SANTIAGO v. SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS et al
Filing
39
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 08/19/2016, that the Motion to Compel (Docket Entry 34 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: on or before September 2, 2016, Defendants shall pro duce to Plaintiff (i) Plaintiff's complete medical records for the period of his incarceration, and (ii) any rules, policies, or regulations for the medical treatment of Hoke County Detention Center inmates that are relevant to Plaintiff's claim or any defense that Defendants may offer. (Taylor, Abby)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
OSEAS SANTIAGO, JR.,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS,
et al.,
Defendants.
1:15cv589
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case comes before the Court on the “Motion for Discovery”
(Docket Entry 34) (the “Motion to Compel”) filed by Oseas Santiago,
Jr. (the “Plaintiff”). For the reasons that follow, the Court will
grant in part and deny in part the Motion to Compel.
BACKGROUND
In July 2015, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint against a
physician’s assistant (“PA Maldonado”), a nurse (“Nurse Jessica”),
and the health provider with which PA Maldonado and Nurse Jessica
worked
(“Southern
Health
Partners”)
(collectively,
the
“Defendants”) for allegedly engaging in acts and/or omissions
amounting to deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs
during
his
confinement
at
the
Hoke
County
Detention
Center.
(Docket Entry 2.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff sought “compensation
for the pain and suffering [Defendants] caused,” “any medical or
legal fees that pertain to [his] claim,” and injunctive relief
requiring “Southern Health Partners [to] provide [Plaintiff] with
a
diagnos[i]s
specialist.”
on
[his]
back
and
stomach
by
a
doctor
or
a
(Id., ¶ VI.)
In November 2015, Plaintiff obtained entry of default against
(See Docket Entry 12 at 1.)1
PA Maldonado and Nurse Jessica.
In
December 2015, Southern Health Partners answered the Complaint (see
Docket Entry 17), and moved to set aside the entry of default (see
Docket Entry 18).
Plaintiff agreed that “it would be fair” to set
aside the entry of default.
asked,
though,
that
(Docket Entry 24 at 1.)
“Southern
Health
Partners
Plaintiff
produce
for
inspection . . . [a]ny and all medical records of Plaintiff from
the time of his incarceration in Hoke County Detention Center [to]
and including the date of [Southern Health Partners’] response to
this request.”
(Id. at 2.)
In making this request, Plaintiff
emphasized that he “cannot give the proper and accurate facts in
this case without his medical records.”
Entry 23
at
1 (“Southern
Health
(Id.; see also Docket
Partners
refuses
to
provide
[Plaintiff] a copy of [his] health records, which prevents [him]
1 Plaintiff sought entry of default against all Defendants
(see Docket Entry 12 at 1), but the Clerk declined to enter default
against Southern Health Partners, as no summons served on Southern
Health Partners in October 2015 properly identified Southern Health
Partners as the named defendant (id. at 1-2; see Docket Entries 6,
10, 10-1, 10-2; see also Text Order dated Dec. 4, 2015).
(Citations herein to Docket Entry pages utilize the document’s
internal pagination if unified internal pagination exists. In the
absence of such pagination, the Docket Entry page citations utilize
the CM/ECF footer’s pagination.)
2
from providing the facts that [he] need[s] to prove the truth of
[his] allegations.”).)
In February 2016, the Court set aside the entry of default
(Docket Entry 28 at 12), and PA Maldonado and Nurse Jessica
answered the Complaint (see Docket Entry 32).
Court
entered
a
scheduling
order,
deadline of September 6, 2016.
In
April
Complaint.
2016,
which
Thereafter, the
imposed
a
discovery
(Text Order dated Mar. 4, 2016.)2
Plaintiff
requested
(See Docket Entry 33.)
leave
to
amend
his
Plaintiff explained that,
“[s]ince the filing of the [C]omplaint[,] the Defendants have begun
to provide proper treatment and have scheduled appointments to see
a specialist.
Which was a relief requested.”
(Id., ¶ 3.)
Accordingly, Plaintiff stated, he “no longer seeks compensatory or
punitive damages.”
(Id., ¶ 4.)
Per the amendment, however,
Plaintiff continued to request “[a] declaration that the acts and
omissions of the Defendants violated Plaintiff[’]s rights under the
Constitution and laws of the United States[,]” his “cost in this
suit,” and “[a]ny additional relief this [C]ourt deems just,
proper, and equitable.”
amendment.
