WHITE v. CENTER FOR CREATIVE LEADERSHIP et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 03/11/2016; that the Revised Leave Motion (Docket Entry 31 ) is GRANTED IN PART as follows: on or before April 1, 2016, White shall file an amended complaint that (i) add s her Title VII sex discrimination claim and (ii) clarifies whether she pursues both an EPA claim and a Title VII sex discrimination claim or whether she instead pursues only a Title VII sex discrimination claim. FURTHER ORDERED that the Initial Leave Motion (Docket Entry 16 ) is DENIED AS MOOT. FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk administratively TERMINATE AS MOOT the Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry 11 ) when White files her amended complaint. (Garland, Leah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

QUANTINA WHITE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CENTER FOR CREATIVE LEADERSHIP,
et al.,
Defendants.

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)
)
)
)
)
)
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)

1:15cv281

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case comes before the Court on the “Motion to Dismiss of
Defendant Center for Creative Leadership” (Docket Entry 11) (the
“Motion to Dismiss”); “Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended
Complaint” (Docket Entry 16) (the “Initial Leave Motion”); and
“Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint” (Docket
Entry 31) (the “Revised Leave Motion”).

For the reasons that

follow, the Court will grant in part the Revised Leave Motion,
thereby mooting the Initial Leave Motion and Motion to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND
On

March

31,

2015,

Quantina

White

(“White”)

filed

an

application to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket Entry 2) (the “IFP
Application”) and a Complaint alleging sex-based pay discrimination
against the Center for Creative Leadership (the “Center”) and three
Center employees (Docket Entry 3; see also Docket Entry 3-1 at 2).1
1
Citations herein to Docket Entry pages utilize the
document’s internal pagination if unified internal pagination
exists. In the absence of such pagination, the Docket Entry page

White attached to her Complaint an EEOC “Dismissal and Notice of
Rights” (the “Notice”) (Docket Entry 3-1 at 2) and associated EEOC
instructions for “filing suit in Federal or State court” under,
inter alia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) and the
Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) (id. at 3).

The Notice and instructions

cautioned that (i) any lawsuit under Title VII “must be filed
WITHIN 90 DAYS of [White’s] receipt of th[e N]otice,” and (ii) any
lawsuit under the EPA “must be filed . . . within 2 years (3 years
for willful violations) of the alleged EPA underpayment.”
2

(emphasis

in

original);

see

also

id.

at

3.)

In

(Id. at
her

IFP

Application, White explained that she intended to pay the court
filing fees “by May 1, 2015,” but she filed the IFP Application and
Complaint because she “d[id]n’t want to miss the filing deadline of
March 31, 2015.”
White’s

(Docket Entry 2 at 1.)2

lawsuit

challenges

the

Center’s

allegedly

discriminatory pay practices. (See Docket Entry 3 at 2-3; see also
Docket Entry 32-1 at 1.)

According to her EEOC charge, White

worked as a Program Coordinator (a “PC”) for the Center from July

citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s pagination.
2 The envelope enclosing the Notice and instructions bears a
December 31, 2014 postmark (Docket Entry 3-1 at 1), making March
31, 2015 the earliest possible Title VII filing deadline (see id.
at 2-3).
Conversely, because the alleged pay discrimination
occurred between July 2013 and May 2014 (see Docket Entry 32-1 at
1), July 2015 constitutes the earliest possible filing deadline
that permits recovery of all “alleged EPA underpayment[s]” (Docket
Entry 3-1 at 2).
2

2012 through May 2014.

(Docket Entry 32-1 at 1.)3

White’s EEOC

charge asserts that White “was fully trained and proficient in
[her] duties and [her] performance was excellent,” but that “[i]n
July 2013[, she] learned that newly hired full-time PC Darryl
Powell (M[ale]) [(“Powell”)] was earning $14.40 per hour while
[she] was still earning [her] starting wage of $13.75 per hour.”
(Id.)4

The EEOC charge states that White reported this wage

disparity, but “[n]othing was done to correct [it;]” subsequently,
however, White received “a wage increase to $14.13 per hour, which
[wa]s still below what [her] male peer was earning.”

(Id.)

The

EEOC charge thus maintains that White “ha[s] been discriminated
against due to [her] sex (Female), paid less than a male peer [she]
was assigned to train, and constructively discharged in violation
of Title VII.”

(Id.)

