TURNER v. CLELLAND et al
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 03/16/2016. Plaintiff failed to comply with the procedural prerequisites for obtaining a TRO and to establish entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief. RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Request for Temporary Injunction (Docket Entry 4 ) be DENIED.(Taylor, Abby)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLES EDWARD TURNER, JR.,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
MR. CLELLAND, et al.,
Defendants.
1:15CV947
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
case
comes
before
the
undersigned
United
States
Magistrate Judge for a recommendation on Plaintiff’s “Request for
Temporary Injunction” (the “Motion”) (Docket Entry 4).
For the
reasons that follow, the Court should deny the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a North Carolina prisoner, currently incarcerated
at
the
Albemarle
Correctional
Institution
(“ACI”),
filed
a
Complaint against ACI “Superintendent Mr. Clelland,” “C/O Curry”
(“Defendant Curry”), and “Case Manager Ms. Honeycutt” (“Defendant
Honeycutt”), as well as the “NCDPS Director of Chaplaincy Services
Ms.
Betty
Brown”
Superintendent
Mr.
(“Defendant
Clelland,
Brown,”
Defendant
collectively
Curry,
and
with
Defendant
Honeycutt, the “Defendants”), alleging violations of his federal
constitutional
rights
and
the
Religious
Land
Use
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.
and
(Docket
Entry 1 at 2-4.)1
“place[d]
more
According to the Complaint, Defendants have
than
a
substantial
burden
upon
[Plaintiff’s]
religious practice” of his Muslim faith during his incarceration at
ACI.
(Id. at 3.)
The Complaint further alleges that, although
“[Plaintiff] ha[s] four claims . . .[,] really its [sic] all one.
The individual Staff members both personally and officially, both
singularly and en masse, have created a toxic environment for NonChristian practitioners at [ACI].
That is [Plaintiff’s] Claim.
([Plaintiff is] the Non-Christian Practioner [sic]).”
(Id.)
Along with his Complaint, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion
requesting that the Court:
1. Temporarily prohibit Jumuah prayers from being held in
the [ACI] Recreation Quiet Room [(the “Recreation
Room”)], while these proceedings are being held [(the
“Recreation Room Request”);]
2. Temporarily prohibit any non-medical emergency
transfers of Plaintiff unless the Court is notified in a
timely manner before, during or after transfer, while
these proceedings are being held [(the “Transfer
Request”); and]
3. If these proceedings are still pending when Day-Light
Savings Time (DST) ends in the spring of 2016,
temporarily prohibit Jumuah Prayer from being held during
the forbidden times [(the “DST Request”)].
1
Many of Plaintiff’s filings are hand-written in small-caps.
(See, e.g., Docket Entry 1.)
For legibility purposes, the
undersigned reproduces Plaintiff’s filings in regular typeface.
2
(Docket Entry 4 at 1.)2
Plaintiff included with the Motion a
“Supporting Brief” (Docket Entry 5), “Memorandem [sic] of Law on
Albemarle Minority Faith Groups” (Docket Entry 6), and “Memorandem
[sic] of Law on Islamic Purification” (Docket Entry 7), but no
supporting affidavits.3
The Recreation Room Request arises from Plaintiff’s contention
that prison staff moved religious services from ACI’s chapel (the
“Chapel”) to its Recreation Room when the Chapel experienced
electrical issues on October 30, 2015.
(Docket Entry 1 at 13.)
Plaintiff maintains that ACI allegedly operates a dog training
program in the Recreation Room “many times a week.”
7 at 5.)4
(Docket Entry
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff “notified staff
2
The Complaint describes “Jumuah” as “Friday or Day of
Gathering” (Docket Entry 1 at 4), as well as a service held on
Fridays that consists of prayer and a sermon (id. at 8).
Practitioners of Islam apparently variously denominate such Friday
services as “Jumu’ah, Jum’ah, Jumah, Jumma, Jummah, and Jumuah.”
