R.S. V. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WOODS CHARTER SCHOOL COMPANY, ET AL.
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge L. Patrick Auld on 01/24/2017. Plaintiffs request to conduct ESI Discovery is DENIED.The parties promptly consult regarding the future course of proceedings in this case and, on or before February 14, 2017, file a joint report setting out their shared or differing views about a schedule for conducting mediation, as well as filing the administrative record and dispositive motions.Defendants Rule 26(f) Report (Docket Entry #12 ) and Plaintiffs Rule 26(f) Report (Docket Entry #15 ) are terminated. (Coyne, Michelle)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
R.S., by and through his father,
RONALD E. SOLTES,
Plaintiff,
v.
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WOODS
CHARTER SCHOOL COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.
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1:16cv119
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the parties’ proposed
discovery plans.
(See Docket Entries 12, 15.)
In his proposal,
Plaintiff seeks discovery of the electronically stored information
(the “ESI Discovery”) of Defendant Woods Charter School (“Defendant
WCS”).
(See Docket Entry 15 at 1.)1
Defendant WCS and Defendant
Board of Directors of Woods Charter School Company (collectively,
the “Defendants”) oppose such discovery.
1
(See Docket Entry 12 at
Specifically, Plaintiff requests permission to conduct
discovery of the “metadata” associated with the electronic
documents that Defendant WCS previously produced to Plaintiff in
PDF format. (See Docket Entry 16 at 4, 8 (alleging that Defendant
WCS produced thousands of documents to Plaintiff in PDF format,
that “[n]one of [Defendant] WCS’[s] production was produced in
native format and therefore no metadata was produced to Plaintiff,”
and that, “[b]y providing all discovery in PDF format, [Defendant]
WCS ensured that [Plaintiff] would not have access to any of the
metadata embedded in the original emails and documents”); Docket
Entry 18 at 3 (requesting leave to conduct further electronic
discovery and providing proposed “Procedures & Protocol to be
implemented in the production of electronic documents previously
directed to Defendant [WCS]”).)
1 (“propos[ing] that no discovery is needed”).)
For the reasons
that follow, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request for ESI
Discovery.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
This
case
involves
claims
under
the
Individuals
with
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (the “IDEA”).
(See
Docket
Entry
1
at
2.)
The
IDEA
and
its
accompanying
regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 300 et seq., oblige all states that
receive federal funds for education to provide a “free appropriate
public education” (“FAPE”) to each child with a disability.
20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.101(a). “The FAPE
guaranteed
by
the
IDEA
must
provide
a
disabled
meaningful access to the educational process.”
child
with
Y.B. v. Board of
Educ. of Prince George’s Cty., 895 F. Supp. 2d 689, 692 (D. Md.
2012) (citing Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch.
Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982)).
“To assure delivery of a FAPE, the IDEA requires a school
district to provide an appropriate Individualized Education Program
(‘IEP’) for each child determined to be learning disabled.” Id. at
693 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)).
If the child’s parents deem the
provided IEP unsatisfactory, they may present complaints “with
respect to any matter related to the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of the child, or the provision of a [FAPE] to
such child.”
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A).
-2-
Upon lodging those
complaints, the parents may further seek a due process hearing
conducted by the state or local educational agency.
20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f).
In North Carolina, the Office of Administrative Hearings (the
“OAH”) conducts the due process hearing (the “OAH Hearing”).
Gen. Stat. § 115C–109.6(a).
N.C.
Litigants before the OAH may utilize
any means of discovery available pursuant to the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 (the “N.C.
Rules”).
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-28 (discussing permitted
discovery in North Carolina administrative hearings, and stating
that “[p]arties in contested cases may engage in discovery pursuant
to the provisions of the [N.C. Rules]”).
An administrative law
judge (the “ALJ”) resolves discovery disputes,
presides over the
OAH Hearing, and issues a final determination. See N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 150B-33, 150B-34(a).
After
the
ALJ’s
issuance
of
a
final
determination,
any
aggrieved party may “fil[e] a written notice of appeal with the
person designated by the State Board [of Education].”
Stat. § 115C–109.9(a).
N.C. Gen.
