YORK et al v. CITY OF BURLINGTON et al
Filing
50
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE THOMAS D. SCHROEDER on 12/22/2016, that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 24 ) is GRANTED IN PART as to Plaintiffs' federal claims (Counts One, Eight, and Twelve), which are DI SMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendants motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' remaining claims under North Carolina law are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and the action is REMANDED to the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, of Alamance County, North Carolina, for further proceedings. (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
KATHY WELLS YORK and MELVIN
BUDDY YORK,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF BURLINGTON, a
Municipal Corporation, HAROLD
T. OWEN, in his official
capacity as the City Manager
of Burlington, THE BURLINGTON
POLICE DEPARTMENT, JEFFREY
SMYTHE, in his individual and
his official capacity as
Burlington Police Chief,
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, in his
individual and his official
capacity as a Sergeant in the
Burlington Police Department,
CAMERON LEIGHT, in his
individual and his official
capacity as an Officer in the
Burlington Police Department,
and DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1:15cv412
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.
This is an action for monetary and equitable relief arising
out of the arrest of Plaintiff Kathy Wells York for larceny and
resisting arrest and the associated seizure of her husband, Melvin
Buddy York.
Plaintiffs seek recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
on several State law grounds.
Before the court is the motion for
summary judgment by Defendants City of Burlington; Harold T. Owen,
its manager; Burlington Police Department (“BPD”) officers Jeffrey
Smythe, Christopher Smith, and Cameron Leight, sued variously in
their official capacity, individual capacity, or both; and unnamed
employees of the City of Burlington (“Does 1-10”). 1
The motion is fully briefed and ready for decision.
(Doc. 24.)
For the
reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted as to the
federal claims, which will be dismissed.
The court declines to
exercise jurisdiction over the remaining State law claims, and the
action will be remanded to State court for further proceedings.
I.
BACKGROUND
The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs
as the non-moving parties, show the following 2:
On April 29, 2012, BPD Officers Smith and Leight were called
to a Belk department store in Alamance County by a store employee,
Michelle Shamberger, who reported the taking of her purse by a
customer.
(Doc. 24-2 at 1; Doc. 24-3 at 2; Doc. 24-4 at 2-4.)
Shamberger reported that, while she was in the stall in the ladies’
restroom, a customer - later determined to be Mrs. York - exited
her stall, washed her hands, and stood by the paper hamper as she
1
Plaintiffs have since dismissed their claims against Defendant Smythe
in his individual capacity and against the BPD. (Doc. 35 at 23, 25.)
As to individual Defendants, this leaves claims against Smith and Leight
in their individual and official capacities, and against Owen and Smythe
in their official capacities.
2
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs have stated they do not dispute the factual
narrative recited by Defendants. (Doc. 35 at 3.)
2
dried her hands.
(Doc. 24-2 at 1-2; Doc. 24-4 at 2-3.)
As the
customer left the restroom, Shamberger could see that her purse,
which she had placed on the paper hamper, was now gone.
4 at 3.)
(Doc. 24-
Shamberger called out to the woman, who did not stop.
(Id.)
Shamberger worked with a store loss prevention specialist to
determine what had happened to her purse.
(Id.)
After reviewing
store videotapes, Shamberger identified Mrs. York as the woman in
the bathroom
when
contacted the BPD.
the call.
Based
her
purse
(Id.)
disappeared.
(Id.)
Officers Leight and Smith responded to
(Doc. 24-2 at 1; Doc. 24-3 at 2; Doc. 24-4 at 3-4.)
on
this
information,
Shamberger had left in her purse.
3; Doc. 24-4 at 4.)
Smith
called
the
cellphone
(Doc. 24-2 at 2; Doc. 24-3 at
A woman answered, but when Smith identified
himself as a police officer, the call was disconnected.
3 at 3.)
Shamberger
(Doc. 24-
A few minutes later, Shamberger’s husband, who was
standing next to Leight, received a return call from the cellphone
that had been in Shamberger's purse.
(Doc. 24-2 at 2.)
The caller
was a woman who stated that she had found a purse and cellphone
and was going to return them to the store.
(Id.; Doc. 24-3 at 3.)
The woman stated that she would be arriving in a black Cadillac.
