MCCRAY v. COLVIN
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATON OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 11/14/2016; the Court finds that the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 9 ) be DENIED, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 12 ) be GRANTED, and that the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld. (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ANDREA
S.
MCCRAY,
Plaintiff,
v
CAROLYN Sø. COLVIN,
Acting Commissionet of Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1:15CV951
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Andrea S. McCray, brought this action to obtain judicial review of a Ftnal
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claims fot a period of disability,
disability insurance benefits
II
and
("DIB") and Supplemental Secutity Income ("SSI") undet Titles
XVI of the Social Security Act ("the Act"). The Coutt
has befote
it the cettified
7,9,12.) Fot
the
reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Defendant's motion (Docket F;ntry
1,2)
pocket E.rtry 9) be denied, and that the final decision of
the
administtative record and cross-motions for judgment. (Docket Entries
be granted, Plaintiffs motion
Commissioner be upheld.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In Apdl
201,2,
Plaintiff filed an application fot DIB alleging a disability onset date of
March 1,2006. Çr1,75-76.)1 Plaintiff also filed an application for SSI on April 1.1.,201.4. Çt
1,93-21,3.) Plaintiffs claims were denied initially and upon teconsideration.
Çr. 77, 93.)
Ptaintiff thereafter tequested a headng befote an,tdministative LawJudge ("ALJ").
28.) A hearing was held on Match 26,201.4.
unfavorable decision on August 1., 201.4.
Çl
(r.127-
26-55.) ALJ \)Vanda Wdght issued
an
Gr. 8-20.) This decision became the final
administrative decision after the Appeals Council declined teview. (Tt. 1-3.) Plaintiff has
exhausted aIl avulable administrative remedies, and this case is now tipe fot teview pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. $ 405þ).
Plaintiff previously filed applications for DIB and SSI, both of which were denied by
an N-J in a final agency decision.
Çl
56-67.) This decision became the final administrative
decision after the Appeals Council declined review. Çr.74-76) No further action was taken
with regards to those applications. Appþing
res
jødicuta principals, ALJ Wanda l7right stated
that the relevant pedod fot her decision began November 25,2009, the day following the priot
decision. Gr. 11; see also Do/e
u.
Astrue, No. CIV.A. 6:10-46-I(FM,201.1. WL 692217, at*8
p.S.C. Feb. 18, 201,1) (unpublished) (citing Albriqþt
u. Corum'r of Soc. Sec., L74 F.3d 473, 476
n.4 (4thcir. 1999) ("To the extent that asecond or successive application seeks to relitigate a
time pedod for which the claimant was pteviously found ineligible for benefits, the customary
pdnciples of preclusion apply with full fotce.")).
1
Transcrþt citations refer to the adminisftative record which was filed with Defendant's Answet.
(Docket Entry 7.)
2
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Commissioner held that Plaintiff was not undet a disability within the meaning of
the
Acl
Under 42 U.S.C. $ a05(g), the scope of judicial review of the Commissionet's final
decision is specifîc and narrow. Srnhh u. Schweiker,795 F.2d 343,345 (4th Cit. 1986). This
Court's review of that decision is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence
in the tecord to support the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. $ a05(g); Hønter
993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1,992);
Hay
u. Sølliuan,
u. Salliuan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
"substantial evidence is 'such televant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support
(1971)).
a
conclusion."' Htlnter,993 F.2d at 34 (citing Nchard¡on
"[t]
u. Pera/es,402
U.S. 389,401
'consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less
than a ptepondet^îce."' 1/. (quotin g l-.aw u. Celebrelry, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)).
The denial of benefits will be reversed only if no reasonable mind could accept the record
adequate
to support the detetmination. Nchardson,402 U.S.
^t
as
401.. The issue befote the
Court, therefote, is not whethet Plaintiff is d-isabled, but whether the Commissionet's finding
that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substanttal evidence and was teached based upon
a
coffect application of the relevant law. Cofrzan
u.
