DICKENS v. COLVIN

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 01/23/2017, that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability be affirmed, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 11 ) be denied, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 13 ) be granted, and that this action be dismissed with prejudice. (Garland, Leah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
MICHAEL ANTHONY DICKENS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

1:15CV878

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff,

Michael

Anthony

Dickens,

brought

this

action

pursuant to the Social Security Act (the “Act”) to obtain judicial
review of a final decision of Defendant, the Acting Commissioner of
Social

Security,

denying

Security Income (“SSI”).

Plaintiff’s

claims

(Docket Entry 1.)

for

Supplemental

Defendant has filed

the certified administrative record (Docket Entry 6 (cited herein
as “Tr. __”)), and both parties have moved for judgment (Docket
Entries 11, 13; see also Docket Entry 12 (Plaintiff’s Brief);
Docket Entry 14 (Defendant’s Memorandum)).

For the reasons that

follow, the Court should enter judgment for Defendant.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for SSI.
that

1

application

initially

(Tr. 284-90.)1

(Tr.

181-99,

Upon denial of

218-21)

and

on

Plaintiff filed a previous application for Disability Insurance Benefits and
SSI, which resulted in an ALJ decision denying his claims on February 23, 2010.
(Tr. 157-75.)

reconsideration (Tr. 200-17, 224-28), Plaintiff requested a hearing
de novo before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) (Tr. 233-35).
Plaintiff, his attorney, a medical expert, and a vocational expert
(“VE”) attended the hearing.

(Tr. 125-56.)

The ALJ subsequently

ruled that Plaintiff did not qualify as disabled under the Act.
(Tr. 110-21.)

The Appeals Council thereafter denied Plaintiff’s

request for review (Tr. 9-15, 40), thereby making the ALJ’s ruling
the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial review.
In rendering that disability determination, the ALJ made the
following findings later adopted by the Commissioner:
1.
[Plaintiff] has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since July 19, 2011, the application date.
2.
[Plaintiff] has the following severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease; fused thumb, and bilateral
meniscus tears with surgical repairs.
. . .
3.
[Plaintiff] does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals
the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
. . .
4.
. . . [Plaintiff] has the residual functional
capacity to perform light work . . . with allowance for
alternating between sitting and standing at 2-hour
intervals; only occasional postural activities including
kneeling, crouching and crawling; and frequent but not
constant use of his right upper extremity. He is also
limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks involving no
contact with the general public and limited contact with
co-workers and supervisors.
. . .

2

5.
[Plaintiff] is unable to perform any past relevant
work.
. . .
9.
Considering [Plaintiff’s] age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there are
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that [he] can perform.
. . .
10. [Plaintiff] has not been under a disability, as
defined in the [] Act, since July 19, 2011, the date the
application was filed.
(Tr.

115-21

(bold

font

and

internal

parenthetical

citations

omitted).)
II.

DISCUSSION

Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits.”
Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006).

Hines v.

However, “the scope

of [the Court’s] review of [such a] decision . . . is extremely
limited.”

Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981).

Plaintiff has not established entitlement to relief under the
extremely limited review standard.
A.

Standard of Review

“[C]ourts are not to try [a Social Security] case de novo.”
Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974).

Instead,

the Court “must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ if they are
supported

by

substantial

evidence

and

were

reached

through

application of the correct legal standard.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 561

3

(internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).

“Substantial

evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”

Hunter v. Sullivan,

993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).

“It consists of more than a mere scintilla

of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Mastro
v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted).

“If there is evidence to justify a

refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there
is

substantial

evidence.”

Hunter,

993

F.2d at

34

(internal

quotation marks omitted).
“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the [C]ourt should not
undertake

to

re-weigh

conflicting

evidence,

make

credibility

determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ, as
adopted by the Commissioner].”

Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal

brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Where conflicting evidence
allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is
disabled,

the

responsibility

for

that

decision

falls

on

the

[Commissioner] (or the ALJ).” Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The issue before [the Court], therefore, is not whether
[the claimant] is disabled, but whether the ALJ’s finding that [the
claimant] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and
was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.”
Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).

