendants have replied. (Doc. 69.) Defendants have also filed a
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees & Costs Associated with Hearing Held
Jan. 24, 2017. (Doc. 64.) Defendants filed a Notice and
Alternative Reply (Doc. 71) noting that Plaintiff failed to
respond to this motion.
Plaintiff has filed a Motion and a Supplemental Motion for
Use of Skype or Telephone for Scales v. Webb and Man Bites Dog
Theater and Summary Judgment (Docs. 68, 72), to which Defendants
have responded (Doc. 70.) Plaintiff has also filed an additional

pleading (Doc. 73) which purports to respond to Defendants’
motion to dismiss or alternatively, for summary judgment (Doc.
61). Plaintiff has filed an additional pleading entitled
“Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants.” (Doc. 76.)
These matters are now ripe for resolution, and for the
reasons stated herein, Defendant’s motions will be granted and
Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on June 25, 2015.

(Doc. 19.) On July 13, 2015, Manbites Dog filed an Answer and
Defenses to the Amended Complaint (Doc. 22), and Webb filed an
Answer and a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint and for
Judgment on the Pleadings. (See Docs. 23, 24.)

This court

denied Defendant Webb’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 36). Plaintiff’s
attorney was allowed to withdraw and Plaintiff elected to
proceed pro se. (Docs. 38, 44.)
On December 19, 2016, Defendants filed a Report of
Plaintiff’s Non-Compliance and Motion for Relief in the Nature
of Order to Show Cause due to Plaintiff’s refusal to participate
in discovery and scheduled mediation. (Doc. 53.) Magistrate
Judge Joi Elizabeth Peake set a hearing on Defendants’ motion
for order to show cause for January 24, 2017, at 10:00 a.m.
(Doc. 54.) Magistrate Judge Peake specifically explained in the

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order and in the docket entry itself (in capital letters and
bold font) that “failure to appear will result in this case
being dismissed for failing to prosecute and for violation of
this order.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff failed to appear at the
hearing, but called the Clerk’s Office claiming that she was
unaware of the hearing until that morning. (Doc. 59 at 1.)
II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a resident of New York City and author of a

1995 essay titled “Tenderheaded: Or, Rejecting the Legacy of
Being Able to Take It,” (“Tenderheaded”). (Amended Complaint
(“Am. Compl.”) (Doc. 19) ¶¶ 8, 11.) According to Plaintiff, the
essay uses Plaintiff’s childhood memories and the history of the
Civil Rights movement to criticize what Plaintiff refers to as
“strongblackwoman,” which is a “pain-enduring, self-denying
‘anti-hero’ who is ‘culturally valued in direct proportion to
her personal sacrifice.’” (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff’s essay was
published in 2001 by Simon & Schuster as the title essay in an
anthology entitled: “Tenderheaded: A Comb-Bending Collection of
Hair Stories” (“the anthology”). (Id. ¶ 12.) The anthology was
copyrighted on March 23, 2001, and Plaintiff copyrighted her
individual essay on May 2, 2012. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) Defendant Webb
allegedly obtained and read a copy of Tenderheaded at some point
prior to March of 2012. (Id. ¶ 16.)

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Defendant Webb completed a play entitled “I Love My Hair
When It’s Good: & Then Again When It Looks Defiant and
Impressive” (“I Love My Hair”) sometime on or about March 8,
2012, allegedly copying several passages from Tenderheaded
directly into her script. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.)
Defendant Webb put on a performance run of the play at
Defendant Manbites Dog’s theater between March 8 and March 17,
2012, selling out each night the play was performed. (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 25-26.) After this run of performances, Defendant Webb
emailed Plaintiff to request permission to use sections of
Tenderheaded, which Plaintiff denied, requesting that Defendant
not use her work. (Id. ¶¶ 30-32.) After this exchange, a revised
version of “I Love My Hair” was again performed at Manbites Dog
Theater, between January 17 and February 1, 2014. (Id. ¶ 36.)
III. DEFENDANTS’ DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS
This court finds that Defendants’ pending motion (Doc. 61)
seeking dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) is
dispositive and will therefore address it first.
A.