Bowen,829 F.2d 51.4, 517 (4th Cit. 1,987).
Thus, "laf claknant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving a disability," Hall
u.
Harris,658 F.2d 260,264 (4th Cir. 1981), and in this context, "disability" means the
"'inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by teason of any medically determinable
physical ot mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted ot
can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not
U.S.C. S 423(dX1XÐ).
"To
regularíze
less than 12
monthsl.l"' id. (quoting 42
the adjudicative process, the Social
J
Security
Administration
has . promulgated . . . detailed tegulations incotpotating
longstanding
medical-vocational evaluation policies that take into account a claimant's age, education, and
work experience in addition to [the claimant's] medical conditton."
Id.
"These tegulations
establish a 'sequential evaluation process' to determine whether a clatmant is disabled." Id.
(internal citations omitted).
This sequential evaluation process ("SEP") has up to five steps: "The claimant
(1)
must not be engaged in 'substantial gainful acttvity,' i.e., cuuently wotking; and (2) must have
a 'severe' impairment that (3) meets ot exceeds the 'listings'
of specified impairments, ot
is
otherwise incapacítattng to the extent that the claimant does not possess the residual functional
capacir¡ ("RFC") to (4) perform [the claimant's] past work or (5) any other
174 F.3d
at 475 n.2 (citing 20 C.F.R.
wotk." Albright,
S 404.1520); see aho 20 C.F.R. S 416.920. The law
concerning these five steps is well-established. Jaa,
e.g,,
Mastro
u.
'4þrtL 270 F.3d 17'1,,177-1.80
(4th Cir. 2001); Hall,658F.2d at264-65.
UI. TFIE erJ's OBClSlm
In her August 1,201,4 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled undet
Sections 216(i),223(d), and 1,61,4(Ð(3XÐ
of the Act. (Tr. 20.) In making this disability
determination, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in "substanttal garnful actlvíty"
since November 25,2009.
(Ir.
13.) At step two, the ALJ found thatPlaintiff had the following
severe impairments: Grave's disease and chronic
fatigue. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff had no impairment or combination of impafuments listed in, or medically equal
to, one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, ,\pp.
1. Gt. 14.) The ALJ
then determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to petfotm sedentary wotk "except she must
4
never use ladders, ropes, ot scaffolds." (Tt. 15.)
was unable to
,tt
step four, the ALJ determined thatPlaintiff
perfotm any past relevant work. (Tr. 18.) At step five, the ALJ determined that
there wete jobs which Plaintiff could petfotm consistent with her RFC, age, education, and
work expedence.
(Ir.
19.)
IV.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff taises two issues on appeal. First, Plaintiff atgues that the ALJ erred in het
fìnding that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform sedentary
Second, Plaintiff argues that the
A{
work. pocket Entty 10 at 8-10.)
etted in her finding as to Plainuffs ctediblhty. (Id.
13.) For the reasons stated herein, the
^t1,0-
understgned concludes that substanttal evidence
supports the ALJ's RFC findings, and the ALJ ptopetly assessed Plaintiffs credibility.
A.
Residual Functional Capacity
Plaintiff atgues that the ALJ etted in finding that Plaintiff has the residual functional
capacity to perform sedentary
claimant can do in
a
work.
(Id. at
8.) "Residual functional capacity" is the most
a
wotk setting despite the physical and mental limitations of her impairment
and any related symptom (e.9., pa:n).
See
20 C.F.R.
SS
404.1545(a)(1), 41.6.945(a)(1);
see also
Hines u. Bamhart, 453 F.3d 559, 562 (4th Cir. 2006). The RFC includes both a "physical
exertional or strength limitation" that assesses the claimant's "ability to do sedentary, light,
medium, heavy, ot very heavy work," as well as "nonexettional limitations (mental, sensory or
skin impaitments)." Ha//, 658 F.2d at 265. H.erq the ALJ found that Plaintiff could petform
sedentary work
with additional limitations.
(It.