McCoy v. Frazier, No. 2:09CV412, 2010 WL 2975747, at *1 n.1 (E.D.
Va. July 6, 2010) (unpublished). For purposes of this Memorandum
Opinion and Recommendation, the undersigned adopts Plaintiff’s
spelling – Jumuah.
3
In support of his Complaint, Plaintiff filed the affidavit
of Norman Linwood Vassar III who asserts that he heard Defendant
Curry make a derogatory remark to Plaintiff about his faith.
(Docket Entry 1-1 at 11.)
4
The Complaint alleges that the Recreation Room contains
“doggy hair everywhere, especially attached to all of the table
legs,” and that there are “doggy mats and other training aids . . .
stored in this room.” (Docket Entry 1 at 10.) Plaintiff further
asserts that the Recreation Room “is also used as a secondary
location for the housing of dogs, as [inclement weather] is
concerned, when the weather reaches certain predetermined limits.”
(Docket Entry 7 at 4.)
3
that the Islamic service . . . could not be held in an area that
routinely accommodates animals of any kind.”
13.)
(Docket Entry 1 at
According to the Complaint, although prison officials had
moved Jumuah to “visitation” on another occasion when electrical
issues
rendered
the
Chapel
unavailable,
this
time
ACI
staff
cancelled Jumuah because of Plaintiff’s objection. (Id. at 10, 13;
see also Docket Entry 5 at 4 (“[Defendant] Honeycutt knows that
visitation
and
the
libraries
and
the
[court]-yard
were
all
available for Jumuah, since [Plaintiff] had previously gone through
this issue with her previously, and she accommodated.
Cancelling
Jumuah Prayers was not the least restrictive means and it was a
substantial burden.”).)
Plaintiff seeks an injunction prohibiting
ACI from holding Jumuah in the Recreation Room if the Chapel again
becomes unavailable.
(Docket Entry 4 at 1.)
As to the Transfer Request, the Motion provides no grounds for
the Court to prohibit Plaintiff’s non-medical emergency transfer
without notice to the Court.
(See id. at 1-2.)
Finally, the DST
Request asks that the Court prohibit ACI from holding “Jumuah
Prayer . . . during the forbidden times” when Daylight Saving Time
(“DST”) “ends in the spring of 2016.”
(Id. at 1.)5
Consistent
with this request, the Complaint states:
5
Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 260a(a), DST commences “on the
second Sunday of March of each year and end[s] . . . on the first
Sunday of November of each year.” 15 U.S.C. § 260a(a). The DST
Request thus presumably means when DST begins, not ends.
4
Muslims must pray at least 5 times a day, these prayers
are called obligatory. . . . The obligatory prayers must
be performed a[t] certain “times” a day in relation to
the sun.
There are three forbidden prayer times:
Sunrise,
High
noon
and
Sunset
[-]
each
lasts
approximately 15 minutes.
The Noon Prayer must be
performed after “High” noon. Every prison chapel prints
out a yearly prayer time sheet so everyone knows what
time to pray. In the summer months this time can be as
late as 1:40 pm but for most of the time it’s about 1:25
pm. In the winter months - time falls back one-hour so
this time is 12:40 most of the time 12:25. Most prisons
understand this and so Jumuah is from 1:30-2:30 pm year
round no problems.
(Docket Entry 1 at 5.)
The Complaint alleges that ACI holds Jumuah
from 12:45 p.m. to 1:45 p.m., on Defendant Brown’s authorization.
(Id. at 6; see also Docket Entry 5 at 3.)
According to the
Complaint, DST will cause the one-hour Jumuah service to overlap
with a forbidden prayer time.
(Docket Entry 1 at 4-5.)
In
Plaintiff’s view, this overlap forces him to “either pray during
the forbidden time or miss Jumuah (one sin or the other).”
Entry 5 at 3.)