Through her Complaint, White seeks “[b]ack pay in the amount
of

the

total

number

of

hours

worked,

during

the

time

the

discriminatory pay was in effect, times the difference in pay

3 White filed an unsigned copy of her EEOC charge with her
Initial Leave Motion. (Docket Entry 16-1 at 1.) The Center filed
a signed copy of White’s EEOC charge with its opposition to the
Revised Leave Motion.
(Docket Entry 32-1.)
The Court takes
judicial notice of White’s EEOC charge. See Philips v. Pitt Cty.
Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009); Robinson v. Bowser,
No. 1:12cv301, 2013 WL 3791770, at *5 (M.D.N.C. July 19, 2013); see
also Alexander v. City of Greensboro, No. 1:09-cv-293, 2011 WL
3360644, *6 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 3, 2011).
4 White worked part-time until September 2012, when she was
“hired on a full-time basis.” (Docket Entry 32-1 at 1.)
3

multiplied by two for discrimination.”

(Docket Entry 3 at 3.)

Although White’s EEOC charge focuses on Title VII, her Complaint
speaks in terms of the EPA.

(See id. at 1 (“This action arises

under the Equal Pay Act of 1963.”); see also id. at 3 (requesting
EPA

liquidated

employment

damages).)

history

with

The
the

Complaint

Center

as

outlines

well

as

White’s

the

EEOC

investigation of White’s “EEOC complaint for pay discrimination on
the basis of sex” (id. at 3), but provides few details regarding
the alleged pay discrimination.

(See id. at 2-3.)

Contending that White failed to adequately allege an EPA
claim, the Center moved to dismiss White’s Complaint.

(See Docket

Entries 11, 12.) White opposed dismissal, explaining that, because
she “filed Complaint 1:15-CV-281 as an extension of the original
EEOC

complaint,

[she]

did

not

regurgitate

the

facts

of

the

complaint and instead added factual background to supplement the
complaint.”

(Docket Entry 15 at 1.)

White further asserted that,

“[a]s shown in the EEOC complaint filed by [White] which is
extended by Civil Action No. 1:15-CV-281, [White] names the male
co-worker that was paid more than [White] and the pay discrepancy.”
(Id.)

White requested that (i) “the original EEOC complaint filed

be added to this Complaint” and (ii) the Court deny the Motion to
Dismiss because the “[d]efendants were fully aware of the original
EEOC complaint, which is extended by the current Complaint, and
adequately provides the minimum elements of an EPA claim.”

4

(Id.)

Simultaneously, White filed the Initial Leave Motion and a
proposed

amended

complaint

(the

“Initial

Proposed

Amended

Complaint”), which recount facts from White’s EEOC charge regarding
Powell and White’s asserted pay differential. (See Docket Entry 16
at 2, 6.)5

The Center opposed the Initial Leave Motion primarily

on the grounds that, allegedly, (i) the Initial Proposed Amended
Complaint fails to adequately plead an EPA claim and (ii) White’s
EPA claim fails on its merits.

(See Docket Entry 24 at 8-11.)6

In

support of its merits contention, the Center offered purported pay
records.

(Id. at 11; see also Docket Entries 24-1 through 24-5.)

The Center’s opposition prompted White to “resubmit[] her
Motion to File Amended Complaint” to reflect “that [she] not only
received discriminatory pay based on sex but based on race as
well.” (Docket Entry 30 at 1.)

White submitted a revised proposed

amended complaint (the “Revised Proposed Amended Complaint”) with
her Revised Leave Motion.

(See Docket Entry 31-1.)

Although

asserting that “[t]his action arises under . . . Title VII” rather
than the EPA as in the Initial Proposed Amended Complaint, the
Revised Proposed Amended Complaint likewise seeks “[b]ack pay in
the amount of the total number of hours worked, during the time the

5
White attached her EEOC charge to the Initial Proposed
Amended Complaint. (See Docket Entry 16-1 at 1.)
6 The Center also objected to White’s failure to sign the
Initial Leave Motion. (See Docket Entry 24 at 7-8.) White has
rectified that oversight. (See Docket Entry 27 at 3, 6-7.)
5

discriminatory pay was in effect, times the difference in pay
multiplied by two for discrimination.”
The

Revised

Proposed

Amended

(Id. at 1, 4.)
Complaint

augments

the

allegations of the Initial Proposed Amended Complaint with further
details regarding Powell’s and White’s job responsibilities and
wages.