15.) Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in her
RFC findings because she did not give conttolüng werght to Plaintiffs treating physician, Dr.
I(aren Smith. (Docket Entry 1,0 at9-1.0.) Plaintiffs argument fails.
5
The "treating physician rule," 20 C.F.R. S 404.1,527(.)(2), generally provides more
weight to the opinion of a treatt¡s source, because
it
may "provide a detailed, longitudinal
picture of [the claimant's] medical impairmentþ) fwhich] may bdng a unique petspective to
the medical evidence." 20 C.F.R. S 404.152 7 (r)Q);
refusing to accord controlling weight
see
a/s020 C.F.R. S 41,6.927 (c)Q).' An ALJ
to the medical opinion of a tteattng physician must
considet vatious "factors" to detetmine how much weight to give
¡ee also
it. Id. S 404.1,527 GXZ)-(6);
20 C.F.R. S 41,6.927(Ð(2)-(6). These factots include: (i) the frequency of examination
and the length, nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (ü) the evidence in support
of
the teating physician's opinion; (üi) the consistency of the opinion v¡ith the tecord as a whole;
(iv) whethet the opinion is from a specialist; and (v) other factors brought to the Social Security
Administtation's attention that tend to support ot contadict the opinion. Id.
(6);
see
al¡o 20 C.F'.R. S 41,6.927
S 404.1527
(c)Q)-
(c)Q)-$).
Significantly, as subsections (2) thtough (4) of the rule desctibe in great detail, a treating
source's opinion, like all medical opinions, must be both well-suppotted by medical signs and
laboratory findings as well as consistent with the other substantial evidence in the case tecord.
Id. S 404.1,527 (Ç)Q)-$);
see
also
20 C.F.R. S 41,6.927 (c)Q)-Ø).
"lI)f
a
physician's opinion is not
supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with othet substantial evidence, it should
SSR 96-2p provides that "[c]ontrolling weight may not be given to a treating source's medical
opinion unless the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and labotatory diagnostic
techniques." SSR 96-2p,1996 lfl- 3741.88, at x1 (July 2,1996). However, whete "atreat)ng source's
medical opinion is well-suppotted and not inconsistent with the othet substantial evidence in the case
tecotd, it must be given conttolling weight[.]" 1/. SSR 96-5p provides furthet that"tteatins source
opinions on issues resewed to the Commissionera;re never entitled to controlling werght or special
signifi.cance." SSR 96-5p, 199ó lfl- 3741.83, at x1 (|uly 2, 7996). However, "opinions from any
medical source about issues resewed to the Commissionet must never be þored, and . . . the notice
of the determination or decision must explain the consideration given to the tteating source's
opinion(s)." 1/.
'
6
be accorded significantly less weight." Craigu. Chater,76F.3d 585, 590 (4th Cir. 1,996);
Mastro,270 F.3d
^t
accord
1"78. Opinions by physicians regarding the ultimate issue of whethet a
plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the Act nevet teceive conttolling weight because
the decision on that issue temains fot the Commissioner alone. 20 C.F.R.
SS 404.1527(d),
41,6.927(d).
Plaintiff relies upon two medical source statements ptovided by Dr. Smith. In one
stâtement regarding chronic fatigue, Dr. Smith noted that Plaintiff could only work 4 houts a
day with frequent bteaks, and no occasional
ot frequent lifting. CIr. 399-400.) In anothet
medical statement, Dr. Smith indicated that Plaintiff was expetiencing severe pain in her left
arm and shouldet, and could only occasionally lift less than 10 pounds. (Tt. 405-08.) This
statement also indicated that Plaintiff could sit, stand and walk without limitations. (Tt. 406.)
Here, the ALJ gave Jimited weight to opinions of Dr. Smith, as they were based upon Plaintiffls
own subjective statements and "appeat[ed] to fest at least in patt on an assessment of
impairments outside [Dr. Smith's] area of expertise."
fit.
