BYNUM v. POOLE
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION as to OLANDER R. BYNUM, signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 11/17/2016, that for the reasons stated herein, RECOMMENDED that the Court GRANT Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default (Docket Ent ry 13 ) and that the Clerk's entry of default (Docket Entry 11 ) be set aside. FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Plaintiff's Motion for Compensation and Motion for Judgment Due to Default (Docket Entry 15 ). (Butler, Carol)
IN THE UNITBD STATES DISTRIÇT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
OL,A.NDER R.
B\î]UM,
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v
KATY POOLE,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
1:15CV960
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter comes before the Coun upon Defendant IQty Poole's Motion to Set r{.side
Errtry of Default. (Docket entry 1,3.) Also before the Cout is Plaintiff Olander R. Bynum's
"Motion for Compensation and Motion forJudgment Due to Default." pocket Entry
15.)
The matters are rþe for disposition. For the following reasons, it is recommended that the
Court
gra;nt
Defendant's motion and deny Plaintifls motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, pro
U.S.C. S 1983
se,
filed this action on November 16, 201,5 alleging a violation utder 42
of Plaintiffs
teligrous
dghts.
(See generalþ
Complaint, Docket F,ntty 2.)
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant "approved the cancellation
lsligious services
-
services otherwise scheduled to take place
þpdl
of all non-Chdstian
3,201,5]
-in
honot of
'Good Ftiday'a Christian holiday." (Id.ÍlV.) Plaintiff is a devout Muslim, and he participates
in 'Juma Service." (Id.) Plnntiff alleges thatJuma Service was held every Friday, except,A.pril
3,201,5, which was Good Friday. Qd.) Plaintiff seeks punitive damages ftom Defendant for
"daringto distespect Islam
as has been done so overdy
in this câse." (1/. T VI.)
On Septemb er 1.2,201,6,the Clerk entered default against Defendant pursuant to Rule
55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for neithet filing an answer not otherwise
responding in this matter. (Docket Entry 11.) On September 1,9,201,6, Defendant filed het
pending motion. (Docket Entry 13.)
In support of het motion, Defendant submitted
an
afftdavitalong with Caitlin Brooks, .Associate Genetal Counsel in the General Counsel's Office
of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety ('NCDPS GCO"). pocket Entries
1,,
14-
with the sulrunons and complaint in this action
1,4-2.) Defendant contends that an envelope
was forwarded to her office at the Scotland Cortectional Institution on March 1,,201,6. (Poole
.A.ff. T 7, Docket
E.,t y 1,4-1.) She never signed a receipt of the envelope. (Id.) Upon
information and belief Defendant asserts that the envelope was signed by "L. Mclver" in the
ptison mailroom.
(d.)
After teceiving the summons and complaint, Defendant directed het
assistant to noti$r the NCDPS GCO to assist in the mattef. (1d.118.) Defendant assetts that
she nevet teceived a response
needed to take further
action.
ftom the NCDPS GCO that would indicate that Defendant
(1d.111,0.) Thus,
Defendant mistakenly believed that this matter
had been tesolved until she received notice of the Entty
of Default on September
1,6,201.6.
(Id.nÍ.)
Attotney Btooks at the NCDPS GCO indicated that she teceived notice of the pending
action on Match 3, 201,6. (Brooks Aff. T 5, Docket E.rtry 1,4-2.) She indicates that she
inadvertently ovedooked the notice at the time, and though not an excuse, the notmal ptocess
for summonses is that they are sent directly to the North Carolina Attorney Genetal's Office.
2
(Id.
n 9.) Attorney Brooks took responsibility for the mistake and furthet
stated that
Defendant should not be held tesponsible. (Id.1l11,.)
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default
Pursuant to the Fedetal Rules of Civil Ptocedute, "[t]he Court may set aside an entry
of
default for good cause[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). The Foutth Circuit has held that cettain factors
must be considered to determine
if there is "good cause" to set aside an entry of default
whethet the moving party has a meritorious defense, (2) whether
(1)
it acts with reasonable
promptness, (3) the personal tesponsibility of the defaulting patty, (4) the prejudice to the
party, (5) whethet there is a history of dilatory action, and (6) the availability of sanctions less
drastic. Palne ex re/. Estate of Calqada
u. Brake, 439
F.3d 1,98,204-05 (4th Cir. 2006).