Legal Standard

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides that:
If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with
these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to
dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the
dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under
this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this
rule -- except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper
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venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19 -operates as an adjudication on the merits.
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that courts must
have the authority to control litigation before them, and this
authority includes the power to order dismissal of an action for
failure to comply with court orders.” Ballard v. Carlson, 882
F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1989). However, “dismissal is not a
sanction to be invoked lightly.” Id. Further, “a district court
must be explicit and clear in specifying that failure to meet
its conditions will result in prejudicial dismissal.” Choice
Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. Goodwin & Boone, 11 F.3d 469, 472 (4th
Cir. 1993).
There is without question a strong preference that cases be
decided on the merits. See, e.g., United States v. Shaffer
Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 453 (4th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, in
this case, Plaintiff has refused to participate in discovery or
the required mediation, failed to appear for a hearing after
being ordered to do so, and engaged in non-responsive personal
attacks in lieu of addressing issues on the merits. Plaintiff’s
flagrant disregard for the civil process necessary to addressing
a claim on the merits requires dismissal.
When reviewing a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), courts
are to consider: “(i) the degree of personal responsibility of
the plaintiff; (ii) the amount of prejudice caused the
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defendant; (iii) the existence of a history of deliberately
proceeding in a dilatory fashion, and (iv) the existence of a
sanction less drastic than dismissal.” Ballard, 882 F.2d at 95;
Nowlin v. Capital One, No. 1:13CV1108, 2014 WL 795771, at *3
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2014); James v. Paragon Revenue Grp., No.
1:12CV1371, 2013 WL 3243553, at *2 (M.D.N.C. June 26, 2013).
This court is required to consider all four factors. See Taylor
v. Huffman, No. 95-6380, 1997 WL 407801, at *1 (4th Cir.
July 22, 1997).
B.

Analysis

Defendants argue that Plaintiff “has willfully failed to
come to Court to explain her misconduct, and falsely represented
to the Court that she had no notice of the hearing set to
address her failures.” (Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mots. to Dismiss
(“Defs.’ Mem.”) (Doc. 62) at 15.) Defendants argue that “[t]he
Court explicitly and unmistakably warned Plaintiff that the
action could be dismissed if she failed to appear or if she
failed to explain her failures to properly prosecute her case,
yet Plaintiff failed to respond or to appear as ordered.” (Id.)
Plaintiff responds in three different pleadings with a
barrage of excuses, personal anecdotes and inflammatory
accusations against Defendants and their counsel. (See Pl.’s
Resp. to Defs. asking for dismissal of case “with prejudice” and

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Request for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Resp. 1”) (Doc. 67) at 1-6); Pl.’s
Mot. and Supplemental Mot. for Use of Skype or Telephone for
Scales v. Webb and Man Bites Dog Theater, and Summ. J. (Pl.’s
Resp. 2”) (Docs. 68, 72) at 1-7; Resp. in Supp. of Summ. J.;
Rejection of Def’s Mot. to Dismiss with Prejudice; and Resp. to
Susan Freya Olive, of March 27, 2017 (“Pl.’s Resp. 3”) (Doc. 73)
at 1-9.)
Plaintiff argues that because she is “the victim” in the
present case, she should not be required to bear travel costs or
other expenses related to this litigation. (Pl.’s Resp. 1 (Doc.
67) at 1.) Plaintiff argues that the ongoing litigation is
“killing [her].” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff argues that she should
not be required to come to North Carolina due to an email
receipt she received from a Wilmington, North Carolina Home
Depot store containing items “one could use . . . to kill and/or
dispose of a body.” (Pl.’s Resp. 2 (Doc. 72) at 2.) Plaintiff
argues that she should not be required to come to North Carolina
because she “suffer[s] from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder” and
has “endured the suicides of three of [her] family members.”
(Id.) Plaintiff also argues that she cannot fly because she “was
raped by an overzealous and criminal NSA officer, at PDX, in
Portland, Oregon’s airport.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff argues that
“[t]here is a correlative between [her] illness and [her] dis-

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ease with flying to North Carolina, and potentially being
abducted, tortured, and/or murdered, by a well-meaning fan of
the Defendants.” (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff’s many pages of reasons that travel to North
Carolina works as an undue hardship ignore the fact that
Plaintiff filed her Complaint and Amended Complaint in the
Middle District of North Carolina. (See Docs. 1, 19. It may be
that Plaintiff had to file in this district for jurisdictional
reasons, but Plaintiff’s complaints about proceeding in the
district in which she filed are not compelling.
The four factors enumerated in Ballard, 882 F.2d at 95, as
applied here, are best understood in the context of the
procedural history. Plaintiff was originally represented by
counsel, however, counsel moved to withdraw prior to the initial
pretrial conference. (Doc. 38.) When Magistrate Judge Peake
granted Plaintiff’s prior counsel’s motion to withdraw,
Magistrate Judge Peake specifically provided that:
To the extent [Plaintiff] is electing to proceed pro
se, she will be responsible for complying with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules
of this Court, which includes her obligation to attend
any hearing or other proceeding scheduled by the
Court. Therefore, Plaintiff must appear in person for
the Pretrial Conference on June 23, 2016.
(Doc. 44 at 2.) On September 10, 2016, Plaintiff “consent[ed] to
receive service of documents and notices of electronic filings