(Doc. 24-2 at 2.)
Sometime later, a black Cadillac pulled up to the sidewalk
outside the Belk store.
(Id.)
A woman, later identified as Mrs.
3
York, exited the vehicle.
(Id.)
Mrs. York approached Shamberger,
who was standing near Leight, while Smith approached the car where
Mr. York was waiting.
(Id.; Doc. 24-3 at 3-4.)
Mrs. York handed
the purse to Shamberger, who confirmed that nothing was missing.
(Doc. 24-2 at 2; Doc. 24-4 at 4.)
At that point, Leight advised
Mrs. York she was under arrest for larceny.
Doc. 26-10 at 3.)
(Doc. 24-2 at 2-3;
Mrs. York turned, crossed her arms, and called
out to her husband. (Doc. 24-2 at 3; Doc. 26-10 at 3-4.) According
to Leight, Mrs. York also said, “No!” and backed away from the
officer.
(Doc. 24-2 at 3.)
Leight put Mrs. York's arms behind
her back, handcuffed her, and arrested her.
3-4.)
(Id.; Doc. 26-10 at
While Leight was arresting Mrs. York, Mr. York began to
exit his vehicle.
(Doc. 26-11 at 3.)
Smith ordered Mr. York to
remain in his vehicle, simultaneously closing the driver-side door
and – according to Mr. York - verbally insulting Mr. York.
24-3 at 4; Doc. 26-11 at 3-7.)
York, however.
Mrs.
(Doc.
Smith did not physically touch Mr.
(Doc. 24-3 at 4; Doc. 26-11 at 5.)
York
was
charged
with
misdemeanor
larceny
and
misdemeanor resisting a public officer under North Carolina law.
(Doc. 30-1 at 5.)
In her criminal trial, Mrs. York was convicted in a District
Court trial on both the larceny and resisting arrest charges.
(Doc. 30-3 at 5.)
de novo.
(Id.)
She appealed to the Superior Court for a trial
There, she moved, at the close of the State's
4
evidence and at the close of all the evidence, to dismiss both
charges.
motion.
(Doc. 24-9 at 2-8, 17.)
(Id. at 11, 17-18.)
The trial court denied each
Mrs. York was acquitted of the
larceny charge but found guilty of resisting a public officer.
(Doc. 30-1 at 5.)
She was sentenced to 30 days in jail, suspended
for 18 months upon her completion of 18 months of supervised
probation, payment of a fine, completion of community service
hours, and adherence to a ban on contacting Leight or visiting
Belk during her probation.
(Id.)
The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated Mrs. York’s
conviction.
State v. York, No. COA13–1147, 2014 WL 1384422, at
*3-5 (2014).
The court reasoned that Leight did not have the
authority to arrest her, as the misdemeanor offense for which he
arrested her – larceny – did not occur in his presence.
Id.
North
Carolina law allows an officer to make a warrantless arrest for a
misdemeanor committed outside of his presence if the suspect is
likely to flee or is likely to damage a person or property.
N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-401(b)(2). But the court held that the exceptions
were inapplicable based on the facts of the arrest.
York, 2014 WL
1384422, at *4.
This
lawsuit
followed.
Plaintiffs
filed
Alamance County Superior Court on April 7, 2015.
the
action
in
(Doc. 1-1 at 7.)
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated their rights under
both State and federal law, advancing a total of three federal
5
claims and nine State law claims. 3
(Id. at 12-20.)
Defendants
removed the action to this court on the basis of federal question
and supplemental jurisdiction.
(Doc. 1 at 2.)
They now move for
summary judgment as to all claims on several grounds.
II.
(Doc. 24.)
ANALYSIS
Summary
judgment
is
appropriate
where
the
pleadings,
affidavits, and other proper discovery materials demonstrate that
no genuine dispute as to any material fact exists and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-33 (1986).
The
party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of initially
demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material
fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
If this burden is met, the non-
moving party must then affirmatively demonstrate a genuine dispute
of material fact which requires trial.
Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
3
There is no
Plaintiffs’ complaint sets forth a § 1983 claim for false arrest of
Mrs. York, alleging a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights (Count
One), a § 1983 claim for unreasonable seizure of Mr. York, alleging a
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights (Count Eight), and a request
to enjoin the City of Burlington to establish training procedures for
its officers in order to deter constitutional violations (Count Twelve).