The State Board of Education then appoints
a State Review Officer (the “SRO”) to conduct an impartial review
of the ALJ’s decision.
Id.
A dissatisfied party may then
challenge the SRO’s decision in either state or federal court. See
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-109.9(d); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
-3-
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At Plaintiff’s request, an OAH Hearing and related proceedings
(the
“OAH
Proceeding”)
took
place
to
address
Plaintiff’s
allegations that Defendant WCS denied him a FAPE pursuant to the
IDEA and “concomitant provisions of North Carolina law applicable
to the education of children with disabilities, N.C. Gen. Stat. §
115C-106.1 et seq.” (Docket Entry 1 at 2); specifically, Plaintiff
and Defendant WCS engaged in written discovery, conducted numerous
depositions, filed multiple discovery motions, and obtained rulings
on those motions from the Honorable Sidney S. Eagles, Jr., the ALJ
who presided over the OAH Proceeding (“ALJ Eagles”) (see, e.g.,
Docket Entry 17-1 (providing copy of ALJ Eagles’s discovery order
resolving six discovery motions, noting occurrence of seven prior
depositions, and establishing deposition schedule for remaining
witnesses).
(See also Docket Entry 12 at 1 (“Th[e OAH P]roceeding
included a full discovery process including written discovery,
depositions,
multiple
discovery
motions
and
rulings
on
those
motions.”); Docket Entry 16 at 5 (“[ALJ Eagles] presided over a 14day administrative due process hearing in th[is] matter.”).)
Upon the close of discovery, ALJ Eagles conducted the OAH
Hearing
and
issued
a
final
decision,
“finding
in
[Plaintiff] and against [Defendant] WCS on all issues.”
Entry 16 at 5.)
favor
of
(Docket
Defendant WCS appealed, and an SRO issued an
-4-
opinion “affirming in part, but mostly reversing” ALJ Eagles.
(Id.)
Plaintiff then filed his Complaint (Docket Entry 1) in this
Court against Defendants and “Does 1 to 10” (id. at 1), seeking
review of the SRO’s decision (see id. at 34-47).
The Complaint alleges that the SRO erred in reversing ALJ
Eagles’s decision, by, inter alia:
1. “appl[ying]
¶ 116);
the
wrong
standard
of
review”
(id.,
2. “determin[ing] that ALJ Eagles’[s] findings were not
regularly made and not entitled to be considered prima
facie correct” (id., ¶ 117);
3. failing to “make sufficient citations of the record to
support his findings” (id., ¶ 118);
4. “unilaterally decid[ing] which issues he was going to
review, reformulat[ing] the issues and . . . add[ing] an
additional issue that was not raised by either party”
(id., ¶ 119);
5. incorrectly applying the statute of limitations for
IDEA violations (id., ¶ 120);
6. “finding that [Defendant]
[Plaintiff’s p]arents regarding
(id., ¶ 122);
WCS consulted with
comparable services”
7.
failing
to
afford
ALJ
Eagles’s
credibility
determinations appropriate deference (id., ¶ 126);
8. finding that Defendant WCS provided services
comparable to that in Plaintiff’s previously issued IEP
(id., ¶ 128);
9. finding that Defendant WCS’s holding an IEP meeting
without Plaintiff’s parents did not violate the IDEA
(id., ¶ 129);
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10. finding that Plaintiff’s parents “were not denied the
opportunity to participate in the development of
[Plaintiff’s] IEP” (id., ¶ 132);
11. finding that Plaintiff did not “lose educational
opportunity” when “[Defendant] WCS violated the IDEA by
changing [Plaintiff]’s placement without first providing
prior written notice to [Plaintiff’s p]arents” (id.,
¶ 134);
12. “determin[ing] that [Defendant] WCS did not have to
hold a manifestation determination prior to changing
[Plaintiff]’s placement” (id., ¶ 135);
13. “misappl[ying] and substitut[ing] his own version of
the law to hold that any award of compensatory education
should be reduced due to [Plaintiff’s p]arent’s failure
to provide ten (10) days’ notice that they were enrolling
[Plaintiff] in home school” (id., ¶ 137); and
14. “finding that [Plaintiff’s p]arents were afforded the
right to meaningfully participate in the process of
providing FAPE to [Plaintiff]” (id., ¶ 138).