"Aty
doubts about whethet telief should be granted should be tesolved in favor of setting aside the
default so that the case may be heard on the merits." Tolson u. Hodgq 411 F.2d 123, 130 (4th
Cir.1'969) (citation omitted). Resolution of motions made under Rules 55(c) "is amattet which
lies largely within the disctetion of the trial judge[.]" Consol. Masonry dz Fireproofing Inc.
u.
Il/agnan Const. Corþ.,383F.2d249,251, (4th Cir. 1961).
Considering the factors ín Pa1ne, the
be granted. The Court
ftst
Cout concludes that Defendant's motion should
considets whether Defendant has raised a medtorious defense.
Plaintiffs complaint is essentially alleging a violation of his constitutional dght to fteely exetcise
his teligion. Q)ocket F;nty
2.) Defendant
asserts that incarceration does
not sttip ptisonets
ftom all constitutional dghts, but such dghts may be "curtailed in furtherance of the legitimate
goals of a cortectional institution, including the need to maintain internal security." (Docket
J
Etttty
1,4
at3.)
Case law supports this argument. See e.9., Bell u. IWolfth,441 U.S. 520,546 (1979)
("fM]aintaining institutional security and preserving internal ordet and discipline are essential
goals that may require limitation
ot
retr.action
convicted prisoners and ptettial detainees )');
see
of the retained constitutional tights of both
al¡o Haase u. Vaøght, 993
F.2d 1079, 1082 (4th
Clr. 1,993) ("A. detainee's Fitst Amendment rþhts may be restticted in the intetest of prison
security."); Nchardson u. Irons,877 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989) ("Prison officials may restict the
practice of religion whete the restriction is reasonably related to legitimate secutity concetns.").
Moteover, the Supreme Coutt has held that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates'
constitutional dghts, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests." Tømer a. SofltJ,482 U.S. 78,89 (1987). Defendant also cites case law wheteby coutts
give some deference as to decision-making by pdson officials regarding pdson administration.
See
Ta/or
u.
Freenøn,34 F.3d 266,268 (4th Cir. 1994)
("It is well established that
absent the
most extraotdinary circumstances, federal coutts ate not to immetse themselves in the
management of state prisons or substitute their judgment for that of the trained penologicai
authodties chatged with the administration
of such facilities."). Defendant also relies upon
other defenses, including immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, and the possibility that
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Docket Entty 1,4 at 4-5.) After
teviewing the totality of such arguments, the Court concludes that Defendant has proffered a
potentially meritorious defense, which weighs in favor of Defendant.
As to the second and thitd factors, both weigh in favot of Defendant. Defendant acted
with reasonable promptness in filing the pending motion within days of teceiving the notice
of entry of default. Additionally, the affidavits
4
demonsúate that Defendant's personal
responsibility
reasonable
for her failure to
respond
in this matter
was minimal. Defendant acted
in assuming that the matter would be tesolved once forwarded to the NCDPS
GCO. Thus, these factots weigh in favot of setting aside the default.
The remainiûg factors also weigh in favor of Defendant. Considedng the
fouth factot,
Plaintiff would not be prejudiced by setting aside the default in this action. Plaintiff has not
cited any patticular prejudicial effect, not does the Coutt find that this matter would be
adversely impacted by setting aside the default.
ì7ith respect to the fifth and sixth factots,
there is no history of dilatory conduct on the part of Defendant, and less dtastic sanctions are
available to remedy Defendant's tardiness. Thus, for good cause shown, and because the
televant factots weigh
in favot of setting aside the default, Defendant's motion should be
gtanted.
B. Plaintiffs Motion for Compensation
and Motion fotJudgment Due to Default
Plaintiff has fi,led a motion seeking default judgment against Defendant and to
be
compensated by Defendant for Plaintiffls pun ar,d suffering as a result of the alleged incident.
(Docket Entry 15.1) Because the Coutt recoÍunends that entry of default against Defendant
should be set aside in this matter, Plaintiffs motion should be denied.
I
The Court also notes that Plaintiff has filed a supplement to this motion which the Court has
consideted. (Jøe Docket F,;nty 1,7.)
5
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein,
IT IS HEREBY RECQMMENDED
that the Coutt
GRANT Defendant's Motion to Set Aside E.rt y of Default (Docket Errtry 1,3) andthat the
Cletk's entry of default (Docket Errry 11) be set aside.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMBNDED
that the Coun DENIY Plaintiffs Motion
fot Compensation and Motion fotJudgment Due to Default pocket Entry
15).
\Tebster
U
November 17,2076
Durham, Noth Catohna
6
States Magistrate Judge
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