POURSAIED v. EEOC et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER signed by JUDGE THOMAS D. SCHROEDER on 11/13/2015; that Defendant Constangy's motion to dismiss (Doc. 6 ) is GRANTED. FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant EEOC's motion to dismiss (Doc. 15 ) is GRANTED. FURTHER ORDERED t hat Poursaied's complaint (Doc. 1 ) is DISMISSED. The dismissal is with prejudice as to all claims except the claim under the Privacy Act against the EEOC, which is dismissed without prejudice. A judgment dismissing this action will be enter ed contemporaneously with this Memorandum Order. A word of caution is in order. Poursaied is proceeding pro se, and the court has considered her non-lawyer status. However, Poursaied is not entitled to be relieved of the applicable legal standards, rules of procedure, or deadlines. See Alston v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., No. 1:12CV452, 2014 WL 338804, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2014) ("[P]ro se litigants are not entitled to a general dispensation from the rules of procedure or court-imposed deadlines."). This includes Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that those who sign and file materials with the court are, by doing so, representing that "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law" and that "the factual contentions have evidentiary support." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (b). A violation of Rule 11 is subject to sanctions, and "[t]here is... no doubt that pro se litigants are subject to any and all appropriate sanctions for their misconduct." Zaczek v. Fauquier Cnty., 764 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 (E.D. Va. 1991). This includes pro se litigants who file frivolous or repetitive lawsuits. Id. at n.21. Here, Poursaied raised nearly two dozen arguments in favor of her complaint, most of which are either clearly inapplicable to her s ituation or based on extralegal authority. (See Doc. 18 at 47 (complaining of violations of the Fourth Amendment, the "doctrine of moral rights," "breech [sic] of trust," and actions contrary to the policy goals of the National Alliance on Mental Illness).) Poursaied has also acknowledged that she alleged at least one cause of action without performing any research and despite knowing that no basis existed for such a claim. (See Doc. 18 at 11.) Finally, Poursa ied admits that she filed this action for the sole purpose of re-litigating arguments that were addressed and rejected by Magistrate Judge Webster in the WFUBMC action. (Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 34 in case No. 1:14CV784, at 1.) Poursaied is cautione d that her filings reflect frivolous and repetitive attempts to obtain relief, and she is encouraged to consult legal counsel before she proceeds further. Any further frivolous arguments or claims will be subject to sanctions, including monetary sanctions. (Garland, Leah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SHAHNAZ POURSAIED,
Plaintiff,
v.
EEOC, and
CONSTANGY BROOKS & SMITH L.L.P
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1:15CV548

MEMORANDUM ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.
Before the court are the motions to dismiss of Defendants
Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP (“Constangy”) 1 (Doc. 6) 2
and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) (Doc. 15).

Defendants challenge the sufficiency of

Poursaied’s complaint under, among other things, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

(Docs. 6, 15.)

All of the

parties’ briefs have been submitted, and the matter is now ready
for consideration.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’

motions will be granted and the case will be dismissed.
I.

BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a dispute between Poursaied, an

Iranian citizen with permanent lawful resident status in the United

1

The complaint and case caption incorrectly identify the Defendants as
“Constangy Brooks & Smith L.L.P.” and “EEOC.”

2

Unless otherwise noted, this and all other record citations refer to
case No. 1:15CV548.

States,

and

Wake

Forest

University

Baptist

(“WFUBMC”), Poursaied’s former employer.

Medical

Center

In January of 2014,

Poursaied filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, claiming
that WFUBMC mistreated and ultimately fired her because of her
nationality and disabilities.

(Doc. 1 at 2.)

As part of this

charge, Poursaied compiled a collection of potentially sensitive
information for the EEOC, including copies of her passport and
green card.

(Id.)

Poursaied also instructed her doctors to

release to the EEOC medical records pertaining to past psychiatric
evaluations and care. (Id.) After receiving a right-to-sue notice
from the EEOC, Poursaied filed a pro se action for employment
discrimination against WFUBMC.

(Id. at 3.)

Constangy serves as

counsel for WFUBMC in that action, which is currently pending in
this district as case number 1:14CV784 (the “WFUBMC action”). 3
The present case arises out of Poursaied’s displeasure with
actions

taken

by

the

EEOC

and

Constangy

discovery related to her WFUBMC action.

in

connection

with

Specifically, Poursaied

alleges that the EEOC released her file to Constangy without her
permission.

(Doc. 1 at 3.)