(Compare id. at 2-3, with Docket Entry 16 at 5-6.)

In

addition, the Revised Proposed Amended Complaint includes racebased discrimination allegations.

(See Docket Entry 31-1 at 4

(asserting that two female employees were paid higher wages than
White and suggesting that this pay differential was race-based);
see also Docket Entry 31 at 3 (asserting that the defendants
“knowingly paid two white female employees more than [White], a
black

female

employee,

responsibilities”).)7

The

for
Revised

the

same

Proposed

position
Amended

and

Complaint

alleges that White learned of this racial discrimination “[o]n
September 30, 2015, [when she] received pay rate information from
the

[d]efendants,”

prompting

her

to

“file[]

an

updated

EEOC

complaint for discrimination of pay due to race under Title VII.”
(Docket Entry 31-1 at 4.)
The Center opposed the Revised Leave Motion on the grounds of
futility. (See Docket Entry 32 at 6-10.) Specifically, the Center

7 The Revised Proposed Amended Complaint largely mirrors the
Revised Leave Motion, but omits the “First Cause of Action”
allegations found in the Revised Leave Motion. (Compare Docket
Entry 31 at 3, with Docket Entry 31-1 at 4.)
6

contends that White’s Title VII claim “is time-barred for failure
to file within 90 days of receipt of her [Notice], and/or is barred
for her failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies.”

(Id.

at 3.) The Center also maintains that White “has abandoned her EPA
claim” through her Revised Leave Motion.

(Id. at 10.)

DISCUSSION
I.

Amendment Standards

At

this

stage

of

the

proceedings,

White

may

amend

her

Complaint “only with the [defendant’s] written consent or the
[C]ourt’s leave.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

Rule 15 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Rules”) specifies that
“[t]he [C]ourt should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so
requires.”

Id.

“[T]his

mandate

is

to

be

heeded.

If

the

underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be
a

proper

subject

of

relief,

[s]he

ought

to

opportunity to test h[er] claim on the merits.”

be

afforded

an

Foman v. Davis,

371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (citation omitted); see also Gordon v.
Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152 (4th Cir. 1978) (“What might be a
meritorious claim on the part of a pro se litigant unversed in the
law

should

not

be

defeated

without

affording

the

pleader

a

reasonable opportunity to articulate h[er] cause of action.”). The
United

States

Court

of

Appeals

for

the

Fourth

Circuit

has

“interpreted Rule 15(a) to provide that ‘leave to amend a pleading
should be denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to

7

the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the
moving party, or the amendment would have been futile.’”

Laber v.

Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc); see also
Foman, 371 U.S. at 182 (explaining that, absent “undue delay, bad
faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment, futility of amendment, etc.[,] the leave sought should,
as the [R]ules require, be ‘freely given’”).

The Fourth Circuit

has further explained that “absence of prejudice, though not alone
determinative, will normally warrant granting leave to amend.”
Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir. 1980).
Here, the Court must determine whether White’s request to
amend her Complaint, as expressed in the Revised Leave Motion and
Revised Proposed Amended Complaint, is futile.
32 at 6-10.)

(See Docket Entry

“Determining whether amendment would be futile does

not involve an evaluation of the underlying merits of the case.
Rather, the merits of the litigation are only relevant to the
Court’s ruling on a motion for leave to amend if a proposed
amendment may clearly be seen to be futile, such as if the proposed
amended complaint fails to state a claim under the applicable rules
and accompanying standards.”

Wonasue v. University of Md. Alumni

Ass’n, 295 F.R.D. 104, 107 (D. Md. 2013) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted); see also Superior Performers, Inc. v.

8

Meaike, No. 1:13CV1149, 2014 WL 5819826, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 10,
2014) (“[A]s to futility, leave to amend should only be denied
based

on

futility

when

the

proposed

amendment

is

clearly

insufficient or frivolous on its face. Such [f]utility is apparent
if the proposed amended complaint fails to state a claim under the
applicable rules and accompanying standards.” (second alteration in
original;

internal

quotation

marks

and

citation

omitted)).

Moreover, if proposed claims are untimely, the Court may deny the
amendment unless the proposed claims relate back to the original,
timely complaint under Rule 15(c).

United States v. Pittman, 209

F.3d 314, 317 (4th Cir. 2000); Davis, 615 F.2d at 614.
II.