(Id., ¶¶ 5, 7, 8.)
The Court allowed the
(See Text Order dated July 15, 2016.)
Also in April, Plaintiff brought the Motion to Compel, asking
for an order “compelling Defendants . . . to produce . . . the
2 The Court also mandated that the parties “file any motion
seeking leave to amend pleadings or to add parties by [May 6,
]2016.” (Id.)
3
following documents:
7th ,
October
2010
[1] Health Records of [Plaintiff] from
to
present.
[2]
Any
policy,
rules,
and
regulations for the medical treatment of inmates at Hoke County
Detention Center.”
(Docket Entry 34 at 1.)
In support, Plaintiff
stated that “[he] submitted multiple written request[s] for these
documents, the last one being on March 25, 2016[,] but [he] ha[s]
not yet received the documents.”
(Id.)
to producing the requested discovery.
Defendants have objected
(See Docket Entry 36.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Discovery Standards
“The purpose of discovery is to provide a mechanism for making
relevant information available to the litigants.”
26
advisory
committee’s
notes,
1983
Fed. R. Civ. P.
Amendment.
Therefore,
“[u]nless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery
is
as
follows:
Parties
may
obtain
discovery
regarding
any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .”
Civ. P.
26(b)(1).
However,
“the simple
fact
that
Fed. R.
requested
information is discoverable . . . does not mean that discovery must
be had.
On its own initiative or in response to a motion for
protective order under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(c), a
district court may limit [discovery] . . . .”
Int’l,
Inc.,
373
F.3d
537,
543
(4th
Cir.
Nicholas v. Wyndham
2004).
As
such,
“[d]istrict courts enjoy nearly unfettered discretion to control
4
the timing and scope of discovery.”
Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg,
W. Va., 81 F.3d 416, 426 (4th Cir. 1996); accord Cook v. Howard,
484 F. App’x 805, 812 (4th Cir. 2012) (observing that “[d]istrict
courts are afforded broad discretion with respect to discovery”).
Litigants may enforce their discovery rights by filing a motion to
compel.
II.
A.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
Production Requests
Defendants’ Overarching Objection
In opposing the Motion to Compel, Defendants generally contend
that
Plaintiff has not demonstrated a need for disclosure
of the information requested, particularly in view of the
fact that Plaintiff is no longer seeking damages in this
case.
See Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an
Amended Complaint [D.E. 33] at 2 (“Plaintiff no longer
seeks compensatory or punitive damages.”). Accordingly,
the broad, limitless requests Plaintiff has made are
grossly disproportional to the needs of this case.
(Docket Entry 36 at 3.)
As an initial matter, Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff
bears the burden of “demonstrat[ing] a need for disclosure of the
information requested” (id.) inverts the longstanding rule in this
Circuit that the parties resisting discovery bear the burden of
persuasion in a discovery dispute.
See, e.g., Kinetic Concepts,
Inc. v. ConvaTec Inc., 268 F.R.D. 226, 243-44 (M.D.N.C. 2010)
(explaining that, “[o]ver the course of more than four decades,
district
judges
and
magistrate
judges
in
the
Fourth
Circuit
(including members of this Court) have repeatedly ruled that the
5
party or person resisting discovery, not the party moving to compel
discovery, bears the burden of persuasion,” and collecting cases).
Defendants offer no justification for departing from this wellestablished approach.
(See Docket Entry 36.)
Nor do the recent
amendments to Rule 26 require shifting the burden of persuasion in
all discovery disputes to the party seeking discovery.
See, e.g.,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes, 2015 Amendment
(“Restoring the proportionality calculation to Rule 26(b)(1) does
not change the existing responsibilities of the court and the
parties to consider proportionality, and the change does not place
on
the
party
seeking
discovery
the
burden
of
addressing
all
proportionality considerations.”); see also id. (“Nor is the change
intended to permit the opposing party to refuse discovery simply by
making a boilerplate objection that it is not proportional.”).
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court declines to depart
from fifty years’ worth of precedent by imposing the burden of
persuasion in this discovery dispute upon Plaintiff.