Poursaied also claims that Constangy

sent her a copy of her EEOC file “via unsafe email,” and later
sent a physical copy through standard mail, where it was ultimately

3

This Court may take judicial notice of its own records without
converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See Bowden
v. Agnew, No. 1:12CV1237, 2013 WL 3545507, at *3 n.2 (M.D.N.C. July 11,
2013).

2

delivered to her by a handyman at her apartment (Id.) 4

Poursaied

alleges that these actions have caused her “serious emotional
injury.”

(Id. at 4.)

After unsuccessfully complaining to the Magistrate Judge in
the WFUBMC action, Poursaied filed the complaint in this case.
(Id. at 3.)

Although her complaint does not articulate all of the

legal bases for her lawsuit, she does allege that Constangy and
the EEOC violated the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(“FOIA”).
II.

(Id. at 4.) 5

ANALYSIS
Rule 12(b)(6) motions 6 challenge the legal sufficiency of a

complaint.
2009).

Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

4

In her brief, Poursaied also claims that Constangy improperly replied
to interrogatories with “vague” responses that referenced her EEOC file
without naming specific portions. (Doc. 10 at 3.) These allegations
are not mentioned in the complaint, however.

5

Poursaied’s briefs also cite nearly two dozen other authorities,
doctrines, and causes of action. (See Doc. 18 at 4–11.) Although the
court has carefully considered each of these arguments, this Memorandum
Order explicitly addresses only the three theories that warrant
discussion.
6

Constangy also argues that the claims against it should be dismissed
due to improper service of process.
(Doc. 7 at 15–17.)
Although
Constangy’s argument appears to be meritorious, “the court will not reach
that argument since the court can presently dispose of the matter on its
merits.” Bickley v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 7:99-CV-00347, 2000 WL
637345, at *1 n.3 (W.D. Va. Jan. 19, 2000), aff’d, 225 F.3d 653 (4th
Cir. 2000).

3

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
Poursaied first contends that the EEOC violated FOIA by
releasing her file to Constangy.

(See Doc. 1; Doc. 18 at 2.)

FOIA

contains only one jurisdictional provision, which grants district
courts authority to “enjoin [agencies] from withholding agency
records

and

improperly

to

withheld

§ 552(a)(4)(B).
plaintiff

order

must

the

production

from

the

of

any

agency

records

5

U.S.C.

complainant.”

Thus, in order to state a claim under FOIA, a
allege

that

an

agency

‘withheld’; (3) ‘agency records.’”

“(1)

‘improperly’;

(2)

See Kissinger v. Reporters

Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980).

In

addition, the plaintiff must show that she has exhausted her
administrative remedies prior to bringing suit.

Judicial Watch,

Inc. v. U.S. Naval Observatory, 160 F. Supp. 2d 111, 112 (D.D.C.
2001).
Here, Poursaied’s complaint fails to state a claim under FOIA.
Poursaied does not claim that the EEOC improperly withheld agency
records; to the contrary, she readily admits that “this case is
not about improperly withheld Records ,IT [sic] IS ABOUT IMPROPERLY
DISCLOSED RECORDS BY EEOC.”
complaint

contains

no

administrative remedies.

(Doc. 18 at 2.)

allegations

relating

In addition, the
to

Poursaied’s

Accordingly, the complaint fails to

state a claim under FOIA.
4

On her civil cover sheet, Poursaied also indicated a claim
under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”).

(Doc. 2.)

Poursaied does not cite or

reference any specific provision within the ADA, relying on general
assertions that that “No disable person should be discriminated
[sic].”

(Doc. 1 at 5.)

The court construes the pleadings of pro

se litigants liberally, but it “cannot shoulder the full burden of
fashioning a viable complaint.”

Simon v. Shawnee Corr. Ctr., No.

13-521-GPM, 2013 WL 3463595, at *1 (S.D. Ill. July 9, 2013).
Regardless, the only ADA provision that appears to be pertinent to
this case extends the “powers, remedies, and procedures” of Title
VII

to

individuals

disability.

claiming

discrimination

See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).

on

the

basis

of

But Title VII only bars

discrimination with regard to employment practices.

See id.

§ 2000e-2. Here, there is no allegation that Poursaied ever worked
or applied to work for either the EEOC or Constangy.

As a result,

the complaint fails to state a claim under the ADA.

See id.

Finally, the complaint could be construed as an attempt to
invoke the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (the “Privacy
Act”).

The Privacy Act prohibits agencies from disclosing certain

types of records without the consent of the individuals to which
those records pertain.

See id. § 552a(b).

But the Privacy Act

also contains two exceptions pertinent to this case.