18.) The A,LJ found that Plaintiffs
subjective complaints were concerning, and that Dt. Smith's opinions were "inconsistent with
other substantial evidence in the case tecotd." Qd.)
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision to afford less than conttolling weight
to Dr. Smith. Based upon referrals dating back to 2007, the record indicates that Dr. Smith
and Plaintiff may have had a long-standing úeating relationship. Howevet, the office
treâtment notes of record provided by Dr. Smith reflect only a one-time visit inJune 2014
392-gg),and medical source statements during the same time pedod.
Çl
Pr. 399-408.) Although
Dr. Smith stated that Plarntiff was experiencing cervical spine pain and left uppet exmemity
7
pain (specifìcally noting left upper humerus with tighted.g), she also opined that Plaintiff had
notmal tone and motor strength, no contractures, malalignment, tenderness,
or
bony
abnormalities, and normal movement of all extremities. (Tr. 398.) Moreover, beyond theJune
2014 assessment, there appears to be no further evidence of cervical spine andf or left upper
exffemity pain, which is seemingly the pdmary basis for Dt. Smith's opinion. Plaintiff atgues
that the medical source statements completed by Dt. Smith dudng the same time petiod
indicate that Plaintiff cannot perform the full tange of sedentary wotk, nor can Plaintiff work
on a sustained, continuous basis. pocket Entry 10 at 10.) Plaintiffs argument ignotes the
fact that it is the ALJ, not Dr. Smith, who is tesponsible for detetmining Plaintiffs RFC and
making a ftnal disabiliry determination here. Praitt u. Coluin, No. 5:13-CV-001,24-MOC,2014
WL 1713832, at *3 CX/.D.N.C. Apr. 30,201.4) (unpublished) (citing 20 C.F.R.
S 404.1546(b))
("The ALJ is solely responsible for detetmining the RFC of a claimant)');
see also
Bamhørt, 392
tr3d 988, 994 (8th Cir. 2005) ("fA]lthough
E,lli¡
u.
medical soutce opinions ate
considered in assessing RFC, the final determination of RFC is left to the Commissioner.");
SSR 96-5P ,1,996
WL
37 41,83,
at*2 ('ff]reating soutce opinions on issues tbat
are reserved
to
the Commissioner are never entitled to conuolling weight ot special significance.").
Dudng the televant period fot her disability claim, Plaintiffs medical history consists
mostly of treatment tegarding het Gtaves' disease and thyroid cate. (See"ft. 280-294;297-98;
299-331,.) Even as to her thyroid condition, Plaintiff has not always been in compliance with
treatment. (SeeTr.300 (Plaintiff "has been somewhat noncompliant with her medications in
the past");
Tt. 305 (Plaintiff "admits to noncompliance with her Synthtoid and will go days
without taking
it")).
Medical evidence also reveals that het condition was manageable when
8
Plaintiff comptied with treatment insttuctions.
(See
Tt. 328-29 (noting that Plaintiff "has been
A{
doing well"); Tr. 355 (noting that "[s]ymptons are stabtre")). The
concluded that Plaintiffs
inconsistencies "suggests that her symptoms may not have been as serious as has been alleged
in connection with fPlaintiffs disability claim]." Qr.17.)
In sum, the ALJ did not ertor in assigning limited weight to Dr. Smith
evidence supports her findings as to these opinions. Mastro
u.
Apfel, 210 F.3d
as substantial
^t
178
("fflh.
ALJ holds the discretion to give less werght to the testimony of a tteattne physician in the face
of persuasive contrary evidence.");
see
also Parrish u. Coluin,
No. 1:09CV845, 201'4WL31'07292,
at x4 (NI.D.N.C. July 7 ,201,4) (unpublished) ("The ALJ did not err by noting that fthe tteating
physician's] objective clinical findings failed to support het proposed limitations and that they
conflicted with other medical evidence and the tecord as a whole."); Breed u. Coluin, No.
1:10CV583 ,201,3
21,5
WL 3717140, at *5 (À4.D.N.C. July 12,201,3),
sabseqaentþ aiad, 592 F.