Proposed Title VII Sex Discrimination Claim

The Center contends that White’s proposed Title VII sex
discrimination claim is time-barred.
at 6-8.)

(See, e.g., Docket Entry 32

Specifically, the Center maintains that, “[p]ursuant to

Title VII, [White] had until March 31, 2015 to file a lawsuit for
sex discrimination.

Rather than filing a lawsuit alleging sex

discrimination under Title VII, [White] based her lawsuit on the
EPA.”

(Id. at 7 (citation omitted).)

In the Center’s view,

White’s “original complaint with purported EPA claims does not toll
her 90-day statute of limitations for filing a Title VII sex
discrimination claim.”

(Id.)8

8 The Center cites three (inapposite) cases in support of its
timeliness contention: Angles v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 494 F.
App’x 326 (4th Cir. 2012); Yarborough v. Burger King Corp., 406 F.
9

Under Rule 15(c), however, White’s proposed Title VII sex
discrimination claim “would clearly relate back [to her Complaint].
It obviously meets the test of the rule that it allege matter
arising out of the same occurrence as that set forth in the
original pleading, thereby insuring that the defendant knew of the
action’s commencement and of its nature in time to avoid any
prejudice to his defense on the merits.”

Davis, 615 F.2d at 614.

To wit, White’s proposed Title VII sex discrimination claim and her
EPA claim arise from the Center’s allegedly discriminatory pay
differential between PCs Powell, a male, and White, a female, from
July 2013 to May 2014.

(See Docket Entries 3, 15, 16-1, 31-1.)

Thus, White’s proposed “amendment asserts a claim . . . that arose
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out — or
attempted to be set out — in the original pleading.”

Fed. R. Civ.

Supp. 2d 605 (M.D.N.C. 2005); and Bledsoe v. Pilot Life Ins. Co.,
Inc., 473 F. Supp. 864 (M.D.N.C. 1978), aff’d, 602 F.2d 652 (4th
Cir. 1979). (See Docket Entry 32 at 6-7.) None of these cases
involves a plaintiff’s request to amend an otherwise timely
complaint to add a Title VII claim; instead, they involve parties’
attempts to initiate lawsuits and/or comply with Title VII
administrative filing requirements. See Angles, 494 F. App’x 326
(finding no grounds to toll Title VII filing deadlines, and
concluding that denied motion for leave to file amended complaint
in separate EPA action did not toll deadline for bringing Title VII
suit); Yarborough, 406 F. Supp. 2d 605 (finding no grounds for
tolling Title VII filing deadline where action filed outside 90-day
deadline); Bledsoe, 473 F. Supp. 864 (concluding that filing EPA
claim with the Department of Labor’s Wage & Hour Division did not
satisfy plaintiff’s obligation to file Title VII claim with the
EEOC, and finding no grounds for tolling Title VII filing
deadlines).
10

P. 15(c)(1)(B).

Accordingly, it relates back to the filing of

White’s Complaint on March 31, 2015 (see Docket Entry 3 at 1),
rendering it timely.

See Davis, 615 F.2d at 614 (reversing denial

of leave to amend complaint where proposed amendment “relates back
in legal effect to the date of commencement of the action”).

The

Court will therefore grant White leave to add her proposed Title
VII sex discrimination claim to an amended complaint.
III.

Proposed Title VII Race Discrimination Claim

The Center contends that White’s proposed Title VII race
discrimination claim is futile because White failed to timely
exhaust her administrative remedies on this claim.
Entry 32 at 8-10.)

(See Docket

To bring a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must

first exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a charge with
the EEOC.

Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th

Cir. 2000).

A litigant generally must file an EEOC charge within

180 days of the allegedly discriminatory act.
§

2000e-5(e)(1).9

jurisdictional

The

timely

prerequisite

to

filing
suit

See 42 U.S.C.

requirement

in

federal

“is

not

a

court,

but

a

requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to
waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”

Zipes v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).

9 The 180-day filing period extends in certain circumstances
to a maximum of 300 days. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
11

This “EEOC charge defines the scope of [the plaintiff’s]
subsequent right to institute a civil suit.

If a plaintiff’s

claims in her judicial complaint are reasonably related to her EEOC
charge

and

can

be

expected

to

follow

from

a

reasonable

administrative investigation, the plaintiff may advance such claims
in her subsequent civil suit.”
omitted).