See Kinetic,
268 F.R.D. at 243-44 (collecting cases, including “Pressley v.
Boehlke, 33 F.R.D. 316, 318 (W.D.N.C. 1963) (‘[T]he burden is on
defendant
to
show
his
objections
to
[discovery]
should
be
sustained.’)” (first alteration in original)).
In assessing proportionality, the Court notes that Plaintiff
originally sought three forms of relief:
medical treatment, “any
medical
to
or
legal
fees
that
pertain
6
this
claim,”
and
“compensation for the pain and suffering caused by” Defendants’
actions.
(Docket Entry 2, ¶ VI.)
Via his amendment, Plaintiff
relinquished any demand for medical treatment and compensatory
damages, but continues to seek reimbursement for his “cost in this
suit.”
(See Docket Entry 37, ¶¶ 4-8.)
At a minimum, this
requested relief encompasses Plaintiff’s $400 filing fee.
(See
Docket Entry 3 at 1-2 (requiring Plaintiff to pay $400 filing
fee).) For proportionality purposes, however, the reduced monetary
stakes represents “only one factor, to be balanced against other
factors.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes, 2015
Amendment;
see
also
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
26(b)(1)
“consider[ations]” pertinent to proportionality:
(listing
as
“the importance
of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy,
the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues,
and whether
the
burden
or
expense
of the
proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit”).
B.
Medical Records Request
Plaintiff seeks his medical records for the period of his
incarceration at Hoke County Detention Center.
34
at
1
(moving
to
compel
production
of
(See Docket Entry
“Health
Records
of
[Plaintiff] from October 7th, 2010 to present”); see also Docket
Entry 24 at 2 (requesting the “medical records of Plaintiff from
the time of his incarceration in Hoke County Detention Center” to
7
the present).)
Defendants oppose this request on the grounds that
“the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(‘HIPAA’),
specifically
dissemination
“of
45
CFR
protected
[§]
164.524(a)(2)(ii),”
health
information,”
bars
including
“[r]eleasing a copy of Plaintiff’s medical record [to Plaintiff]
while [he] remains incarcerated [because it] would jeopardize the
health, safety, security, custody, or rehabilitation of [Plaintiff]
or
other
others.”
inmates,
or
the
safety
(Docket Entry 36 at 2.)
of
officers,
employees,
and
Defendants also maintain that
this request “is not proportional to the needs of this case because
it is not limited in scope to the time period or the treatment
relevant to this case, and seeks information for time outside the
statute of limitations.”
(Id.)
First, as to HIPAA, individuals generally possess the right to
obtain
§
copies
of
their
164.524(a)(1).
own
medical
However,
records.
pursuant
to
45
45
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
§ 164.524(a)(2)(ii):
A covered entity that is a correctional institution or a
covered health care provider acting under the direction
of the correctional institution may deny, in whole or in
part, an inmate’s request to obtain a copy of protected
health information, if obtaining such copy would
jeopardize the health, safety, security, custody, or
rehabilitation of the individual or of other inmates, or
the safety of any officer, employee, or other person at
the correctional institution or responsible for the
transporting of the inmate.
Id. (emphasis added).
does
not
impose
a
Based on its plain language, this exception
blanket
ban
8
on
dissemination
of
health
information to inmates, but rather authorizes withholding such
information in circumstances where its dissemination would present
a danger to the inmate or others.
See id.
Here, Defendants offer
no support for their conclusory assertion that “[r]eleasing a copy
of Plaintiff’s medical record while Plaintiff remains incarcerated
would
jeopardize
the
health,
safety,
security,
custody,
or
rehabilitation of the individual or other inmates, or the safety of
officers, employees, and others.”
such,
the
Court
rejects
(Docket Entry 36 at 2.)
Defendants’
HIPAA-based
As
discovery
objection. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) (mandating that parties
“state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request
[for production of documents], including the reasons”).
Next, in regard to Defendants’ treatment contention, the Court
notes that the Complaint did not limit Plaintiff’s allegations to
one discrete medical condition or instance of undelivered medical
care.
(See Docket Entry 2, ¶ V.)
Instead, the Complaint alleges
ongoing failure to provide requested treatment for “back and
digestive problems,” as well as associated pain, and requested
“copies of sick calls and medical grievances that [Plaintiff] ha[s]
filed.”
(Id.)