The complaint contains the following State law claims: malicious
prosecution for larceny (Count Two); malicious prosecution for resisting
a public officer (Count Three); false imprisonment of Mrs. York (Count
Four); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count Five);
assault and battery of Mrs. York (Count Six); special damages (Count
Seven); false imprisonment of Mr. York (Count Nine); assault and battery
of Mr. York (Count Ten); and punitive damages (Count Eleven).
6
issue for trial unless sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving
party exists for a factfinder to return a verdict for that party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 257 (1986).
In
addition,
the
nonmoving
party
is
entitled
to
have
the
“credibility of his evidence as forecast assumed, his version of
all that is in dispute accepted, [and] all internal conflicts in
it resolved favorably to him.”
Metric/Kvaerner Fayetteville v.
Fed.
197
Ins.
Co.,
403
F.3d
188,
(4th
Cir.
2005)
(quoting
Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
A.
Mrs. York’s § 1983 Individual Capacity Claim
Defendants argue that Mrs. York’s § 1983 claim should be
dismissed because Plaintiffs cannot prove that her constitutional
rights were violated and that Leight and Smith are protected by
qualified immunity.
(Doc. 26 at 6-19.)
Plaintiffs argue that
Leight violated Mrs. York’s rights because he did not have the
authority to arrest her under North Carolina law and, furthermore,
is not entitled to qualified immunity.
(Doc. 35 at 4-12.)
“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing
discretionary functions from personal-capacity liability for civil
damages under § 1983, insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”
Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors
Marshall U., 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilson v.
7
Layne,
526
U.S.
603,
609
(1999))
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
Officials will receive immunity unless the § 1983 claim
satisfies
a
two-prong
test:
(1)
the
allegations,
if
true,
substantiate a violation of a federal statutory or constitutional
right and (2) the right was “clearly established” such that a
reasonable person would have known his acts or omissions violated
that right.
Id.; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001), modified by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)
(holding that courts need not first determine whether a plaintiff
proves a constitutional violation); Brockington v. Boykins, 637
F.3d 503, 506 (4th Cir. 2011).
The Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity “applies
regardless of whether the government official’s error is a mistake
of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions
of law and fact.”
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Qualified immunity protects “all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
In other words,
qualified immunity “protects law enforcement officers from ‘bad
guesses in gray areas’ and ensures that they are liable only ‘for
transgressing bright lines.’”
Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553,
558 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295,
298 (4th Cir. 1992)). Indeed, as the Fourth Circuit has explained:
8
[i]f every mistaken seizure were to subject police
officers to personal liability under § 1983, those same
officers would come to realize that the safe and cautious
course was always to take no action. The purposes of
immunity are not served by a police force intent on
escaping liability to the cumulative detriment of those
duties which communities depend upon such officers to
perform.
Gooden v. Howard Cty., Md., 954 F.2d at 960, 966–67 (4th Cir.
1992).
In her § 1983 claim (Count 1), Mrs. York alleges that Leight’s
warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor that did not occur in his
presence violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-401 and thus her Fourth
Amendment rights.
(Doc. 4 at 6-7; Doc. 35 at 7-12, 14-16.)
Plaintiffs point in support to the North Carolina Court of Appeals’
decision overturning Mrs. York’s conviction for resisting arrest
on that ground.
this
precise
(Doc. 35 at 6-7.)
argument
is
As Defendants note, however,
foreclosed
by
the
Fourth
Circuit’s
decision in Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372–73 (4th Cir.
1974).
(Doc. 26 at 10-11.)
In Street, the plaintiff sued under § 1983 for false arrest
where Maryland law similarly authorized a misdemeanor arrest only
if committed in the officer’s presence.
71.
Street, 492 F.3d at 370-
The court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to extend the
Fourth Amendment to be coterminous with State law.
While an
officer violating Maryland law for conducting an arrest for a
misdemeanor he did not witness may be liable for common law claims
9
of false arrest or false imprisonment, the court stated that
“section 1983 does not provide a remedy for common law torts.”
Id. at 371.