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via the Court’s Electronic Filing System.” (Doc. 49.) On
December 19, 2016, Defendants filed their report of Plaintiff’s
non-compliance and a motion for a show cause order, which
alleged that Plaintiff refused to participate in mediation or
engage in discovery. (Doc. 53 at 1-6.) Defendants allege that
one of Plaintiff’s purported reasons for her inability to
participate include a family trip to Florida. (Id. at 3.)
Following the filing of Defendants’ above-described motion,
Magistrate Judge Peake signed an Order addressing these issues
on December 22, 2016. (Doc. 54.) This Order set a hearing for
January 24, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. and proscribed that “Plaintiff
is specifically cautioned that she must appear in person at the
hearing; failure to appear will result in this case being
dismissed for failing to prosecute and for violation of this
Order.” (Id. at 1.) The Order again cautioned Plaintiff that she
must appear at the hearing in person, followed by these words in
bold font and all capital letters: “Failure to appear will
result in this case being dismissed for failure to prosecute and
for violation of this order.” (Id. at 2.) The docket entry for
the December 22, 2016 Order contains the same text, again
reproduced in bold font and capital letters. (Doc. 54.)
Despite these clear warnings, Plaintiff failed to appear at
the January 24, 2017 hearing. (Doc. 59 at 1.) However,

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“Plaintiff contacted the Clerk’s Office less than two hours
before the hearing, claiming that she was unaware of the hearing
until that morning and that she had not received notice of the
hearing.” (Id.) Setting aside Plaintiff’s refusal to take
personal responsibility for her failure to appear, this court
takes a dim view of Plaintiff’s claim given its apparent and
objective inconsistency to the January 23 email Plaintiff sent
to Defendants.
At the January 24, 2017 hearing, Defendants introduced an
email from Plaintiff dated January 23, 2017, and time-stamped at
4:20 p.m. (Id. at 2.) “In the e-mail, Plaintiff represented that
she would not attend the hearing, but cited an ongoing personal
family issue, rather than lack of notice, as her excuse.” (Id.
at 2-3.) Further, “[t]he Court’s ECF filing system includes an
electronic receipt that shows that the Order was sent to
Plaintiff at the e-mail address where she consented to receive
electronic service in this case.” (Id. at 2.) The implications
of this email, as well as the fact that Plaintiff’s chosen email
address received notice of the hearing, significantly undercut
Plaintiff’s assertion that she was unaware of the January 24,
2017 hearing.
This court now turns to the four factors enumerated by the
Fourth Circuit in Ballard when determining whether to dismiss a

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plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
Ballard, 882 F.2d at 95.
First, this court must consider “the degree of personal
responsibility of the plaintiff.” Id. Here, because Plaintiff is
a pro se litigant who was explicitly advised to comply with
court rules and orders, this court assigns Plaintiff sole
responsibility for the present misconduct. Snipes, 2013 WL
4833021, at *4; Paragon Revenue Grp., 2013 WL 3243553, at *2;
see Kiser v. Salisbury Police Dep't, No. 1:14CV51, 2015 WL
4094089, at *1-2 (M.D.N.C. July 7, 2015). Magistrate Judge Peake
clearly delineated Plaintiff’s responsibilities in her multiple
warnings, which Plaintiff received and acknowledged, yet still
refused to follow. Although Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and
might be entitled to some deference, the instructions and
responsibilities were patently clear.
Second, this court must consider “the amount of prejudice
caused the defendant.” Ballard, 882 F.2d at 95. Plaintiff caused
prejudice to Defendants in the form of wasted time and
attorneys’ fees by refusing, in bad faith, to participate in
mediation and discovery as well as by refusing to appear at the
January 24, 2017 hearing. (Doc. 59.) The discovery period is
closed (see Doc. 46), and Plaintiff has not complied with the
mediation requirement. Plaintiff also has not appeared at a