First, the

Privacy Act permits agencies to disclose such records “for a
5

routine use.”

Id. § 552a(b)(3).

Routine use is defined as any

disclosure “which is compatible with the purpose for which [the
record] was collected.”

Id. § 552a(a)(7).

In order to qualify

for this exception, the agency must publish notice of the manner
in which it will use such records in the Federal Register.

Jones

v. Runyon, 32 F. Supp. 2d 873, 876 (N.D.W. Va. 1998) (citing 5
U.S.C. § 522a(e)(4)(D)), aff’d, 173 F.3d 850 (4th Cir. 1999).
Second, the Privacy Act permits disclosure of information that the
agency must disclose pursuant to FOIA.

5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2);

Greentree v. U.S. Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 76–79 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
Here, the court does not need not to determine whether the
EEOC’s conduct violated the Privacy Act because Poursaied has not
pleaded cognizable damages.

The Privacy Act authorizes civil

actions by individuals harmed by an agency’s “intentional or
wilfull” violation of the act.

FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441,

1448–49 (2012) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 522a(g)(4)(A)).

But the act

only waives sovereign immunity if the plaintiff can prove “actual
damages.”

Id.

In the context of the Privacy Act, the term “actual

damages” is limited to pecuniary harm and does not include purely
mental or emotional harms.

Id.

at 1452–53.

Thus, in order to

state a claim under the Privacy Act, a plaintiff must claim some
pecuniary loss.

See id.

Here, Poursaied claims that the EEOC’s

conduct made her “upset” and caused her “serious emotional injury,”
6

but she does not claim to have suffered any pecuniary harm.
addition,

these

documents

are

material

to

Poursaied’s

In

WFUBMC

action, she has not contended that WFUBMC should not have access
to them, and the Magistrate Judge in that action has entered a
protective order to ensure their confidentiality throughout the
proceeding.

(See Doc. 33 in case No. 1:14CV784.)

As a result,

Poursaied’s complaint fails to state a claim under the Privacy
Act.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the court finds that the complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Constangy’s motion to
dismiss (Doc. 6) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant EEOC’s motion to dismiss
(Doc. 15) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Poursaied’s complaint (Doc. 1) is
DISMISSED. The dismissal is with prejudice as to all claims except
the

claim

under

the

Privacy

dismissed without prejudice.

Act

against

the

EEOC,

which

is

A judgment dismissing this action

will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Order.
A word of caution is in order.

Poursaied is proceeding pro

se, and the court has considered her non-lawyer status.

However,

Poursaied is not entitled to be relieved of the applicable legal
standards, rules of procedure, or deadlines. See Alston v. Becton,
7

Dickinson & Co., No. 1:12CV452, 2014 WL 338804, at *3 (M.D.N.C.
Jan. 30, 2014) (“[P]ro se litigants are not entitled to a general
dispensation

from

deadlines.”).

the

rules

of

procedure

or

court-imposed

This includes Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which provides that those who sign and file materials
with the court are, by doing so, representing that “the claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law” and that “the
factual contentions have evidentiary support.”
11(b).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

A violation of Rule 11 is subject to sanctions, and

“[t]here is . . . no doubt that pro se litigants are subject to
any and all appropriate sanctions for their misconduct.”

Zaczek

v. Fauquier Cnty., 764 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 (E.D. Va. 1991).
includes

pro

lawsuits.

se

litigants

who

file

frivolous

or

This

repetitive

Id. at n.21.

Here, Poursaied raised nearly two dozen arguments in favor of
her complaint, most of which are either clearly inapplicable to
her situation or based on extralegal authority.
4–7

(complaining

of

violations

of

the

Fourth

(See Doc. 18 at
Amendment,

the

“doctrine of moral rights,” “breech [sic] of trust,” and actions
contrary to the policy goals of the National Alliance on Mental
Illness).)

Poursaied has also acknowledged that she alleged at

least one cause of action without performing any research and
8

despite knowing that no basis existed for such a claim.
18 at 11.)

(See Doc.

Finally, Poursaied admits that she filed this action

for the sole purpose of re-litigating arguments that were addressed
and rejected by Magistrate Judge Webster in the WFUBMC action.
(Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 34 in case No. 1:14CV784, at 1.)
cautioned

that

her

filings

reflect

frivolous

Poursaied is

and

repetitive

attempts to obtain relief, and she is encouraged to consult legal
counsel

before

arguments

or

she

claims

proceeds
will

be

further.
subject

Any
to

further

frivolous

sanctions,

including

monetary sanctions.

/s/
Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
November 13, 2015

9