Defendants answered (Docket Entry 8), and the parties filed
their opposing discovery proposals (Docket Entries 12, 15).
The
Court held an initial pretrial conference on the opposing discovery
proposals and, at its conclusion, “instructed [Plaintiff] to file
a twenty (20) page brief no later than September 19, 2016, that
identifies exactly what discovery [P]laintiff wants to do, etc.”
(Minute Entry dated Aug. 29, 2016.)
-6-
After Plaintiff made his
filing (Docket Entry 16),2 Defendants responded (Docket Entry 17),
and Plaintiff replied (Docket Entry 18).
ANALYSIS
The IDEA provides that a federal court reviewing a state
administrative decision “(i) shall receive the records of the
administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at
the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the
preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court
determines is appropriate.”
added).
Because
the
IDEA
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) (emphasis
authorizes
courts
to
hear
only
“additional evidence” to supplement the administrative record, the
scope of discovery in IDEA cases remains limited. See Rodriguez v.
Independent Sch. Dist. of Boise City, No. 1, No. 1:12-CV-390, 2013
WL 943838, at *3 (D. Idaho Mar. 11, 2013) (concluding that “limited
discovery
is available”
in
IDEA
cases).
“The
party seeking
discovery must identify for the district court the particular
discovery sought, how the discovery is directly relevant to the
specific issue or issues raised in the complaint challenging the
[SRO’s] decision, and how the discovery is neither cumulative nor
duplicative
of
the
evidence
introduced
2
in
the
administrative
Plaintiff filed his brief late. (See Docket Entry 16 (filed
September 20, 2016).) Plaintiff has not requested permission to
file a late brief. (See Docket Entries dated Aug. 29, 2016, to
present).) The Court nonetheless has considered Plaintiff’s brief
and related filings.
-7-
proceedings.”
Id. at *1.
The relevance of a discovery request
turns on whether the discovery could lead to the disclosure of
“additional evidence” that a party could use to supplement the
administrative record.
See id. at *4 (“‘To prepare for presenting
supplemental evidence, discovery may be undertaken as in any other
civil case.
Its scope is limited to the type of evidence which a
court has no discretion to admit at trial.
Discovery must relate
to matters that are relevant to the review.’” (quoting James A.
Rapp, Education Law, 4–10C § 10C.12 (2012))); see also id. at *4
n.1 (noting that, when a party seeks to compel discovery in an IDEA
case, that party must “explain why supplementation is necessary,”
and that the recognized categories of “additional evidence” provide
“a good starting point” for that explanation).
To avoid undermining the administrative proceeding, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has construed the
term “additional evidence” narrowly. Springer v. Fairfax Cty. Sch.
Bd., 134 F.3d 659, 667 (4th Cir. 1998).
In Springer, the Fourth
Circuit explained that “[a] lax interpretation of ‘additional
evidence’ would reduce the proceedings before the state agency to
a mere dress rehearsal by allowing appellants to transform the
[IDEA]’s judicial review mechanism into an unrestricted trial de
novo.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Springer Court
further
explained
that
“[a]
lenient
standard
for
additional
evidence would [thus] have the consequence of making the whole IDEA
-8-
process more time consuming, as parties scrambled to use the
federal court proceeding to patch up holes in their administrative
case.”
Id.
exclusion
of
The Springer Court therefore reasoned that the
evidence
available
during
the
administrative
proceeding “properly encourages thorough administrative review of
special education disputes,” “facilitates the resolution of these
disputes sooner rather than later,” and “advances the aims of
Congress in [IDEA].”
Id. (affirming district court’s decision not
to admit witness’s testimony as “additional evidence” under 20
U.S.C. § 1415 because the witness remained available to testify
during the administrative process).
Pursuant
to
this
reasoning,
courts
routinely
limit
the
introduction of “additional evidence” to address circumstances that
remained
beyond
a
party’s
proceeding, such as:
F.
Supp.
2d
at
control
during
the
administrative
(1) “unavailability of a witness,” Y.B., 895
703
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted),
(2)
“evidence concerning relevant events occurring subsequent to the
administrative hearing,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted),
(3) evidence that “the requesting party could not have, by due
diligence,
discovered
.