App'x
(4th Cu.201,5) ("The ALJ's assessment of fthe tteating physician's] opinion is supported
by substantial evidence."); Chauis u. Coluin,No. 1:11CV771,,201,3WL7853486, at *6 (À{.D.N.C.
Mar. 4,201,3) (unpublished)
assessments, does
("[]he
record, including [the treating physician's] own medical
not demonstrate a limitation . . . as suggested in fthe treating physician's]
medical source statement.").
B. Plaintiffls Credibility
Next Plaintiff argues that the ALJ ered in het determination of Plaintiffs credibility.
pocket Ent y 1,0 at 1,0-13.) The Fourth Circuit Coutt of Appeals has adopted a two-step
process by which the ALJ must evaluate a claknant's symptoms. First, the ALJ must determine
if the plaintifÎs medically documented impaitments could reasonably be expected to cause het
9
alleged symptoms
.
C*tg, 16 F.3d at 594. The second step includes an evaluation of subiective
cvidence, considedng the claimant's "statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of [the claimant's] symptoms."
41,6.929(c)(4) and
Id.
at
595 (citing
20 C.F.R. SS
a0a.1,529(Q(). "The ALJ must consider the following: (1) a claimant's
testimony and other statements concerning pain ot othet subjective complaints; (2) claimant's
medical history andlal¡or.atory findings; (3) any objective medical evidence of pain;and (4) any
other evidence relevant
to the severity of the impairment." Grwb@
u. Attrue, No.
1:09cv364,2010 ìØL 5553671 ,at x3 CX/.D.N.C. Nov. 18, 201,0) (unpublished) (citing Craig 76
F.3d at 595;20 C.F'.R. $ 404.1529(c). "Other evidence" refets to factors such as claimant's
daily activities, duration and frequency of pain, treatment other than medication teceived fot
relief of symptoms, and any other measures used to telieve claimant's alleged patn. Id. SSR
96-7p, Assessing rhe Credibilitl of an IndiuidaalJ Statemenîr, also insttucts the ALJ to "consider the
entire case record" and requires a credibility determination to "contain specific reâsons for the
finding on ctedibility, supported by the evidence in the case record[.]" SSR 96-7p. An ALJ's
credibility determination receives "substantial defetence." Saltre u. Chater, No.95-3080,1.991
lx"l- 232305, at*1. (4th Cir. May 8, 1,997) (unpublished).
Here, at step one, the ALJ found that "fPlaintiff] does have sevete impafuments that
could reasonably be expected to produce some of the symptoms she alleges if she failed to
follow her medical regimen or attempted to exceed het residual functional capacityf.]"
Gt
16.) At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiffs "allegations as to the intensity, persistence
and limiting effects
of these symptoms are disptoportionate and not consistent with
the
coroborating evidence." Qd.) The ALJ's decision is suppotted by substantial evidence. At
10
the hearing, Plaintiff testified concerning her constant feeling
of fatigue, and having blutry
vision, heart palpitations, and migaines stemming from the Graves' disease.
Plaintiff stated that she always adhered to treatment instructions.
(It. 46.)
(lr.
37-38.)
However,
as
previously noted, Plaintiffs own medical documentation indicates some lapses in treatment
compliance. (Tr. 47-48;300;305.) Plaintiff testified as to debilitating knee pain.
Plaintiff sought treatment for her knee pain
(It.
(Ir. 334-38;339-343;344-348),howevet
a
39-40.)
physical
therapy dischatge summârT indicated Plaintiff had "poor attendance" ànd that her "þ]oals
v¡ere not
met." Qr. 3a9) This again highlights a point of noncompltance from Plaintiff
as
it
relates to her medical treatment. Additionally, Plaintiffs subjective complaints of her alleged
disabling condition are discredited by her own testimony of daily living acttvíty including her
ability to prepâre simple meals, handle personal finances, perform household chores u¡ith
assistance, go
walking and grocery shopping, attend church and socialize with ftiends.