(Docket
As a result, he seeks injunctive relief prohibiting
ACI from holding Jumuah “during the forbidden times.”
(Docket
Entry 4 at 1.)
II. DISCUSSION
The Motion seeks temporary injunctive relief “while these
proceedings are being held.”
appeared.
(Id.)
Defendants have not yet
(See Docket Entry 17 (reflecting returns of service by
the United States Marshals Service that, on their face, would
require Defendants to answer or otherwise respond from March 17,
5
2016, to March 22, 2016).)
“The grant of interim [injunctive]
relief is an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very
far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited
circumstances which clearly demand it.”
Steakhouse, Inc. v. City
of Raleigh, 166 F.3d 634, 637 (4th Cir. 1999) (brackets omitted);
see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22
(2008) (describing “injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy
that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is
entitled to such relief”).
“The purpose of a TRO is to preserve
the status quo and avoid possible irreparable injury to a party
pending litigation until a hearing may be conducted.”
Watson v.
Garman, No. 7:12-CV-37, 2012 WL 664066, at *1 (W.D. Va. Feb. 29,
2012) (unpublished) (citing Steakhouse, Inc., 166 F.3d at 637). “A
[TRO], particularly one granted without notice to the defendant, is
an emergency procedure and is appropriate only when the applicant
is in need of immediate relief.”
5:10-CV-231,
2010
WL
2332103,
at
Broughton v. Aldridge, No.
*1 (E.D.N.C.
June
(unpublished) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9, 2010)
Plaintiff’s
instant Motion fails under both the procedural rule that governs
TROs and the legal test for preliminary injunctive relief.
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65
Two procedural safeguards exist to protect defendants against
unwarranted TROs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A)-(B). First, the
movant must provide “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified
6
complaint
[that]
clearly
show
that
immediate
and
irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the
adverse party can be heard in opposition.”
65(b)(1)(A).
Fed. R. Civ. P.
Second, “the moving party’s attorney, or the movant
himself, in the case of a pro se party, must ‘certif[y] in writing
any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not
be required.’” Science Sys. & Applications, Inc. v. United States,
Civ. Action No. 14–2212, 2014 WL 3672908, at *3 (D. Md. July 22,
2014) (unpublished) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B)).
“The
stringent restrictions imposed by . . . Rule 65[ of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 65”)] on the availability of ex
parte [TROs] reflect the fact that our entire jurisprudence runs
counter to the notion of court action taken before reasonable
notice and an opportunity to be heard has been granted both sides
of
a
dispute.”
Granny
Goose
Foods,
Inc.
v.
Brotherhood
of
Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda Cty., 415
U.S. 423, 438-39 (1974) (footnote omitted).
Thus, courts may not
lightly disregard Rule 65’s technical requirements, as they provide
crucial procedural safeguards of due process.
Tchienkou v. Net
Trust Mortg., No. 3:10-CV-23, 2010 WL 2375882, at *1 (W.D. Va. June
9, 2010) (unpublished) (citing Austin v. Altman, 332 F.2d 273, 275
(2d
Cir.
1964)
(“emphasiz[ing]
that
a
district
court
should
scrupulously observe the requirements of Rule 65 in the delicate
business of granting [TROs]”)).
7
Here, Plaintiff did not verify his Complaint (see Docket Entry
1) or submit affidavits in support of the instant Motion (see
Docket Entries 4-7).
Further, “Plaintiff has not certified in
writing any efforts made to put Defendant[s] on notice of the
[M]otion, nor has he offered any reason as to why notice should not
be
required.”
Plaintiff’s
Tchienkou,
failure
to
2010
adhere
WL
2375882,
to
Rule
at
*1.
65(b)’s
requirements, the Court should deny his Motion.