Moreover, Defendants do not contend that producing
Plaintiff’s “‘complete medical records’” (Docket Entry 36 at 1)3
3 Defendants’ quotations of Plaintiff’s document production
requests differ in language but not in substance from the requests
that Plaintiff describes in his various filings to the Court.
(Compare Docket Entry 36 at 1 (“Plaintiff is requesting, ‘The
complete medical records from the time of my incarceration (October
9
imposes any undue burden or expense on them.
(See id. at 1-2.)
In
these circumstances, the Court concludes that the entire range of
Plaintiff’s medical records — rather than a treatment-specific
subset
—
qualifies
as
relevant
to
Plaintiff’s
claim
and
proportional to the needs of this case.
Finally,
Defendants
assert
that
Plaintiff’s
request
impermissibly “seeks information that is barred by the statute of
limitations”
and
“covers
a
period
three
years
prior
Plaintiff himself asserts his health problems began.”
to
when
(Id. at 2
(observing that Plaintiff’s health problems allegedly began in
2013).)
The statute of limitations does not provide a hard-and-
fast boundary for purposes of defining the scope of permissible
discovery.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also, e.g., Byard v.
Verizon W. Va., Inc., No. 1:11cv132, 2013 WL 30068, at *11-13 (N.D.
W. Va. Jan. 2, 2013) (rejecting defendants’ objection to discovery
prior to “the earliest date for statute of limitations [purposes,
namely] May 29, 2009,” and instead “limit[ing] the temporal scope
7, 2010) through and including the date of your response to this
request.’”), and id. at 3 (“Plaintiff also requests, ‘All rules,
regulations, and policies related to the medical treatment of
inmate housed in the Hoke County Detention Center and under the
care of Southern Health Partners.’”), with, e.g., Docket Entry 34
at 1 (requesting “Health Records of [Plaintiff] from October 7th,
2010 to present[, and a]ny policy, rules, and regulations for the
medical treatment of inmates at Hoke County Detention Center”).)
Although Defendants provide no citations for their quotations,
presumably they obtained these references from one of the “multiple
written request[s] for these documents” that Plaintiff “submitted”
to Defendants (Docket Entry 34 at 1).
10
of the [discovery to] . . . [t]he earliest of five years prior to
May 29, 2009 or five years prior to the earliest date that [the
d]efendants . . . began the [challenged] practice”).
In addition, Defendants themselves introduced the issue of
Plaintiff’s health at the start of his incarceration (in 2010) into
this litigation.
(See Docket Entry 18-2 at 1-2 (averring that,
“prior to his incarceration at the Hoke County Detention Center,
[Plaintiff]
suffered
a
gunshot
wound
in
October
2010”).)
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s earlier medical records logically may
contain information relevant to his deliberate indifference claim,
particularly given Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff suffered
a gunshot injury in the week preceding his incarceration.
In sum, the Court overrules Defendants’ objections to the
medical records request.
C.
Policies and Rules Request
In
addition
to
his
medical
records,
Plaintiff
seeks
information regarding Defendants’ rules and policies for treating
Hoke County Detention Center inmates.
Defendants
oppose
this
proportionality grounds.
request
(See Docket Entry 34 at 1.)
on
confidentiality
and
(See Docket Entry 36 at 3.)4
4
Defendants also assert that “the requested material is
protected by HIPAA, as described above.” (Id.) Notably, 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.524 governs only an individual’s “right of access to . . .
protected health information about the individual.”
45 C.F.R.
§ 164.524(a)(1). Defendants fail to explain the relevance of this
provision to the requested policies, rules, and regulations. (See
Docket Entry 36 at 2-3.)
Accordingly, the Court overrules
11
In particular, “Defendants object because its [sic] policies
and rules are confidential, proprietary, and/or trade secrets.”
(Id.)
of
the
If Defendants possessed concerns about the confidentiality
requested
information,
they
remained
free
to
seek
a
protective order from the Court or a confidentiality agreement with
Plaintiff that would have limited dissemination of any confidential
commercial information, but they lacked authority to unilaterally
withhold the requested documents.
Valley
Trs.,
LLC,
297
F.R.D.
See, e.g., Patrick v. Teays
248,
263
(N.D.
W.
Va.