Consequently, States “are free to impose greater
restrictions on arrests, but their citizens do not thereby acquire
a greater federal right.”
Id. at 372.
Quoting Justice Douglas,
the court said that the question was not whether State law was
violated, but “whether an inhabitant of a State had been deprived
of a federal right by one who acts under ‘color of any law.’”
at 371.
Id.
Accordingly, the court held, “there is no cause of action
for false arrest under section 1983 unless the arresting officer
lacked probable cause.”
Id. at 372-73.
Based on the claim before
it, therefore, the court concluded, “We do not think the fourth
amendment
should
now
be
interpreted
to
prohibit
warrantless
arrests for misdemeanors committed outside an officer's presence.”
Id. at 372.
Even with the facts viewed in a light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, Leight plainly had probable cause to arrest Mrs. York
for misdemeanor larceny.
Probable cause exists when the facts and
circumstances within an officer's knowledge, or the information he
possesses
that
is
reasonably
trustworthy,
are
sufficient
to
convince an officer of reasonable caution that an offense has been
or is being committed.
Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68
(4th Cir. 2002); see also Gomez v. Atkins, 296 F.3d 253, 262 (4th
Cir. 2002).
Officers are given latitude in the determination of
10
probable cause, and a reasonable mistake of either fact or law
will not subject the officer to liability.
Saucier, 533 U.S. at
206–07 (“officers can have reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to
the facts establishing the existence of probable cause”); Heien v.
North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (finding Fourth Amendment
permits
reasonable
mistakes
of
law
as
to
whether
conduct
is
illegal).
The elements of larceny under North Carolina law are that the
defendant (1) took the property of another, (2) carried it away,
(3) without the owner's consent, and (4) with the intent to deprive
the owner of his property permanently.
State v. Perry, 305 N.C.
225, 233, 287 S.E.2d 810, 815 (1982), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Mumford, 364 N.C. 394, 699 S.E.2d 911 (2010).
The
suspect
she
must
have
had
the
intent
to
steal
at
the
time
unlawfully takes the property from the owner’s possession by an
act of trespass.
11, 14 (1968).
State v. Bowers, 273 N.C. 652, 655, 161 S.E.2d
The intent to permanently deprive the owner of the
stolen item, as an element of larceny, need not be established by
direct
evidence
circumstances.
but
can
be
inferred
from
the
surrounding
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–72; State v. Hager, 203 N.C.
App. 704, 692 S.E.2d 404 (2010).
Here, there is no dispute that the first three elements of
larceny - (1) taking the property of another and (2) carrying it
away (3) without the owner's consent, Perry, 305 N.C. at 233, 287
11
S.E.2d at 815 – were present.
argue
that
the
last
element
(Doc. 24-4 at 2-4.)
–
intent
to
Plaintiffs
permanently
deprive
Shamberger of her property - is not met because Mrs. York brought
the purse back to her in the presence of the officers.
at 7-12, 15-16.)
probable
cause
(Doc. 35
But the critical question is whether Leight had
to
believe
that
Mrs.
York
had
the
intent
to
permanently deprive Shamberger of her purse when she took it from
the bathroom.
Bowers, 273 N.C. at 655, 161 S.E.2d at 14.
on the facts known to him, he objectively did.
Based
Shamberger had
given Leight her account of yelling at Mrs. York to let go of her
purse – to which Mrs. York failed to respond.
Doc 24-4 at 3-4.)
(Doc. 24-2 at 1-2;
Leight reviewed the surveillance video showing
Mrs. York leaving the mall with Shamberger’s purse.
2.)
(Doc. 24-2 at
Leight also consulted with Smith, who had personally called
Mrs. York on Shamberger’s cell phone, and learned that Mrs. York
hung up after Smith identified himself as a police officer.
(Id.)
And Mrs. York’s explanation to Leight contradicted what Leight had
observed on the surveillance video (id.).
According to Leight,
Mrs. York stated that she found the purse in the parking lot.
(Id.) However, during his review of the surveillance video, Leight
did not observe York pick up anything from the parking lot (id.),
and Shamberger, of course, had told him that she observed Mrs.
12
York take the purse from the store bathroom (id. at 1-3). 4
Therefore, because Leight had probable cause to arrest Mrs.