Given
procedural
See id. (denying
pro se plaintiff’s motion for TRO for failing to adhere to Rule
65(b)(1)’s procedural requirements, holding “[t]he requirements of
Rule 65(b)(1) are not merely technical niceties that a court may
easily disregard”); see also Parker v. American Brokers Conduit,
Civ. Action No. 15-3652, 2015 WL 7751664, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 1,
2015)
(unpublished)
(observing
that
the
pro
se
plaintiff’s
noncompliance with Rule 65(b)(1)(B)’s notice provision justifies
denial of TRO motion/request); Lescs v. Berkeley Cnty. Sheriffs
Office, No. 3:14-CV-96, 2014 WL 4802057, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. Sept.
23, 2014) (unpublished) (same).
Under these circumstances, the Court should deny Plaintiff’s
instant Motion for failure to satisfy Rule 65(b)(1)’s procedural
requirements.
B. Legal Test for Preliminary Injunctive Relief
Even
if
Plaintiff
had
satisfied
Rule
65(b)’s
procedural
requirements, the United States Supreme Court “requires parties
8
seeking preliminary injunctions to demonstrate that (1) they are
likely to succeed on the merits, (2) they are likely to suffer
irreparable harm, (3) the balance of hardships tips in their favor,
and (4) the injunction is in the public interest.”
Pashby v.
Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Winter, 555 U.S.
at 20); see also Miles v. Guice, Civ. Action No. 5:13-CT-3193, 2014
WL 1399442, at *1 n.2 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 10, 2014) (unpublished)
(noting that preliminary injunction standards apply to TROs (citing
Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 422
(4th Cir. 1999))). This standard “requir[es] that each preliminary
injunction factor be satisfied as articulated.”
quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal
Here, Plaintiff has not shown that he
will suffer irreparable harm or that the public interest favors
granting such “extraordinary” relief.
First, the Motion’s Recreation Room Request asks that the
Court prohibit ACI from holding Jumuah in the Recreation Room.
(Docket Entry 4 at 1.)
Plaintiff’s filings establish that Jumuah
routinely occurs in the Chapel (see, e.g., Docket Entry 1-1 at 1920 (the Chapel’s August 2015 and October 2015 monthly calendars
showing “Islamic Jumah” held every Friday from 12:45-1:45 p.m.)),
and only two instances of the Chapel’s unavailability for religious
services during Plaintiff’s incarceration at ACI (see Docket Entry
1 at 10, 13 (explaining that, due to electrical problems, the
Chapel was not available on September 4, 2015 and October 30,
9
2015)).
Further, the Complaint alleges that ACI attempted to
relocate Jumuah to the Recreation Room on only one of those two
occasions.
Defendant
October
(See id. at 13 (explaining that on September 4, 2015,
Honeycutt
30,
2015,
moved
ACI
Jumuah
staff
to
“Visitation,”
cancelled
Jumuah
whereas
on
when
Plaintiff
objected to holding Jumuah in the Recreation Room).)
On these
facts, Plaintiff cannot show that he suffers the type of immediate
threat
of
irreparable
injunctive relief.
harm
that
would
warrant
preliminary
See Winters, 555 U.S. at 22 (rejecting notion
that courts may award injunctive relief “simply to prevent the
possibility of some remote future injury” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Further, prohibiting ACI from holding Jumuah in the Recreation
Room would require the judiciary to interject itself into the dayto-day operations of a prison facility, something courts rarely
should do. See Scott v. Mathena, No. 7:12-CV-469, 2012 WL 4891711,
at *2 (W.D. Va. Oct. 15, 2012) (unpublished) (citing Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 n.23, 548 n.29 (1979) (explaining that
“maintaining security and order and operating the [prison] in a
manageable fashion . . . [are] considerations . . . peculiarly
within the province and professional expertise of corrections
officials” and that “courts should defer to the informed discretion
of
prison
administrators
because
the
realities
of
running
a
corrections institution are complex and difficult, courts are ill
10
equipped to deal with these problems, and the management of these
facilities is confided to the Executive and Legislative Branches,
not to the Judicial Branch” (internal quotation marks omitted))).