.
.
in
time
to
offer
it
at
the
administrative hearing,” Brandon H. ex rel. Richard H. v. Kennewick
Sch. Dist. No. 17, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1179 (E.D. Wash. 2000), (4)
“evidence [that] was improperly excluded from the administrative
hearing,” id., or (5) “evidence [that] is needed to repair gaps in
-9-
the administrative transcript caused by mechanical failure,” id.;
see also Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ. for Com. of
Mass.,
736
F.2d
773,
790
supplementation
will
vary;
administrative
transcript
(1st
Cir.
they
1984)
might
owing
to
(“The
include
reasons
gaps
mechanical
in
for
the
failure,
unavailability of a witness, an improper exclusion of evidence by
the administrative agency, and evidence concerning relevant events
occurring subsequent to the administrative hearing.”), aff’d sub
nom., School Comm. of the Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Department
of Educ. for Com. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
party
bears
the
threshold
burden
of
“The requesting
demonstrating
that
supplemental evidence should be admitted on these bases.”
895 F. Supp. 2d at 703.
the
Y.B.,
Ultimately, the district court possesses
discretion “to limit the introduction of ‘additional evidence’
under the IDEA.” Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 554 F.3d 470,
476 (4th Cir. 2009).
In this case, Plaintiff fails to identify the direct relevance
of the ESI Discovery to the specific issues raised in the Complaint
challenging the SRO’s decision, or how the ESI Discovery could lead
to the disclosure of “additional evidence” that he could use to
supplement the administrative record.
Plaintiff
has not
shown
that
the
With regard to relevance,
ESI
Discovery
qualifies
as
directly relevant to the specific issues raised in the Complaint
challenging the SRO’s decision.
(See Docket Entries 15, 16, 18.)
-10-
For instance, Plaintiff does not allege that the ESI Discovery will
prove that the SRO applied the wrong standard of review, gave
insufficient weight to ALJ Eagles’s findings of fact, failed to
sufficiently cite to the record, or misapplied the statute of
limitations for IDEA violations.
(See Docket Entries 15, 16, 18.)
Instead, Plaintiff presents the conclusory contention that he needs
the ESI Discovery “[i]n order to successfully obtain an [o]rder
reversing
the
[d]ecision
Eagles’s d]ecision.”
of
the
[SRO],
and
reinstating
[ALJ
(Docket Entry 16 at 8.)
Plaintiff also has not identified how the ESI Discovery could
lead to the disclosure of “additional evidence” to supplement the
administrative record.
For example, Plaintiff has not established
that the ESI Discovery involves the testimony of witnesses that
remained unavailable during the OAH Proceeding, relevant events
that occurred after the OAH Proceeding, evidence that the ALJ
improperly excluded from the OAH Hearing, or evidence necessary to
repair gaps in the OAH Hearing transcript caused by mechanical
failure.
(See, e.g., Docket Entry 16 at 8 (contending that
Plaintiff needs the ESI Discovery in order to have access to
specific categories of information, but providing no explanation
for how that information could qualify as “additional evidence”).)
Likewise, Plaintiff has not established that the ESI Discovery
will lead to the disclosure of evidence that he could not have,
with due diligence, obtained in time to offer at the OAH Hearing.
-11-
In that regard, Plaintiff and Defendant WCS engaged in extensive
discovery in the OAH Proceeding.
(See, e.g., id. at 4 (noting that
Defendant WCS produced 8,839 documents during the OAH Proceeding);
Docket Entry 17-1 (providing copy of ALJ Eagles’s discovery order
resolving
six
Plaintiff’s
discovery
“First
Set
motions).)
of
That
Interrogatories
discovery
and
included
Requests
for
Production of Documents and Things” (Docket Entry 16-1 at 8) (the
“First Production Request”) in which Plaintiff originally requested
the ESI Discovery.3
Plaintiff then pursued the First Production Request with a
“Motion to Compel Further Production of Documents” (Docket Entry
17-2) (the “Motion to Compel”), but did not specifically seek to
compel production of the ESI Discovery.
In other words, Plaintiff
knew about the ESI Discovery prior to the OAH Hearing, but chose
not to pursue its production in the OAH Proceeding (through the
Motion to Compel or otherwise); as a result, Plaintiff cannot show
the requisite due diligence.