2013)
(“Defendant is free to seek a protective order to protect its
proprietary information, but this is not a valid reason to withhold
production.”), aff’d sub nom. Patrick v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 298
F.R.D. 333 (N.D. W. Va. 2014); see also Innovative Therapies, Inc.
v. Meents, 302 F.R.D. 364, 382 (D. Md. 2014) (“To address [the
party’s] confidentiality concerns, the appropriate remedy would be
a confidentiality stipulation limiting use of the information,
rather than preventing its production altogether.”).
Defendants,
however, opted not to pursue such options, even in the face of the
Motion to Compel.
(See generally Docket Entries dated July 20,
2015, to present; see also Docket Entry 36 (lacking any request for
confidentiality restrictions or representation that Plaintiff had
refused to accept such measures).)
Defendants’ HIPAA-based
34(b)(2)(B).
objection.
12
See
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
Moreover, even in opposing the Motion to Compel, Defendants
only recite the elements of a trade secret in support of their
confidentiality contention.
(Compare Docket Entry 36 at 3, with
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-152(3) (defining “Trade secret” under the
North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act).)
Such conclusory
arguments would not justify any sort of protective order, much less
the blanket withholding of materials.
See, e.g., Martin v. Bimbo
Foods Bakeries Distribution, LLC, 313 F.R.D. 1, 6 (E.D.N.C. 2016)
(“A party moving for a protective order has the burden of making a
particularized showing of why discovery should be denied, and
conclusory or generalized statements in the motion fail to meet
this burden.”); Innovative Therapies, 302 F.R.D at 381 (explaining,
in evaluating discovery motion, that party “has not made a strong
showing
that
it
has
historically
sought
to
maintain
the
confidentiality of th[e requested] information,” and rejecting its
“conclusory statement” regarding confidentiality as “self-serving
and
insufficient”).
The
Court
therefore
rejects
Defendants’
confidentiality objection.
Finally, Defendants object that “[a] request for all rules,
regulations, and policies is not tailored in any way to the claims
herein.” (Docket Entry 36 at 3 (emphasis in original).)
finds
merit
accordingly.
in
this
objection
and
will
limit
this
The Court
request
Specifically, the Court will order Defendants to
produce all rules, regulations, and policies for the medical
13
treatment of Hoke County Detention Center inmates that are relevant
to Plaintiff’s claim or any defense Defendants may offer, including
any
rules,
policies,
(i)
treatment
of
or
back,
regulations
digestive,
or
regarding,
pain
inter
issues,
alia,
(ii)
the
provision of medical records, (iii) responses to medical complaints
and
treatment
requests,
(iv)
treatment
by
specialists,
and
(v) conditioning treatment on payment of medical expenses.
CONCLUSION
Defendants impermissibly withheld some discovery sought by
Plaintiff, and thus the Court grants in part the Motion to Compel.5
5
If, upon receipt and review of the produced discovery,
Plaintiff concludes in good faith that information contained
therein warrants exploration via further discovery, he may file a
motion, on or before September 23, 2016, requesting leave to
conduct such discovery, notwithstanding the discovery deadline of
September 6, 2016. Any such motion shall describe in detail the
specific additional discovery Plaintiff would conduct and the
nature and source of information from the discovery produced by
Defendants in response to this Order that led Plaintiff to seek
further discovery. Lastly, where (as here) the Court grants in
part and denies in part a motion to compel, the Court “may, after
giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable
expenses for the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C). In this
case, the Court exercises its discretion not to order any such
apportionment, given the fact that Plaintiff (by proceeding pro se)
has not incurred any attorney’s fees in connection with the Motion
to Compel, as well as the fact that, although Plaintiff obtained
most of the relief he sought, certain of Defendants’ unsuccessful
arguments, such as its temporal and treatment-related objections to
Plaintiff’s
medical
records
request,
appear
substantially
justified. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii) & (iii)
(prohibiting expense-shifting, even in cases where a litigant
succeeds entirely as to a motion to compel, if “the opposing
party’s . . . objection was substantially justified” or if “other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust”).
14
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Compel (Docket
Entry 34) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
on or
before September 2, 2016, Defendants shall produce to Plaintiff
(i) Plaintiff’s complete medical records for the period of his
incarceration, and (ii) any rules, policies, or regulations for the
medical treatment of Hoke County Detention Center inmates that are
relevant to Plaintiff’s claim or any defense that Defendants may
offer.
This 19th day of August, 2016.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
15
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