Smith, 202 F.3d at 247 (citation

Thus, “a Title VII lawsuit may extend to any kind of

discrimination like or related to allegations contained in the
charge and growing out of such allegations during the pendency of
the case before the [EEOC].”

Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590

(4th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Nevertheless,

“a claim in formal litigation will generally be barred if the EEOC
charge alleges discrimination on one basis, such as race, and the
formal litigation claim alleges discrimination on a separate basis,
such as sex.”

Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th

Cir. 2009).
White “last worked [for the Center] on May 30, 2014.” (Docket
Entry 32-1 at 1.)

She “filed an updated EEOC complaint for

discrimination of pay due to race” on or after September 30, 2015.
(Docket Entry 31 at 3; Docket Entry 31-1 at 4.)

Filed more than a

year after the last alleged discriminatory action, White’s “updated
EEOC complaint” is untimely. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). White
advances no grounds for excusing the timely filing requirement.
(See Docket Entries 30, 31, 31-1.)

12

Liberally construed, however, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007), White’s filings contend that her initial EEOC charge
encompasses her Title VII race-based discrimination claim (see
Docket Entry 30 at 1).

White’s initial EEOC charge describes sex-

based discrimination, without mentioning race.
32-1 at 1.)

(See Docket Entry

White states that she first learned of the alleged

racial discrimination on September 30, 2015.

(See Docket Entry 30

at 1; Docket Entry 31 at 1, 3; Docket Entry 31-1 at 4.)

As such,

White implicitly concedes that the administrative investigation of
her

sex-based

discrimination.

EEOC

charge

did

not

address

race-based

See Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124,

133 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Administrative investigation of . . . sex
discrimination, however, could not reasonably be expected to occur
in light of [the plaintiff’s] sole charge of race discrimination,
and the investigation of the complaint did not touch on any matters
other than race discrimination.”); cf. Salmon v. South Carolina
Elec. & Gas, Civ. Action No. 3:14-4493, 2015 WL 3441144, at *4 &
n.3 (D.S.C. May 28, 2015) (concluding that the “[p]laintiff’s
retaliation claim based on age would follow from a reasonable
administrative investigation” of his EEOC charge detailing, inter
alia, “retaliation under Title VII,” and observing that “[the
p]laintiff argues in his response, and [the d]efendant has not
disputed, that [the d]efendant ‘addressed potential retaliation in
violation of the ADEA in its [EEOC] response’”).

13

Accordingly, White failed to timely exhaust administrative
remedies on her Title VII race discrimination claim.

The Court

therefore denies as futile White’s request to add a Title VII race
discrimination claim to her lawsuit.

See Brown v. Henderson, 6 F.

App’x 155, 156 (4th Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of motion for
leave to amend complaint where the plaintiff “failed to timely
pursue her administrative remedies”).10
IV.

EPA Claim

Finally, the Center maintains that White “abandoned her EPA
claim” through her Revised Leave Motion.
11.)

(Docket Entry 32 at 10-

The Court disagrees with the Center’s assertion that White

“proposes an entirely new complaint, with new allegations” (id. at

10 An otherwise barred “discriminatory allegation may still
constitute relevant background evidence for valid claims.” Evans
v. Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962 (4th
Cir. 1996) (citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553,
558 (1977)); see also Keener v. Universal Cos., Inc., ___ F. Supp.
3d ___, ___, No. 1:14CV982, 2015 WL 5130866, at *9 (M.D.N.C. Sept.
1, 2015) (“Although this court has found that [the p]laintiff has
not exhausted her hostile work environment claim, these allegations
could nonetheless possibly serve as evidence to support her
properly asserted sex discrimination claim.”).
Accordingly, if
relevant to her sex-discrimination claim(s), White may offer
evidence, if it exists, that race discrimination caused the alleged
pay differential between White and the female employees.
See
Branch v. United States, 101 Fed. Cl. 411, 415 (2011) (concluding
that male plaintiff did not establish EPA claim where, inter alia,
“more women are affected by this alleged pay disparity than men”);
see also Brewster v. Barnes, 788 F.2d 985, 992 (4th Cir. 1986)
(“The Equal Pay Act ‘has been structured to permit employers to
defend against charges of discrimination where their pay
differentials are based on a bona fide use of “factors other than
sex.”’” (emphasis in original) (quoting County of Wash. v. Gunther,
452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981))).
14

10) in her Revised Leave Motion.
Docket

Entry

16

at

4-6.)