York for misdemeanor larceny, 5 Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment as to any claim for individual liability under § 1983
arising from Mrs. York’s alleged false arrest (Count One). Street,
492 F.2d at 372–73.
B.
Mr. York’s § 1983 Individual Capacity Claim
Mr. York argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated
when Leight and Smith illegally seized him by ordering him to
remain in his vehicle while Mrs. York was being arrested.
35 at 16-18.)
(Doc.
Defendants contend they are entitled to summary
judgment because these allegations do not establish a violation of
a constitutional right.
(Doc. 26 at 7-11, 16-19, 28-30.)
The court assumes without deciding that Mr. York was seized
when he was ordered to stay inside his vehicle.
Brendlin v.
California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) (holding that a traffic stop
subjects
the
driver
and
any
passengers
to
Fourth
Amendment
4
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
did not address whether Leight had probable cause to arrest York when
vacating her conviction. In fact, the court opined that “these facts
might provide probable cause for Leight to believe that Defendant had
indeed committed larceny.” York, 2014 WL 1384422, at *4 (emphasis in
original).
5
Finding that probable cause existed as a matter of law, the court need
not reach Defendants’ alternative argument that Plaintiffs are
collaterally estopped by the criminal case from disputing it. (Doc. 26
at 11-12.)
13
seizure).
But even so, this seizure was neither unreasonable nor
illegal.
Numerous courts, including the North Carolina Supreme
Court and the Fourth Circuit, have held that such orders are lawful
under these circumstances.
See United States v. Walker, 575 F.
App'x 146 (4th Cir. 2014) 6 (holding that, following officer's
lawful traffic stop of vehicle for having expired tags and no
insurance, the officer had the authority to order defendant, a
passenger, to remain inside the vehicle without having additional
reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity);
State v. Shearin, 170 N.C. App. 222, 228-29, 612 S.E.2d 371, 377
(2005) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has held that a police
officer may order a passenger to exit a vehicle, as a safety
precaution,
without
committed a crime.
any
suspicion
that
the
individual
has
The same rationale may be applied when an
officer orders an individual to remain in a vehicle.” (citing
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412–15 (1997))); Coffey v.
Morris, 401 F. Supp. 2d 542, 544-49 (W.D. Va. 2005) (holding that
requiring a passenger to remain in the car during the lawful
traffic stop of her son did not violate her Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights).
6
Unpublished opinions of the Fourth Circuit are not precedential. See
Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2006)
(recognizing that “we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our
unpublished decisions” and that such decisions “are entitled only to the
weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning” (citation
omitted)).
14
Because
Leight
and
Smith
acted
within
their
authority,
Defendants enjoy qualified immunity as to this claim as a matter
of law.
The court will therefore grant Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment as to Mr. York’s § 1983 claim alleging individual
liability (Count Eight).
C.
Federal Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiffs contend that the City of Burlington is liable under
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 69091 (1978), based principally on a failure to train theory as well
as “policy or practice” of the BPD to conduct improper arrests.
(Doc. 35 at 18-20, 24-25.) In advancing their argument, Plaintiffs
invite the court to examine the personnel records of Leight and
Smith.
But the court need not venture down that path.
As
Defendants note, Plaintiffs’ failure to show any violation of their
constitutional rights dooms their official capacity claims for
damages because “supervisors and municipalities cannot be liable
under § 1983 without some predicate ‘constitutional injury at the
hands of the individual [state] officer,’ at least in suits for
damages.”
Waybright v. Frederick Cty., 528 F.3d 199, 203 (4th
Cir. 2008) (quoting City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799
(1986)); see also Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 654 (4th Cir.
2012)
(“Because
we
hold
that
all
plaintiffs
failed
to
state
predicate § 1983 claims against the individual officers, we must
also hold that all plaintiffs have failed to state supervisory
15
liability.”); Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 579 (4th
Cir. 2001) (“The law is quite clear . . . that a section 1983
failure to train claim cannot be maintained against a governmental
employer in a case where there is no underlying constitutional
violation by the employee.”).
Plaintiffs’ failure to demonstrate a cognizable claim against
the officer Defendants therefore precludes a damages claim for
supervisory liability.
D.
