SANTIAGO v. SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS et al
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD. IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction 7 be DENIED. (Coyne, Michelle)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
OSEAS SANTIAGO, JR.,
)
)
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)
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)
)
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Plaintiff,
v.
SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS,
et al.,
Defendants.
1:15CV589
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
case
comes
before
the
undersigned
United
States
Magistrate Judge for a recommended ruling on Plaintiff’s request
for a preliminary injunction (Docket Entry 7).
For the reasons
that follow, the Court should deny that request.
BACKGROUND
On July 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint, which
(construed liberally) asserts a cause of action, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants (a physician assistant, a
nurse, and an entity for/with whom they work) violated Plaintiff’s
federal constitutional rights by acts and/or omissions amounting to
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs during his
confinement at the Hoke County Detention Center. (Docket Entry 2.)
The Complaint requests damages, as well as the following injunctive
relief:
“that
the
[C]ourt
have
[Defendant]
Southern
Health
Partners provide [Plaintiff] with a diagnoses [sic] on [his] back
and stomach by a doctor or a specialist.”
(Id., ¶ VI.)
On October 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed an “Order to Show Cause
for an [sic] Preliminary Injunction” (Docket Entry 7) (which the
Clerk
properly
Injunction”),
docketed
along
with
as
a
a
“Motion
Declaration
Memorandum of Law (Docket Entry 9).
for
(Docket
a
Preliminary
Entry
8)
and
Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction asks the Court (1) to enjoin Defendants
“from intentionally failing to provide medical care that would
prevent suffering and knowingly interfering with treatment” (Docket
Entry 7 at 1) and (2) to order “that [D]efendants [] make an
appointment for [P]laintiff[] to be seen by a physician” (id.).
DISCUSSION
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy afforded
prior to trial that temporarily provides the relief that can be
granted permanently after trial.”
BASF Agro B.V. v. Makhteshim
Agan of N. Am., Inc., No. 1:10CV276, 2011 WL 2135129, at *1
(M.D.N.C. May 27, 2011) (unpublished) (Osteen, Jr., J.) (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As the Background
section documents, the only injunctive relief Plaintiff’s Complaint
seeks (and thus the only injunctive relief he could receive after
trial) is an order directing Defendant Southern Health Partners to
provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to obtain a diagnosis for his
back and stomach from a doctor.
To the extent the instant Motion
for a Preliminary Injunction requests anything beyond that specific
injunctive relief, it is subject to denial for exceeding the scope
2
of Plaintiff’s Complaint. See, e.g., Church of Holy Light of Queen
v. Holder, 443 F. App’x 302, 303 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The injunction
is therefore overly broad because it reaches beyond the scope of
the complaint . . . .”).
As to the request for a preliminary injunction directing
Defendant Southern Health Partners to provide Plaintiff with an
opportunity to obtain a diagnosis on his back and stomach from a
doctor, the Court should deny relief for at least two reasons.
First, Plaintiff’s Declaration acknowledges that, “[o]n August 25,
2015[, he] went to the ER, where [a] Doctor [] attended [him and]
. . . medicine [was] prescribed [to him] . . . .”
at 1.)
(Docket Entry 8
Accordingly, it appears that Plaintiff’s request to see a
doctor to obtain a diagnosis is moot.
Second, to the extent Plaintiff’s request for an opportunity
to obtain a diagnosis on his back and stomach by visiting a doctor
is not moot, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the conditions for
issuance of a preliminary injunction.
“To obtain a preliminary
injunction, a plaintiff must establish [1] that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the
public interest.”
BASF Agro, 2011 WL 2135129, at *1 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original) (emphasis added);
see also id. at *7 (“[A] plaintiff must satisfy all four prongs of
3
the pertinent test in order to obtain a preliminary injunction
. . . .”).
At a minimum, Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of
success on the merits of his deliberate indifference claim.
“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard [and] a
showing of mere negligence will not meet it.”
F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999).
Grayson v. Peed, 195
Instead, to make out his claim of
deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must prove (in addition to the
existence of a serious medical need), these two aspects of the
Defendants’ mental state:
First, the evidence must show that the official in
question subjectively recognized a substantial risk of
harm. It is not enough that the [official] should have
recognized it; [he or she] actually must have perceived
the risk.
Second, the evidence must show that the
official in question subjectively recognized that his [or
her] actions were inappropriate in light of that risk.
As with the subjective awareness element, it is not
enough that the official should have recognized that his
[or her] actions were inappropriate; the official
actually must have recognized that his [or her] actions
were insufficient.
Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004)
(internal citations, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted).
“The
subjective component therefore sets a particularly high bar to
recovery.”
Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008).
A review of Plaintiff’s filings, including his Complaint,
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Declaration, and Memorandum of
Law,
confirms
that
he
has
not
come
close
to
establishing
a
likelihood of success in meeting the “particularly high bar,” id.,
of proving that Defendants “subjectively recognized a substantial
4
risk of harm [to him]” and “subjectively recognized that [their]
actions were inappropriate in light of that risk,” Parrish, 372
F.3d at 303; to the contrary, Plaintiff has merely offered largely
conclusory factual allegations that appear, at their core, to
describe a dispute about pain-management (see Docket Entry 2, ¶ V
(alleging that “[Defendant] Southern Health Partners failed to
properly treat [Plaintiff’s] back and digestive problems,” that
“[Defendant Nurse] Jessica also showed deliberate indifference to
[Plaintiff’s] serious medical needs by ignoring [his] requests to
be treated and [his] grievances of improper treatments,” that
“[Defendant
Physician
Assistant]
Maldonado
showed
deliberate
indifference to [Plaintiff’s] serious medical needs . . . [by]
refus[ing] to properly and affectively [sic] treat [his] ongoing
pain” and “[by] telling [him] ‘you’ll live’”)).1
1
Neither Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction nor
his Memorandum of Law contains any factual allegations.
(See
Docket Entries 7, 9.)
Moreover, as noted above, Plaintiff’s
Declaration concedes that he recently was seen by a doctor, who
prescribed medication.
(Docket Entry 8 at 1.)
Although the
Declaration states that said doctor recommended further evaluation,
“if the medicine that he prescribed [Plaintiff] did not aliviate
[sic] [his] condition” (id. (emphasis added)), and that
“[Defendant] Southern Health Partners refuses to allow [Plaintiff]
to see a physician [for such further evaluation unless ‘his] family
pays for it’” (id.), the Declaration provides nothing beyond
conclusory statements to suggest that the newly-prescribed medicine
will not reasonably address any condition Plaintiff endures (see
id. (“I am in serious pain daily that significantly effects [sic]
daily activities. . . . . Immediate and irreparable injury and
damage will result if my condition is not treated. It is possible
that my back condition can lead to paralysis.”)).
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In sum, “Plaintiff may disagree with the decisions that the
medical care providers have made about the medicines that he is or
has been taking, the pace in scheduling diagnostic tests, or the
manner
in
which
they
responded
to
his
grievances.
These
disagreements, however, generally implicate medical judgments by
the practitioners, and likely are insufficient to support [his
federal constitutional] claim of deliberate indifference to medical
care.” Simpson v. Rodas, No. 10CV6670(CS), 2012 WL 4354832, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2012) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
CONCLUSION
“As Plaintiff[] ha[s] failed to demonstrate that [he is]
likely to succeed on the merits, [his] Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction must be denied.”
BASF Agro, 2011 WL 2135129, at *7.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction (Docket Entry 7) be denied.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
December 7, 2015
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