ROBLES v. TRANSDEV NORTH AMERICA, INC.
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN, JR. on 8/18/2015, that Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13 ) is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for Negligence is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (Daniel, J)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STEPHANIE ROBLES,
Plaintiff,
v.
TRANSDEV NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
Defendant.
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1:15CV285
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
Presently before this court is a Partial Motion to Dismiss
filed by Defendant Transdev North America, Inc. (“Defendant”),
claiming that Plaintiff Stephanie Robles (“Plaintiff”) has
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in her
Second Cause of Action for Negligence.
(Doc. 13.)
Plaintiff
has responded (Doc. 16), and Defendant has filed a reply (Doc.
17).
This matter is now ripe for adjudication, and for the
reasons stated herein, this court will grant Defendant’s Partial
Motion to Dismiss.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant acting as a
Specialized Community Area Transportation van driver from
November 10, 2008, until she was terminated on April 27, 2012.
(Complaint (“Compl.”) (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 9, 28.)
Plaintiff now asserts
violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act, codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (“FMLA”), along with a
common law claim of negligence against Defendant, based on her
discharge.
(See Compl. ¶¶ 30-39.)
Plaintiff contends that she received a letter from her
doctor indicating that she could only perform light duty due to
a host of issues, including asthma; injuries that resulted from
a car accident on September 25, 2011; the fact that she was
pregnant; or a combination of these conditions.
17.)
(See id. ¶¶ 13-
Plaintiff contends that, despite these conditions, she was
able to perform the essential functions of her job.
(Id. ¶ 18.)
Plaintiff’s complaint ultimately charges that Defendant
(1) violated the FMLA and (2) breached its duty to Plaintiff
when it discharged her for her absence due to her going into
early labor and then did not reinstate Plaintiff, even after
Defendant received notice that Plaintiff was absent for an FMLAeligible reason. (See id. ¶¶ 26-28, 35-36, 38.)
Plaintiff also alleges a number of actions taken or
omissions made by Defendant leading up to her discharge,
including: (1) denying Plaintiff’s request for “light duty;”
(2) putting Plaintiff on leave for eight weeks, but then
requiring that Plaintiff return to work after only two days of
leave; (3) not honoring Plaintiff’s medical restrictions; and
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(4) requiring that Plaintiff work excessive hours and without
breaks.
(Id. ¶¶ 19-25.)
Because the FMLA and negligence claims
are connected to Plaintiff’s discharge, this court notes it is
unclear from the face of the Complaint how these factual
allegations are connected with Plaintiff’s FMLA or negligence
claims.
In her FMLA claim, Plaintiff also asserts that the
decision to terminate Plaintiff, which allegedly violated the
FMLA, was made willfully and in bad faith.
(See id. ¶ 36.)
While Defendant does not seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s FMLA
allegations, Defendant has made a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
negligence claim.
For the reasons set out below, this court
will grant that motion.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allows a party to make a motion to dismiss due to the opposing
party’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
“When there are well-
pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to
an entitlement to relief.”
(2009).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679
The burden remains on the party making the claim “to
allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of
[Plaintiff’s] claim,” Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324
-3-
F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003), and “to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the
misconduct alleged, see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007).
Granting a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when the
complaint’s factual allegations, read as true, fail as a matter
of law to state a plausible claim for relief.
678.
Iqbal, 556 U.S at
In determining if a claim has “facial plausibility,” a
court is not required to accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements,” id.; unsupported legal allegations, Revene v.
Charles County Commissioners, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989);
legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); or conclusory factual
allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United
Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).
III. ANALYSIS
There are two major reasons why this court must dismiss
Plaintiff’s cause of action based on negligence.
First, Plaintiff’s claim of negligence is vague and
conclusory.
Plaintiff’s claim of negligence relies on and is
completely comprised of three legal conclusions:
(1) “[Defendant] has an obligation as an employer to act
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lawfully for the protection of others;” (2) “[Defendant]
breached that duty by terminating [Plaintiff] unlawfully;” and
(3) “[Defendant’s] breach is the proximate cause of
[Plaintiff’s] emotional distress and pecuniary injury.” (Compl.
(Doc. 1) ¶¶ 37-39.)
Because this court is not to accept
conclusory legal allegations or bare recitals of the elements of
a claim as true, these allegations do not plausibly state a
claim for negligence.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Revene, 882
F.2d at 873.
Because Plaintiff’s negligence claim is based on legal
conclusions, this court must look to the facts incorporated into
her claim to determine if the claim is plausible.1
However, when
this court looks to the facts underlying Plaintiff’s claim of
negligence, this court does not find a sufficient basis for
Plaintiff’s claim of negligence.
Plaintiff has failed to
specify what law gave rise to Defendant’s duty to Plaintiff.
Without specifying the basis for Defendant’s duty to Plaintiff,
Plaintiff has stated an incredibly broad duty, namely that
Defendant has a duty “to act lawfully for the protection of
others.”
(See Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 37.)