As the Supreme Court recently recognized, “[p]rison officials are
experts in running prisons and evaluating the likely effects of
altering prison rules, and courts should respect that expertise.”
Holt v. Hobbs, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 853, 864 (2015).
At
this early stage in the litigation, a directive mandating that
Defendants alter ACI’s decisions about the location of religious
programs
poses
potential
security
and
safety
concerns.
See
generally Rogers v. Stanback, No. 1:13CV209, 2013 WL 6729864, at
*1, *3 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 19, 2013) (unpublished) (recommending denial
of pro se prisoner’s motion for TRO requesting authorization to
possess certain prohibited “religious” materials, in part, because
“court involvement in decisions made by prison administrators
regarding materials deemed to be security threats” did not serve
public interest), recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Feb.
20, 2014).
The Court should therefore deny Plaintiff’s Recreation
Room Request.
Second, the Motion’s Transfer Request petitions the Court to
“[t]emporarily prohibit any non-medical emergency transfers of
Plaintiff unless the Court is notified in a timely manner before,
during or after transfer, while these proceedings are being held.”
(Docket Entry 4 at 1.)
Plaintiff has not demonstrated (see Docket
11
Entries 4-7) and likely cannot demonstrate that this request will
provide him relief from Defendants’ alleged violations of his
religious rights, will prevent him irreparable harm, or will serve
the public interest, see Merriweather v. Reynolds, 586 F. Supp. 2d
548, 557 (D.S.C. 2008) (“There is no constitutional right for a
state prisoner or federal prisoner to be housed in a particular
institution, at particular custody level, or in a particular
portion or unit of a correctional institution.” (citing Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245–46 (1983))); see also Williams v.
Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that prisoner’s
transfer to a different prison mooted request for declaratory and
injunctive
relief).
The
Court
should
thus
deny
Plaintiff’s
Transfer Request.
Third, the Motion’s DST Request asks that the Court prohibit
ACI from holding Jumuah “during the forbidden times” in the spring
of 2016.
(Docket Entry 4 at 1.)
In that regard, the Complaint
alleges that, while incarcerated at other North Carolina prisons,
Plaintiff requested changes in the scheduling of Jumuah during DST
and those prisons “matched the facility time with the year-round
. . . time[;] 1:15 pm - 2:30 pm.”
(Docket Entry 1 at 5.)
However,
the Complaint alleges that ACI denied a similar request.
(Id.)
Plaintiff’s filings reveal that the Chapel holds a Catholic service
on the first Friday of each month from 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. (see
Docket Entry 1-1 at 19-20), such that a scheduling conflict would
12
arise if ACI moved Jumuah to the later time requested by Plaintiff.
(See Docket Entry 1 at 5 (explaining that prison officials denied
Plaintiff’s request to move Jumuah back because “it conflicted with
a
once
a
highlights
month
the
Catholic
fact
service”).
that
That
scheduling
potential conflict
prisoner
programs
and
allocating space to those programs generally constitute matters
appropriately left to prison officials.
Indeed, “[e]fficient and
effective penal administration furthers the public’s interest, and
involving a federal court in the day-to-day administration of a
prison is a course the judiciary generally disapproves of taking.”
Maxwell v. Clarke, No. 7:12-CV-477, 2012 WL 5463200, at *2 (W.D.
Va. Nov. 8, 2012) (unpublished) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2)
(mandating that, when considering appropriate remedies with respect
to prison conditions, courts “shall give substantial weight to any
adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal
justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect
the principles of comity”)).
The Court should therefore deny
Plaintiff’s DST Request.
In
sum,
Plaintiff
has
failed
to
show
entitlement
to
preliminary injunctive relief.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff failed to comply with the procedural prerequisites
for obtaining a TRO and to establish entitlement to preliminary
injunctive relief.
13
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Request for
Temporary Injunction (Docket Entry 4) be DENIED.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
March 16, 2016
14
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