(It.
44-45;232-39.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ "misapplied the Foutth Circuit pain standard by dismissing
[Plaintiffs] subjective complaints
as inconsistent
with the record." (Docket Etttry
Plaintiff relies upon Hines u. Bamhart, where the Fowth Circuit found the ALJ in
1.0
at 12.)
erot fot
"requir[ing] objective evidence that [claimant's] pain was so intense as to pïevent him ftom
working an eight hour day." 453 F.3d at 563-64. However, the coutt also held noted that
\X4rile objective evidence is not mandatory at the second step of the test,
[t]his is not to say, however,thatobjective medical evidence and othet objective
evidence are not crucial to evaluating the intensity and persistence of a
claimant's pain and the extent to which it impairs her ability to wotk. They most
certainly are. Although a claimant's allegations about her pain may not be
discredited solely because they are not substantiated by objective evidence of
the pain itself or its severity, they need not be accepted to the extent they ate
11.
inconsistent with the available evidence, including objective evidence of the
underþing impairment, and the extent to which that impairment can reasonably
bc cxpected to cause the pain the claimant alleges she suffets.
Id. at 565 n.3 (citing Cmig 76 F.3d at 595). "Hine¡ does not nnþel ALJs to considet only
subjective evidence
^t
p^rt two of the credibility
assessment, âs such a requirement conflicts
with the regulations, which plainly tequire ALJs to consider a variety of factors in evaluating
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of pain." I-.ongu. Coluin, No. 1:13CV0659,2015
WL
1,31,291.9,
2015
\rL
atx5 (À{.D.N.C. Mar. 24,2015),
1,646985 O{.D.N.C.
Apt.
report and recommendation adoþted,
No. 1:13CV659,
1.4,201,5) (citing 20 C.F.R. S 404.1.529(c) (emphasis in
original)). Here, the ALJ considered Plaintiffs testimony, along with medical recotds and
Plaintiffs notable treatment noncompliance. To the extent Plaintiffs subjective complaints
were "inconsistent with the available evidence," the ALJ was not requited to accept them.
Daneron u. Coluin,
559 F.
App'*
analysis
245
No. 1:09-CV-425,201.3 WL 1909870, at *3 (À4.D.N.C. May 8, 201'3), aÍfd,
(4th Cft. 201,4) (citing Hines, 453 F.3d at 565). "In sum, the ALJ's ctedibility
. . . complies with the regulations and Founh Citcuit lav/."
1:13CV1150, 201.5
WL
4460348,
Ptaintifls atgument Fails.
Mason u. Coluin,
No.
at x6 (À4.D.N.C. July 21, 2015) (unpublished). Thus,
See Hewett
u. Coluin,
(IVI.D.N.C. treb. 22,201,6) (unpublished)
No. 1:14CV684,
201.6
WL 715793, ú
*5
("p]he Court cannot find that the ,A.LJ selectively
cited the record to inaccurately find an inconsistency as it Hines, or that the ALJ placed undue
emphasis on Plaintiffs described daily activities."); Bell u. Coluin, No. 1:10CV709, 201'5 WL
419870, at
*8 (À{.D.N.C. Feb. 2,
201,5) (unpublished) (finding that
"the ALJ did, in fact,
properþ consider objective medical evidence conttary to þ]laintiffs claims in conjunction
with the subjective evidence
as
requited by Hinef').
72
V. CONCLUSION
After a careful consideration of the evidence of tecord, the Court finds that the
Commissioner's decision is suppoted by substantial evidence and was teached based upon a
correct application
of the relevant law. Accotdingly, this Coutt RECOMMENDS
that
DENIED,
that
PlaintifPs Motion for Judgmenr on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 9) be
Defendant's Motion fot Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entty 72) be GRANTED, and
that the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld.
LW&t*r
$mmr h{4gi*mùûJudgË
Novembet 14,2016
Durham, North Catolina
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?