4

When confronting that issue, the Court must take note that
“[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving
a disability,” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981),
and that, in this context, “disability” means the “‘inability to
engage in

any

substantial

gainful

activity

by

reason

of

any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months,’” id.
(quoting

42

U.S.C.

§

423(d)(1)(A)).2

“To

regularize

the

adjudicative process, the Social Security Administration has . . .
detailed regulations incorporating longstanding medical-vocational
evaluation policies that take into account a claimant’s age,
education, and work experience in addition to [the claimant’s]
medical

condition.”

Id.

“These

regulations

establish

a

‘sequential evaluation process’ to determine whether a claimant is
disabled.”

Id.

This sequential evaluation process (“SEP”) has up to five
steps:

“The claimant (1) must not be engaged in ‘substantial

gainful activity,’ i.e., currently working; and (2) must have a
‘severe’ impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the ‘listings’ of

2

The Act “comprises two disability benefits programs. The Disability Insurance
Benefits Program provides benefits to disabled persons who have contributed to
the program while employed. [SSI] . . . provides benefits to indigent disabled
persons. The statutory definitions and the regulations . . . for determining
disability governing these two programs are, in all aspects relevant here,
substantively identical.”
Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1 (internal citations
omitted).

5

specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent
that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capacity
to (4) perform [the claimant’s] past work or (5) any other work.”
Albright v. Commissioner of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 475
n.2 (4th Cir. 1999).3

A finding adverse to the claimant at any of

several points in the SEP forecloses an award and ends the inquiry.
For example, “[t]he first step determines whether the claimant is
engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’ If the claimant is
working, benefits are denied.

The second step determines if the

claimant is ‘severely’ disabled.

If not, benefits are denied.”

Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at
each of the first three steps, “the claimant is disabled.” Mastro,
270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and
two, but falters at step three, i.e., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment
is not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment,
the ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(‘RFC’).”

Id. at 179.4

Step four then requires the ALJ to assess

3

“Through the fourth step, the burden of production and proof is on the
claimant.
If the claimant reaches step five, the burden shifts to the
[Commissioner] . . . .” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal citations omitted).

4

“RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the claimant’s]
limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562 (noting that administrative regulations
require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-related physical
and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis . . .
[which] means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule”
(internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted)).
The RFC includes both a
“physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses the claimant’s
“ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work,” as well as
“nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or skin impairments).” Hall, 658
(continued...)

6

whether, based on that RFC, the claimant can perform past relevant
work; if so, the claimant does not qualify as disabled.
179-80.

See id. at

However, if the claimant establishes an inability to

return to prior work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step,
whereupon the ALJ must decide “whether the claimant is able to
perform other work considering both [the claimant’s RFC] and [the
claimant’s] vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work
experience) to adjust to a new job.”

Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65.

If, at this step, the Commissioner cannot carry its “evidentiary
burden of proving that [the claimant] remains able to work other
jobs

available

disabled.

in

the

community,”

the

claimant

qualifies

as

Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.5
B.

Assignments of Error

Plaintiff contends that the Court should overturn the ALJ’s
finding of no disability on these grounds:
(1)

the

ALJ

“committed

error

in

failing

to

include

[Plaintiff’s] difficulties in concentration, persistence or pace
[(“CPP”)] in his RFC despite finding that he suffered from moderate

4

(...continued)
F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only after [the ALJ] considers
all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments and any related symptoms (e.g.,
pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63.
5

A claimant thus can establish disability via two paths through the SEP. The
first path requires resolution of the questions at steps one, two, and three in
the claimant’s favor, whereas, on the second path, the claimant must prevail at
steps one, two, four, and five. Some short-hand judicial characterizations of
the SEP appear to gloss over the fact that an adverse finding against a claimant
on step three does not terminate the analysis. See, e.g., Hunter, 993 F.2d at
35 (“If the ALJ finds that a claimant has not satisfied any step of the process,
review does not proceed to the next step.”).