1
This extremely broad duty
Early in her Complaint, Plaintiff states that “[e]ach
paragraph of this Complaint incorporates all others.” (See
Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 3.)
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is vague and does not give Defendant notice of what theory
underlies Plaintiff’s negligence.2
Additionally, while Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
committed certain acts or omissions related to her employment,
there is no explanation in Plaintiff’s pleading as to how
Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff breached Defendant’s
duty to Plaintiff or what Plaintiff should have done to avoid
being negligent in making the decision to terminate Plaintiff.
Without an assertion of how Defendant breached its duty to
Plaintiff, and with only an allegation that Defendant “breached
that duty by terminating [Plaintiff] unlawfully,” (see Compl.
2
In her Response, Plaintiff identifies Defendant’s duties
under the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act, the
North Carolina Persons with Disabilities Protection Act, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act as a basis for her negligence
claim. (See Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 16) at 6-10.) Plaintiff also
identifies in her Response how Plaintiff breached its duty to
Plaintiff. (Id. at 10-13.) In identifying how Defendant
breached its duty, Plaintiff points to actions apart from her
termination. (Id.) Because Plaintiff’s complaint contains only
an FMLA claim and a conclusory claim of negligence based on her
termination (see Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 30-39), these arguments were
clearly not contained in the Complaint and are outside of the
scope of what this court can consider in determining if
Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief. Yet, even if
this court were to consider these duties, Plaintiff would still
not have stated a plausible claim for negligence, as Plaintiff
is attempting to state a claim for disability discrimination
without showing either (1) causation as required for wrongful
discharge in violation of North Carolina public policy, as set
out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2, or (2) that she has met the
requirements of the North Carolina Persons with Disabilities
Protections Act, as codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168A-1.
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(Doc. 1) ¶ 38), this court cannot find that Plaintiff has stated
a plausible claim for negligence.
As a result, Plaintiff’s
negligence claim must be dismissed.3
Second, this court finds that dismissing Plaintiff’s
negligence claim is necessary - and by extension that granting
Plaintiff leave to re-plead her negligence claim would be futile
- because Plaintiff’s claim would fail as a matter of law even
if Plaintiff included sufficient factual support for her claim.
North Carolina, as an at-will employment state, allows for
employers to “terminate a contract at will for no reason, or for
an arbitrary or irrational reason.”
3
Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co.,
Defendant also contends Plaintiff cannot use a series of
intentional acts - acts that form the basis for Plaintiff’s
claim of willful violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act
- to state a plausible claim for negligence. Defendant cites
several cases applying North Carolina law in support of this
contention. See Locklear v. Person Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No.
1:05CV00255, 2006 WL 1743460, at *17 (M.D.N.C. June 22, 2006);
see also Mitchell v. Lydall, Inc., 16 F.3d 410, at *3 (4th Cir.
1994) (unpublished); Barbier v. Durham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 225
F. Supp. 2d 617, 631 (M.D.N.C. 2002). Mitchell and Barbier,
despite the fact that they are not binding on this court and
involve claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress,
are well-reasoned and are persuasive on these facts because
negligent conduct is a necessary component of both a claim of
negligence and a claim of negligent infliction of emotional
distress. See Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospitality Ventures of
Asheville, 334 N.C. 669, 672, 435 S.E.2d 320, 322 (1993).
Therefore, these cases are instructive in showing that
conclusory allegations of negligence, supported by factual
allegations of nothing but intentional acts, cannot state a
claim for negligent conduct. See Mitchell, 16 F.3d 410, at *3;
Locklear, 2006 WL 1743460, at *17.
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325 N.C. 172, 175, 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1989).
Unless an
employee can show that she was terminated “for an unlawful
reason or purpose that contravenes public policy,” the
employer’s decision to fire the employee is not tortious.
Id.
Thus, in order to state a viable tort claim that avoids the
at-will doctrine, an employee must assert (1) that there is an
established public policy protecting the employee and (2) that
there is some causal connection between the public policy
violation and the employer’s decision to terminate the employee.
See Abels v. Renfro Corp., 335 N.C. 209, 215, 436 S.E.2d 822,
825 (1993) (noting that a party must show causation between the
protected activity and plaintiff’s discharge to prevail in a
wrongful discharge case based on the Workers’ Compensation Act).
Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty
to act lawfully, while vague, is true.
However, Plaintiff’s
claim for negligence does not meet the public policy exception
to the at-will doctrine because it does not allege that there
was a causal connection between a violation of North Carolina
public policy by Defendant and Defendant’s decision to terminate
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s negligence claim merely asserts that
Defendant breached its duty to act lawfully, without making any
claim as to Defendant’s motivation for terminating Plaintiff.
Because proof of causation is necessary to qualify for the
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public policy exception and because meeting the public policy
exception is necessary to show that the discharge of an at-will
employee is tortious, this court finds that it must dismiss
Plaintiff’s negligence claim and that any attempt to re-plead
Plaintiff’s claim of negligence would be futile.
IV.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Partial Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 13) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Second Cause of
Action for Negligence is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
This the 18th day of August, 2015.
______________________________________
United States District Judge
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