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hearing to address her failure to participate in discovery and
mediation. (Doc. 54.)
Third, this court must consider “the existence of a history
of deliberately proceeding in a dilatory fashion. Ballard, 882
F.2d at 95. Here, the record shows that Plaintiff has
“proceed[ed] in a dilatory fashion.” Id. “Plaintiff’s failure to
comply with the mediation requirement was willful and defiant,
and resulted in significant expenditures of time by Defendants
and by the assigned mediator, who repeatedly attempted to work
with Plaintiff to schedule the mediation, to no avail.” (Doc. 59
at 3-4.) “Despite numerous opportunities to do so, Plaintiff
refused to respond to any of Defendants’ discovery requests,
even in light of accompanying warnings that refusal to
participate in discovery as ordered by the Court could result in
dismissal of the action.” (Id. at 4.) Further, “[i]nstead of
responding to discovery as required by the Rules of Civil
Procedure, Plaintiff responded with non-responsive e-mails
filled with personal attacks on Defendants and Defendants’
counsel, in violation of this Court’s Local Rules and the
decorum expected of parties appearing before this Court.” (Id.)
Beyond Magistrate Judge Peake’s summary, this court is disturbed
by the contents of Plaintiff’s email correspondence – to label
her systematic and continued approach to this case “dilatory” is

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a significant understatement. (See Defs.’ Mem., Ex. G (Doc. 628) at 2-4; Ex. F (Doc. 62-7) at 2.)
Fourth, this court must consider “the existence of a
sanction less drastic than dismissal.” Ballard, 882 F.2d at 95.
Magistrate Judge Peake’s Order specifically warned Plaintiff
that her failure to appear at the hearing would result in
dismissal of this case. “In view of that warning, the Court has
little alternative to dismissal. Any other course would have the
effect of placing the credibility of the Court in doubt and
inviting abuse.” Nowlin, 2014 WL 795771, at *4; Snipes, 2013 WL
4833021, at *4; Paragon Revenue Grp., 2013 WL 3243553, at *2.
As such, this court finds that all four Ballard factors
weigh heavily in favor of dismissing the present action with
prejudice. 882 F.2d at 95.
IV.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
In the January 30, 2017 Order, Magistrate Judge Peake

provided that, in addition to filing the present dispositive
motion, “Defendants may also file a motion for reimbursement of
their reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees, incurred
in connection with filing the Motion for Order to Show Cause and
attending the hearing.” (Doc. 59 at 6.) On February 7, 2017,
Defendants moved for a total of $3,248.60 in fees and costs.
(Docs. 64, 65.) Plaintiff did not respond. (See Doc. 71.)

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A.

Legal Standard – Availability of Fees

Title 17, United States Code, Section 505 provides that
“[i]n any civil action under this title, the court in its
discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against
any party other than the United States or an officer thereof.”
The Fourth Circuit has provided that “[i]n exercising such
discretion, we have instructed district courts to consider: (1)
the motivation of the parties; (2) the objective reasonableness
of the legal and factual positions advanced; (3) the need in
particular circumstances to advance considerations of
compensation and deterrence; and (4) any other relevant factor
presented.” Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy
Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 498 (4th Cir. 1996).
B.

Analysis – Availability of Fees

First, this court must consider “the motivation of the
parties.” Id. at 498. While this case may have started as an
author pursuing a claim under copyright law, this courts agrees
with Magistrate Judge Peake’s assessment that it has since
dissolved into Plaintiff’s repeated sending of “non-responsive
e-mails filled with personal attacks on Defendants and
Defendants’ counsel, in violation of this Court’s Local Rules
and the decorum expected of parties appearing before this
Court.” (Doc. 59 at 4.)

Plaintiff also writes extensively about

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her seeming desire for revenge. (See (Pl.’s Resp. 1) (Doc. 67)
at 6); (Pl.’s Resp. 2) (Doc. 72) at 7); Pl.’s Resp. 3 (Doc. 73)
at 9.) As such, this court finds that Plaintiff’s apparent
motivations weigh in favor of awarding fees to Defendants.
Second, this court must consider “the objective
reasonableness of the legal and factual positions advanced.”
Superior Form Builders, 74 F.3d at 498. Briefly setting aside
the other contents of Plaintiff’s pleadings, this court finds
Plaintiff’s “Motion for Use of Skype or Telephone for Scales v.
Webb Summary Judgment” to be particularly troublesome. (Doc.
68.) It is in this pleading that Plaintiff asserts or argues
that Defendants, by use of an email receipt from a Wilmington,
North Carolina Home Depot, threatened to murder her. (Id.) This
court finds that such an argument is wildly inappropriate and
weighs heavily in favor of awarding fees to Defendants.
Third, this court must consider “the need in particular
circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and
deterrence.” Superior Form Builders, 74 F.3d at 498. As
discussed above, there is significant need for deterrence in the
present situation. Litigants must follow this court’s orders and
realize that there are real consequences for failing to do so.
As such, this factor weighs heavily in favor of awarding fees to
Defendants.