7

difficulties in maintaining concentration in step 3 of the [SEP]”
(Docket Entry 12 at 10 (bold font and underlining omitted));
(2) “[t]he ALJ erred in determining that Linda Hunter, LCSW,
is not an acceptable medical source and by not giving greater
weight to her opinion” (id. at 11 (bold font and underlining
omitted)); and
(3) the ALJ “failed to evaluate [Plaintiff’s] affective and
anxiety-related disorders and their effect in combination with his
other severe impairments on his ability to work on a sustained
basis as required by 42 U.S.C. [§] 423(d)(2)(c)” (id. at 12 (bold
font and underlining omitted)).
Defendant disputes Plaintiff’s assignments of error, and urges
that substantial evidence supports the finding of no disability.
(See Docket Entry 14 at 4-15.)
1. CPP
In Plaintiff’s first assignment of error, he contends that the
ALJ

“committed

error

in

failing

to

include

[Plaintiff’s]

difficulties in [CPP] in his RFC despite finding that he suffered
from moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration in step 3
of the [SEP].”

(Docket Entry 12 at 10 (bold font and underlining

omitted).) Plaintiff maintains that, pursuant to Mascio v. Colvin,
780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015), “‘an ALJ does not account for a
claimant’s limitations in [CPP] by restricting the hypothetical
question to simple, routine tasks or unskilled work . . . [because]

8

the ability to perform simple tasks differs from the ability to
stay on task[,] [and] [o]nly the latter limitation would account
for a claimant’s limitation in [CPP].’”
(quoting

Mascio,

omitted)).)

780

F.3d

at

638

(Docket Entry 12 at 10-11

(internal

quotation

marks

According to Plaintiff, the ALJ’s failure to include

Plaintiff’s difficulties in maintaining concentration in the RFC
and hypothetical question to the VE “justifies a remand of the
claim.”

(Id. at 11.)

Plaintiff’s argument misses the mark.

Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has held that “the ability to
perform simple tasks differs from the ability to stay on task” and
that “[o]nly the latter limitation would account for a claimant’s
limitation in [CPP].”

Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638.

However, in this

case, the ALJ included a restriction in the hypothetical question
to the VE (although not in the RFC) “reasonably related to a
moderate limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to stay on task,” Grant
v. Colvin, No. 1:15CV00515, 2016 WL 4007606, at *6 (M.D.N.C. July
26, 2016) (unpublished), recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C.
Sept.

21,

2016)

(Osteen,

C.J.),

by

restricting

Plaintiff

to

“simple, repetitive tasks . . . where there would be no contact
with the general public and limited contact with co-workers and
supervisors, [and] a non-production environment” (Tr. 151 (emphasis
added)).

In that regard:

[T]he weight of authority in the circuits that rendered
the rulings undergirding the Fourth Circuit’s holding in
Mascio supports the view that the non-production
restriction adopted in this case sufficiently accounts
9

for [the p]laintiff’s moderate limitation in CPP.
Moreover, that approach makes sense.
In Mascio, the
Fourth Circuit held only that, when an ALJ finds moderate
limitation in CPP, the ALJ must either adopt a
restriction that addresses the “staying on task” aspect
of CPP-related deficits (which a restriction to simple
tasks does not, at least on its face) or explain why the
CPP limitation of that particular claimant did not
necessitate a further restriction regarding “staying on
task.” Where, as here, the ALJ has included a specific
restriction that facially addresses “moderate” (not
“marked” or “extreme,” see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(c)(4))
limitation in the claimant’s ability to stay on task,
i.e., a restriction to “non-production oriented” work,
Mascio does not require further explanation by the ALJ,
at least absent some evidentiary showing by the claimant
(not offered here) that he or she cannot perform even
non-production-type work because of his or her particular
CPP deficits.
Grant, 2016 WL 4007606, at *9; see also id. at *7-9 (discussing
authority addressing “non-production” restrictions). Accordingly,
the ALJ explicitly considered and accounted for Plaintiff’s ability
to “stay on task” in the hypothetical question, which the Mascio
court distinguished from the ability to perform simple tasks, see
Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638.6
In sum, Plaintiff’s first claim on review fails to entitle him
to remand.
6