See generally E.C. v. Lewisville
Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:11-CV-56, 2012 WL 1070131, at *2 (E.D.
3
Plaintiff does not dispute that the First Production Request
included a request for the ESI Discovery. (See, e.g., Docket Entry
16 at 4 (“None of [Defendant] WCS’[s] production was produced in
native format and therefore no metadata was produced to Plaintiff
as requested in [Plaintiff]’s First [Production Request].”); see
also Docket Entry 16-1 at 14, ¶ 27 (providing copy of the First
Production Request, which sought “[a]ny metadata associated with
the [requested] documents which are stored in an electronic
format”).)
-12-
Tex. Mar. 29, 2012) (“Section 1415’s requirement that the [c]ourt
consider additional evidence upon the request of a party does not
apply to any evidence that was available or readily discoverable at
the time of the administrative hearing.”).
Plaintiff has contended that certain OAH Hearing testimony and
the redacted nature of Defendant WCS’s production of documents in
response to the First Production Request suggest that Defendant WCS
failed to produce all responsive materials. (Docket Entry 16 at 4,
7-8.)
However, if Plaintiff harbored such suspicions, he could
have pursued those matters with ALJ Eagles with a proper pre-OAH
Hearing motion or during the OAH Hearing.
For instance, through
the Motion to Compel, Plaintiff obtained an order from ALJ Eagles
requiring Defendant WCS to produce additional documents responsive
to his discovery requests.
(See Docket Entry 17-1 at 5-6.)4
Put
another way, Plaintiff knew that ALJ Eagles could (and would)
resolve discovery disputes, but Plaintiff opted against pursuing
any such relief as to the ESI Discovery.
4
Moreover, Plaintiff has
Indeed, during the OAH Hearing, Plaintiff sought and
obtained the production of additional emails from an employee of
Defendant WCS, whose testimony, Plaintiff asserts, raised questions
about the completeness of his previous production. In particular,
Plaintiff’s counsel questioned Defendant WCS’s employee, Bryan
Matthews, at length about his emails, and requested that he provide
additional copies of all emails from his personal email account
relating to Plaintiff.
(Docket Entry 17 at 6; see also Docket
Entry 17-4 at 2-4, 13-18 (OAH Hearing transcript).) “Mr. Matthews
agreed to do so and [ALJ] Eagles provided further directions for
having those emails delivered to Plaintiff’s counsel.” (Docket
Entry 17 at 6; see also Docket Entry 17-4 at 14, 17-18.)
-13-
offered no explanation for not raising any issue regarding the ESI
Discovery during the OAH Proceeding. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 16.)
In sum, Plaintiff’s failure to raise objections during the OAH
Proceeding regarding the ESI Discovery precludes a finding that
Plaintiff could not have, with due diligence, discovered the ESI
Discovery in time to offer it at the OAH Hearing.
See Johnson ex
rel. Johnson v. Olathe Dist. Sch., 212 F.R.D. 582, 586 (D. Kan.
2003) (declining to permit discovery of certain documents available
before the administrative hearing); see also Brandon H. ex rel.
Richard H., 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (declining to admit additional
evidence
that
remained
available
to
the
plaintiff
at
the
administrative level where the plaintiff “failed to show that he
could not have, by due diligence, discovered the information in
time to offer it at the [administrative] hearing”).
Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that Plaintiff
has not satisfied the standards for obtaining discovery.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not established that the ESI Discovery qualifies
as directly relevant to the grounds upon which he challenges the
SRO’s decision.
In addition, Plaintiff has not met any of the
criteria for pursuing discovery of “additional evidence” in this
IDEA suit.
-14-
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request to conduct
ESI Discovery is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties promptly consult
regarding the future course of proceedings in this case and, on or
before February 14, 2017, file a joint report setting out their
shared
or
mediation,
differing
as
well
views
as
about
filing
a
the
schedule
for
administrative
conducting
record
and
dispositive motions.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Rule 26(f) Report
(Docket Entry 12) and Plaintiff’s Rule 26(f) Report (Docket Entry
15) are TERMINATED.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
January 24, 2017
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