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Fourth, this court can consider “any other relevant factor
presented.” Superior Form Builders, 74 F.3d at 498. This court
has considered the fact that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, and
accordingly afforded her the lenience to which such litigants
are entitled.
This court finds that, given the factors outlined above, an
award of fees to Defendants is proper as to the January 24, 2017
hearing.
C.

Legal Standard – Fee Amount

“The proper calculation of an attorney's fee award involves
a three-step process.” McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 88 (4th
Cir. 2013), as amended (Jan. 23, 2014). First, “a court must
first determine a lodestar figure by multiplying the number of
reasonable hours expended times a reasonable rate.” Robinson v.
Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4th Cir. 2009).
“To ascertain what is reasonable in terms of hours expended and
the rate charged, the court is bound to apply the factors set
forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc., 488 F.2d 714,
717–19 (5th Cir. 1974).” McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88. Second, “the
court then should subtract fees for hours spent on unsuccessful
claims unrelated to successful ones.” Id. Finally, the court
should award “some percentage of the remaining amount, depending
on the degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff.” Id.

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D.

Analysis – Fee Amount

This court must first determine “a lodestar figure by
multiplying the number of reasonable hours expended times a
reasonable rate.” Robinson, 560 F.3d at 243. In support of their
request for fees, each of Defendants’ counsel1 has submitted
declarations attesting to their fees. (Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of
Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees (“Defs.’ Attys’ Fees Mem.”) (Docs.
65-1, 65-2).) “Susan Freya Olive, an intellectual property
litigator with over 40 years’ experience . . . billed at her
usual rate of $395/hour; and Swain Wood, a commercial and
intellectual property litigator with almost 20 years’ experience
. . . billed at a reduced rate for comparable cases of
$300/hour.” (Defs.’ Attys’ Fee Mem. (Doc. 65) at 2-3.) Defense
counsel has also submitted a number of district court citations
within the Fourth Circuit containing awards of fees, as “[t]his
requirement is met by compensating attorneys at the prevailing
market rates in the relevant community.” Rum Creek Coal Sales,
Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Attorneys Wood and Olive
also billed 4.5 and 4.6 hours, respectively. (Defs.’ Attys’ Fee

Attorney W. Swain Wood withdrew from the case, and
attorney J. Christopher Jackson, who is now the attorney of
record for Defendant Manbites Dog Theater Company, submitted the
declaration on attorney Wood’s behalf. (See Docs. 60, 65-2.)
1

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Mem. (Doc. 65) at 3.) Attorney Olive billed an additional $81.60
for her mileage and parking associated with attending the
January 24, 2017 hearing. (Id. at 3-4.) This court concurs with
Defendants’ counsel that $3,248.60 is a fair and accurate
lodestar calculation.
Turning to the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974),
this court finds that they do not warrant a further deduction or
increase. McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88.
Finally, because this court is dismissing Plaintiff’s only
count, this court finds that 100% of the requested fee should be
awarded. Id.
V.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ACCOMMODATIONS OR TO CHANGE VENUE
Citing her purportedly declining health and a variety of

other concerns, Plaintiff moved that she either be allowed to
conduct the remainder of her case telephonically or that this
court transfer the venue of her case to New York. (See Mot. for
Use of Skype or Telephone for Scales v. Webb Summ. J. (Doc. 68)
at 1-4; Supplemental Mot. for Use of Skype or Telephone for
Scales v. Webb and Man Bites Dog Theater and Summ. J. (Doc. 72)
at 1-7.) Because this court is dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint
with prejudice, this court finds no further reason to consider
the motions as they are now moot.

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VI.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Lawsuit with Prejudice, and for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 61) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees & Costs Associated with Hearing Held Jan. 24,
2017 (Doc. 64) is GRANTED. Plaintiff is HEREBY ORDERED to pay
Defendants a total of $3,248.60 in fees and costs.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion and
Supplemental Motion for Use of Skype or Telephone for Scales v.
Webb and Man Bites Dog Theater and Summary Judgment (Docs. 68,
72) are DENIED as moot.
A judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and
Order will be entered contemporaneously herewith.
This the 5th day of June, 2017.

______________________________________
United States District Judge

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