Moreover, in determining Plaintiff’s mental RFC, the ALJ gave “greatest weight”
to the opinions of the state agency psychologists. (Tr. 119.) Notably, each
psychologist assessed Plaintiff with moderate difficulties in CPP (see Tr. 190,
207); however, they each concluded that Plaintiff remained able “to maintain
concentration and attention for an adequate period to complete short and simple
tasks” (Tr. 195, 213). The ALJ’s express reliance on these opinions regarding
Plaintiff’s ability to stay on task provides further support for his mental RFC
and renders Mascio distinguishable. See Del Vecchio v. Colvin, No. 1:14CV116,
2015 WL 5023857, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 25, 2015) (unpublished) (“Here, unlike in
Mascio, the ALJ discussed substantial record evidence in determining [the
claimant’s] mental RFC, and his explicit reliance on [the state agency
consultant’s] opinion adequately explains why [the claimant’s] limitations in
[CPP] did not translate into any additional restrictions . . . . Therefore, the
Court is not left to guess at the ALJ’s decision-making process.”).

10

2. Therapist’s Opinions
In Plaintiff’s second issue on review, he alleges that the ALJ
“gave inadequate weight to the medical opinion of Linda Hunter,
[Plaintiff’s] therapist, and failed to recognize her opinion as
being from an ‘other’ medical source.”

(Docket Entry 12 at 11.)

Although Plaintiff concedes that the ALJ could not have accorded
Ms. Hunter’s opinion controlling weight because she does not
qualify as an “acceptable medical source” (id. at 12 (quoting 20
C.F.R. § 404.1513)), Plaintiff asserts that “the ALJ must consider
the opinions of non-acceptable medical sources as he would any
other relevant evidence” (id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b))).
According to Plaintiff, “[a]s a licensed clinical social worker who
worked as part of a team of providers including medical doctors
. . ., Ms. Hunter fits the criteria of ‘other’ medical sources, who
are appropriate sources of evidence regarding the severity of a
claimant’s impairment, and the effect of the impairment on a
claimant’s

ability

§ 404.1513(a)).)

to

work.”

(Id.

(citing

20

C.F.R.

Plaintiff’s contentions fall short.

As Plaintiff conceded (see Docket Entry 12 at 12) and the ALJ
correctly recognized (see Tr. 120), Ms. Hunter does not constitute
an “acceptable medical source” under the regulations, 20 C.F.R.
§

416.913(a)

physicians”

(defined

and

to

“[l]icensed

include,
or

inter

certified

alia,

“[l]icensed

psychologists”),

rather an “[o]ther source[],” 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(d)(1).

11

but

Social

Security Ruling 06-03p, Titles II and XVI: Considering Opinions and
Other

Evidence

from

Sources

Who

Are

Not

“Acceptable

Medical

Sources” in Disability Claims; Considering Decisions on Disability
by Other Governmental and Nongovernmental Agencies, 2006 WL 2329939
(Aug. 9, 2006) (“SSR 06-03p”) addresses the significance of the
distinction

between

“acceptable

medical

sources”

and

“other

sources” as follows:
The distinction between “acceptable medical sources” and
other health care providers who are not “acceptable
medical sources” is necessary for three reasons. First,
we need evidence from “acceptable medical sources” to
establish the existence of a medically determinable
impairment.
See 20 [C.F.R. §§] 404.1513(a) and
416.913(a). Second, only “acceptable medical sources”
can give us medical opinions.
See 20 [C.F.R. §§]
404.1527(a)(2)
and
416.927(a)(2).
Third,
only
“acceptable medical sources” can be considered treating
sources, as defined in 20 [C.F.R. §§] 404.1502 and
416.902, whose medical opinions may be entitled to
controlling weight. See 20 [C.F.R. §§] 404.1527(d) and
416.927(d).
SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2 (emphasis added).