(Compare Docket Entry 31-1, with

White’s

proposed

Title

VII

sex

discrimination claim and her EPA claim are “parallel” claims.
Buntin v. Breathitt Cty. Bd. of Educ., 134 F.3d 796, 801 (6th Cir.
1998); see also Korte v. Diemer, 909 F.2d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1990)
(“A finding of ‘sex discrimination in compensation’ under one Act
is tantamount to a finding of ‘pay discrimination on the basis of
sex’ under the other.”).

Throughout this litigation, White has

clearly advanced a sex-based pay discrimination claim. (See Docket
Entries 3, 16, 31-1.)
The questions that have arisen concern whether White makes
this claim under the EPA or Title VII or both the EPA and Title
VII.

For instance, White repeatedly characterized her Complaint,

which explicitly references only the EPA, as an “extension” of her
Title VII EEOC charge.

(See Docket Entry 15 at 1.)

Furthermore,

White filed the IFP Application so that she could meet the Title
VII filing deadline (see Docket Entry 2 at 1), even though she
anticipated paying — and did pay — the court filing fees months
before her earliest possible EPA filing deadline (see id.; see
also Docket Entry dated May 1, 2015 (acknowledging receipt of
filing fees)). Moreover, although it does not explicitly reference
the EPA, the Revised Proposed Amended Complaint contains additional
details regarding White and Powell’s duties and pay discrepancy
(compare Docket Entry 31-1 at 2-3, with Docket Entry 16 at 5-6),

15

for the apparent purpose of mitigating issues that the Center
raised in its opposition to the Initial Leave Motion regarding the
adequacy of White’s EPA allegations (see Docket Entry 24 at 5, 810; see also Docket Entry 23 at 3 (“[White] filed an Equal Pay Act
claim against [the Center] . . . . [White] did not and cannot file
a claim for violation of Title VII . . . . [White] must meet the
pleading elements of an Equal Pay Act claim, which she has not.”)).
In addition, White retains the request for doubled back pay — an
EPA

remedy

—

in

her

Revised

Proposed

Amended

Complaint.

(See Docket Entry 31-1 at 4; compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (EPA
liquidated
relief).)

damages),

with

42

U.S.C.

§

2000e-5(g)

(Title

VII

Under these circumstances, the Court declines to find

that White, a pro se litigant, has abandoned her EPA claim through
her Revised Leave Motion.

The Court instead directs White to

clarify in her amended complaint whether she wishes to proceed
solely under Title VII or whether she wishes to pursue both Title
VII and EPA claims.
V.

Remaining Motions

In sum, the Court grants the Revised Leave Motion and directs
White to file an amended complaint as detailed herein.
the Initial Leave Motion is moot.

As such,

See Gould v. Bertie Cty., Civ.

Action No. 5:14-CT-3066, 2014 WL 3854076, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5,
2014) (“Because the court DIRECTS plaintiff . . . to amend his
complaint . . ., plaintiff’s remaining motions to amend and motion

16

for

equitable

original)).11

tolling

are

DENIED

as

MOOT.”

(emphasis

in

Similarly, the filing of an amended complaint moots

a motion to dismiss.

Mooney v. Cato Corp., No. 107CV76, 2007 WL

2406961, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 2007) (“As a matter of law,
defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is mooted by the filing of the
Amended Complaint.”).

Accordingly, upon the filing of White’s

amended complaint, the Clerk shall administratively terminate the
Motion to Dismiss.
CONCLUSION
White’s proposed Title VII sex discrimination claim relates
back to the filing of her Complaint, rendering it timely and nonfutile.
VII

race

White failed to timely administratively exhaust her Title
discrimination

claim,

however,

rendering

it

futile.

Finally, White must clarify whether she wishes to pursue an EPA
claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Revised Leave Motion (Docket
Entry 31) is GRANTED IN PART as follows:

on or before April 1,

2016, White shall file an amended complaint that (i) adds her Title
VII sex discrimination claim and (ii) clarifies whether she pursues
both an EPA claim and a Title VII sex discrimination claim or
whether she instead pursues only a Title VII sex discrimination
claim.

11 White may attach her EEOC charge to the amended complaint.
17

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Initial Leave Motion (Docket
Entry 16) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED

that

the

Clerk

administratively

TERMINATE AS MOOT the Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry 11) when
White files her amended complaint.
This 11th day of March, 2016.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge

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