Federal Injunctive Relief Claim
Plaintiffs
also
seek
injunctive
governmental Defendants under § 1983.
relief
against
(Doc. 1-1 at 19-20.)
the
In
particular, Plaintiffs argue “it might prove appropriate for the
court to order Chief Smythe to implement a meaningful training
protocol for officers, revise its policies concerning arrests, or
implement meaningful discipline when an officer has illegally
arrested a citizen.”
(Doc. 35 at 24.)
Defendants contend that
Plaintiffs lack standing to raise a claim for injunctive relief
and further lack sufficient facts to demonstrate an entitlement to
it.
(Doc. 26 at 29-30.)
The court agrees with Defendants that
Plaintiffs have not shown they have standing to assert this claim.
It is a fundamental precept that in order to invoke the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, a plaintiff must meet the
threshold
requirement
of
Article
III
alleging an actual case or controversy.
16
of
the
Constitution
by
City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983).
“‘allege[
]
controversy’
such
as
a
to
personal
warrant
Consequently, a plaintiff must
stake
his
in
the
invocation
outcome
of
of
the
federal-court
jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers
on his behalf.”
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975)
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
In the context
of a claim for injunctive relief, while an individual need not
subject
herself
to
actual
arrest
or
prosecution,
she
must
nevertheless demonstrate an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and
particularized”
and
“actual
or
imminent,
not
conjectural
or
hypothetical”; “a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of”; and redressability of the injury by a
favorable decision.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560–61 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This requires
a plaintiff to show a “substantial risk” that harm will occur to
him or her.
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334,
2341 (2014).
Here, Plaintiffs have not done so.
As noted, Plaintiffs have not even shown a constitutional
violation.
The mere fact that they have been detained once before
under the circumstances of this case - even assuming they could
establish some liability under Monell 7 - does not demonstrate that
they are any more likely than any other citizen to be detained in
7
Monell applies to § 1983 claims for injunctive relief.
v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29 (2010).
17
L.A. Cty., Cal.
the future for a suspected misdemeanor larceny.
Lyons, 461 U.S.
at 111 (concluding that past injury by police, “while presumably
affording
[plaintiff]
standing
to
claim
damages
against
the
individual officers and perhaps against the City, does nothing to
establish a real and immediate threat” of future injury to him);
Rapa v. City of N.Y., No. 15-CV-1916 JMF, 2015 WL 5671987, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2015) (finding one past incident involving
plaintiff insufficient to demonstrate likelihood of future harm to
him, even if police department had “policy or practice” under
Monell causing it to commit unconstitutional acts).
Plaintiffs’ claim for an injunction therefore fails because
of their inability to show standing, and Count Twelve will be
dismissed. 8
E.
Remaining State Law Claims
Plaintiffs’ remaining claims (Counts Two through Seven and
Nine through Eleven) are all based on North Carolina law.
Under
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a federal district court “may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over State-law claims if “the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.”
The
Fourth
Circuit
has
noted
in
a
similar
circumstance that “[w]ith all its federal questions gone, there
8
Because Plaintiffs lack standing to raise this claim, and because the
remaining claims were dismissed on other grounds, the court need not
reach Plaintiffs’ arguments as to any basis for liability under Monell.
18
may be the authority to keep [the case] in federal court[,] . . .
but there is no good reason to do so.”
Waybright v. Frederick
Cty., Md., 528 F.3d 199, 209 (4th Cir. 2008).
Because this court
will dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims and there is no
other identified basis of subject matter jurisdiction, the court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their State
law claims.
be
remanded
Plaintiffs’ remaining State law claims will therefore
to
the
General
Court
of
Justice,
Division, of Alamance County, North Carolina.
Superior
Court
Hinson v. Norwest
Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 617 (4th Cir. 2001) (recognizing
that “the remand power [is] inherent in the statutory authorization
to decline supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the court finds that Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ federal claims.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 24) is GRANTED IN PART as to Plaintiffs’ federal
claims (Counts One, Eight, and Twelve), which are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
Defendants’
motions
for
summary
judgment
as
to
Plaintiffs’ remaining claims under North Carolina law are DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and the action is REMANDED to the General Court
of Justice, Superior Court Division, of Alamance County, North
Carolina, for further proceedings.
19
/s/
Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
December 22, 2016
20
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?