In light of

the reduced deference owed to the opinions of “other sources,” the
ALJ

did

not

err

by

failing

to

give

Ms.

Hunter’s

opinions

controlling weight.7

7

Notably, Plaintiff does not argue (see Docket Entry 12 at 11-12) that Ms.
Hunter worked so closely under a psychiatrist’s or psychologist’s supervision
that she offered her opinions while acting as the agent of an acceptable medical
source. See generally Taylor v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228,
1234 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that nurse practitioner could qualify as
“acceptable medical source” where she worked under physician’s close supervision
such that she acted as physician’s agent); Padrta v. Colvin, No.
3:12–CV–01521–KI, 2014 WL 1236185, at *6 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2014) (unpublished)
(holding where “[t]here is no evidence that the nurse practitioner work[ed]
closely with and [wa]s supervised by an acceptable medical source[,] . . . the
ALJ is only required to give a germane reason to reject [the nurse
(continued...)

12

Nevertheless, the ALJ must still evaluate the opinions from
“other sources” like Ms. Hunter under the factors set forth in 20
C.F.R. § 416.927(c).

See Social Security Ruling 96-5p, Policy

Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Medical Source Opinions on
Issues Reserved to the Commissioner, 1996 WL 374183, at *5 (July 2,
1996) (“SSR 96-5p”) (noting that ALJs “must weigh medical source
statements . . . [and] provid[e] appropriate explanations for
accepting or rejecting such opinions”).

Here, Ms. Hunter supplied

a letter dated June 14, 2013, in which she reported that she had
treated

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

had

since

“serious[]

November

15,

2007,

limit[ations]

and

in

[his]

opined
ability

that
to

concentrate, ha[d] difficulty with follow-through and reliability
and [wa]s in danger of decompensation without medication to help
him stabilize and cope.”

(Tr. 725.)

In addition, Ms. Hunter

reported that, “[u]ntil [Plaintiff’s] medical and psychological
conditions can stabilize, he will be unable to manage any kind of
work.”
The

(Id.)
ALJ’s

evaluation

of

Ms.

Hunter’s

complied with the regulatory requirements.

foregoing

opinions

The ALJ accorded

“little weight” to Ms. Hunter’s opinions for multiple reasons.
(Tr. 120.)

The ALJ found that Ms. Hunter’s own treatment records

7

(...continued)
practitioner’s] opinion”); see also Martin v. Colvin, No. 1:14CV516, 2015 WL
5944455, at *10 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 2015) (unpublished) (Auld, M.J.) (instructing
ALJ to reassess conclusion that counselor did not constitute acceptable medical
source where supervising psychologist signed off on counselor’s opinions),
recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Nov. 3, 2015) (Biggs, J.).

13

did not support her opinions (see Tr. 119-20), and that Ms.
Hunter’s opinions also lacked consistency “with other mental status
reports indicating [Plaintiff’s] cognition and concentration were
intact” (Tr. 120). Further, the ALJ correctly observed that Ms.
Hunter’s opinion that Plaintiff could not “manage any kind of work”
qualified as “a matter reserved to the Commissioner.” (Id. (citing
SSR 96-5p); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d).)

Significantly,

Plaintiff makes no argument specifically attacking these reasons
for discounting Ms. Hunter’s opinions and, beyond arguing that she
constitutes an “other source,” does not supply any basis for
affording her opinions more than “little weight.”

(See Docket

Entry 12 at 11-12.)
Under such circumstances, the ALJ did not err in evaluating
the opinion of Ms. Hunter.
3. Combined Effect of Impairments
In Plaintiff’s third and final issue on review, he maintains
that the ALJ failed to evaluate the combined effect of his mental
impairments and “his other severe impairments on his ability to
work
[§]

on

a

sustained

423(d)(2)(c).”

basis

(Docket

as

Entry

required
12

at

12

by

42

(bold

U.S.C.

font

and

underlining omitted).) According to Plaintiff, “an ALJ is required
in his decision to ‘adequately explain his or her evaluation of the
combined effects of [a claimant’s] impairments and not fragmentize
them,’”

and

that

“‘disability

14

may

result

from

a

number

of

impairments which, taken separately, might not be disabling, but
whose total effect, taken together, is to render [a] claimant
unable to engage in substantial gainful activity.’” (Id. at 13
(quoting Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1989)).)
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ here “failed to analyze and discuss
the overall impact of [Plaintiff’s] affective and anxiety-related
disorders and their interaction with his other severe impairments
including

chronic

back

and

bilateral

knee

pain.”

(Id.)

Plaintiff’s third challenge lacks merit.
The weight of authority dispels the argument that Walker
mandates the level of analysis and discussion that Plaintiff would
have the Court place upon ALJs, as recognized in the following
well-reasoned decision from a neighboring court:
When dealing with a claimant with multiple impairments,
the Commissioner must consider the combined effect of a
claimant’s impairments and not fragmentize them.” Walker
v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing
Reichenbach v. Heckler, 808 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1985)[)].
This requires the ALJ to “adequately explain his or her
evaluation of the combined effects of the impairments.”
Id. The ALJ’s duty to consider the combined effects of
a claimant’s multiple impairments is not limited to one
particular aspect of review, but is to continue
“throughout the disability determination process.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1523.
Following the Walker decision, the Fourth Circuit has
provided little elaboration on what constitutes an
“adequate” combined effect analysis.
However, other
circuits have shown great deference to the Commissioner
in addressing the same issue.FN2
In an unpublished
opinion decided after Walker, the Fourth Circuit seems to
fall in line with these other circuits. See Green v.
Chater, 64 F.3d 657, 1995 WL 478032 (4th Cir. 1995). In
the opinion, the court found that the district court
15

“correctly determined that the ALJ had adequately
explained his evaluation of the combined effect of [the
claimant’s] impairments.” Id. at *3. In reaching this
conclusion, the court focused on the ALJ’s conclusory
statement that he had considered all of the claimant’s
impairments, both singularly and in combination and then
noted evidence that was consistent with this conclusion.
Id. This evidence consisted of (1) the ALJ’s finding
that the claimant’s combination of impairments precluded
heavy lifting; (2) the ALJ’s listing and consideration of
each of the alleged impairments; and (3) the ALJ’s
finding that many of the claimant’s symptoms were
treatable.
Id.
Thus, this limited threshold for an
“adequate” combined effect analysis suggests that “Walker
was not meant to be used as a trap for the Commissioner.”
Brown v. Astrue, 0:10-cv-01584-RBH, 2012 WL 3716792, at
*6 (D.S.C. Aug. 28, 2012). “Accordingly, the adequacy
requirement of Walker is met if it is clear from the
decision as a whole that the ALJ considered the combined
effect of a claimant’s impairments.” Id.
FN2.
See Gooch v. Secretary, Health & Human
Servs., 833 F.2d 589, 592 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he
fact that each element of the record was discussed
individually hardly suggests that the totality of
the record was not considered, particularly in view
of the fact that the ALJ specifically referred to
‘a combination of impairments’ in deciding that
[the plaintiff] did not meet the ‘listings.’”);
Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir.
1992)
(“After
separately
discussing
[the
plaintiff’s]
physical
impairments,
affective
disorder, and complaints of pain, as well as her
daily level of activities, the ALJ found that her
impairments do not prevent [her] from performing
her past relevant work.
To require a more
elaborate articulation of the ALJ’s thought
processes would not be reasonable.”
(internal
quotation marks omitted)); Eggleston v. Bowen, 851
F.2d 1244, 1247 (10th cir. 1988) (“The ALJ’s
opinion
addresses
[the
plaintiff’s]
various
impairments, and we find nothing to suggest they
were not properly considered.”).
Williams v. Colvin, Civ. No. 6:11-2344-GRA-KFM, 2013 WL 877128, at
*2 (D.S.C. Mar. 8, 2013) (unpublished); see also Paris v. Colvin,

16

No. 7:12-CV-00596, 2014 WL 534057, at *12 (W.D. Va. Feb. 10, 2014)
(unpublished) (holding that “[i]t is apparent from the RFC itself
that

the

ALJ

accounted

for

the

cumulative

impact

of

[the

plaintiff’s] impairments as supported in the record, providing
restrictions that are both mental and physical”); Wilson-Coleman v.
Colvin, NO. 1:11CV726, 2013 WL 6018780, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 12,
2013) (Webster, M.J.) (unpublished) (concluding that “sufficient
consideration of the combined effects of a claimant’s impairments
is shown when each is separately discussed in the ALJ’s decision,
including discussion of a claimant’s complaints of pain and level
of daily activities” (quoting Baldwin v. Barnhart, 444 F. Supp. 2d
457, 465 (E.D.N.C. 2005), aff’d, 179 F. App’x 167 (4th Cir. 2006))
(internal brackets omitted)), recommendation adopted, slip op.
(M.D.N.C. Dec. 6, 2013) (Schroeder, J.); Jones v. Astrue, No. 5:07CV-452-FL, 2009 WL 455414, at *15 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 23, 2009) (noting
that ALJ’s RFC assessment and summarization of medical records as
to each impairment indicate ALJ “considered all of [the c]laimant’s
mental and physical limitations together”).
Here, the ALJ provided a thorough discussion of the medical
evidence and discussed each of Plaintiff’s alleged impairments,
both severe and non-severe.

(Tr. 116-20.)

At step three, the ALJ

expressly found that Plaintiff did “not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of one of the listed impairments.”

17

(Tr. 115 (emphasis

added).) In conjunction with the RFC determination, the ALJ stated
that he had “considered all symptoms and the extent to which these
symptoms
objective

can

reasonably

medical

be

evidence

accepted
and

other

as

consistent

evidence.”

with
(Tr.

the

116.)

Moreover, the ALJ’s RFC, limiting Plaintiff to light work with a
sit/stand option at two-hour intervals, and involving occasional
postural activities, frequent use of his right upper extremity,
simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, no contact with the general
public, and limited contact with co-workers and supervisors (Tr.
116),

clearly

accounted

for

Plaintiff’s

physical

and

mental

impairments.

Thus, the ALJ’s decision, as a whole, adequately

demonstrates

that

he

considered

Plaintiff’s

impairments

in

combination in accordance with Walker.
As a final note, even if the Court should find that the ALJ
did not adequately explain his analysis of the cumulative effect of
Plaintiff’s impairments, the Court need not remand this case,
because Plaintiff has not made any attempt to show how a more
complete analysis would have resulted in a more restrictive RFC or
a different outcome in the case (see Docket Entry 12 at 12-13).
See Anderson v. Colvin, No. 1:10CV671, 2013 WL 3730121, at *7
(M.D.N.C. Jul. 12, 2013) (Webster, M.J.) (unpublished) (“Plaintiff
has failed to establish how further scrutiny of the combination of
her impairments results in any greater functional limitations than
those already set forth in her RFC.”), recommendation adopted in

18

relevant part, 2014 WL 1224726 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2014) (Osteen,
C.J.) (unpublished).
In short, Plaintiff’s third assignment of error fails as a
matter of law.
III.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has not established an error warranting reversal or
remand.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision
finding no disability be affirmed, that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 11)8 be denied, that
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 13)
be granted, and that this action be dismissed with prejudice.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
January 23, 2017

8

Although the title of Plaintiff’s motion reads “MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,”
in the body of the motion, Plaintiff indicates that he “moves this Court for an
Order [g]ranting Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (See Docket Entry 11 at 1.)

19